Supreme Court Decisions, Lopez vs. Matias Vda. De Tinio - Justice Padilla.pdf

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Kahoy sa. ll'ilipinas and tht! CLO. On July 23, 194S, following a strike sfaged by the laborers, that coqrt again awarded them wage increases coupled with vacation and sick leave with pa.y. Taken to the Supreme Court by a writ of certiorari, this latter award was affirmed in toto on January 28, 1950. The conipany, hoirever, filed a motion for reconsideration, and pending determination of this motion in the Supreme Court, the company filed another motion, dated March 31, 1950, in the Court of Industrial Relations asking for a modification of both the award of November 23, 1946 and that of July 23, 1948, on the grounds that conditions had changed since those awards were amde' due to losses suffe1·ed by the company in 1948 and 1949, the down trend in the cost of living, and _ the reduction of wages in other lumber companies. This motion for modification wa&i docketed as case No. 71-Vl6>, but consideration thereof was suspended pending the i·esolution of the motion fo1· reconsideration in the Supreme Court. On July 3, 1950, the Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration, and its decision having been declared final and execu. tory on July 6, the pre.sent petitioners filed a motion in the Court of Jndush-ial Relations asking for the execution of the judgment: The company agretd to the execution with respect to the wage increases fOr .194'1 but objected with re_ spect to the wage increases for 1948, 1949 · alid-1950 for reasons already alleged in its motion for :i:nodification:· The motion for ~xecution an<l the motion for ruodifiCation were hEard together - each being considered a reply to the other - and thereafter the Court of Jndustrial Relations, under date of Nov. 24, 1950, .rendered an order declaring itself without authority to modify an award for an increase of wages .. fo1· the period of the pendency of the, appeal in the Supreme Court" and 01·dering the corresponding writ of execution to be issued "in accordance with the decision of July 2:;, 1948 x x x." Reconsideration of this 01·der having been denied, the company petitioned the Supreme Court for a w1·it of certiorari <G.R. No, L-4680J to have the order annulled. But the petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the dismissal beca.me final on May 25, 1951. That was the status of the case when the Court of Industrial Relations, at the instance of the Company, issued the order of 1\Iay 2~, 1952, by which that coul't gave course to the motion for modification of th~ award that ha.d already become final by ordering an examination of the t:ompany's books of account and otheL· pertinent reco1·d to ascertain "its financial condition for the years Hl48, 1949 and 1950" so as "to enable the Court to determine the justice, equity and subst1mtial merits of the case coucerning the modification of the award of July 23, 1948 x x x." It is this order that the laborers brought to this Court fo1· review after the <:ou1·t below, with two of its judges dissenting, had i·efused to reconside1· it. At the time the orde1· was issued, the award was already 011 its way to being executed as1 the amounts due the laborers thereunder had a.lready been computed by the court examiner and were then being discussed in court. The laborers, therefore, maintain that the award could no longer be modified so that the order giving course to the motion for modific~tion was a nullity. Brushing aside all technicalities, the broad question presented for determination is whether the Court of Jndustrial Relations may modify an a.ward that has been affirmed by the Supreme Court after a order for the execution of that award has already become final. Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended i·eads: "Sec. 17. Li?Jlit of effectiveness of award. - An award, order or decision of the Court shall be valid and effective during the time therein specified. Jn the absence of such specification, any party or both parties to a controversy may terminate the effectiveness of an award, order or decision after three years have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by giving ·notice to that effect to the Court: Provided, however, that any time during the eHectiveness of an a.ward, order or decision, the Court may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or i·copcn any question involved therein." While the above .:;ection apparently authorizes the modifica.tion of an award at any time. during its effectiveness, there is nothing jn its wording to suggest that such modification may be authorized even after the order for the execution or the award has already becom1:: fmal - with respect, of course, to the period tha.t had already elapsed at the time_ the order was issued. To read such authority into the law would make of litigations between capital and labor an endless affair, with the Industrial Court acting like a modern Penelope, who puts off her suitors by unraveling every night what she has woven by day. Such a result could not have been contemplated by the Act creating said court. Conformably to the above, the order complained of is annulled and set aside insofar as it aifrds or retards the execution of the award of July 23, 1948 for the yea.rs 1948, 1949 and 1950, So orde1·ed. Ricardo Paras, Guillermo F. Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Sabino Padilla, Pedro Tuason, Marceliano R. Montemayor, Fernaudo Jugo, Fe. fix Bautista Angelo, Alejo Labrador, concur. IX Ne1· J. Lope;:, versus J,ucia Y. Matias Vda. de Tinio and the Hfln. Judge Gwillen1~-!I R. Cabrera, of the .ll1wnicip11l Court of Manila, B• ranch Ill, G. R. No. I L-6005, promulgated on De1:eml;er 29, 19f.3. APPE_ AL; DENIAL OF MOTION TO DJSMISS NOT APPEALARLE. ~ A denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory prder and e.s such not appealable nor can be the. subject of certiorari. After an adverse judgment of a municipal court, the defendant may appeal. This is his remedy. ·Jovc1-. Led•1sma rnid J>nno for petitioner:.appellant. Reyes and Nuiiez for respondents. DECJSION PADILLA, J.: In a detainer action Lucia Y. Matias Vda de Tinio sought to dispossess Ner J. Lopez of a lot located on Evangelista street, Manila. foe failure to pay the stipulated rentals. A motion to dismiss the complaint on t-he ground that it states no cause of action was denied. Whereupon, the defenllant in the detainer ca.se filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for a writ of certiora1·i with preliminary injunction. Th~ Court denied the petition and from the order deny- • ing it he has appooled. That the municipal court of Manila has jurisdiction to try and decide the action for detainer brought by the appellee Lucia Y. Matih~ Vda. de Tinio again'st the appellant cannot be disputed. It does not appear that the appellee attached to her complaint the conract of lease, upon which the appellant i·elies to ask fo1· the dismissal of the complaint. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and whethe1· a court has jurisdiction over an action brought to it is ascertained from and determined upon the ultimate material facts pleaded in the complaint. Matters of defense such as the one raised by the appellant may be pleaded in his answer. After issues have been joined the court must proceed to hear the evidence of both parties and render judgment. ]t is well-settled in this jurisdiction that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and not appealable. As heretofore stated, there is no question that the municipal court of Manila has jurisdiction over an action for detainer, and if the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be appealed because it is interlocutory, much less would a petition fer a writ of certiorari lie. After an adverse judgment by the .municipal court the defendant may appeal. That is his i·emedy and not the extraordinary one for a writ oi' certiora.ri. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Paras, C./., Beng:zo11, J11go, Pablo, Tunson, Bauista. Angclu, a1lci Labrador, concur. Montemayor, J., tool• no pa1·t. x Lennor ltogel, alias Sister Angelica of the S. Hen,rt, and Angela. Vogel, alias Sister Marie Du Rosaire, versus Sattirnino i1ioldero, <:, N. No. L-4972, September 25, 1953. LAND REGISTRATION; REGISTER OF DEEDS; RECOURSE WHEN DEED 01'' SALE IS RE1'~USED INSCRIPTION AND February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 77
Date
1954
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In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted