The search for new logistical concepts

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Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: The search for new logistical concepts
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) September 1956
Year: 1956
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Fulltext: P HILIPPINES ARMED FORCES JOURNAL The Search For New Logistical Concepts I By Colonel Earl H. Houschultz I?EW days before that December morning when gray-clad Germans broke through the fog hanging low in the Ardennes, S. L. A. Marshall stopped near Utah Beach to talk to a sentry walking post around a supply dump. The sentry said that both he and the dump had been there since three weeks after the invasion and that it had been a long time since anything had been removed from the dump. That was one aspect of logistics in World War II. Another was the payoff of the doctrine that the "impetus of supply is from the rear"-so tremendous was the outpouring of the arsenal of democracy that no soldier, in theory, had ever to do without either chocolate bar or ammunition. That some soldiers did do without revealed n hidden gimmick in the concept: a pipeline can be stuffed to the point of constipation by the massive forced feeding of a wealthy and talented nation. That the gimmick hadn't been foreseen isn't surprising; no other country had ever lavished such a largess of goods on annies sent so far from home. Now we know that that very lavishness contained the germs of defeat and our logisticians are searching for an antidote. Colonel Hauschultz, in the article beginning on the facing page, ably diagnoses the problems and suggests the direction the science of logistics must take. In the article following it, Joseph Bourdow reports on a step the Army is taking right now: the inauguration of a limited experiment that re\'erses the concept and makes the impetus of supply come from mony with tactical changes. In this article T shall examine briefly the nature of the logistical problem in in the equally modern war and define a concept for important field of logistics. Our meeting the nuclear challenge. nation's security in the Atomic Age As we proceed, it would be wise to requires us to develop logistical con· remember that although planning cepts that are workable and in har- for war may be a science, its conduct is an art and as such is subject that hath been, it is thot which shall to the imponderables found in the be, and that which is done is that variables which characterize milita- which shall be done; and there is ry operations. no new thing under the sun. The foremost of these variables is Historical E\·olution that wars are waged by fallible hu- of Logistics man beings. Here we deal with the 1t is significant that recognition of unpredictable and many-sided reac- logistics, as a third major subdivitions of superiors, equals and subor- sion (after strategy and tactics) of dinates. Out of human frailties and the science of war, has been relafoibles come misunderstanding, mis- tively tardy. Although Alexander interpretation, selfishness, contrari- understood its principles and Naponess and incompetence.- all failings leon learned at :\Ioscow that armies that can disconcert the best-laid march on their stomachs, logistics plans. was only faintly understood by hisIn our search for the truth in the tory's great commanders. Lincoln struggle for survival, the areas of had a profound understanding of lorichest promise lie in ourselves and gistical implications. In a Jetter to -, the courage of our own convictions. General Banks he demonstrated that The Bible says it clearly: The thing the Union armies moved more slowly than the Confederates because every U.S. commander insisted on gathering huge supplies befor~ he advanced, then had to get horses and wagons to haul the supplies, then had to get forage for the horses, and then had to get extra-duty men to care for the animals and the SUJI· plies. "i\ty Dear General," wrote Lincoln, "this expanding and piling up of impedimentia (sic) has been so far almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it is not abandoned." There are several reasons for the laggardness in perfecting logistical organization for war Before the complexities of modern equipment were made available by the Industrial Revolution, the ageless practice of Jiving off the land mad~ extensive logistical ~upport. unnecessary. On the April night in 177.5, when Paul Revere rode the few mile~ from Charlestown to Lexington with the news that the British were coming, he set in motion forces which made history. Within the next twentyfour hours these force~ produced three results: the militia wa~ mobiAIIMED FORCES I OU it ~AL lized, it was equipped, and it met the cia! service and supply organization. en{'my. The period between the two world Six generations after the ride of wars set the stage for conventional Paul Re\"ere, the U.S. declaration of modern warfare by ad\·ances in tech· war against Germany released the nology, production and distribution. same forces, but in 1917 the process It was not, however, until the final was in exag~erated slow motion. stages of the war that the full sig· Thr{'e and a half months elapsed be- nificance of t.he impact of total war fore the first number was drawn in on logistics was generally realized a draft which was to provide an ar· and its \"arious components assem· my of nearly four million men. bled. Another one and a half months Today, the relatively small armies elapsed before the first group of of the past ha\·e gi\•en place to in· selectees started for the training tricate combinations of men and rna· camps. The United States had been chines. They feature mobility, fire at war with Germany nearly seven power and destructive capabilities months h{'fore the first shot was undreamed of a century ago. They fired by American troops on the create tremendous demands for sup· Western Front, and at the close of plies and equipm{'nt of unimagina1917 there was but a single Ameri· ble variety. can division in action. Out of this situation several problt was in this war that the high Jems developed: how to maintain rommand found a need for an offj. production through dispersal of plant and supporting populations; how to provide shelter, food, clothing and utilities for disaster relief with the attendant drain on reserve stocks intended for the combat forces; how to protect extended lines of communications from interruption. During World War II the foundation for theater logistics rested on preliminary plans and decisions made in Washington. Though for months before our entrance into the war we had planned for the movement of troops overseas, these plans failed to estimate correctly shipping requirements in terms of existing capability. Throughout the war operations were continually delayed by shipping shortages. The war in Europe was characterized by mammoth stocks of supplies, equipment and materiel which could not keep up with the tactical pace over comparatively short distances. The war in the Pacific was typified by austerity - though inspired planning and leadership managed to support the combat forces over tremendous stretches of water and jungle. An examination of these two theaters should provide some fundamental guide Jines for the future. The landing on the continent of Europe and the consequent defeat of the German armies was an unparalleled movement of men and supplies in which it was conclusively proved that commanders could not ignore supply problems nor; disregard their effect upon opeiations. Overlord was backed by logistical support based upon a build-up in the United Kingdom. There were, however, three vital factors Overlord planners failed to consider which affected not only the logistics but the over-all strategy of the campaign. The first of these was the tendency of senior combat command<!rs to override supply considers- der also served as the deputy theations and indulge in spectacular, if ter commander. This created a conshort-lived, tactical gains. This is dition whereby tactical planning was illustrated by the dash of the Third influenced by an unrealistic logistics Army across France despite the ab- plan. It created an inflexible situasence of ports to supply it. The tion and finally an inability to supdash bogged down, not because of port the unanticipated speed of the enemy action but because of the pursuit across Europe. supply shortage which the posses- Logistics experience in ETO can sion of the ports would have in- be summarized as follows; sured. A tendency to complicate comThe second factor was overesti- mand relationships by excessive demating the capabilities of the French centralization of operations and aurailways. With great ingenuity - thority. a nd publicity - truck transports- Inadequate delineation and control tion was thrown into the breach, and of the relationship between the comwhile the Red Ball Express did pro- bat forces and the ComZ and its vide a temporary stopgap, it did so sections. at the expense of long-term problem A transportation system inadeof forward build-up. quate to the needs of the combat The third factor was logistical or- forces. ganization. During the first phase Inadequate control of transportsof the campaign the ComZ comman- tion and the flow of supplies from ARMED FORCES JOURNAl. ComZ to the combat zone. An inadequate communications system unable to control supply ope-• ra~~~l~re to plan for and provide !IOiii!IB,fij[-i:iliJ~iiio-oiiil..,oir. adequate, feasible and workable supply levels. Failure to implement sound principles of stock control. To a lesser degree these same lessons could be derived from a study of the Southwest Pacific Theater. Here, however, maneuver was on a grand scale, and a study of the distances involved and theater deployment could well be used as the pattern for logistical support under dispersed conditions. Effed of Nuclear Weapons on the Science of War The maturing of air capability and mass-destruction weapons has established a requirement for new tactical concepts. Such tactics, according to tacticians, will emphasize the principles of maneuver and surprise. To exploit these two principles, modern tactics envisages deployment in great depth and across broad fronts with the capability of concentrating great striking power rapidly. Where in the past this striking power has been made possible by concentrations of troops, fire power is rapidly achieving dominance, and further advances in automatic weapons of greater power will empha,o;ize this even more. This establishes the need for small, combat-autonomous, mobile battle groups, trained and equipped for fast attack and quick withdrawal; means of forcing the enemy into concentrations that are rewarcl· ing to nuclear weapons; the ability to hold strong points for prolonged periods, with supply and reinforcement by air; an integrated, coordinated and effective system of tactical air, or guided-missile, and ground attack; extensive preparations for retarding and denying operations; and, finally, tremendous fire power. These changing concepts have a definite impact on logistics. They have caused many logistiCians to anticipate great increases in the support organization along with the acceptance of added responsibility. If we are to avoid commitment of too large a fraction of our army to supply functions, improvements must be made in the efficiency of logistical support organization and procedures. Nuclear weapons clearly leave both strategic and tactical logistics in a vulnerable position. It is no longer true that the impetus of supply from the rear stops short of artillery range at the army supply point. Logistical operations can no longer be conducted with relative safety behind this point. cation of modern mobility to strategy ~nd. tactics dictates its application to logistics. An academic treatment of the problem suggests several means for making the logistics system in the light of technological capabilities. Any study of logistics must enCurrent Logistical compass its basic functions : moveProblem Areas ment and supply. Supply can furThe present logistics system ope- ther be reduced to the functions of rates on the principle of mass by procurement, storage and distribuconcentrating huge quantities of tion. Our interest lies in the busisupplies and materiel contiguous to ness of getting the means for makthe combat operations area in static ing war from the ZI stockpile to the and usually partially unidentified combat troops. storage. This system \\'ill not do in It has been demonstrated that in a time of nuclear challenge. It has spite of speed capabilities ten to a hindered logistical mobility in the hundred times greater than those past, and will certainly prove ina- enjoyed by George Washington, the dequate for the support of modern overage speed forward for supplies mobil~ tactical concepts. The appli- in World War II exceeded Washington's by only two milfs an hour, ture. Hindsight convinces the for a record three and a half miles t houghtful ihat his system has workan hour. This emasculation of ed successfuHy in the past only betransportation capability can be cause of an almost inexhaustible charged mainlv to outmoded admi- wealth in resources. This system nistrative and handling procedures. has provided adequate front-line To gear logistics to the pace of mo- supply at the expense of mountainrlern war requires the elimination of ous stockpiles of supplies stretching administrative and procedural stop- from the rear of the field army back pages in the pipeline, and a built-in to the manufacturing plants in the c:.pability to identify tonnage in Zone of the Interior, and the farther terms of line items concurrently t he distances involved, the more the with that movement. cavernous maw of the pipeline A supply system that embraces a craved. A large portion of these complex depot system and empha- supplies never see the front lines. sizes detailed inventories with at- being required to support the fore~ tendant segregation of items on a that is needed to colint and handle retail basis, plus a requisitioning them. This creates a ''icious cycle: system reminiscent of a housewife's the more supplies, the larger the shopping calendar, is incapable of force required to administer them, meeting the requirements of the fu- which in turn creates the requireCOMPARATIVE ORDER AND SHIPPING TIME (5urface transportatio~ on1yl . .. lhporlonco ~ev••• .. rro<tocl fuom --t ,IT!"'• -.,it~.•- !;ly ,.,porlonucl ,.., .. ..,. ,,, co•ltol fM 101-191 !f,te~••,.l94~1 .1f.;~A <>flluro ~ ~clom :oclli~u copobihl:::. =~::;7~:. M IOr~::w,..,.... J ! li•J• ~:::~o ~::::~ , .. ......, ~ !~, ~dit o~lll olrt,... II,... Mo•llor only ~~,.. -. z1 d~o< _ loll~ roloun ..... o~~~!:"' .z= :.~:;;'!:',:7 oo 1'00 ~"'""""'' !i-.... T~~•fl llmo loa•"'Y_ lfrl• J...,t l ... oliu 0,..>011..,• Cet>let .,..,k, ~ndo• t ... ""II •~petvlo1.., of the G-4. The''""''"" a•• dlte<ltr,..P,.....,-~e ef!lo.po<ti.,•nlledl"l<•lut~lu.Thloottonloo!!""w.,..l<fot>peot ot lh• Com% ...t ,~....,.Ho- loo~e!o. llo W.,loi•W• • It .,..ce<f•nl ln lh SW~A ""'" !h Ca•t• l•odlnt Comml!teo ment for still more supplies, and so are massive in comparison with the on. building of the largest skyscraper. An example of what we must And yet the Army must do as welL achieve can be found in the logistic- The secret lies in our organization a! problem of skyscraper construe- for logistical support. That means tion in New York City. Space for qualified professional officers. stockpiling construction materials Our organization for logistical simply doesn't exist; yet the cost of support has grown more by happenlabor requires that materials be on stance than by considered design. the job site when the workmen are Generally, even a poor organization readr for them. The solution is a is not fatal if capable men direct ;~ carefully controlled deliverr system it. However, the logistical organithat brings what is net"ded to the zation, comprised as it is of seven job when it is needed. separate segments, lends itself to The logistical requirements of war weakness through piecemeal and unPIII L.I I'I' INES ARMED FORCES JOURNAL. concerted effort. This has required Develop a uniform logistical doethe superimposition of a staff at the trine that will apply to all the techdepartmental level in both world nical services. A single agency must wars. Our present Deputy Chief of do this, since the development of Staff for Logistics may be the an- logistical doctrine cannot be.divorced swer. from the deYelopment of tactical In the final analysis, the fact that doctrine. our logistical mobility is little bet- Effecth•ely coordinate the teehniter today than that of our Revo- cal services, particularly in the area lutionary ancestors is due mostly to of logistical operations. the lack of professional officers who Create a logistics deYelopments appreciate the problem and have the group commensurate to the combat know-how to so!Ye it. To develop developments function of Continentmen with such understanding and a! Army Command. know-how, we should: Provide for professional logistito embark on revolutionary changes as it is to catch up with evolution. The Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II suggests a solution to the dispersion problem. Who can deny that if the scattered bases dispersed along the axis of advance had within themselves been sufficiently dispersed, this would set the doctrinal pattern for a war in the atomic age 1 The history of this theater indicates that while the strategist and tactician exploited movement for their purpose, the logistician, perhaps through mistaken economic reasoning, allowed the means of movement to exploit him. There were exceptions when, in tactical emergencies, supplies by-passed the chain of bases to flow directly to the consumer. These instances, while rare, show that it is possible for supply and movement to react as one sensitive, intelligent body to the requirements of combat. Since speed of mo,·ement is constantly increasing, it is logical to focus effort on a s)•stem employing both movement and dispersion, letting movement compensate, so far cians by establishing a logistician's as possible, for added manpower career pattern to include schooling and materials required in a system above branch level for combat and built around dispersion alone. service officers interested in such a If logistical mobility is to ena· career. ble us to evade the fury of the unCan Logistics Meet leashed atom, we must identify what the Challenge? we can do with what we have and Armed with these elements, what then determine the effectiveness of can logistics do with its present ca- the result. By applying such procepabilities? dures as automatic supply coupled As we have seen, logistics has with daily theater shortage reports, trailed behind tactics in mobility, radio telecon, faster loading and unmaneuverability, dispersion, and de- loading of ships, improved materials ception. Therefore, the problem handling, and such, it is possible to that faces logisticians is not so much reduce the World War II average order and shipping time of 120 days to 32 days. Roughly this means that the speed of movement forward has quadrupled. Even with this modest improvement, theater reserve supply levels could be reduced by a minimum of two thirds without jeopardizing combat support Logistics' New Look Reducing theater supply levels will improve the dispersion capability while concurrently reducing manpower and facilities requirements, which will in turn release movement capability for the additional load created by dispersion. This argument should make it clear that movement and dispersion complement each other. From these evolutionary trends emerges the shadowy shape of mo'''tiLIPPINF:s ARMED .. FORCEs JOURNAL riern logistics. These trends emphasize an expedited transportation system, which to be fully efficient must revolve about an expedited materials-handling system. Administration of supply reduced through greater use of modern communications facilities using semiautomatic supply methods. This, in turn, can eliminate repetitive screenings of requisitions at various command echelons, some of which can be-.entirely eliminated from the logistics system. Drastic reduction of theater levels of supply will eliminate manpower and facilities requirements. Modern movement, materials handling, and communications technolo- -"1 gy now enable the logistician to employ dispersion and movement as his answer to the nuclear challenge. The line of communications from r source to destination gives us the and parcel of the room to maneuver. In the sense of which it supports. combat forces cross-country mobility, the width of the LOC must be defined as the width of the operational theater. As segments of this LOC will suffer dislocation from time to time by enemy action, the entire system must move forward at a rate geared to consumption requirements. When a segment is destroyed, the loss, Integration of supply and movement in the current organization can be attained by the introduction of a joint logistics operations center at ComZ and its various subordinate levela. This provides for the integration of the army technical services and the supporting sea and air elements. Stock status and while comparatively small due to its movement control must be exercised dispersed state, must be replaced around the clock. from the supplies in "fluid dispersion" and this stock replaced in turn It is time to cease conjecturing by an increase in speed in all seg- and time to do! We overcomplicate ments to the rear of the one des- the science of logistics which, of the troyed until the gap is closed. Ob- sciences of war, is the most factual viously, the major portion of the and manageable if we would make theater reserves are in the pipeline it so. itself. 1\ly concluding thought is best exThe organizational structure re- pressed by a quotation from an adquired to man and control this sys- dress to the Industrial College of tern must provide integration or in- the Armed Forces made in 1946 by finite coordination of supply and General Somervell: "The important movement. It must provide securi- thing is to let the plan be for the ty in fact instead of in theory. And next war and not for the one just lastly, in its philosophy, it must be past. Experience is not enough; unified within itself and be part you have to have some vision." (Reprinted from the ARMY magazine, USA) About the Author Colon•/ Earl H. Hauschullz woo commiuion•d in th• /nlonfry ll••••v• olr., graduating ltom ltipon Co!J•Il• in 1933, Aft•r a tour with the CCC ond •mp/oy· m•nl os a m•chonicol •nginur h• wos ord•r•d lo acfiv• duty in 1941, ~trving liv• r•oro in th• Sourhweot ond w.,,.,, Pocilic Th•olre. lnl•gral•d i~lo lh• ll•gulor Armr in !953. h• tronoler .. d to th• Tronoporlolion Corp!. H• hc u urud on th• Seolll• Potl ol Emborkotion, Th• lronoporlolion School, and on th• otoll of IX Corp• in Ko .. o A groduol• of th• Army War Coll•g•, h• is now G3 Euculiv• lor Plono ond Oodri" e of CONAI!C