The Aranas Case (unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379)

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Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: The Aranas Case (unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379)
Language: English
Source: XXV (11) November 30, 1960
Year: 1960
Subject: Unconstitutional conditions doctrine (Law); Republic Act 1379; Judgments (Law); Appellate courts; Philippines. Supreme Court; Aranas, Jesus Clint O.; Barot, Edilberto
Rights
Abstract: The complaint filed by the former Commissioner of Internal Revenue against the Solicitor General for prohibition with the preliminary injunction was published in the October issue. The Solicitor General opposed the issuance of the preliminary ruling.
Fulltext: THE ARANAS CASE (UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 18•9) Jn the· October· i11ue1 we :Published the eomplaiilt filed bJ' former CGlllJlliaioner 'of Intermal Revenue Mr. Arafiaa agaiut the Solicitor General for prohibition with pftliminary injunction, coyt8Ddlng that Republic Act No. 1879 is unconstitutional for being an es post fa.tJto Jaw. ·Solicitor General Barot opposed. the issuance of the prelimina1'7 illjunction. A l'eply to the opposition was filed by Atty. Franeiaeo who represent.a Araiias. Judge Alvendia denied the i ... auance of preliminary injunction. We publish hereunder the aforeaaid opposition, reply and the pertinent portion of the or-r of Judge Alvendia. · OPPOSITION OF SOL. GEN. BAROT "The term •z-poat /a.t:kJ l1MU is a technical term used only in connection. with crimes and penalties. It ia not applicable to civil laws but to penal and criminal laws (Concepcion vs. Garcia, 64 Phil. '81). Although Republic Act No. 13'19 provides for forfeiture to the· State of property which petitioner has not shown to have been iawfully acqul~ (Sec. 6), said forfeiture is imposed not as a penalty but aa a civil remedy to recover that which never lawfully belonpd to petitioner. The proceed.inc ia akin to eseheat which ia nothing more or lea• than the reversion of property to the State.· which takes place when title fails (Delaney vs, State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290, quoted in footnote 6, 19 Am. Jur. 881,. cited. in Relloaa v. Gaw Chee Hun, L-1411, Sept. 29, 1963). As applied to the right bf the State to lands purchued by an alien, it would more properly be termed a "forfeiture" at common law -(19 Am. Jur. 381, cited in Relloaa v. Gaw Chee Hun, saq.wa.). Although eseheat and forfeltUl'fl are not strictly synonymous terms, the diatinetion. between. them is ,not clearly drawn in modern usage (19 Am. Jur. 880). Thus, the uae of the term "forfeiture" in Republic Act No. 1879 does not necessarily make the statute penal in nature. On the theory that such property was obtained by a public officer either as a gift given to him in consideration of his office or as monies which should have aeci·ued to the Government in the first plaee, and both on the principle that a public office is a public trust and that nO one i!hould be permitted to enrich himself at the expense of another, it follows that the recovery of sueh property may be viewed as one for recovery of property held under an implied trust (Arts. 1445, 1447, 1891, Civil Code). Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner's objections as to the n:..po11t faoto character of the statute are valid, it will be seen· however that the complaint filed against him (Appezulbc B of the Petition) contains char.gea of unexplained acquisitions made after June 18, 1966, the effectlft date of Republic Act No. 1879. In so far therefore aa they are concerned, they cannot be subject to attack of invalidity on ground of es-post faeto. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to a m:it Of prohibition enjoining respondent from taking cognizance of the complaint. The act of suspending the operation of a law by the t1ial court especially one intended to combat graft and corruption in the government, is a matter of extreme delicacy, because that ia an interference with the official act.s not only of the duly elected repreaentatiftB of the People in Congress but also of the highest magistrate of the land . The courta should, therefore, refrain from enjoininc the enforcement "ot la1n1, and should ·not interfere with tJie ·am-.. of public officen perfonned under statutory. authoriZ.i.tion ." A Dieft allegation ot the invalidity of a ltatlate will not warftnt the enrciae by the courta of the atraordtnary injmLCtive power and· ~ t.lte enforcement of the law (Borden's Farm. Products vs. Baldwin, l!98 US 194, 68 S Ct 111'1; State ... Ad81118 El<p. Co., 86 NEB 26, 41 LR.A. (ra) 898). Thia :la specially 10 where in thia caSe, the petitioner js not placed under any rerstraint of his freedom of action in hia daily life by any doubtful provision of the·law. · Furthermore, the constitutionality of the law can always be interposed as a defense in ea1e ot the filing ot a complaint apinst petitioner." · REPLY OF. A TIY. FRANCISCO "In the course of the oral argument yesterday, the Solicito1· General manifested to the court that he doea not dispute the ·ex .. i1-tence and correctness of the authorities cited in the Petitioft for Prohibition, which hold that forfeiture la a punishment for trans· greasing the law; that the effect of the forfeiture ia to transfe1· the title of a specific property from the owner to the sovereign power, imposed by way of punishment for the tranagresaion Of the l~w, or the eommilllion of some wrong; that a law creating forfeiture as punishment is a penal statu~ and that a penal statute that makes an action, done before ita passage and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes auch action is an e:c..po11t jaoto law. Hov.-ever, he contended that although the law provi~ that whenever any public off'icer has acquired during his incumbency an am:ount of prope1ty which is maniffftly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, and said public officer is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired that property, the same should be forfeited in favor of the State, aaid forfeiture is imposed not as a penalty but u a civil remedy· to recover that property which DeVel" lawfully belonc to him but to the State, anci that he, therefore, only held it in trust. "The proceeding" - the Solicitor General maintained - "is akin to eacheat which is the reve1-sion of property to. the State which takes place when title fails." (Page 5, Oppoaition.) No proposition could be more obviously fallacious. 1. Although we have cited a long line of authorities holding tba11 the law which creates forfeiture &s a punishment for the trangression of its provisions is a penal law (Petition for Prohibition, pp. 11-12). the Solicitor Genei·al \\'&8 not able to cite a single authority holding the conti:ary. Having !ailed ·to find any authority holding that fo1i'eiture is not penalty, he stretched his imagination and foisted the novel theory of escheat. But this i8 the JDOBt unfortunate argument that the Solicitor 11ad advanced. The properties subject of escheat are those left by a person who die.d intestate, leaving no heir or person by law entitled. to them (Rule 92, Rules of Court; Arts. 1011-1014, Civil Code). And, according to Manreaa, •·the foundation of tho State's right over the propertiea of a pemon who died without a will and without leaving heirs, springs from the actual condition of abandonment of the properties so left upon the death of the owner and all peraons having rights thereto/' (7 Manre&a 168.) In the caae at bar, the properties that the Solic_itor seeks to forfeit in favor of the State are propeitiea that belong .to the petitioner, not properties belonging to 111.0 One and, therefore, is not reversible to the State, as in the e11.se of escheat. 350 LAWYERS JOURNAL NOVfmber 30, 1860 '·'·'Besides, iii. eacheat. there is no forfeiture but reveraion of the ProPertY to the State. Bennion la defined as "the retu.rn of the ~ to the gr&ntor after the grant i& OTer. n (Bou.vier's Law Dic!trO:liary); tha grantor in eaae of the escheat is the State. Fo .... feitire,· on the Other hand, is defined as "a puD.ishm.ent annexed bj ~18.~ to some illegal aet in the owner of lands or hereditaments w~ he loees all his interests therein, and they become ·vested in .~e St.ate." (Ibid). SU.relJ', the law in usilll' the term "forfeiture" instead of "eseb;ea~, n each of whieh terms has established meantnc and connotatiC.it of its own and is distinct from ihe other, the law could n6t ~ve contemplated "eacheat." Othenise, it would have em~ the term "escheat" instead of "forfeiture," Why should the l&w use "forfeiture" if it meant "escheat"! The law must be ta~ to mean what it plainly and unequivocally aaya; it cannot b&. Changed by ·the courts, much less by the Solicitor General. · Where the language of a statute is plain and unambipous and convey& a clear and defiuite meaning, there is no occasion for reaorti~ to ~ rulea of statutory interpretation, itnd the court has no right to look or impose another mean. ing. In the case of such unambiguity, it is the established pOiicy of the courts to regard the statute as meaninc what it &aJS, and to aYOid giving it any other constniction than fhat whieh its words demand. 50 Am. Jur. 206-20'7. · A statute may not. under the cuise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten, or given a constiucti.on of which its words are .not susceptible, or which is repugnant to its terma. The terms of the statute may not be disregarded, To depart from the meaning apressed by :the words of a statute, is to alter it, and is not construction, but leg1slatiou. 50 Am. Jv.r, 218-214.. ·2. Pursuing this fantastic eacheat theory, the St:tlicitor Gen~ eral advances the arpment. equally fantastic, that the philoaopb)r of' the law in providinc that propert)r acquired by a public offiee1· out of proportion to his salary an.ti. to his other laWfUI income. is unlawful and ahall be forfeited in favor of the Stat.9 unless hei can show to the u.tiafaetion of the court that he baa lawfully acquired the same, ia that it belonp to the State and petitioner only held it entrust for the State. In the light of our, contention that Republic Act 18'79 is an em-pa10 /aoto law, let us apply .aaid th80cy' to properties acquired by the petition.er in 1929, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983~ 1984, 1986, 1986, 198'7, 1988, 1989, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944., 1946, 1946, 194'7, 1948, 1949, 1951>, 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1954. The Solicitor admits-and he cannot deny-that those properties acquired by the petitioner in thase years belonc to him and 'that the presumption is that he acquired those properties lawfullJ'. Even if there is no proof as to how a person has acquired a piece of property, his mere possession thereof under claim of ·ownership carries with it the legal presumption that he pouessea it with just title, i.e .• lawfully. Article 641 of the Civil Code provide& that ••a poueasor in the concept of the owner has in his favor the legal preaumption that he poasessea a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." "'Every person is taken to be honest and acting in good faith unleu the contrary appears. The reason for this presumption is to protect owners from inconvenience. A contrary rule '\11."0uld oblige the owneJ.' to carry with him his titles ·in order to exhibit them to anyone who, with or without reason, may bring an action. against him." ( 4 :Manresa 248.) Since the complaint filed. by the Anti-Graft Committee admits that the petitioner is the owner of those properties whieh he acquired in those years, the legal preaui:nption is that he acquired the same lawfully. How then can the Solicitor General claim that sinee those properties are manifestly out of proportion to 'bia income, the same were unlawfully acquired and held by him, only In trust for the State! Granting, for the eake of a .... 'gmnent, that the &mount of thoee properties were out of propo..., tion to his income, wu there any law at the time of their acquisition declaring that auch acquisition is unlawful! Since it was only on June 18, 1956, that a law (Republic. Act No. 13'79) was passed' ~larinl' that propertiea acquired by a public ofricer out of proportion to his income is unlawful, we have to. oonclude that prior to thia law the lecaJ. presumption is that the acquiidtion ~I such propertie• was lawful . And he beinl' the lawful owner of thOH »roperties, it is absurd to maintain that he only held them in trust for the State, 3. Jn invoking the tJieoey of trust, the Solicitor Generai d089 not of course have in mind an ezprua trust but an implied. trust, the concept of which is em.bddied in article 1466 of the Civil Cod. which providea: · Art. 1456. Jf proper()' is acquired. through mistake or fraud, the person obtainiDI' it is, by force of law, considered a trustee. of an implied trust for the benefit of the Person from whom the property comes.· Frorq the above.quoted. provision, it is dear (l) that in order that property ma.y he considered held in implied trust, the same must have been acquired through mistake or fraud and (2) that the property ia held for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Now, considering that properties acquired by a public officer prio1· to the enactment of Republic Act No. 13'19, rega.rdle.sa of whether or not it is oat of • proportion to his salary or to his lawful income ia presumed to be posseaed. by him under a just title; that la, legally, how can those properties be deemed. to have been acquired thrw1h fraud and thua held in Im.plied trust! '· And even assuming that those prope1:ties were acquired under eircumatances creating an Implied trust in accordance with· the afetre-quoted provision- of the Civil Code, how can it be contended that those properties: held for the benefit of the State, since the same admittedly do not come from the State? If at all, such propertlee are held in trust for the benefit Of anyone, it ia cmtainq nOt fiYr the benefit of the State, but of the person from whom the property came. Property unlawfully acquired. within the meaninc of Republic Act No. 18'79 cannot be conaide:ntd to be held in trust; for the State any more than property acquired. through robbel'J', theft, or eata:fa. 4.. There can be no doubt that in trying to slip across the id• that the proceedings provided by Republic Act No. 18'19 is akin to eacheat. the purpose of the Solicitor General is to cloak the e,; poat /GtJto natm'8 .:if the said Act with a civil mantle. Thia, of course, is futile: · • The ere-post /aeto effect of a 13.w cannot be evaded by giving a ~ivil form. to. that which wu essentially criminal. Brwgene w. Slamon, 97 U.S. 381, 24 L. Bd., 1104. A statute Which deprives a man of his eat.ate or any· part of it for a crime which was not declared to be an offense by any previous law is void ea an ex. post facto law. FleUMr ""' Peok, 6 Cnmelt. (U.S.) 8'1, L. Bd., 162. The Solicitor General further contended that even assuming 1'or the sake of argument that Reputllic Act No. 18'79 is an ez poet /a.do . law, the complaint filed ap.inat him contains charges of 1.!nexplalned acqulaition made before and after June 18, 1956, the effective date of the said A.ct, and that in'sofar aa the properties acquired after the effeetivity of said Act is concerned, the law cannot be attacked. as an e:x: po.st facto law. Citing the separability of provisiona provided in Section 13 of the law, which reads: "If any provision of this Act or the apl'lication thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application. of auch provision to other persona or circumstances shall not be affected thereby,n the Solicitor General claims that although the complaint makes reference to properties acquired before passage of the law, it also makes reference to properties acquired after th6 · passage of the law; therefore, as to the latter properties, .the law cannot be attacked as es posO /aoto. Moreover. he argues, even if the law is Bl!: poat /a.cto, the provision that make& the law ex post facto may De disregarded and separated from the rest 6f the law without affecting the remainder of the Act. November 30, 1960 LAWYERS JOURN"AL 351 .. . The . entire. argument of the Sc;>licitor General rests on this false premise: that only part of the Act in question is es poet facto law a~d the l'emainder is not such. Mothing could be clearer than that it is the Act itself, not mereiJ" a part. thereof, that is ez post facto; the Act itself penalizes acts performed prior to ita enactment and innocent and not punialtable at the time. The whple: Act, therefore, is. n post facto and hence, unconstitutional Dnd invalid in toto, pul'suant to exp1·ess provisional eonatitutlon which we again quote: "No ex post facto" law or bill of, attainder shall be enacted." Section 1. (1) Article Ill, PhiL Constitution.. Moreover, it Is apparent from the foregoing provhdon of the Constitution that it prohibit. an es post fa.cto law, such U the law under consideration, absolutely, without any qualifie•tion it.a to severability. When a law is of that character, it becomes unconstitutional in ·ivto, the constitution s.llowing no part to- remain. True, the ex post facto Character of the Act proceeds from Settion 14 of the law. But the fact remains that It la not aolely Section 14 that is es poae facto,· but the entire Act by l'e&SOn of the said section. Nor could Section 14 be separated from the rest of the Act, since It provides for the effeeti-rity and operation of ~he entire law. Neither is it poasible to weed out any part of Section 14 f1"0m the l'est thereof in order to remo'le the ea: po•t facto character from "the Act without amending the law and thus in effect ~e aorting to judicial legialation. Section 13 reads: "Thia Act aball • take effect on its approval an:l shall epply not onlv to properly thereafteT unlawfully ~ired hut aJ•o to property unlawfully aequlred before the effective date of this AeL" It is patent that we cannot remove the clause "but also to prope1ty unlawfully acquired. before the effective date of this Act," since what would remain would be an incomplete incoherent idea, to wit: "'Thi• Aet shall take effect on its approval, and shall not only apply to property thereafter unlawfully acquired." It will be aeen that eveey part of this provision of Sect.ion 14, la interdependent and not a&verable from one another. BAR EXAMS • . • (Continued from 7JO.ll• 349) VII. .1, poseessing only a student license to drive motor vehicles,. finds a parked cal' with the key left in the llwitch. He ' proceeds to d1:ive it away, intending to sell it. Just then, B, the owner of the car al'rivea. Failing to make A at.op, B boards a taxi and pursues A who in his haste to eacape, and because of his inexperience, violently collides with a jeepney full of pauengers. The jffpney was overturned and wrecked; one pauenger wu killed; the leg of another passenger was crushed and had to be am~ putated. The car driven by A was also damaged. What offense or offenses may A be clu\1-cecl with? VIII. State the t'Ule for the applicatic:in of penalties which contain three periods (maximum, medium and minimum) in view of the p1-esence or absence of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances, IX. (A) State ·one difference between arbitrary detention. and illegal detention. (B) A, is accused of robbe1·y and is arrested by B, a cc.nstabula1·y serpant, by virtue of a warrant of al'l'eat. A put lilP bail and was orde1-ed released by the court. Three days later serge&Dt B eees A at the cockpit and Immediately arrests him and takes him to the constabulary cuardhouse and was kept there till the next morninl' when B took him to the court. All along A was telling B that he was out on bail, but B would .ftot believe him; J!e,ither did he, B, make liny effort to verify if A had really been released on bail. What offense if any has B committed, and why? X. Define complex crime and· givo an ell:alriple. No matter how invoked, the rule must be employed .with the Q'1ali,ication that it it is impouible to tell what part of .a statute is intended to be operative ~-hen some of ita provision~ are- unconstitutional, it ie wholly innlid. Consequeiili).r, where the legislature intends to substitute a new QBt9m .of taxation as a whole for the existing one, and all the imm:sions cannot be carried into effect because of conatitntion.al infirmity, and it ia impossible to tell what part the lecial#ure would have adopted independently, the entire statute ia wid. 11 Am. Jar~ 838-889. ' Ita unconatitutional character cannot be remedied ueqt; .by amending the law thus: "'i'hia Act ahall take effect on Its approval and shall only apply to property thereafter unlawfully, ltCquired," which would be the function. of the legislature. and tM>t of the Court. It is a pneral rule that the courts, in the interprei..tion of a statute, may not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute, or. delete, subtract, or omit. anythinc therefrom. 50 Am. Jur. 219. It is well settled that inj~on will lie to restrain the .enfol'cement of a penal law that Is unconstitutional or the constitutionality of which is doubtful and failiy debatable (Yu Cong Enr: YB. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 886) a1 well as where it is n~ for an orderly administration of juatice or to prevent the Wl8 of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive tnanner (Recto vs. Cas-telo, 13, L. J. (1963) 660, Dimayuga vs. Fernandez, 47 Phil: 385) - which circumstances obtain in this case . JUDGE ALVENDIA'S ORDER In re10lving the question of the iasuance of the writ Of preliminary injunction, Judge Carrnelino Alvendia: iuued an order idated November 5, 1960 denying the issuance of the aame on the elaim of petitioner CAraiias) that Republic Act No. 1879 is unco:nstltutlonal, and adduced as reason thereof: "To tlo so would be: equivalent to judging- the cause on lta me-rits before the lasuea are actually joined and hearing ia held." (To b• cominuecl) -~~~~~--~~~~ PARITY . . . (Ccmtinaad from ""'1• 325) "legal safeguanle," the "legal authority," the "legal way" out Of • hopeless predicament once we have fallen into the gri~ of the Imperialistic cobra. If We must go tb hell, let's not :fq,mish the rope to lead us there. If we must haftl', let us at least nfuac to sign our death. wal'rant. If we. must be subdued, let us at l~ast refuse to submit. CONCLUSION Adverting our attention to the heaV}' demande for naval, aerial and military bans already diaturbill&' us, to the most recent violations of our sovereignty in Palawan yet unpunished., to the heavy investment in big estates already atarttng, to the growing control of our army by military asailltantl frotn abroad, etc., etc., let this my last warninl", If not heal'd, at least, be recorded: Pass this amendment and you have turned the c1oek: of Philippine history 400 yeal'8 back. Pasa this resolution and :you -have led our unhappy nation thrcnigh the fatal gates where passed the nations of vanished or vani1hing identities - Hawaii, Caba. Persia, the Carribean countries, Korea, and a dozen others in Europe and Central America that have the misfortune of falling within the otbit of mie"hty powers. Pass this amendment and you have consummated the greatest betrayal to the sublimest national eause, and the worst destrur.tlon to" the memories of the hei"Oes and leaders who fought and fell in 300 revolutions and three· wan that eonatitute the sum total of our epic cruaa.de for freedom. Pan this amendment and when the tragic 1:9nsequencea of this act will a11urrie a reality showing our poaterity orphaned. of" their birthright and their friedom. - you will. weep but too late with the anathema of history on your head told in the words of" Ateiza, the mother of weeping Boadbil expellel king of Granada, when she said, "Weep like a woman for the loss of the kingdom whieh you did not defend like a man." 362 LAWYERs JOURNAL November 30, 1960'