Supreme Court Decisions, Santos vs. Aquino et al. - Justice Padilla.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Santos vs. Aquino et al. - Justice Padilla.pdf

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extracted text: the 1ires1:nt petition for cel"tforari and mundamus, asking th.rt the said or1for be annulled as having been issued without jurisdiction, and that a writ issue commanding the judge below to lift the stay of tl>.eeution. Courts of first instance in detainer cases are authorized to grant execution upon appellant's failure to deposit the monthly rents on time during the pendency of the appeal. But this CourL has already ruled that execution may be denied where the delay in making the deposit was due to fraud, error or excusable negligence. (Bantug vs. Roxas, 73 Plul. 13; Gunaan vs. Rodas, 44 Off. Gaz., 4927; Yu Phi Khim vs. Amparo, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, 98>. Jn the present case, the deposit was late, but the lower court hac excused the de!Ry as being due to an honest belief that the supersedeas bond cove1·i!d both past and Iut.ure rents - as therein expressly stipulated - and that, after all, appellant's right to remain in office and enjoy its emoluments, including free quarters, was still pending determination in the Court of Industrial Relations. The lower court, in our opinion, acted with justice and equity and only followed the precedent established in the cases above cited when it rendered the resolution herein complained of. Pending decision on this petition for certiorari and mandamus, counsel for the company, on March 18, 1952, filed a supplemental pleading, compl'aining that on the 3rd of that month the lower court had denied another motion for tixecution based on Valencia's failure to deposit the rental for January l)f that year. It appeal's from the order of denial that the lower court considered the new motion for execution as involving the same question as those which gave rise to the present case and which were denied because of "unique or ex. ceptional circumstances" that, in its opinion, made suspensiori of execution "more in consonance with justice and equity," for which reason the court again had to deny immediate execution" at least, until Supreme Court has passed upon the questioned orders." Now that a decision has come down from the Court of Industrial Relations ordedng Valencia's reinstatement, and with the certiorari case CG. R. No. L-6158) for the review of that decision already heard, we ar:! not disposed to interfere with the exercise of discretion which the lower court has made in the last order complained of for the maintenance of a status quo. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is deni~, with costs against t~e petitioner. Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor; Jugo; Bautista Angelo and Labrador, J.J., concur. xv Angeles S. Santos, petitioner-appellrmt vs. Paterio Aquir.o et ril., respundertts.1rppcllet s, G. R. No. L-C>lOl, November 28, 1953. 1. CJVIL PROCEDURE; DECLARATORY RELIEF; ORDINANCE NOT AMBIGUOUS OR DOUBTFUL.-Therc can be no action for declaratory relief, where the terms of the ordinances assailed arc not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. 2. IDEM; JDEM; RELIEF MUST BE "iSKED BEFORE VIOLATION OF THE ORDINANCE.-Granting that the validity or legality of the ordinance may be drawn in question in action for declaratory relief, such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be committed (Section 2, Rule 66, Rues of Court). When this action was brought on 12 May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordin!rnces, the tax rate of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for declaratory relief. 3. lDEM; IDEM; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.-The petitioner, does not aver nor does he testify that he is the owner or part owner of "Cine Concepcion." He alleges that he is only the manager thereof. For that reason he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be affected by the municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to bring this action either for deeh1.ratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently is the purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that actions must be brought in the name of the real party in interest (Section 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. (1 C.J.S. 1074-1049.) The fact that he is the manager of the theater does not make him a real party in interest, 4. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS; MUNICIPAL COUNCJL EMPOWERED TO ADOPT ORDINANCES IMPOSING TAXES WHICH ARE NOT EXCESSIVE, UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE OR CONFISCATORY.-Under Com. Act No. 472 the Municipal Council of Malabon is authorized and empowered to adopt the ordinances in question, and there being no showing, as the evidence does not show, that the rate of the municipal taxes therein provided is excessive, unjust, oppressive and confiscat.-Ory, their validity and legality must be upheld. The rate of the taxes in both ordinances, to wit: Pl,000 a year for "Class A cinematogi·aphs having orchestra, balcony and lodge seats" in Ordinance No. 61, series, of 1946, (Approved by the Department of Finance on 11 June 1947. So the tax for 1947 to be collected was Pl80 plus 50% of the original tax, or P90, or a total of P270), and P2,000 for each theater or cinematograph with gross annual receipts amounting to P130,000 or more in Ordinance 10, series Of 1947, (Approved by the Department of Finance at a reduced rate on 3 November 1948. So the tax for 1948 was that imposed by Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, approved on 11 June 1947, as reduced and approved by the Department of Finance on 3 November 1948.) under which the "Cine Concepcion" falls, is not excessive but fair and just. 5. IDEM; IDEM; .MUNICIPAL COUNCILS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES.-Municipal councils are not constitutional bot.lies but creatures of the Congress. The latter may even abolish or replace them with other government instrumentalities. Arse1~io Paez for appellant. AcHng P·rovincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal Irineo V. Berrn.vrdo for appellees. I DECISION PADILLA, J.: This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to have Ordinance No. 61, sr.ries ot 1946, and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void; to prevent the collection of surcharges and penalties for failure to pay the taxes imposed by the ordinances referred to, except for such failure from and after the taxpayer shall have been served with the notice of the effcctivity of the ordinances; and to enjoin th<o respondents, their agents and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from enforcing the ordinances referred to and from making any collection thereunder. Further, petitione1· prays for such other remedy and relief as may be deemed just and equitable and asks that costs be taxed against the respondents. The petitioner is the manager of a theater known ai:i "Cine Concepcion," located and operated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the respondents are the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and ~he Municipal Treasurer, of Malahan. The petitioner avers that Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon on 8 December 1946, im· poses a license tax of Pl,000 per annum on the said theater in addition to a license tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in Malabon, pursuant to Ordinance No. 61, the same series; that prior to 8 December 1946 the municipal license tax paid by the petitioner on "Cine Concepcion" was r1so, pursuant to Ordinance No. 9, series of 1945; that on 6 December 1947, the Municipal Council of Malabon adopted Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, imposing a graduated municipal license tax on th('aters and cincmatographs from P200 to P9,000 per annum; that the ordinance was submitted 'for approval to · the Department of Finance, which reduced the rate of taxes provided therein. and th•· ordinance with the reduced rate of taxes was approved on 3 November 1948; that notice of reduction of the tii.x rate and :.1pproval by the Department of Finance of said graduated municipal license :February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL ·~ ·tax provided tor in .Said Ordinu.nce No. 10, as reduced, was served on the ·petitioner on 12 Febrµary 1949 when the respondent Municipal Treasurer present.ed a bill for collection thereof; that Ordinance No. s1: series of 1!'146, i8 ultra vires and repugnant to the pi-ovisions of the Constitution on taxation; that its approval was nof in accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, is also null -and void, because the Department of Finance that· approved it act.ed in excess and against the powers· granted it by .Jaw, and is- WljJtst, o!l~res~ive and confiscatory; _ and that_ the adoption of both ordinances was the result of persecution of the petitioner by the respondents beeause from 20 July 1946 to 8 December 1947, or '~itbin a period of less than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of l\:lalabon adopted four ordinances increasing the taxes on cinematographs and theaters and imposing a penalty of- 20% sUJcharge 'for late payment. "~ - --i ·motion ;'to-,:_disrOiss was filed by the ASsistant Provincial FisCaF of: Rizal, but upon suggestion of the Court at the hearing thereof, the respondents were prevailed upon to file their answer. ., , In their answer the i·espondents allege that both 01·dinances adopted by the ;i,:lunicipal Council of Malabon are not ultra· virei;, the same. not being ~ndei; .. .any- of the exceptions provided fo.i· in section ,.3 of Com. Act No. 472; that the ordinances were adopted pursuant to the policy enunciated by the Secretary of the Interior in a circular issued on 20 June 1946 which in substance suggested and urged the municipal councils to increase their revenues and not to rely on the ·National Government which was not in a pm>i· tion to render any help and to make such increase depen,dent upon the .taxpayer's ability to pay; that .both ::n·dinances assailed by th(: petitioner had been submitt.ed to, and approved by, the Department of Finance, as required by section 4 of Com. Act No. 472, and took effect on 1 January 1947 and 1 January 19481 respectively; that the petitioner had filed a protest with the Secretary of Finance against such increase of taxes, as-fixed by the municipal ordinances in question but the Depa1·tn1ent of Finance although reducing the amount of taxes imposed in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947; and changing- the date of effectivity of both ordinances, upheld ~he legality thereof; and that the petitioner brought .this action for declaratory relief wjth the evident purpose of evading payment of the unpaid balance of taxes due from the "Cine Concepcion." By Way of sjiecial defense the respondents allege that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that the Court has · no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for declaratory relief; that the petitioner should have paid under protest the taxes imposed by the ordinances in question on "Cine Concepcion" and after payment thereof should bring an action under se.ction ·1579 of' the Revised Administrative Code; that this being an action for declaratory relief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal should have been notified thereof but the petitioner failed to do- so; that the petition does not join all the necessary parties and; therefore, a judgment rendered in the case will not terminate the uncertainty or the controversy that is--sought to be settled and det.erm.ined. After hearing the Court rendered judgment holding that the ordinances in question are valid and constitutional and dismissing the petition with costs against the petitioner. The latter has appealed. This is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief, such relief must be a.sked before a violation of the ordinance be conunitted. (1) When thii;: action was brought ou 12 May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances, the tax rat.e of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for declaratory relief. Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he t.estify that he is the owner or part owner of "Cine Concepcion." He alleges that he is only th(: manager thereof. For that reason he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be affected by the nmnicipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to bring this action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently is the purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer ·of the petition. The rule that ·actioits must be brought in the name of the real pa1·ty in inter~st~ (2> applies to actions brought unde1· Rule 66 for declaratory relief, c:n The fact that he is the managet· t>f the theatre docs not '·make him a real party in interest. (4) Nevertheless, laying aside these procedural defects, w~ arc o1 f the opinion and so hold that under Com. Act No. 472 the Municipal Council of Malabon is authorized and empowered to adopt the ordinances in question, and there being no showing, as ·the eVidcaCe does not show, that the rate of the municipal taxes lheiei,i" pr~~ vided is excessive, unjust, oppressive and confiscatory, thiiir Validity and legality must be upheld. The rate of the taxes in both ordinances, to wit: Pl,000 a year for "Class A Cinematographs having orc·hestra, balcony and lodge seats" in Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, (5) and f'2,000 for each theate1· or cinematograp~ with gross annual receipts amounting to f'l3o-;ooo or nloie iii.- n~ dinance No. 10, series of 1947, (6) under -Which "thti '"Cine COD.cep·cion" falls, is not excessive but fair and just. It is far from being oppressive and confisCatory. Pursuant to said Commonwealth Act if the increase of the municipal tax is more than 50% O\"ef the previous ones already in existence, the Municipal Council adopt·ing such increase must submit it for approval to the Department of Finance which, although it cannot increase it, may reduce it and may approve it as reduced, or may disapprove it. It is cont.ended that as only municipal councils are authorized by law to adopt ordinances, after the i·eduction by the Department of Finance of the tax rate imposed in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, duly adopt.ed by the Municipal Council of Malabon, tlie latter should adopt another ordinance accepting 01· fixing the rate tax as reduced by ~e Department of Finance. The contention is without merit because the rnte of taxes imposed on theaters or cinematographs in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, was the only one reduced by the Department of Finance and the i·eduction was for the benefit of the taxpayer as it was very much lower than the rat.e fixed by the Municipal Council, The authority and discretion to fix the amount of the tax was exercised by the Municipal Council of Malabon when it fixed the same at !"9,000 a year. Certainly, the Municipal Council of Malahan that fixed the tax at !"9,000 a year also approved the tax at P2,600 a year, this being very much less than that fixed in the ordinance, The .power and discretion exercised by the Municipal Council of Malabon when it fixed t.hc tax at P9,000 a year must be deemed t-0 have been exercised also by it when the Department of Finance reduced it to !"'2,000 a year, for the greater includes the lesl1er. The adoption of another ordiJ)ance fixing the tax at f'2,000 a year would be an idle ceremolly and waste of time. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that municipal councils are not constitutional bodies but creatures of the · Congress. The latt.er may even abolish or replace them with-- other government instrumentalities. Commonwealth Act No. 472 grants to the Department of Finance the authority to disapprove, implied in the power W approve, an ordinance imposing a tax which is more than 50% of the existing tax, or to reduce it, also implied in the same power. This, of course, is to forestall abuse of power· by the municipal councils. If the Congress has granted t6 thC Department of Finance the power to reduce such tax, implied' in the power to approve or disapprove, there seems to be no cogent reason for requiring the municipal council concerned to adopt another ordinance fixing the tax as reduced by the Department of Finance. Therefore; the action of the Department of Finance in approving Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, ·it a reduCEid1·3iP, is not in excess of the powers granted it by law. The evidence -does not show that the adoption of the ordinances in· question by the Municipal Council of Malabon was the result of persecution of the petitioner. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs :oigainst the appelant. · <Continued on pv.ge 85l 84 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL l"ebruary :?8, 1954
Date: 1954
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