Supreme Court Decisions, Acuna and Dias vs. Furukawa Plantation Company - Justine Reyes.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Acuna and Dias vs. Furukawa Plantation Company - Justine Reyes.pdf

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extracted text: In a registration or eadastral case does rtot become fina l and Incontrovertible until the expiration of one yep.r after the entry of the final decree; that a.s long as the final decree is not issued and th~ period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Jose C. Culayco for oppositor-appellant.. Jesus V. Ar:bo!eda a.nd Ildefonso M. Bleza for petitioner-appellee. DECISION MONTEl\IA YOR, J. The Court of First Instance of Mindoro acting as cadastral court and after hearing Cadastral Case No. 2 G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 216, rendered a decisior. dated April 2!), 1921, adjudicating cadastral lots to those entitled thereto. Lot No. 768 with its improvements was adju.dlcated to the brothers, Victoriano, Felix e.nd Agustin, all surnamed CAPIO, in equal parts. On January 7, 1947, about twenty-six years later, Victoriano Capio, one of the three brothers filed in the Mindoro court a petition asking for the reopening of the cadastral case and the setting a.side of that part of the decision adjucating Lot No. 768 to him and to this two brothers Felix and Agustin for the reason that according to him, said lot was, during the caclastral hearing, claimed only by himself and by no others, not even by his two brothers; that the lot really belonged to him and his wife exclusively and that the adjudication made by the cadastral court w::is through an error. After considering 5aid petition a.s well as the opposition thereto filed by Fe1·nando Capio, the only helr of petitioner's brother, Felix and inasmuch the trial court found that the decree for said lot 768 was not issuerl until November 1, 1949, anrl also bceause the oppositor did nr,t deny the allegations of the petition for the reopening of the case, the lower court, according to it, to avoid the miscarriage of justice, ordered the reopening of the case at the same time declaring null and void the decision of April 29, 1921, with respect to lot No. 768. It set the hearing on said lot during the May calendar. All this was contained in .the court artier dated February 28, 1950. Oppositor Fernando Capio filed a motion for recqnsideration of the order. Acting upon said motion and the answer thereto filed .by Victoriano, the Mindoro court set the said motion for reconsideration for hea.ring stating 'that at the hearing evidence may be presented in order to properly establish the issues and also for the parties to support their allegations. On Septembf!r 2, 1950, the lower court issued an order which we reproduce below. "0 R DE R "This is a motion for the rec:onsider'ltion of the order of this Court dated February 28, 1950. "This motion was set for hearing in order to receive any evidence which the parties might present in support of their contentions. The movant did not appear while the oppositor was a.llowed to present his evidence. "Considering the motion for reconsideration :md the opposition thereto together with the evidence presented by the oppositors, the court finds no justification in reconsidering its order of February 28, 1950 and therefore denies the same for lack of sufficient merits. "IT IS ORDERED." The order of February 28, 1950, above referred to is the order declaring null and void the decision of the cadastral court dated April '29, 1921, as regards lot No. 768 and setting said lot for hearing. Later, on October 20, 1950, the trial court finally issued the following order. "0 R DE R "Petition for postponement of the hearing of thi6 case set for the 28th instant is hereby granted. The court, however, believes that there is n<> necessity of having this case set for hearing anew beca:ise the records of this case clearly show that on September 2, 1950, when the motion for reconsideration was calleC. for hearing in order to receive any evidence which the parties might present in support of their contentions, the petitioner did not appear while the oppositor was allowed to present his evidence. "The Court after considering the motion for reconsideration and the opposition' thel'eto together with the evidence presented by the oppositor, finds no justification in reconsidering its order of Febrnary 28, 1950 and therefore denied the same for 'Jack of sufficient merits. "WHEREFORE, the order of this Court dated September 2, 1!)50, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of this court dated February 28, 1950, is hereby affirmed and maintained. "IT IS SO ORDERED.'' Appellant Fernando Capio is now appealing from this last order of October 20, 1950. In numerous decisions, some of the latest being Afallo and Pinaroc v, Rosaura, 60 Phil. 622 and Valmonte v. Nable, G. R. No. L-2842, December Z!l, 1949, 47 0. G. 291'?, we have held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cada.stral case does not become final :md incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. In the present case, a~ the time the petition for review was filed, the decree had not yet been issued. It is, therefore, clear that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law <Section 38, Land Registration Act). As to the merits of the petition, it · would appear that during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration at which the oppositor did not appear and where petitioner Victoria.no presented evidence, Victoz"iano testified and presented d .. cuments to show that this lot No. 768 was previously bought by Pedro Capio, father of the three brothers Victoriano, Felix and Agustin from one Mamerta Atienza who, before the sale had held it for about thirty years; that on April 26, 1920, his fa their Pedro sold the same land to one Alejandro Dris for f800.00; that on May 5, 1920, Victorie.n.o Capio purchased from the vendee Dris 3/4 of the land for f'600.00; and on October 29 of the same year Vietoriano again bought the remainder from Dris for P350.00; that Victoria no was the only cne who filed his claim in the cadastral proceedings for lot No. 768, and that at the hearing he was the only one who appeared and claimed the land. Furthermore, the petition for reopening of the case filed by Victoriano on January 7, 1947, bears the written conformity of his brother Agustin Capio, so that the only one opposing this petition is Fernando Capio, the only heir of his brother Felix Capio. Finding the order appealed from to be in conformity with Jaw, the sa.rne is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. We notice however from the order of the trial court of October 20, 1950, which we have reproduced above that it entertained the belief that there was no further need for a hearing as to the ownership of the lot No. 768, because said hearing had already been held and presumably the court was convinced that the lot properly belonged to petitioner Victoria.no Capio. The record, however, shows that this hearing was held in connection with the motion for reconsideration. Moreover, said hearing was held in the absence of oppositor Fernando Capio, he perhaps believing that it was not a trial on the merits of the case. The trial court is therefore directed to hold a regular and formal he:uing of the case with notice to both parties where evidence as to the ownership, possession, etc. of the lot and its improvements may be presented and thereafter a decision shall be rendered. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Brng:;;on, Pudilla, Tuason, Rey.:s, Jugo, Baut·ista Angeki a11d Labrador, J.J., concur. XIII F'la1. •1'ana Acuiia and Eusebia Diaz, plaintiffs.(llppellants, u.s. Furukff.wa Pla11tation Company, dependant.appellee, G. R. No. L..5833, Octobe1 22, Ulfl3 v{, CIVIL PROCEDURE; DECLARATORY R.ELIEF; IMPROPER ACTION. - F company is the registered owner o( a large tract of land in the province of Davao. This tract of land was turned <>Ver to the NA FCO for administration a.nd disposition. Among those favored with an allocation were A und her daughter, two hr,me~teadcrs within tht: area co,·ercd by F company's 80 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL February 28, 1954 j;lanlatio1: title. T·h~y howcw1· tut'l\t:d down their allocatlon, claiming that they w~re entitled to the whole area occupied by them -- ~cme 31 hectares. When this claim was denied they Lrought act1011 against the company in the Court of First Instance of Davao. What A _ ansf her daughter appear to claim is that whfle _the land occupied by them as homestead is embraced ·in l."' conlpany's tpl'J'~ns title the improvements thereon are ex-JifeSslY excluded therefrom,-beit1g -among those noted down in the Torrcris . ~e rtifkate as 1n·op-erties belonging to other persons. HELD: A and d"aughter are not merely asking for a determination of defendant's certificate of titles. What they want is to have that certificate amended by having their names insdibed thet·eon as owners of the improvements existing on the homestead occupied by them but registered in defendant's name. This iS a remedy that can be granted only under the Land Registration Act and is, therefore, not within the scope and purpo$e of an action for declaratory relief as contemplated in Rule 66. If plaintiffs' first cause of action is to succeed, it must be formulated by proper.petition in the original case where the decree of registration was entered, and with notice to all persons who!:le rights might be affected by the proposed amendment to · the· certificate of title. If may be stated that au amcndriient of that kind is not barred by the incontestability of defendant's Torren's title, since this contains a special reservation with respect to inlprovemente tv the persons. IJ. CIVIL CODE; RIGHT OF OWNER OF l!UPROVEME:t-..TS MADE IN OTHER'S LAND. - Since A and daughter are a~king ., the defendants be compelled to cede to them the land covered by their hom,•stead it should be noted that Article 361 of the Civil Code (i\rt. 448 l of the new Civil Code gives ''the owner of land on which anything has bt>f'll buili., .~own, or planted, in g;_1od faith," the right "to appropriate 1hr thing so built, sown, or planted; upon p:_i.yii1g the compf'nsativ11 mentioned in Articles 453 an~i 454, or to compel the 1ierson who has built or planted to pay him the proper rent therefor.·• But the article invoked does not givl' plaintiffs, as owners of the improvements, the right to compel . defendant, as registered owner of the land, to cede to them, · by. sale or otherwise, the land in question. Under the article, it is the owner of the land that has the right to choose between acquiring the imprc.vemcnts and selling the land. An action predicated. on the assumption that the option may be exercised by the owner of the improvements is clearly without legal basis. Q11impa & Kimpo and Remedios A. Ponferrada for appelants Antonio HaJJnna, Jr. for appellee. DECISION REYES, J. : The Furukawa J>lantation Company, a Philippine corporation, is the registered owner of large tract of land in the province of Davao, as eYidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 2768 fnow Transfer Certificate of Title No. 276) of th(:: land records of that province, issu(::d more than 30 years ago. As a result of the last war, this tract of land was turned over to the NAFCO <National Abaca and Other Fibet:s Corporation) for administration and disposition and, together with other Japanese-owned properties in the province, distributed among war veterans and dese1'Ving civilians, each of whom was al.. located five hectares pursuant t<i the directives of the P1·esident of the Philippines and the agreement entered into between the Philippine Veterans Lcgior. and the NAFCO. , A.mong those favored with an allocation were Flaviana Acuila ind" her daughter EusCbia Diaz, two homesteaders within the aren coVered by the Furukawa' Plantation Company's title, who, however, turned down their allocation, claiming that they were entitled to the whole area occu;>ied by them - some 31 hectares - and, on this claim being denied, brought the present action against the company in the Court of F'irst Iiistance of Davao. The complaint sets up t!1rec causes of action· a.nd alleges that plaintiffs are the widow and daughter, respectively of Roman Diaz, deceased, who, as a homestead applicant, was, on August 18, 1914, granted by the Director of Lands a provisional permit to occupy and clear 31.79 hectares of public land in sitio Calanitoi, municipality of Santa C1·uz, Davao province; that since then, Roman Diaz and (after his death> plaintiffs themselves have been cultivating and improving the said land, planting it to coconut and other fruit trees and food crops, and building thereon two residential hou:~es; that, through fraud and stra.tegy, defendant was able to include the said land and the improvements thereon in its certificate of title, though acknowledging plaintiffs' right thereto under a general annotation on the certificate which ~Ns : "ExCept tE_ose herein expressly noted as belonging to other 1icrso~~;" that as defendant's certificate of title does not give tht> name.s ~f _ those . "other persons," it is necessary that plaintiffs "be ~p~~.s.sly declared and. {their names) annotated" as among the persons referred to; aJ;d that defenda.nt and its agents have been abetting its overseer and other persons in occupying plaintiffs' coconut planta- # lion and committing depred~.tions thereon to the damage and prejudice of said plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that they be declared to be "among those perMns noted d"I owners of the improvements included in <defemlar1t'sJ Trausfcr Certificate of Title No. 276;" that defendant be made to cede to them the 31.79 hectares of land on which the improvements owned hy them stand; and that defendant be made lo pay damages and, together with those acting under its authority, enjoined frl'm "committing furtlwr acts of disiiossession and despvliatl')n" on the homestead. Before answel"ing the complaint, defendant moved that it be disuiissed, and the eomt granted the nwtion on the grounds that the complai~t did not state a cause of actiou, that plaintiffs' action had aln :ad:Y -Prescribed, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. From the ord~r of dibmii>sal plaintiffs appealed to the Co1ut of Appeals, but that court lias certified the case here because of the nature of the questions invoked. .For a lll"Oper resolution of thl'se questions, it .should be statfd . ai. the outset tha.t despite the allegation of "fraud and strategy" in the procurement of defendant's title, the validity 01· incontestability of that title does not appear to be in issue, and in any event the title lias already become indefeasible be;:ause of the more than 30 years that have elapse<i since the decree of registration was {;ntered. What plaintiffs appear tv claim is that, while the land occupied by them as homestead is embraced in defendant's Torrens title, the impl'ovemeuts thereon ~re expressly excluded therefrom, being among those 11oted down in the Torrens certificate as properties b€Jonging to other persons. On this hypothesis, plaintiffs are asking for th1·ee specific remedies, namely: (1) to have their names inscribed in defendant's certificate of title as owners of said improvements; (2) to hu.ve de- ' : Cendant cede to them the land on which the improvements stand; and (3 ) to have defendant pay damages for depredations comnutted on plaintiffs' coconut plantation by persons acting under defendant's authority and to have a w1·it issue to enjoin "further acts of dispossession and despoliation." With respect to the first remedy, which is the subject of the f11"st cause of sction and which plaintiffs seek to obtain through an action for declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rule of Court, we npte that plaintiffs are not merely asking for a determination of theil' rights through a judicial interpretation of defendant's certificate of title. What they want is to have ha.t certificate amended by having iheir names inscribed thereon as owners of the improvements existing on the homestead occupied by them but registered in defendant's !lame. U> This is a remedy that can be granted only under the Land H.cgistration Act and is, therefore, not within the scope and purpose of an action for declaratory relief as contemplated in Rule 66. If plaintiffs' first cause of action is to succeed, it must be formulated by proper petition in the original case where the decree of registration was entered, and with notice io all persons whose rights might be af·fected by the proposed amendment to the certificate of title. <2> It may be stated that an amendment of that kind is not barred by the incontestability of defendant's Tonen's t itle, since this contains a special i·eservativn with respect to improvements belonging to other pH·sons. The second remedy - which is the objective of plaintiffs' second cause of action ~ is sought to he attainer\ through an ·action for "spcci fie performance." But it is obvious that an action of that kind will not lie, since plaintifis arc Hot seeking the fu lfillment of <ill)' contrnct. What they ask for is that dcfe11dant be made to ct:de to them the land i:uvered by their homestead and for that they invoke Article 361 of the old Civil Code lArticlc 'l48 0£ the ut:w) which gives "the ownei' of land on which :-iny\'hing has been built. sown. or planted, iii good faith,'' the right "to a.p1n·opri'ate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upofi paying the compensation mentioned in Articles February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOµRNAL 81 i453 t.nd 454, 011 t.o com1•el the person who ha.s built Ol· planted to pay him the value of the lan<l, ~nd the person who sowed thereon to pa)' the proper rent therefor.'' But the article invoked does not give plaintiffs, as owners of the improvements, the right to compel defendant, as registered owner of the land, to cede to them, by sale or otherwise, the land in question. Under, the article, it is the owner of the land that has the right to choose between acquiring the improvements and selling the land. An action predicated on the assumption that the option may be e.."Xercised by the o~ner of the improvements is clearly without legal basis. On the assumption that plaintiffs are the owners of the improvements on the land occupied by them and that defendant's men or those acting under its authoritY. arc committing depredations thereon, there can be no qut>.stion that pl:iintiffs should be entitled to the remedy sought in th'!ir third cause of action, that is, to have the depredations stopped and indemnity paid for damc.ges suffered. \Ve note, howeve!', that the cumplaint does not identify and delimit the land on which plai11tiffs' improvements stand, the complaint. being for that i·eason defective. To summarize, it is ou1· conrlu~ion that Cl) plaintiffs may not in the present case ask for the remedy sought in their first caus~ of action, for the reason that an amendment to a Torrens certificate of title may be had only in t.he origiual case where the decree of regis~ tration was entered; (2) plaintiffs' second cause of action is untenable; and (3) plaintiffs' complaint is defective with respect to the property sought to be pl'Otected hy a writ of injunction. Wherefore, the order of dismissal is affinned with respect to the first and second causes of action, and modified as to the third in the st:nse that this ca1,1se of action shall be deemed definitely dismissed if the complaint is not properly amended within ten days from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs. Pa·rns, Bengzo•t, Tuazon, Ji.go, Pablo, Padilla; Montenw1 1or; Lab. rador and Bautista Angelo, concur. XIV Cebu Portland Ce-m.mt Company, petitwner, vs. Hor.. Vicente Varela et al., TCSJ~ondents, G. R. No. L.5438, September 29, 1953. CIVIL PROCEDURE; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO DEPOSIT THE MONTHLY RENTS DUE TO FRAUD, ERROR OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. - On November lG, 1950, V, General superintendent of C Co., was dismissed and retired with gratuity by the company's board of directors. The labor union to which he belonged took the case to the CIR which rendered a resolution finding his dismissal unjustifiable and ordering his reinstatement in office with full back p&y. The resolution was brought before the Supreme Court for review. Be~ cause V refused to leave the company house which as the general superintendent he was entitled to occupy free of charge, the company brought a sui"t against him for illegal detainer in the JP court which rendered judgment ordering him to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of Pto0.00 from November 16 <Jf that year. B appealed !:o the rFI. In the CFI the company had an order issued for a writ of execution but the order was lifted on October 8, 1951 following the filing of the supersedeas bond for Pl,500.00 which answered not only the rents already due (fl.000.00J but also those th&t were still to become due <fos alquilercs d1>vengados y los por devcngar"> On December 7, 1951, the company was again able to securt" a writ of execution because of V's failure to make a cash deposit for the rents corresponding to September and October of that year. V moved for a reconsideration, deposited P400 to cover four months rental and called attention to the fact that the question of his separation from the company was still pending with the CIR on llecf:mhcr 29, l!J51. 1'he court issued an 01·der suspending the writ of execution on the grounds that V's right lo continue occupying the premises depended upon the result of the case in the CIR which had not yet been decided, that his bond for rl,500 was answerable for the rents up to the final determination of the .:use, and that 1 he deposit of P400 to cover rents up to and including December J951 negati\•ed ;~ny intention on his part to enjoy the occupancy of that house without any rent. A motion to lift the order of suspension having been denied, the company petitioned for certiorari and mandamus asking that the said order be annulled as having been issued without jurisdiction and that a writ issue commanding the judge below to lift the stay of excc\1.tion. HELD: Courts of the first instance in detainer cases are authorized to grant execution upon appellant's failure to deposit the monthly rents on time during the pendency of the appeal. But this Court has already ruled .that execution may be denied where the delay in making the deposit was due to fr&ud, error or excusable negligence, (Bantug vs. Roxas, 73 Phil, 13; Gun:1.an vs. Rodas, 44 Off, Gaz., 4927; Yu Phi Khim vs. Amparo, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, 98L In the present case, the deposit was late, but the lower court has excused the delay as being due to an honest belief that the supersedeas bond covered both past and futu1·c rents - as t herein expressly stipulated - and that, after all, appellant's right to remain in office and enjoy its emoluments, including free quarters, was still pending determination in the Court of Industrial Relation11. The lower court, in our opinion, acted with justice and equity and only followed the preeede0 nt established in the cases above-cited when it rendered the resolution herein complained of. Fortunato V. 1Jorro11~e9 and Jesu;; N. Bo·rrum,eo for petitioner. Alonso & Alon;;o and Emilio Lumontad for respondents. DE CJS IO N REYES, J.: On November 16, 195U, Felix V. Valencia, general supt:rintendent 1f the Cebu .Portland Cement Company, was dismissed and retired :with gratuity by the company's boai-d of directors. Contesting his dismissal, the labor union to which he belonged took the case to the .l:ourt of Industrial }{elations, and that court, under date of July 8, tl.1152, rendered its resolution, finding Valencia's dismissal unjustified <and ordering his reinstatement in office with full backpay and "witil all the privileges and emoluments thereunto attached x x x." That ;resolution is now before this Court for i·eview, but it is not the subject of the present petition for cel'tiorori and mandamus, and is here mentioned only because of its bearing on the case. The present casf:l arose as a con.:;equenee of the company's attempt to oust Va!t:ncia from the company house which as gener.:i.I superintendent he was entitled to occupy frel. of charge. Because Valencia refused to leave the house desritt: his removal from office, the comrany brou;;ht suit against him for illegal detainer in the Ju~tice of the .Peace Court of Naga, Cebu, and that court., on August 20, Hlf.il, rendered judgment ordering him t.o vacate the premises and pay a mcmthly rental of PHJ(J,00 from November 16 of that year. VeleJicin. app<"aled to the Court of .First Instance, the appeal being perfected on September 12, 1951 with the filing of the appeal bond on that d'lte. Once the case was in the CouJ"t of First Instance, the company had an order issued for a writ of execution, but the order wa.s lifted 0.1 October 8, l!f51, following the filini;- of a supcrsedeas bond for Pl,500.00. Ordinb.rily such bond answers only for rents due at the time of the perfection of the appeal. But in the present case the bond, in express terms, guarantees not only the rents already due (f'l,000.00), but also tho'Se that wer<.? still to become due C"loi; alqui. ieTes deve't.gados y los por del(engar''), On .December 7, 1951, the company was again able to SPcure u writ of execution because of Valencia's failure to make a cash deposit for th0e rents corresponding to September and October of that year. Valencia moved for a reconsideration, deposited P400.00 to cover fout· months' rent and called attention to the fact that the (!Uestion of his !'eparation from the conlji~ny was still pE:nding in the Court of I ndustrial Relations. Acting· 011 this mction, the cou1t issued iU:: order of December 29, 1951, suspending the writ of execution on the grounds that Valencia's right to continue occupying the premises d~pcnded upon the result of the ca~e in the Industrial Court, which had not yet been decided, that his supersedeas bond for Fl,500.0(J was answerable for the rents up to the final" determination of the case, and that the cleposit of P400.00 to cover rents up to and including Dcct>.mber, 1951, negatived any intention on his part to enjoy the occupancy of the house without Jla~•ing r n"y rent. A motio11 to lift this order of suspc..nsiun having been denied, tin• company brought 82 THE LAWY ERS JOURNAL February 28. 1954.
Date: 1954
Rights