Elements of harbor defense

Title

Language

English

Source

Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) October 1956

Year

1956

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

I PHASE of naval warfare that ha~· not yet been perfected into a science is hal'bor defense, becau>e in it, all the factors are variable, dependmg, among other:;, on the geography of the coastline, the availability of materials, and the intensity of the attack expect_ ed. It is not the aim of this article to Jay down any form of harbor df'fense doctrine, nor go into the mechanics of implementing one; rather, it is aimed at presenting a clear-cut discussion of the subject ba>::ed on lessons learned from actual combat. Amphibious assault doctrines have been formulated after the succl'ss and failure of amphibious OJJerations during the early times and thf' first and second world wars. One way to effect a good, strong harbor defense, then is to curtail the efftctive. ness of a!\ the phases of an amphibious operation. PHILIPPIN~:S ARMF.O FO!ln:S JOl'RI".\1. An amphibious assault t'<'quires the the beach; secondly, mobility-when utmost in surprise, coordination, and faced with a much stronger entmy, stnking power in order to be suc. the inferiol· forc:e should be versac.-~~ful. Also, the assaulting forces tile and fast, st!'iking when and must have a pl·edominance in air where Jeast cxptcted. power, support ships and assault A harbor def~::nse perimeter sho· .. ld troops. Supe!'ior air pow~::r i:s irnpe. be treated in a most confider.tial J'atlve as air sup•·emacy cun com manner inasmuc:h as prior know). pcnsate for any deficic>ncy in troop edge of the enemy of the defense strength and1or support' ships, but set-up will make it possible for them the opposite is not true. For a har· to make an accurate ~stirnate of the bor defense to be effective, then, con· situation. Concealed mechanical de. trol of the air is ma11datory, through fens<'!s and gun emplacements should 3ircraft 1nd AA fire. not '.~e known to the enemy until An undefended harbor defen~e is the~e things have achieved thei1· objust like a closed gate that can be jectives. Enemy reconnaisance will opened at will. Cement embank- come both from the air and i:he su1 ments, nets, booms, and bat·bed face. Secrecy and survei\Jance, as win~s could be demolished und re. well as striking power will keep •he moved as easily as they could be reconnaisance planes anrl UDT's placer!. Well-conct:aled field guns guessing and away from our shores. should be situated in such a way In the experience of the United that they can be made to beat on States Navy in amphibious OlJet·a. any enemy unit attempting to l'e tions, there h&'S neve1· been a beach move the installations. A close sur- head that has not been taken. This 1 ·eillanee of the area will insurt> the has been because the requirements Jetection of UDT's (underwatel· de· of a successful amphibious assault molition .,;earns) when these .'!l:trt previously cited have always been their intelligence study of the har- fulfilled. The mistakes in Saipan bor and, afterwal·ds, actually start were studied :.nd evaluated. The dc~tl·oying its defenses. succeeding attack on Tarawa was In the face of a much superior indeed successful as far ;;.;, casual· enemy force, any harbot· defense r.an ties and time element were con· achieve only a delaying action. No cemed. Tht: staggering number of defenses could withstand the force deaths in Iwo Jima was, perCentage. and impact of a pre-D.day shore wise, l'~>duced considerably because bombardment and close and distant the Japanese virtually conceded t he air supp.,rts of a stronger force. beachhead to the United States MaHence, eithe1· of two ways could be l'ines and dug·in the mainland. adopted; first, concealment - keep- The Japanese doctrine on coastal ing one's own armaments silent till defense, if any they had, was mea the most opportune time t0 fire has ger and inadequate to meet the shock, arrived, say during troop debaJ·ka· impact and rapidity of a welltiun or when the landing cr~<fts hit planned amphibious assault. ThL "I . .,, t' \ OCTOBER 195i To odequolely meel o well-plonned omp~ibrou• ouoult, r/ " rmp.,otrH that t~ere m<~>l be a 9ood and •imilarly well plonn•d 'Y'''"' ol ~orbor delen••· Surloce cta/1 o• Jllown obo•e m<:oy be uad to Jupport tile •y•tem Japanese had one consolation: they duty and all their characteristics ar.d were against overwhelming odds armaments are made to give that that defeat was inevitable. They type 0! vessel every advantage poscoulrl stall, they could fight to the siblc. Most of our crafts are delast, but they could never win. Their signed for ASW, an offensive task wealth resources were almost drain- more .often than not, and shifting ed toward the end of the war, and theit· assignment to one of a defenthe materials available to them most sive nature could very well mean certainly offered the maximum but the inefficient misallocation of suJ·. inadequate resistance that could have face forces such as the Japanese been derived from t hem. did with their aircraft carriers and The Philippine Navy is built more submarines during the Second World o1· less around a stl'iking force made War. A criterion is very hard to up of patrol crafts, R:Unboats, and aTrive at. A compromise between submarine chasers, and any contem- logistics and the operating forces plation of a harbor defense support. should be secured. Let us use whaled by these surface ves~e ls can be e\·er we have the best way we can. considered sound. However, in so "One bowman, placed on tl wall, doing, the purpose for which some is a match in war for a hundred of the types of ships have been con- enemies, and a hundred for ten thou. structed will be defeated. Ships are sand; therefore, a fort is recomdesigned for a particular trpe of mended," wrote Sir William Jones in Noool cocl•t• r•c•i•• instr"clion. in st-ing ••u•l lofer they ot• mod• ro opplr w~ot th•r ho•• l•otn•d by doing things th•m••l•••· Abo••, cod•ts, <ltlcler g11idonc• ol PN p•r.onn•l, Jt••r o ••u•l in Monilo Soy the Ordinances of Mem1, published Jery units that could be transpoJ·tf'd in 1805. Such was the doctrine in from onr:: vantage point to another. early times. Today, there is no. These artillery pieces stood guard thing more vulnerable than a fort; over the defensive minefields that there is nothing more fatal than to were indeed vet·y costly and most have one's back against a waH with dangerous to clear. thtJ enemy in numbe1· after him. The Mobility and concealment will untimes have changed. New doctrines doubtedly make the fire control of 'ty have evolved, but the concepts are enemy support ships extremely diffi. still the same. cult if not possible. Minefields, like the nets, booms, embankments, :~.nd barbed wires previously mentioned. to be effective, must be closely guarded and supported by guns, both close and long range, if possible. A harbor defense should be the last Today, a fort is a defensive mine. field laid with utmost s~recy and in a manner most difficult for minesweeping operation. The threat of a minefield alone will go very far in harbor defense. There is Mthing more detrimental to the morale of resort of any power. Any country caught with its back against itself is doomed to lose. Let us build in the enemy. The minefield should be a combination of several types of mines laid in a definite accur·atf' any way we can 11 striking force lhat pattern so that several en:my sweep- will keep the_ e~emy away from our ing operations will be required to coasts, even 1f 1t be tempo,l:ary. dear it.

Media