Does the Supreme Court make frequent mistakes?

Title

Creator

Perello, Jose A.

Language

English

Source

XXV (11) November 30, 1960

Year

1960

Subject

Judicial error

Judgments (Law)

Appellate courts

Philippines. Supreme Court

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

The article describes the petitioner’s personal experiences that he had gone through for the incorrect decision of the Supreme Court and for not handing over his case to the right court. The petitioner also states the time and money wasted in the process of searching the right court.

Fulltext

"DOES THE SUPREME COURT MAKE FREQUENT MISTAKES?" lly JOSE A. PERELLO Member, P4Ui,,,,tne BM A law pro:f'esaor had Just winded UR a lengthy diileourfie on the doctl'ine of ata.t"e deMa before ll :fri!ahtnan Un\" claaa When one of the students asked him: "Sir, does the Supreme Court make frequent mistakes!" Having newly become familiar with the doctrine, the young ttl*n was fraftlily worried about the consequeneea ihoukl the hil'beat tribunal of t.he land make erroneoua but precedent-setting decisions. · ' After a pause, the. p1'0fessor replied in carefully measured words: 11Well, it does make mistakes - ermmm ~um eat. Of cotni1e, when the Supreme Court realizes its errors, it does ncti:f'y them, for, as Ju.slice Maleolm said, 1'More important than Dnything else is. that the court should ,be right." One may imagine, though, how many Jud.pa and lawyers in , iubsequant similar ca~ would be misled while such errors last, how much rights would be prejudiced and how mueh time &nd money of the litigants, the government, and all other concerned lliOUld be wasted in foll~int erron~us detisicrias. This brings to our mind the promulgation in recent years of certain conflicting decisions that could hardly serTe as guii.leposta in our forest of laws and jurisstrudence. O• Avouat 81, 1966, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Industrial ltelaElons hali jurisdiction over caaea where the controversy refera to minimum wage under the Minim.um Wap Law, or when it involves houn of employtnent under the Eia')lt. Hour t.bor Law. Pa.flu vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-9116, 52 O.G. &Ba&. 0a Ma'I/ 81, 1967, the Supreme Court held that the Court of . Jnduatrial. Relations . has jurisdiction onr claims for payment of additional compensation for work performed on Sundays and bolldaya, for night work, and for ftcation and. sick leave pay. Detective and Prot!ective .BureaH, Im:. va. FBlipe Guevat'G, G. R. No. £-8738. On Octolm· 81, 1967, the Sup1-eme Court held that the Court of Industrial Relations, has juriadiction over eaaee involving claims for convenion of wages from hourly to daily baaia, overtime pay on Sundays and legal holidays, vacation and sick leave pay, payment of medical and hospitalization bills, and paJ1118nt of their waces during a strike, if such strike had to be declared due to the refusal of the company to consider their demands. Il#IGO P"'1l Bowling Alley vs. United Empltt1fe•• Asaociation., G. R. No. L-9831. On December 28, 1967, the Supreme Court held that it is the Court of First Instance and not the Court of Industrial Relations which haa ju1·hdidtion over elaima for paymG of overtime wages, because auch claims do not involve hours of emploJ'lilent under Commonwealth Aet No. 444. Mittda.noo Bu Bmplopea Labat' Union vs. Mindanao Companu, ct a~ G. R. No. L-9795. On April 30, 1968, the.Supreme Cou1t held that; where the action 'Was simplJ for the collection· of unpaid salariea and wages alleged to be due tor services rendered and no labor dispute appears to be involved, and petitioners do not seek reinstatement, the Court of lnduattial Relation& doee ~ot haw··juriadlction over the case but the Court of Ffrat; Instance. lilOmon. Ca.tholio A-rcli.biskop 6/ Manila vr. Ys11.stm. r.. R. Nb. L-18841. On Afhil 30, 1968, ~e Supreme Court, in Eliza.Ide & Co., Inc. vs. Yanson, et -1., G.R. No. i.-12346, reiterated the above doct·f'ine. Ou. August 18, 1968, the Supreme Court held that it was the Court ot Industrial Relations, and not the Court of First Instance, which ·has jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for overtime compensation and for separation. pay. Said the Suitreme Court: "It is clear from the forephil' that the Court of First Ihatarice baa jurisdiction only OY81" eontroveraiea inYOJ.vint viOlations of the Minimum Wage Law. The initailt actioni however, was for the collection of overtime com.PflnHtion 'Under the Eight-Hout Labor Law (Cofti. ·Act 4'4-) and for sepGm~ tion pd.If.. and that aetioni of thii nature Sliall be brodclit befol'e a court of competent jurifldicbioli. In· this 1'8spect, it has been held by this Court that with the enactment of the lndwltrial Peace Aet (:ihp. Act 8'15)t c!&eea iil.t'OltJ"irig holii'S of empllNtJW!rit under the Ei/Jhe.Jlnr Labor La.to •"6aif~ f.U wUl&if& tA• · ;vrim-leeion df ti\ei Cbnt"t o.f Itldustrid& .R•r.fion• (Philippifle Aisociation of Free ·:u.bor Untona-PAFLU vs. Tan G.R. No. L-0116, prom.ul~te:I Adgrist III, 19&6; Reyei Va. T811; G.R. No. L-913'1, promu1-ted August 81, 1966; Cebu Port Labor Unions Vs. States Ma.tine doFpota"tion, G.R. Ne. 1)9B1i0, ptorit0.lpted Ma:v 20, llt57) "· Gonie:c v•. North Cll1nd.rineB Lum•er Co., a. R. No. L-11946. In this case, petitioner Raymundo Gomez was no longer employed by the respondent company and did not ask. for reinstatement. On. NOVBmber 28, 1968, the Supreme Cou1·t held that it ls the Court; of Industrial Relations and not the Court of First Instance, whith has jutiadietlon to heat and determine elal11$ fqr offrtime corilpen!ation. and for work done on Sunda:vs '9oiid holidays nnd at night. The petitioner in thia case was actually in tha employment of the reepondent company. N ASSCO va. ALMEN et al.. G. R. No. L-9066. On. April 29, 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance - and llOt the Cour.t of Industrial Relations, - whleh has juriadletion oveit claims -for the differential and overtime pay of claimants who wete former employeee of respondent company. CHUA WOIUCB.RB UNION va CITY A UTOMOTIVB COMPAl\•Y, tt al., Q.R. No. L-11616. On May 29, 1.969, the Sup"reme Cou1t held. that the Court ol. Industrial Relations and. not the Court of First Instance, which has juriidiMion over a cliJie where the claimant seeks pajment of differential and overtime pay and reinstatement. MON ARES vt. CNS ENTERPRISES, et al., G.R. N4. L-11749. On. AP'l;l 29, 1960, the Supreme Cou1·t held that the Court o1 Industrial Relations, and not the Court of Fh"St Instance, which has jurisdiction over the contl"OVel'SY of 39 employees of the respondent company for payment for work in "excess of eight hours including Sunda:rs and lep.l holidays and nighttime wo1il:, eince it is practicallr a labor dispute that may ,lead to conflict between the employees and management. The Supreme Court fur· November -SO, 1960 LAWYERS JOURN.\f, 321 ther stated that "if the claimants were not actual employees of the NASSCO, as for example, they have severed .. tb~r. conneetion with it or were dismissed but do not insist in reinstatement; the claim for overtime compensation would become simply · a monetary de.. mand properly cognizable by the regnlar courts and not by the Court of Industrial Relations." Naatfoo 118, Cou'T't of Industrial R'e-_ latioti.B, G. R. No. L-18888. On May 23, 1960, the Supreme Court, after making an analysis of all the conflicting decisions on the question of jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation, laid the following doctrine: "Where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be established because of its wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought such claims become mere money claims, and come within the. jurisdiction of the regular courts." Prisco 1.1. C.f.R. et al., G.R No. L-13806. Duti"ng th,e Commonwealth regime, there were conflilcting doctrines of the Supreme Court, but this was due tO the fact that the Supreme Court had been acting then in division and, quite . inevitably, the ruling of one division conflicted with those of the other divisions on similar question. This was not frequent, however. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the d.ele• gates of Lhe Constitutional Convention adopted the present pro'•ision in the Constituti~n enjoining the Supreme Court to always sit en bane when. deciding cases. Similarly, it was the practice of the Supreme Court during the Commonwealth regime to distribute amongst its justices the cases for decision, with each justice thereafter making an individual study of the case assigned to him and submitting his findings and conclusions therein to the whole division or to the Court en bane. This practice ptovoked the criticism, founded or otherwise, that the resultant decision purportedly Of the Supreme Court was in reality a onejustice decision. To remedy the situation, the Constitutional Con.vention provided in Sec. 11 Article VIII of the Constitution of the Phllippines that - · "The ·conclusion of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation be/we the case is assigned to a justice for the writing of the opinion of the court," If the Supreme Court had followed this constitutional mandate and the legal presumption is that it did, then perforceJ. the aforecited doctrines were reached by its justices in consultation with each other. As is obvious, the, aforecited doctrines of the Supreme Court on the court which has jurisdiction over claims of separation pay, overtime pay, and allied subjects, hold diametric.ally opposing views, and it is not too difficult to see that they cannot all be correct. Hence, it is not surprising if our young law student's apprehension about the hosts of judges arui" lawyers of litigants who must have been confused and misled thereby, the precious time and money that mus\; have been wasted in the process of searching just for the right court, should come to pass. Indeed, an illustrative actual case in point which demonstrates the adverse ill-effects of shifting doctrines on litigants haplessly caught in its wake is the case of "Stanley Winch, petitioner, versus P. J, Keiner Co., Ltd., i·espondent, G.R. No. L-17665."' Thls case involves a claim for overtime pay, vacation leave pay, and separation pay claimed by petitioner as a result of his illegal dismissal which took place on April 19, 1955. It was commenced on November 4, 1955, in the Department of Labor later substituted by the Wage Administration Service (WAS). As the proceeding in the WAS was very rnl.ich delayd, petitioner decided to file the corresponding complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila and notified the WAS of the withdrawal of his claim.. However, the WAS dismissed the claim with prejudice. On July 6, 1966, petitioner filed with the Court of First In-. stance of Manila the corresponding complaint based on the claim presented to WAS and docketed as Civil Case No. 30132. The complaint, hO"\\-ever, upon motion of the respondent company that the same is barred by a prior judgment (referring to the order of dismissal of the WAS), was dismissed by the court. 01\ appeal, however, the Supreme Court Set: aside the dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, The ._case, however, was not heard on its merits beeause the respondent company again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and despite petitioner's opposition, the court issued its order dated March 5, 1969 dismissing the Cllse, basing its resolution on the doctrine of the Supreme Court in the case of "Gomez v. North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc.," G.R. No. L-11945, promulgated on AugUSt lS, 1958, holding that claims for collection ol overtime compensathm and separation pay pertain to the jurisdiction of the Cou.rt of Industrial Relations. (supra) In view of said dismis.sal and doctrine of the Supreme Court petitioner had no alternaiive but to reproduce his complaint be~ fore the Court of Industrial Relations, which he did on April 13, 1969 and the same was docketed as C.I.R. Case No. 1937-V. But the respondent company again filed a motion to dismisa the complaint on the ground that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction ov~r the case invoking thi~ time the case of "Chua Workers' Union (N .L. U,) vs. City Automotive Company, G.R. No. L-11655, promulgated on April 29, 1959, where the Supreme Court decreed that claims for collection of differentiai and overtime pay belong to the jurisdiction of the regular courts ( su.p1-a,) Petitioner opposed this motion, invoking the doctrine of the Supreme Court in the case of Monares vs. CNS Enterprises," G. R. No. L-11749, promulgated on May 29, 1969, declaring that claims for recovery of differential and overtime pay, reinstate.. ntent and damages fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. In its order dated June 25, 1960, three judges held that the CIR has no jurisd_iction over the case citing the case of NASSCO vs. CIR, supra; another judge ruled that the CIR has no jurisdiction and cited the case of Price Stabilization Corp. vs. CIR supra; and another judge held ~hat the CIR has jurisdiction citing the cases of Monares vs. CNS Enterprises, and Gomez v. North Camarines Lumber Co., supra. Curiously enough, however, after declari·ng itself without jurisdiction over the case the Court of Industrial Relations also ruled that petitioner's a~tion. has already prescribed after the lapse of four years from the accrual of his cause of action. Petitioner then brought the case to the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari, but this Court dismissed the petition "for Jack of merit". To cap it all, when petitioner's lawyer tried again to reneW petitioner's action before the CFI of Manila, it was found out that respondent (Kiener) had closed down business in the Philippines and returned to the United States. Upon being; informed of the result of the case by his lawyer, said petitioner sharply remarked, "After my case has been footballed from one court to another to the tune of changing rulings, now the court ruled that I have lost my right to bring action to recover overtime pay, vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, and separation pay because more than four years have elapsed. But all these four years were consumed in footballing my case from one court to another. Why should I be held responsible for it? What kind of justice is this?" "Truly, only when we cease to be- human and have lost all sense of fairness can we fail to understand the bitterness of this poor litigant. 322 LAWYERS JOURNAL November 30, 1960

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