Supreme Court Decisions, Orias et l. vs. Ribo et al - Justine Bautista Angelo.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Orias et l. vs. Ribo et al - Justine Bautista Angelo.pdf

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extracted text: that they are subject to the power of the legisla.tul'e to abolish them. Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Cnstillv for nppellani. Ffrsl Asst. Sol. Gen. Ruperto f(Uput<an J1·. & Sol. Jcs11s A. A1:ance1ia for appellee. DECISION TUAZON, J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, for bck of merit, an application for mandamus and quo warranto with a demand for back pay and/or damages. The cause wa.s submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, the relative portions of which are condensed below. The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan. His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. On October 18, 1945, after liberation, he was reappointed to that position with compensation at the rate of f'720.00 per annum. On Ma.rch 21, lp46, he resigned bU.t on April 16 he was reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947, when the bridge was destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laici off. Previously, from July to September 10, 1946, the bridge had been temporarily closed to traffic due to minor repairs and during that period he and his fellow toll collectors had not been paid salaries because they had not. rendered any service, but upon the reopening of the bridge to traffic after the repairs1 hti and his companions resumed work without new appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947, \Vhen the bridge was reconstructed and reopened t.o traffic a.bout the end of November, 1950, the plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint him. Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in February, l!J51, and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since. The positi'on now carries a salary of Pl,440.00 a year. · The Hued toll b1'idge is a portion of a national road and is a nat.iona.l toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation was set aside for these salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 15, 1950, the board on toll bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees thereon, and prescribed corresponding rnles and regula.tions. Main ground for denial of the petition by the lower court is that. thr position in dispute is temporary and its functions transitory and precarious. The Solicitor General in this instance simplifies the issue by confining the point of discussion to whether 01· not by the total destruction of the bridge in Hl47 the position of toll collectors provided therefor were abolished. He opines that they were. We agree with the Solicitor General's approach of the case but are constrained to disagree with his conclusions. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently, as the word ''abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought, avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. Rather t.he contrary was taken for grant. ed, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in northern Luzon and to Baguio. This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not, in our opinion, work to destroy but only to suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. This position is temporary, transit.ory or precarious only in the sense that its life is co-extensive with that. of the b1·idge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by stat.ute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that. they are subject to the power Or the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the oJfices exist, except for cause. The fact that the destruction of the bridge In question was ~ote.l and not partial as in 1945, the length of time it took to reconstruct it, and the hypothetical supposition that the new structure could have been built across another part of the river, are mere matters of detail and do not alter the proposition that the positions of toll collector were not eliminated. We believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments wl:re not considered forfeited not.withstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines and who were allowed to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new appointments are pertinent authority for the views here expressed. Some of 'such cases came up before this Court and we specially refer to Abaya v. Alvear, G. R. No. L-1793, Garces v. Bello, G. R. No. L-1363, and Tavora v. Gavifia et al., G. R. No. L-1257. Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to lhl: position he held before the destruction of the Bued river bridge. The cla.im for back salary and/ or damages may not be granted, hcwever. .Without deciding the merit of this claim, it is our opinion that the respondent Provincial Treasurer is not personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without proper authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to the suit: The decision of the t.ria! court is reversed in so far as it. denies the petitioner's reinstatement, which is hereby decreed, and affirmed with t·espect to the suit for back salary and damages, without special finding as to. costs. Pam,;, Pablo, Be11::011, Patliflu, llfoulem{t.yor, Rey<,s, .fuqo, and Bautistn ~111velo, J, J., concur. IV l~ucia Javier, Petitioner ·us. J. Antunio Amneta et al., Respondents, G. R. No. L-4369, August 31, 1953. CIVIL PROCEDURE; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AFTER CASE HAD BEEN DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT; DEATH OF' DEFENDANT. -While the trial court was in the process of re· ceiving evidence on damages incident to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunct.ion, J the defendant., died and because of this event the trial court entertained the view that the claim for damages should be denied because the claim should be filed against the estate. of the deceased. HELD: The finding of the trial court that the claim for damages of respondents should be denied because of t he death of the deceased and that the claim should be filed against the estate of the latter is not well takeu. This result only obtains if the claim is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant. dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, <Rule 3, Section 21, Rules of Court), but not when the claim is for damages for an injury lo person or property, (Rule 88, Section 1 idem). In the present Jll'OCecding, the claim for damages had arisen, not while the action was pending in the Court of First Instance, but after the case had been decided by the Supreme Coul't. Moreover, the claim of respondent is not merely for money or debt but for d~mages to said i·espondent. A/h,wtu de Joyn for vcti!ioncr, Ara.nela and Arunetlt fur re;;. pondent. RESOLUTION BAUT1STA ANGELO, J.: Ott Oct-Ober 30, 1951, this Court dismissed the petition for Cl'f· tiorari interposed by Lucia Javier and dissolved the preliminary injunction issued as prayed for in said petition. Before this decision has become final, a petition was filed in this Court 111·aying that the damages suffered by respondent resulting from the issuance of the writ be assessed either by the Supreme Court ot· by the court of origin. On November 21, 1951, acting favorably 011 said petition, this Court directed the trial court to make a finding of the damages allegedly suffered by respondent., and on August HI, 1953, this Court was furnished with a copy · of the order entered by t.he trial court on August 12, 1953, wherein it denied the motion of respondent to assess the damages 'as directed by this Court 70 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL February 28, 19G1 and oidered that the record 'be forWarded to the 1atler Court for v whatever action it may deem proper to take in the premises. TEODULO T. ORIAS, ET AL., VS. MAMERTO S. RIBO ET. AL., It appears that while the trial court was in the process of re- G.R. No. L-4945, October 28, 1953. ceiving evidence on the dama&"eS incident . to the issuance of ~he writ of preliminary injunction, Lucia Javier, the defendant, died and because of this supervening event, the trial court ent~rtainti'd the view that the claim for damages should be denied because that claim should be filed against the estate o( the deceased; It also / appears that, when respondent pressed for action on his motion for assessment of damages, counsel for the bonding party, Alto Surety Company, opposed said move on the ground that the action contemplated is too late because the order of the trial court denying respondent's motion for reconsideration and cancelling the bond filed by the surety has already become final and unappealable; and considering that a petition for damages holding the surety liable should be filed bdoi·e judgment becomes final, the court sustained ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT WITHOUT EXAMINATION AND· CERTIFICATION BY THE CIVIL SERVICE.-Appointments under Sec. 682 of the Hcviscd Administrative Code, as amended by Com. Acts Nos. 177 and 281 are temporary, when the public interests so require and only upon the prior authbrization of t he Commissioner of Civil the opposition and denied the motion to assess damages. The incident is now before this Court for the corres1ionding appropriate action. The finding of the trial coul't that the claim for damages of respondent should be denied because of the death of the debtor, Lucia Javier, and the claim should be. filed against the estate of the latter, is not well taken. This result 011ly obtains if the claim is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and tl1e defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, (Rule 3, Section 21, Rules of Court), but not when the claim is for damages for an injui'Y to person or property, (Ruic 68, S.ection 1, I dem). In the present proceeding, the claim for damages had arisen, not while the action was pending in the Court of First Instance, but after the case had been decided by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the claim of respondent is not merely for money or debt but for damages to said respondent. Thus, Chief Justice Moran, commenting on .Soction 1, Ruic 3, says : "The above section has now removed all doubts by expressly 1iroviding that the action should be discontinued upon defendant's death if it is for the recovery of moneY, debt, or interest thereon, while, on the other hand, in Rwle 88, Section 1, it is provided that nctivns to recover damages for injitry tv person or .property, real or personal, many be maintained against t he executor or daministrator of the deceased." <Moran, Comments on the Ru'Jes of Court., Vol. 1, 1952 ed., p. 109.) On the otheJ" han<l, under Ru!e 3, Section 17, Rules of Court, when a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order the legal representative of the deceased, or the heirs to be substituted for him within a period of 30 days, or with· in such time as may be granted. Here, it appears that no step has so far been taken relative to the settlement of the estate, nor an executor or administrator of the estate has been appointed. This deficiency may be obviated by ni;?.king the heirs take the place of the deceased. The claim that t he move of respondent to have the damages assessed against Lucia Javier has come late because the order of the couit denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent and cancelling the bond filed by the surety has already become fina.l and unappealable, is not also well taken, it appearing that the motmn of respondent pressing for action on the motion to assess damages was filed only five days after said order has been entered. It should be noted that the original order entered by the court on April 7, 1953, was not a denial of the claim but merely a statement of its view that no action thereon can be taken in view of the death of Lucia Javier because in its opinion the claim should be filed against her estate, and the order which ordered the cancellation of the bond was entered only on May 27, 1953. It appearing that the trial court has refrained from assessing the damages which it was directed to assess in the resolution of thi_s _Court issued on November 21, 1951, for reasons which, in the opm1on of the couit, are not well founded, it is the sense of this Court that the record should be remanded to the trial court for it to act as directed in said resolution. Parus, Br.ny;o11, 1'uozo11, Heyt>s, FadiU,1, iUonfemayor, Juyo, and LuliMdor, concur. Pablo, J. took no pa1-t. Service, not to exceed three mont.hs and in no ca.se shall extend beyond thirty days from receipt by the chief of the bureau or office of the Commissioner's certification of eligibles. Id., Id. - The fact that the peitioners who were appointed under Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Com. Acls Nos. 177 and 281 held the positions for more than thre<" months does not make them civil service eligibles. IJ., Id. - The fact that the acting Commissioner of Civil Service authorized their appointments "u:1der section 682 of the Revised Administ!'ative Code W continue only until replaced by an eligible" docs not make them eligibles. ' hi., Id. - The hol<liug of a JJOsition by a temporary appointee until replaced by an eligible in disl'egard of the lime limitation of three month3 is unauthorizeP. and illegal. Id., Id. - The temporary appointment of other non-eligibles to replace those whose term have expired is not prohibited. Pri:scv ill. Bitos for res1wnde1ds-appellant1J and Gow::ales and Acasio 'fo1· reispondeufs-a.ppellees, Pruvi11cial Guards. Filcmon Saavedra for /l(fitioners-appellanfis. DECISION PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for a writ of (/IW warm11fo to test the legality of the a1ipointmcnts of Isidro Magallanes as deputy provincial warJen, Pedro Floi·ca as cor1Joral of the 11rovincial guards, and Crisanto Cab, Da.lmacio CoJ"lel, Rafael Galleon, Bienvenido Gonzales, Filomeno Adobas, Franciscv Tavera, Jacinto Barro, Constancio Acasio, Teresa Caindoy, Narciso Ravago and Arcadia Maglines, as provincial guards of Lcytc, with Station at Maasin; and of 111-andanms to compel the respondent Mamerto S. Ribo in his capacity as provincial governor to reinstate the petitioners in the positions held by his co-respondents named above, and him <Ribo) and Melecio Palma, the latter in his capacity as provincial treasurer of Leytc, to pay the unpaid sale.ries allegedly due the petitioners from 1 November 1950 up to the final disposition of this case, and Francisco P. Lopez, in his capacity as clerk of the Court oi First lllstancc of Lcytc, to turn over to the JJctitioncrs all the prisoners in the pro_vincia.l jail. Simultaneously on 12 April 1951 the parties entered into the following stipulations of facts, the fil·st reading as followsThe petitioners and the respondents Provincial Goveri1or Mamerto S. Ribo and Provincial Treasm·er Melecio Palma assisted by their respective counsels l1ave come to the following: AGREED STATEMENTS OF FACTS J . Tlw.t residences of 11eti~ionera and 1·es110ndents are admitte<l to be that of Leyte as well as of iheir respective capacities; 2. That the respondents admit the appointment and commissions of the petitioners per Exhibits A, A-1 to A-14. In each and every appointment Qf said petitions appear the following authorization by the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service: "AUTHORIZED under Sec. 682 ot the Revised Adminislra.tive Code to continue only until replaced by an eligible, but not beyond thil·ty <30) days from the date of receipt of the certification of eligibles, provided, there is no qualified employee from the ranks who may be promotl'd to the positions involved. <Sgd.> Acting Commissioner of Civil Service" 3. That the respondent Govt:mor Ribo addressed a communicatio11 to petitioners infol'lning the latter t-hat their servi<:es were onlered tCl'minatcd as of the lasl worki11g hours of October 31, l!J50; 4. That the 1istitionet·s arc a.11 marricd and have their children except Felipe Enelo, Vedasto CabaleS and Teotimo Mullet who arc still single; G. That the petitioners have not received their salaries corFcoruary 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 71
Date: 1954
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