Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Bulos Vda. de Tecson vs. Bensamin et. al - Justice Bautista Angelo.pdf

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

extracted text

On this score the respondent judge's action on Lastrl\la'P acquired a definitiv-e charaeteP", And still in another ease, an motion should be declared as in excess of jurisdiction, which even order granting a review of a decree of registration issued more amounted to want of jurisdiction, considering specially that Durfe than a year ago had been declared null and void. In all these _ and Asturias, and the defendants themselves, had undoubtedly the cases the existence of the right to appeal has been disregarded. r;glit to be heard - biit the11 1t·ere not not1fied.4 In a probate case, a judgment according to ~ts own recitals was Why was it necessary t(l hea o· them on the merits of Lastrilla's rendered without any trial or hearing, and the Supreme motion? Court, in granting certiorari, said that the judgment was by Because Dorfe and Asturias might be unwilling to recognize its own recitals a patent nullity, which should be set aside the validity of Lasttilla's purchase, or, if valid, they may want though an appeal was available but was not availed of. x x x" him not to forsake the partnership that might have some obligations Invoking .:>ur ruling in Melocotones v. Court of First Instance, in connection with the pai-tnership properties. And what is more 57 Phil, 144, wherein we applied the theory of !aches to petitioners' important, if the motion is granted, when the time for redemption 3-year delay in requesting certiorari, the respondents point out comes, Dorfe and Asturias will receive from redemptioners seven- that whereas the orders complained of herein were issued in June teen per cent (17%) less than the amount they had paid for the 13, 1951 and August 14, 1951 this special civil action was not filed same properties. until August 1952. It should be observed that the order of June The defendants Arnold Hall and Jean Roxas, eyeing Lastrilla's 13 was superseded by that of August 14, 1951. The last order financial assets, might also oppose the substitution by Lastrilla of me:rely declared "que el 17% de las propiedades vendidas en publiFred Brown, the judgment against them being jrtint a.ml several. ca subasta pertenece al Sr. Lastrilla y este titme derecho a dicha They might entertain misgivings about Brown's slipping out of their porcion." This does not necessarily mean that 17% of the nwney common predicament thru the disposal of his shat·es. had to be delivered to him. It could mean, as hereinbcfore indiLastly, all the defendant& would have reasonable motives to cated, that the purchasers of the property ( Dorfe and Asturias) object to the delivery of 17% of the proceeds to Lastrilla, because ~;:1 ~Ai~e=n~~ ~:sttr~~:·:0~:vt~:::~~· a!t 0 ;;esr ~~:ec~~g A~:u s~!: ~~8 a:t~e~c~e:0:e: t~~~~c~~~ra';!1!~:g;~~chre~::1~:i.~ti~f:P;~;~ riff "to tum over" to Lastrilla "17% of the total prnceeds of the of course, there was no fraudulent collusion among them. ~i~~~~~ ~:!:·;~, ;:~r~h:y t~:u;~1~e:t t~~~i~c;:eal:~sr:;~:;c~~ ~:Jyp~t~: Now, these varied interests of necessity make Dorfe, Asturias 1952 (Annex Q>. Surely a month's delay may not be regarded and the defendants indispensable. pa-rties to the motion of Lastrilla , as !aches. ___..granting it was a step allowable under our regulations on exe- In view of the foregoing, it is ou1· opinion, and we so hold that cution. Yet these parties were not notified, and obviously took all orders of the respondent judge requiring delivery of 17% of the no part in the proceedings on the motion. proceeds of the auction sale to respondent Olegario Lastrilla are "A valid judgment cannot be rendered whei·e there is a null and void; and the costs of this suit shall be taxed against the want of necessary parties, and a court cannot properly adju- latter. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made perdicate matiers involved in a suit when necessary and indis- manent. So ordered. pensable parties to the proceedings are not before it." {49 C. Pa11•as, Feria, Pablo, Tuazon, Mo1itemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Baidista J. S. 67.) Angelo and Labrador, J. J., concur. "Indispensable parties are those without whom the ac!ion cannot be finally determined. In a case for recovery of ret1l property, the Qefendant alleged in his answer that he was occupying the property as a tenant of a third person. This third person is an indispensable party, for, without him, any judgment which the plaintiff might obtain against the tenant would have no effectiveness, for it would not be binding upon, and cannot be executed against, the defendant's landlnrd, against whom the plaintiff has to file another action if he desires to recover the property effectively. In an action for partition of property, each co-owner is an indispensable party, for without him no valid judgment for pa-rtition may be rendered." (~loran, Comments, 1952 9d. Vol. I, p. 56.) <Underscoring si.ipplied.) Wherefore, the orders of the court i·ecognizing Lastrilla's right and ordering payment to him of a part of the proceeds were patently cn-oneous, because they were promulgated in excess or outside of its jurisdiction. For this rea.son the respondents' argument resting on plaintiffs' failure to appeal from the orders on time, although ordinarily decisive, i:arries no persuasive force in this instance. , For as the former Chief Justice Moran has summarized in his Comments, 1952 9d. Vol. II, p. 168 - "x x x And in those instances wherein the lower cou1"t has acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or where the order or judgment complained of is a patent nullity, courts have gone even as far as to disregard completely the question of petitioner's fa.ult, the reason being, undoubtedly, that acts performed with absolute want of jul°isdiction over the subjectmatter are void ab initio and cannot be validated by consent, express or implied, of the parties. Thus, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certio1·ari and set aside an order reopening a cadastral case five years after the judgment rendered therein had become final. In another case, the Court set aside .an order amending a judgment six years after such judgment (•) TrQe, Lairtrilla wa. attorney for defendanh. but he was careful in all his moUon1 on the matter lo ~ign "Jn hla own representation" ~r "for himself and in hlsbeba\f." VII Tomasci V. Bulos Vda.. de 1'1icso11, as administra.tri:t of the testttfr n~tate of the deceased Pablo Tecson Ocampo, versus Benjamin, et ul., all surnamed Tecson, G. R. No. L-5233, September 30, 1953. CIVIL PROCBDUHE; PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDliMENTS. - While a petition for relief as a rule is add1·e!lsecl to the sound discretion of the court, however, when it appears th" ai. a party has a good and meritorious defense and it would be unjust and unfair to deny him his day in court, equity demand!' that the exercise of judicial discretion be reconsidered if there are good reasons that warrant it. Castillo anrl Gnevam a·ltd Lc-0, Feria and Manglapus for appellants. CCaro J U. Recto for a.ppellce. · - DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .: The incident involved in this appeal stems from an action for forcible entry originally commenced on June 12, 1941 in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, by Tomasa V. Bulos Vda. de Tecson in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the tleceaiwd Pablo Tecson Ocampo against defendants-appellants. In that case, defendants filed a written answer. After trial, the court dismissed thr, case. From the decision plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8889. Having failed to answer the complaint within the time prescribed in Section 1, Ruic 15, of the Rules of Court, defendants, on motion of plai11tiff, were declared in defa· lt and thereafter plaintiff present('d her evi<Jcnce. On OctobeJ' 9, 1!)41, a judgment by default \ras rcndet"ed against defendants, and on October 10,' 1941, copy of the decii:ion was served on defendant.e' couruiel. Three days after receipt of copy of the decision, or on October 13, 1941, counsel for defendants filed a writte'11 manifestation stati11g that he would file u petition to set aside the decision by default but that he needed more time to do so lo enable him to gather eviaence February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNA~ 75 and prepare the neCttHary affidavits of merit in support of the petition. This was done on October 16, 1941. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the petition for relief. Then war broke out and no action was taken on the petition. · After liberation, counsol for defendants took steps to have the petition for relief acted l,!pon by the court. The petition was set for hearing several times, but before action tl1ereon could be taken, both parties agxced in a joint action to ha~e the hearing cancelled as they would merely file a memoranda in_ support of .their contentions. These memoranda having been submitted, the court issued an order d<"nying the petition. From this order defendants took the case directly to this Court stating that their appeal "is based merely on questions of law." The preliminary question which should be threshed out before we come to the main issue is whether this appeal should be determined considering merely the findings o(. fact of the lower court in. tho c.rder subject of appeal. Counsel for appellee sustains the affirmatlve "View because, he contends, a.ppellants have stated in their notice of appeal that their "appeal is based merely on questions of law" which means that they cannot discuss any fact or circumstance other than those found by the lowe1· court. · Counsel for appellants sustain the contrary view contending that the facts brought out in their pleadings and affidavits of merit ~tand undisputed a,~d so they can now be considered. It appears that on October 13, 1941, or three days !~om receipt of copy of the decision by default, counsel for defendants filed an urgent manifestation stating that ht: would presently file a petition for 1'€1ief but tha.t he wanted more time to gather data and prepare the requisite affidavits of merit in support of the petition, and in effect he filed the petition three days thereafter attaching the!·eto four affidavits of merit-. Said petition shows the following facts: The notice intended for defendants requiring them to answer was received by one Mariano Linao, an employee of a business firm namt:d Lawyers' Printers. The office of defendants' counsel was locutt!d in the same room occupied in part by said firm, whose manager was one Marcos Suiiiga. The personnel of the law office of counsel for defendants merely consisted of three, namely, Atty. Gaudencio B. Talahib, one typist and a messenger. When the notice of the conrt reached the office of counsel, only Mariano Linao was present, who signed the return card and placed the letter on a table. The messenger of defendants' counsel was out to attend to some errand but when he returned Linao left without calling his attention to the letter. Both Atty. Castillo, defendants' counsel, as well as his a.ssistant, Atty. Talahib, were also out attending to some professional engligement. The notice never came to the knowledge of defendants' counsel until he received, to his surprise, copy of the decision by default. Immediately he took steps to file a petition for relief. This petition was set for hearing several times, but the hearing was never held, as the parties agreed to submit memoranda in support of their contentions. And one of the points ~ti·essed in the petition was that defendants had a good and meritorious defense. Considering that the petition for relief did not go thru the process of a hearing, because both parties agreed to submit memoranda in support of their contentions, which implies that they waived their privilege to submit evidence, the logical consequeJJce is that plaintiff, or her counsel, is deemed to have admitted the truth of ail material and relevant allegations appearing in the petition, as well as in the affidavits of merit, and to have submitted the case upon those allegations. As this court aptly said, "One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as io the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party, and rest his motion for judgment on those a.llcgations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings." (Evangelista v. De la Rosa, 42 0. G. 2100; Aquino v. Blanco, 45 0. G. 2080.' The facts concerning the petition for relief not being disputed, we are inclined to sustain the Yiew of appellants' counsel that fo1 purposes of this appeal we may take into account not only the findings of fact made by the lower court but all other relevant and material facts appearing in the pleadings to determine if said findings are proper, just and warranted. The lower court found, among other things, that the facts contained in the petition give a picture of a law office poorly organized and directed; a law office with one a.ssistant, one messenger and one typist, still court 1toticcs are 1·eceived by a stranger who signs {or them; the allegation of counsel for the defendants that during or around the period he was very busy at the trial of many cases, as correctly answered by the plaintiff, is no excuse for the default entered in this ca.se,'' and after stating that "plaintiff is as entitled as the defendants for the speedy termination of the case," the court, based on said findings, denied the petition for relief. While a petition for relief as a rule is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, however, when it appears that a party has a good and meritorious defense and it would be unjust and unfair to deny him his day in court, equity demands that the exercise of judicial discretion be reconsidered if there are good reasons that warrant it. Here these i·easons exist if only all the facts are considered. Note that counsel did not lose time in putting things aright when he came to note that something wa.s wrong. Upon receipt of copy of the decision of the court, which came to him as a surprise, he immediately gave notice of his desire to file a petition for relief, which he did in no time, attaching to his petition four affidavits of merit. These documents show that defendants had a good and meritorious defense and outline the circumstances which resulted in the failure of their counsel to 1:1.nswer within the reglamentary period. They show th<!.t counsel was sharing office with a business firm and th8t because of an unfortunal:e coincidence the notice to answer Was served on an employee of the firm. That such coincidence can happen -cannof be denied. It is one of these things that can happen in the ordinary course of business. It mu.y be an act of negligence for Mariano Linao not to give the nr.tice to the messenger of defendants' counsel, or an act of negligencf' for the messenger to leave the office without ]eav. ing a substitute, buhit cannot be denied that that negligence is excusable because there was no deliberate intent on their part to cause inconvenience to the court, or delay the administration of justice. On the other hand, there is no ehowing that counsel is guilty o{ any attempt to delay the proceedings, or of any act of bad faith or inexcusable ne~ligence which may warrant disciplinary action; on the contrary, it is the first time that he has been placed in a predicament where his client ha.s been declared in default. These consideratio:ns warrant that the ease be reopened &nd defendants be given one more opportunity to answer and present their evidence. Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. The pe. titian for relief of defendants is granted and defendants are given ten UOJ days from notice to answer the complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C.J., Bcnuznn, Padilla., Tuason, ftlonten;ayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrndnr, J.J., concur. Pablo, J., took no pwrt. VIII Hernando Pabilonia a,nd Romen Pabilonia, Petitioners, vs. llon. Vi. cente Santiago, Judge Court of First /II.stance of Quezon Province, Hranch II; Antonia Aba..s and Panfilo Nauar, Respondents; G. R. No. L-5110; July 29, 1953; Court of Industrial Rdations; it has nc power W nwdify cm award confirmed by S11pn:me Court.-While Sec. 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended appa.rently authorizes the Court of Industrial Relations to modify an award at any time during its effectiveness, there is nothing in the wording to suggest that the Court of Industrial Relations may modify ·an award that has been affirmed by th<" Supreme Court after an order for tl:te execution of that award has .already become final. Potenciano A. Magtibay for petitioners. G. N. Trinidad for respondents. DECISION REYES, J.: The petitioners in these two cases challenge the validity :..nd seek the annulment of &n order of the Court of Industrial Relations by which that court gave to a motion for modification of a judgment that had already become -final. Though .differing in form - one CG. R. No. L-6265) an appeal by certiorari --.- the two cases are but Ont! in substance u.nd purpose, and should be adjudicated togeth~l'. This decision is, therefore, rendered for the adjudication of both. It appears that, on November 23, 1946, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded wage increases to the laborers of Dee C. Chual". & Sons, Inc., a Philippine corporation in the iumbcr businets, the laborers being then represented by the Kaisa.han ng Manggagawa sa 76 TH~ LAWYERS JOURNAL February 28, 19f~

Date

1954

Rights