The role of intelligence in psy-war operations

Media

Part of The Philippine Educator

Title: The role of intelligence in psy-war operations
Language: English
Year: 1953
Rights
Fulltext: Two soldiers printing psy-war handbills on a portable mimeograph in the field during an operation. , I N February 1953, I attended a conference of S-2s of IMA at Camp Holmes, Baguio as a representative of the AC of S, G-2, GHQ. One of the subjects so ably discussed by the Area CAO of IMA, Capt Pagkalinawlfu, was the "Use of CAO Agencies for Intelligence Purposes." Civil Affairs Officers have, indeed, accomplisheq a great deal and the long list of surrenderees and captured dissidents stand as an eloquent testimonial to the effectiveness uf our CAOs. But every one agreed that better results can be achieved if: 1. Coordination between S-2s, S-3s, and CAOs is improved, and 2. The S-2, S-3, and CAO exert more effort to get a better understanding of their respective functions in the conduct , of Psy-war. In other words, a little more give and take is indicated. What can Intelligence do for the PsyWar Officer? Plenty! In fact, I am wondering how we can ever conduct Psywar without it. I shall go into greater detail than just merely defining "Intelligence," since an understanding of thE' Role oi Intelligence in Psy-War is premised on an understanding of the nature of intelligence itself. • What is Intelligence? The prognostications taken out of a crystal ball? The "stuff" turned out by the 2s? There is 20 a lot uf undentandable mystery associated with Intelligence but actually, it is a simple, self-evident thing. • All of us er.~ gage in intelligence work in one way or other. It can be so informal imd instinctive, that we fail to recognize it as such -like consulting a calor cha~-t in determining the right necktie to go with the rest of our attire. Sometimes it takes painstaking research work - as in t.he .... preparation of a thesis. But in essence, Intelligence is nothing more than the systematic search foT the single best answer.· We talk of Intellig%'1Ce as an extension of this search for knowledge. But it takes on a more serious stature if we say that it is the search for knowledge essential to the success oi an operationor at our level here at GHQ-the search for knowledge VITAL to our national survival. '· A more authoritative definition o€ "Intelligence" and one we'll find occasion to refer to is the following: "Intelligence is knowledge acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning a possible or actual enemy or areas of operation. It includes deductions concerning curre?!t and future enem11 capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action which can affect the accomplishment of our mission. It is the basis for all operational plans and 68• timates." ---------------- L------------- ~-------------------~-r.~ lNTEI,LlGENCE IN PSY-WA.R OPERATIONS 21 From the foregoing definition let u!) see how intelligence is produced. Produe. tion of military intelligence is a science - a matter of logic. It is governed by principles which are t.biversal in their application. Without an understanding of these principles, the production and use of Intelligence become a confused maze of un. related and useless notivns or presump. · tions. The fundamental principle of Military Int~lligence is embodied in the relation. ship among four major 1\!atures: 1) the collection of information, 2> the processing of informaticm to produce intel. tel!igence, 3) the use of the resulting intelligence, and 4) the direction of the col• lection effort. Let me illustrate this principle from our own military history. Collection .On 21 July 1951, Lt Cal Luis Villareal, then G-2 of IMA, received accurate information ffom an undercover agent, (an American named David Jones who volunteered for the job) of the existence of a large enemy camp called Lagrimas, in the Zambales mountains southwest of Clark AF». The existence of this camp had 'come to the attention of Lt Co1 Villareal since 9 Feb 1951 and he had been patiently building up this particular situation eve1; since. This feat of Jones provided the first clear break in the situation, however. , The informaticm given by Jones was incomplete but whatever informatiort' he revealed was evaluated and interpreted by Lt Col Villareal and integrated with the other information already available at that time. \ Based on the processed information then available, Lt Col Villareal prepared an estimate which he presented orally to Brig Gen Alfonso Arellano, the Area Commande1·, who used this intelligence in arriving at a decisicm to organize a Task Force to surround and destroy tltis enemy concentration as soon as more definite information uf its exact location is known. Based on this decision an Operation Directive was issued on 23 July 1951 with tentative D-Day set for early August. The initial information was necessary to arrive at a definite decisicm. Accordingly, Gen Arellano directed Lt Col Villareal to obtain additional infonnation. <In the trade, this is called EEI>. The most important among these abviously is, Five Huh convalescing at the V. Luna general hospital. They and many of their comrades who have been, CI!Ptured or surrendere~ have been largely won back to the ways of demdtracy and peace by. psy-wer campaign being waged by the Armed Forces. ' - 22 PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES JOURNAL "Where exactly is Camp Lagrimas?" The first estimated location of Lagrimas hap. pened to fall on a blank portion of the map - since the area is largely unex. plored. So one can ililagine what a difficult problem faced the G-2. The G-2 ma~ plans for the collection of information and among the operations were the taking of numeraus air photographs of the objective area and the plotting of magnetic azimuths ~f important landmarks in said area. The task of obtaining the desired photographs was given to the PAF. FortUnately, the main HMB camp was located just above a twin waterfall which provided our air platoon units with a conspicuous landmark. In the meantime, furthh interrogation of Jones and other recently surrendered HMB prisoners revealed further clues as to the exact location of Lagrimas. All the information thus gathered were evaluated, interpreted, correlated, and integrated into a moTe or less clear pictu;re of the enemy situation. From photographs and aerial observations, it was possible to make a rough sketch of the area and by painstaking analysis the exact location of Camp Lagrimas, including approaches. to it were established. It was even poss1ble t~ pinpoint the coordinates of Lagrimasquite an achievement - considering that there were only blank coordinate . squares in the map of the area and the only information available on the map was t.he following discouraging note: "Mountainous and UnexplOTed." This intelligence was used by Gen Arellano to confirm his initial decision and to organize Task Force "CG" to be command.ed by Col T G FajardO'. Elements of stxth BCTs were to be thrown into the assault. 'rhe area was to be attacked initially by ·the PAl!' wl(Ue ground units were to execute a tightening encirclement of the objective. The imprcrved picture was, however, still incomplete and detailed information was required. The G-2 was again directed to get such fnf01'mation through its collecting agencies. Informatian turned in as to location of outposts, mof:lus ope-randi of the enemy, sources of supply, etc. were. collected, processed, and used as fast aa they wet·e reported and more /tnd more inforri1ation was called for. ·By 4 August 1951, the enemy picture was fairly cemplete and a final written estimate was prepa1·ed and submitted ta Gen Arellano. Based on, this estimate, Gen Arellano issued Ais operation orders. and Operation "OMAHA" was launched. I have dwelt at length only on a single selected item O'f information prior to the ~peration, i.e., the location of Camp Lagrimas and the routes leading to it. Clearly, this was not the only infarmati?n sought, receivedtor processed by Col Vlllareal before, during, and even after this operation. But the securing of this in. formation serves to illustrate how intelligence is produced by tracing the steps relative to one item of information. It < must also be remembered that while I have discussed the production of intelligence in the above-mentioned operation by steps, the four steps of the Intetligence cycle are simultaneooo and not mutually exclusive. Each of these steps is essential to the entire 'lracedure. Anyone confronted with a mission must use all available intelligence in order to make a decision. Invariably, certain information will be fack-< .. ing, so he directs a search for such informatiO'n through the intelligence officer. The intelligence officer organizes the search and issues Jirectives in the name of the CO for the collection of information. The infoTmation collected and sut>mitted by information-collecting agencies are proce~:sed by the intelligence officer and then submitted to his CO in such form which will permit the latter to 'lise it. This cycle: v.se, direction, collection, P'ro.~essing, and back to use again is the fundamental · structure of Intelligence. The relationship expressed in this cycle constitutes the basic principle of military intelligence. Intelligence and Psy-War . Intelligence and operations <any operations) are inter-dependent and com~le mentary. A psy-war officer who dehberately violates this principle conducts psywar by mere intuition or gu~s wo~k. But Psychological Warfare w1thout Intelligence is liable ta be more "psycho"' than "logical." Psy-wa:tt has, been defi.ned · as "the planned use during peace or war of all tothl hi~ c:6 bBhd· inf,r. aL'~~~· ;tl.! ell)? ~ ~1l~ ~)tit; - iffiW ~fc:ti fl.; ~· ¢tsl r ·~J? tr.b!INTELLIGENCE IN PSY-WAR OPERATIONS 23 measures exclusive af atmed conflict, d~ signed to inUuence the thought, moz·al~, or behavior of a given group of people, through logic oT fear in such a way as to support the accQIDplishment of our military ur national aim~." The military application of Psy-War is mure limitedi.e.. "the use of propaganda against the enemv together with other operational measures of a military nature for specific strategic or tactical purposes." If wo are, however. to consider the nature of the operations we ale currently engaged in and the economic, politioal, social and ideO'logical aspects which can not be solved by military action alone, I believe we have to think of Psy-war in terms of the broader definition. Psy-war is directed towards specific goals and must consider the intelligence O'f the audienc~ Therefore, all information concerning audience opinion, reaCtions, fads,~ slang, humor, customs, superstttlons, and traditions must be relayed to the propagandist. The successful] conduct of psy-war operatio~s is dependent on a timely and constant flow of voluminous specialized intellig!nce dealing principally with social and political conditions. That time is crf the essence in these operations is illustrated by the following historical data. Credit bas been gjven to, but little is known about, a highly succ~ssful PsyWar Operation conducted during the last war against Japan under the direction of Rear Admiral Ellis N Zacharias, formerly with ONI. Psy-War O'perations against the Japanese could have ended the war much so:mer - soon enough to have preventeR Okinawa, lwo Jima and Yalta, if official support of the O'peration had been more enthusiastic an<J · prompt. Intelligence knew that as early as in December 1944, Japan was already a physicallybeaten nation. But the Japanese spirit was not yet ready to accept the idea of surrender. Without necessarily deprecating the armed effort which, of course, was the prime factor in Japan's collapse, it can be said that the Japanese were so · influenced by the 14 surrender broadcasts that it actually hastened their decision to surrender precisely as envisioned in the Open Pl4ln . P,repared· bll Admiral Zacharias. Now, how could Admiral Zacharias have been as accurate as that? The answer is, Intelligence. Timely, accurate intelligence. This feat of Admiral Zacharias was the result of painstaking re. search and a lifeJJ>ng study of the Japanese mind plus a continuous flow of current, timely intelligence. Intelligencl had revealed the existence of a "peace party" in Japan, a group of pacifist elements close to the Emperor. who were merely waiting for an oppO'\:tunity to obtain peace terms. This potentially influential group was made the target of intensive propaganda so that their influence was enhanced while the High Command was discredited. In this, Psy-War was suCcessful and when the "peace party" rosl' to power it immediately, albeit covet;jly, took steps to end the war exactly as it was predicted the pacifists would. Even a piece of spot intelligence can · achieve far-reaching results if exploiteil promptly fur propaganda purposes. In the spring of 1946, Czechoslo,.akia was op the eve of its first postwar general elections. By that time. the "Cold War" was beginning and Czechoslovakia was already lined fur Russian conquesb Moscow had directed the Czeck Communist party to win the elections by an absolute majority but had cautioned that no visible interference with the election was to be shown because the . eyes uf the world were then focused on Czechoslovakia. At the behest of Czeck Red leader. Klement Gottwald, the 3d Mechanized Army of Marshal Konev which was then preparing to retum to Russia from Austria was directed to change its route and to so .a time its return that it will pass through Czechoslovakia just before the elections. On the day before the elections, May 25,-.. the Army was to bivouac, its elements stretched from one end of, the country to the other, ostensibly a purely innocent rest period as part of the long journey home. Then rumors were to spread that Koney would stay unless the communist party won! A young American officer got wind of t11is information just a few hours after the Soviet move had been decided upon in great secrecy. After confirming the fact that Konev's army had changed its itinerary and wouJf detour through Czechoslovakia, the Officer re·• \ It li II I I 24 PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES JOURNAL j ported his information to his superiors. All they had to do was to publish the news! The publication which exposed the Russian attempt to influence the elections was calculated \lo stop Konev's tanks in their tracks. It did! A few hou~ before departure time, Koncv received the order not to pass via Czechoslwakia. Two years later Czechoslovakia fell, but that is another story. The point is, even a ~ngle item of intelligence, properly and promptly exploited can yield tremendous . propaganda results! The success of military psy-war uperations is dependent largely on a voluminous flow of timely accurate intelligence dealing primarily with the military situati~n and enemy morale. Prompt recogniticm and exploitation is important. Let us see examples of military PsyWar on the tactical level and the rofe of intelligence in achieving success. Prior to the blitzkrieg jn 1940, German tactical propaganda showed its masterful hand. A week &,fter the start of the war, French soldiers were unloading barges at Strassbuurg when they were suddenly caug-ht in the glal·e of German searchlights~ Before they could hide, a German voice boomed through a loudspeaker: Don't be afraid, Kamaraden! We turned on the lights so you can see better. We have the same work em our side and we know how di.fficult it is!" On other occasions, the supposedly secret arrivals on the line of French UJJits. were announced by German loudspeakers a few hours after they had taken the place. The Germans would announce the name of every member oi the newly-arrived unit, his hometown and the names of his officers. The result was so demoralizing that the units had to be immediately withdrawn and replaced. How. did the Germans get such accurate intelligence? By intuition? If so at least it mtUst have been· some intellig; ence officer's intuition I On 24 April 1953, a group of 11 HMBs was surrounded by troops of the 6th BCT in Tangle, Mexico, Pampanga. Lt Ricardo Viray, CAO of the 6th BCT invited the HMBs to surrender by loudspeakers. The CAO officer was able to carry out his psy-war mission on this particular occasion mainly because of the prompt and effect:ve coordination of the S-2 and ,, the CAO in the area. Lt Viray had been ~ aterted by the S-2 seconds after the operation was mounted. 1 1 The task of intelligence is to discover II sources of weak~ess ,in the enemy's morale, to anticipate situations in which psy-war may be employed, and to furnish psy-war agencies with facts required to exploit a situation. Information to ~auge the effectiveness of our own psywar is also indispensable. To get the 1 information desired, it may be necesSl\rY for special psy-war interrogators to interview prisonet's for special information. -Psy-war officers themselves have to in- , terview HMB prisoners to get information and also to gain an insight intouthe Huk mind. lntelligenc~ in Counter-Propaganda It -is also the responsibility of G-2 to ~ assist in the planning and supervision of training designed to mu'llify the effects of enemy propaganda. This is counterpropaganda. G-2 derives, r. intelligence from an analysis of enemy propaganda. This is one reason why Psy-War officers should look more kindly on the efforts of the security-conscious S-2 to censor 1 i the information they plan to reveal ~t a if mass rally or in a press release. 1 Propaganda is at times used as an ef- I fective means of deception. For example, \ German propaganda prior to the Battle , of the Bulge cleatiy hinted that Ger- · many was no longer capable of mounting a counter-offensive I The Allies fell for it. In the local scene, the Huks are adept in the use of similar deception. Before theHMB attack on Apalit, Pampanga in April 1947, they announced. their intention to raid the place with 1,000 ~en in a letter they wrote to the town "mayor. Actually there were only 50 HMBs in the raid but they succeded in raisi:ng the panic among the town~s defenders. Deception measures lie in the field of counter-intelligence which, in turn, is a branch of intelligence. How can one make use of intelligence effectively? Lt General Manton S Eddy, former commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College has this piece of advice: "Know the value of accurate intelligence, the methods . by which it is produced, the manner in which it is used, and,then insist on~. service." As a staff office,..· eoprdmate ~~ ~! ~ r.,et I ff!l nl!r· p p h, ff:rJ )l;l:l ~ INTEI~LIGENCE IN PSY-WAR OPERATIONS 25 \Vith your S-2. Intelligence and operations - psy-v.\r operations - are, we have said, interdependent and complementary. The success of psy-war operations is dependent upon a .voluminous flow ofJtimely accurate intelligence. The task of Intelligence is to discover weaknesses in the enemy's morale, to anticipate situations where psywar may be employed; and to furnish ~he psy-war officer with facts to exploit a !f.ituation. It must gather information to gauge the effectiveness of our own psywar operations while ~t the same time assist in the training of our own men so as to nullify· the effects of enemy psywar operations. Sun Tzu, ancestor of military proverbialists, saw this used for invaluable co· ordination of J;l;y-war and intelligence operations. On psy-war, he says, " ... to fight and conquer in all your badles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.'' And on intelligence he quips,) "What enables the good general to strike and to conquer and to achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is forekncrwledge.'' PEFTOK soldiers in Korea man a gun emplacement and stand ready for any enemy charge. Communism is a doctrine of hate. Its leaders must always seek to tear down, wreck, destroy or liquidate anything or anybody blocking their path toward world domination. Thq cannot tolerate good. will among peoples. That would mean independence, freedom to thmk and act, each on l,is own. They accord no such right to any people .. They reco~ize no law, no restraint, save those they themselves Impose to mamtain and extend their despotic domination over other human beings. o General Matthew B. Ridgwfy r----------------------------------------\