Supreme Court Decisions, Busacay vs. Buenaventura - Justine Tuason.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Busacay vs. Buenaventura - Justine Tuason.pdf

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

extracted text: ~ion and control of the financial Affairs of the provincial, city and municipal governments," and providing, among other matters, fo1; lhe submissirm to the said Secretary, through the Secretary of the Interior, of the local budgets which are "to contain the planti11a of fJersonncl.'' Petitioner contends that Hcpublic Act No. 528, approved on June 16, 1950, abrogated Executive Order No. 167 and that, moreover, that C'Xecutive order is unconstitutional in that. thereby the Chief Exccutivcf assumes cor.trol as well as supcn:ision of local gov('rr.ments, whereas by Section 10(1 J of Article VII of the Constitution tht::. President only has "gcncrnl supervision" over such governments. Republic Act No. 528 amended Section 2081 of the Revised Administrative Code so as to read as follows: "Section. 2081. Ei1111loym. "Jnl of subordinates.- The Provincial Board shall rix the number of assistants, deputies, clerks, and other enoployees for the va.rious branches of the provincial government and in accordance with the Salary Law to fix the rates of salary or wage they shall receive. "After their number and compensation shall have been thus determined, the Pl'Ovincial Governor shall, any provision of exist.. i11g law tu the contrar~· notwilhstaudi11g, appoint, upon recommendation of the chief provincial official concerned, all the sub0rdinate officers and cmployccs in the \'arious branches of the provi!1cial goYernment whose salaries, compensation or wages arc paid, wholly from Jll'Ovincial funds, in conformity \Vith the provisions of the Civil Service La\\·, except those whose appointments are now or may hereafter be vested in the Presidellt or 11ropcr Depa.t tment Head, teachers and other school employees and transient officials or employees who shall, as heretofore, be appointed by the proper chief uf provincial office with the appl'Oval of the Department Head concerned x x x" Assuming, without deciding, that this Act has superseded previous enactments and executive orders inconsistent therewith, yet, it will be 11oticed, the powers conferred ou local entities by the statute arc subject to the condition that they be exercised in accordance with the Salary Law and the Civil Service Law. Upon this assumption the question then arises, is pelitioner'3 new salary of f3,600 yearly in conformity to the Salary Law? No question is raised as to the i'"-titioner's civil service eligibility. Executive Order No. !.14, seric;; of 1947, •·reorganizing the different departme;its, bureaus, offices, and agencies of the liovernment oi the Republic of the Philippines, etc." and issued by virtue of Hqh.1blic Act No. 51, entitled "An act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities oi the Government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it," amended Commonwealth Act No. 402, The Salary Law, and classifies into 15 gra.dcs, with salaries ranging from f2,400 to 1'6,000 per an num, chiefs oi divisions, chiefs of sections, supervisory positions ancl positions of equal ranks, the rates of compensation being based un the natui·e of work performed, "latitude for the exercise of independent judgment," the importance and size of divisions or sections, ou the technical, professional and experience of the incumbents, and the like. Petitioner alleges in his petition that his position as secretary b the provincial governor "requires and imposes on him the exercise and performance of judgme~t and functions falling under Grade l wh ich p1·cscribes a salary of ro,ooo per annum." He stated in his memorandum in the court below that he is " the administrative head or chief of the Office of the Governor," "required to perform the administrative direction and with a very wide latitude for the exe1·cise of independent judgment." And in his brief filed in this instance the claim is made that he "supervises the 11ersonnel of such <Gov. ernor's) cffice an<l the 1n·ovinclal jail," "is also the head of the local and municipal divisions in Samar," and "ca.JTies out confidential measures required of him by the Governor." He says in addition that "he is a lawyer of Jong experience in practice.'' On the other side, it is asserted that the JH!lili':mer's position comes under Grade 13 for which the compensation authorized is P"J,760 per annum. The classification of positions by Executive Order No. !.14, series of 1947, Is loose and the demarcation lines between the grades quite indefinite. But it is fairly certain that, giving petitioner the full extent and benefit of his description of his job, the Secretary of Finance has not departed from the standard set by the schedules of salaries laid down in the executive order just mentioned, in placing petitioner's position within Grade 12-15. Actually, it has been seen, he is allowed the salary provided for Grade 11, which we believe calls for a latitude or independent judgment, technical training and experience, anti supervisory work and ability well above those demonstrated by tiw allegations. The claim that the position of secretary to the provincial governor of a first class A province comes within 1-8, inclusive, is at best highly controversial. But granting again, for the purpose of this case, that by a very liberal interpretation petitioner could qualify under any of these grades as well as Grades 12 to 15, the opinion of the Secretary of Finance, nevertheless, should be entitled to respect and preference in case of overlapping of grades and their definitions and of divergence of views, this official being the instrumentlity charged with supervising the allocation of salaries in local governments. He is to judge the kind and degree of ability, experience, training and other circumstances needed to discharge the duties of each position. It is a. manifest 1iolicy of Congress that there be a central authority lo establish uniformity in the emoluments of officers aud employees of equal ranks in the numerous provinces and other local entities. Determination of the rates of compensation of such officers and employees cannot be left to the will and discretion of each provincial boatd or city or municipal c:ouneil, if there is to be "standardization of salaries," "equal distribution of funds for salary expenses among the different provincial offices," 01· security of "the financial solvency and stability of the provinces," as pl'Ovided by Executive Order Nn. 167, series of 1938. F1'om the stu.ndpoint of the Constitution to which the petitioner would cast this case, we perceive no valid objection to the intervention by the Secretary of 1-~inance in the application and enforcement of the SaJary Law. Classification throug;1 the President of government 1•ositions is a legislative prel'Ogative, and the President's designation by executive m·de1· of his chief financia l officer to see that the classification and the Salary Law are observed by local governments, is a legitimate exercise of the power of supervision vested in the Chief Executive by Section 10 (IJ, Article VII, of the Constitution. Finding no reversible el'for in the dismissal of the proceeding by the court below, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. Purus, Pablu, Po.dilla, Jllu1di:11w/f"'" Heyes, J11yo, Bautista Aityelo, and Lab'l" . .l(lor, J. J., concur. Ill M ~1HCNUNO BUSAC.'1.Y, 1-'LAJN1'Il'F AJ\!0 Al'JJJ::LLANT VS. A NTONIU f'. JJUt:NAVENTUJ:A. AS PHOVJNCIAL TREASUHl'R OF' PANGASINA."' & ALF'HE'1JU lltURAO, DEFENDANTS AND APJ'EJ,LEES, G. R. No. L-bS56, SEPTb'MBER 23, 1%3. PURLIC OFFICEHS; ' WHI..;N A POSITION MAY BE DEEMED ABOLISHED. - A was tl1e toll collector of a bridge which was destroyed by flood; hence he and two other toll collectors were laid off. When the bl'idge was 1·econstructed and reopened to triffic A notified the provincial treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties as toll collector but the treasurer refused to reinstate or reappoint him. Held: ( J) The collapse of said bridge did not destroy but only suspended A's position; therefore, upon the bridge's 1·ehabilitation and rcoperation as a toll bridge A's right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. (2) To conside1· an office abolish~d there must have been an intentfon to do away with it wholly and permanently, as the word ''abolish" denotes. (3) The pusition of toll collector is temporary, tr2nsito1·y, or precarious univ in the sense that its life is co-extensive with that of the bri~lgc <IS a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by statutes arc more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL G9 that they are subject to the power of the legisla.tul'e to abolish them. Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Cnstillv for nppellani. Ffrsl Asst. Sol. Gen. Ruperto f(Uput<an J1·. & Sol. Jcs11s A. A1:ance1ia for appellee. DECISION TUAZON, J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, for bck of merit, an application for mandamus and quo warranto with a demand for back pay and/or damages. The cause wa.s submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, the relative portions of which are condensed below. The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan. His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at the rate of f'720.00 per annum. On Ma.rch 21, lp46, he resigned bU.t on April 16 he was reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laici off. Previously, from July to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not been paid salaries because they had not. rendered any service, but upon the reopening of the bridge to traffic after the repairs1 hti and his companions resumed work without new appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947, \Vhen the bridge was reconstructed and reopened t.o traffic a.bout the end of November, 1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in February, l!J51, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The positi'on now carries a salary of Pl,440.00 a year. · The Hued toll b1'idge is a portion of a national road and is a nat.iona.l toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees thereon, and prescribed corresponding rnles and regula.tions. Main ground for denial of the petition by the lower court is that. thr position in dispute is temporary and its functions transitory and precarious. The Solicitor General in this instance simplifies the issue by confining the point of discussion to whether 01· not by the total destruction of the bridge in Hl47 the position of toll collectors provided therefor were abolished. He opines that they were. We agree with the Solicitor General's approach of the case but are constrained to disagree with his conclusions. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently, as the word ''abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought, avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather t.he contrary was taken for grant. ed, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon and to Baguio. This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. This position is temporary, transit.ory or precarious only in the sense that its life is co-extensive with that. of the b1·idge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by stat.ute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that. they are subject to the power Or the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the oJfices exist, except for cause. The fact that the destruction of the bridge In question was ~ote.l and not partial as in 1945, the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments wl:re not considered forfeited not.withstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed. Some of 'such cases came up before this Court and we specially refer to Abaya v. Alvear, G. R. No. L-1793, Garces v. Bello, G. R. No. L-1363, and Tavora v. Gavifia et al., G. R. No. L-1257. Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to lhl: position he held before the destruction of the Bued river bridge. The cla.im for back salary and/ or damages may not be granted, hcwever. .Without deciding the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit: The decision of the t.ria! court is reversed in so far as it. denies the petitioner's reinstatement, which is hereby decreed, and affirmed with t·espect to the suit for back salary and damages, without special finding as to. costs. Pam,;, Pablo, Be11::011, Patliflu, llfoulem{t.yor, Rey<,s, .fuqo, and Bautistn ~111velo, J, J., concur. IV l~ucia Javier, Petitioner ·us. J. Antunio Amneta et al., Respondents, G. R. No. L-4369, August 31, 1953. CIVIL PROCEDURE; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AFTER CASE HAD BEEN DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT; DEATH OF' DEFENDANT. -While the trial court was in the process of re· ceiving evidence on damages incident to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunct.ion, J the defendant., died and because of this event the trial court entertained the view that the claim for damages should be denied because the claim should be filed against the estate. of the deceased. HELD: The finding of the trial court that the claim for damages of respondents should be denied because of t he death of the deceased and that the claim should be filed against the estate of the latter is not well takeu. This result only obtains if the claim is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant. dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, <Rule 3, Section 21, Rules of Court), but not when the claim is for damages for an injury lo person or property, (Rule 88, Section 1 idem). In the present Jll'OCecding, the claim for damages had arisen, not while the action was pending in the Court of First Instance, but after the case had been decided by the Supreme Coul't. Moreover, the claim of respondent is not merely for money or debt but for d~mages to said i·espondent. A/h,wtu de Joyn for vcti!ioncr, Ara.nela and Arunetlt fur re;;. pondent. RESOLUTION BAUT1STA ANGELO, J.: Ott Oct-Ober 30, 1951, this Court dismissed the petition for Cl'f· tiorari interposed by Lucia Javier and dissolved the preliminary injunction issued as prayed for in said petition. Before this decision has become final, a petition was filed in this Court 111·aying that the damages suffered by respondent resulting from the issuance of the writ be assessed either by the Supreme Court ot· by the court of origin. On November 21, 1951, acting favorably 011 said petition, this Court directed the trial court to make a finding of the damages allegedly suffered by respondent., and on August HI, 1953, this Court was furnished with a copy · of the order entered by t.he trial court on August 12, 1953, wherein it denied the motion of respondent to assess the damages 'as directed by this Court 70 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL February 28, 19G1
Date: 1954
Rights