Supreme Court Decisions, The Leyte Samar Sales Co. and Tomassi vs. Cea.pdf

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extracted text: no11-digibl"'!, replaced petitione\· Meliton de Gracia., a non-eligible: pet.itioners Teo<lu1o T. Orais, David Lim, Domingo Sa.Ugo and Eulalio respondent J acinto Barro, a non-eiigible, replaced vetitioner Mar- - Bernades, respectively, who are not civil service eligibles. The rest garito Basuga, a non-eligible; 1·espondcnt Constancio Acasio, 11. of the resp~~dents, all not civil service eligibles, replaced the rest non-eligible, replaced petitioner Luis Marte, ~ non-eligible; res- of the petitioners, except Manuel Kangleon and Alfredo Lucin, po~dent Tereso Kaindoy, a non-eligible, replaced petitioner Do- who are also not civil service eligibles. Respondents Bienvenido minador Cordoves, a non-eligible; and respondent Al'cadio Magli- Gonzales and Constancio Acasio, not civil service eligibles, i·eplaced nes, a non-eligible, l'eplaced petitioner Teotimo Mullet, a non- Fdipe Enelo and Luis Marte who though not civil service eligibles eligible, as shown by Exhibits 1 to 13; are vetei-a.ns. 9. That since the aforesaid petitioners have been duly ap- Petitioners invoke in support of their clcim section 682 of the pointed and qualified and assumed the perfol'mance of their res- Rf:vised Adm'.nistra~ive Cod~, as amended by Com. Acts Nos. 177 pective offices up to the tim.? their services were ordered ter- ar.d 281. Said section P_rov1des: . . . . . minated effective as of October 31, 1950, they did not resign nor . Temporary a~po.1ntment w~t~out e~ammatl?n and cert1f1cah th b d "th f · d t · t d·s t1on by the Commissioner of Civil Service or his local represenave ey een re~o.ve . ei er or miscon ~c • mcompe ~cy, 1 - tative shall not be made to a competitive position in any case, loyalt! to the :hihppm~ G~vernment, neither have t. ey e~er except when the public interests so require, and then only upon comnutted any l~Tegular1ty m the performance o~ their duties the prior authoi·iza.tion of the Commissfoner of Civil Service; not· have they violated any law or duty or committed any act and any temporary appointment so authorized shall continue that may ca.use abandonment of their duties nor have they been only for such period not exceeding three months as may be investigated for cause. necessary to make appointment through certification of eligibies, 10. That until the present, the respondents, Governol', Trea- and in no case shall extend beyond thirty days from receipt surer and Guards, have refused and continue to refuse the peti- by the chief of the bureau or office of the Commissioner's certioners their 1·espective positions above mentioned and they have tification of eligibles; x x x. not been paid their salaries from the time of the termination of Appointments made under the section are tempo1·;u·y, when the their services or removal from theii· offices until the present; public interes.ts . so require. ~nd ou~y upon the prior authorization 11. That the respondent provincia.1 guards were paid their of t~e Comm1ss1:mcr of C1v1l Service,_ not to exceed thr~e months ~alaries as such provincial guards, the first sala~-y payme~t hav~~l~fmo;otl~:s~u~~::l~ e;~c~~fi:y~;d t~~ir~o~:~sf~·~~~ .• ~·e~~11~~f:t~~~ rn~ been made on December 26, 19~0, after their res~ec.tive ap- of eligibles. The fact that the petitioners held the positions for P~l~tment~ have been duly authorized by the Commiss~oner of more than thre(' months does not make them civil service eligible!!. Civil Service and apprOved by the Secretary of the Interior;_ Also the fact that the acting Commissioner of Civil Service authorized 12. Respondents and petitioners admit the authenticity and 'their ap11ointmcnts "under section 682 of the Revised Administrative due execution of Exhibits A, A-1 to A-14, R, B-1 to B-4, C, D, B, Code to continue only until replaced by an eligible" does not make F, G, H, T, J, K, L, L-1, L-2, L-3 of petit.ioners and of Exhibits them eligibles. 'l'he holding ot: .a position by a temporary appointee 1, l(a), l(b), 2, 2(a), 3, 4, 4ca), 4(b) , 4(c) , 4(d), 4(e), until replaced by an eligible in disregard of the time limitation of 4(f), 4{g), 5, 6, G<al, 7, 7(a), 8. 8(a), 9, 9(a). 10, lO C a), (1, three months is unauthol'ized and illegal. The temporary appointll(a), 12, 12(a), 13, 13(a), 14, 16, 16 (2 pages), 17 (2 pages), ment of ut~e~· non-eligibles to replace those whose term have expired 17(a), 17(b>, 17(c), 17 (d), 17(e), and 17(() for respondents. is. not pro~1b1ted~ ~ence the repl~cement of 'feodulo T. Orais,. I?avid respectively, without necessarily admitting their validity, legality Lm1, _Domingo Sahgo <llld Eulaho Bernade~, who a.re non-ehg1bl~s, nor the conclusions therein contained. by Js1d1"0 Magallan:s,. Pedr.o ~lores, F1~anc1sc? Tavera and Narciso WHEREFO~E, the part.ies to. this .Honorable Court most !:~~~f ;0hno-e~i1;ib~~:1:~es~o~-~::g~~~~r~:n1c:w;~~hu~~:~ a~~ep~~~a:~;; resp~ctfully submit .the forego1~g stipulati?~ of fac~ for approv- to section 682 of thf: Revised Administrative Code. The replacement al with the reservat10n to sumb1t such additional evidence as eacl1 of Felipe Enelo and Luis Marte, non-eligibles but veteran&, by party may deem necessa.17. Bienvenido Gonzales and Constancio Acasio, who are non-eligibles, M.i.asin, Leyte, April 12, 1951. is unlawful The former are preferred under Rep. Act No. 65, as Upon the above quoted stipulations of facts, the Court of First amended by Rep. Act No. 154, they have. been appointed within the Instance of Leyte rendered judgment, the dispositive part of Wrm provided for in said Republic Acts. If the preference of a which is, v«teran is to be confined to appointment and promotion only ':lnd ta) Declara<lo a los recurrentes Teodulo Orais, Eulalio Bernades, Dominador Cadavero, David Lim, Nicomedes Conejos, Vedast:i Cabales, Meliton de Gracia, y Margarito Basuga sin dereclio <1. los cargos de sargento de la guardia provincial y guardias provinciales ocupados pol' los recurridos Isidro Magallanes, Pedt·o Flo1·es, Francisco Tavera, Narciso Ravago, Crisanto Cab, Dalmacio Corte!, Rafael Galleon, Filomeno Adobas, Jacinto Barro. Tereso Caindoy y Arcadio Maglines, y sobreseyendo su accion. Cb) DeclarandO a los recurrentes Felipe Enelo y Luis Marte con derecho de continuar en sus cargos como guardias provinciales y que los nombramientos extendidos a favor de los i·ecurridos Bienvenido Gonzales y Constancio Acasio son contrnrios a la lay, y ordenando a estos dos ultimas que entreguen sus puestos a los refcridos recurrentes Felipe Enelo y Luis Ma.rte. (c) Ordenando al tesorero provincial Sr. Melecio Palma, o a su sucesol· que pague los sueldos de los recurrentes Felipe Enelo y Luis Marte desde el primero de Noviembre de 1950 y mientras dichos recurrentes continuen desempciiando sus cargos legalmentc. <dl Sobreseyendo la accion de los recunrntes Manuel Kangleon y Alfredo Lucin. Ce) Absolviendo libremente de la demanda a los l'ecurridos Mamerto S. Ribo y Francisco P. Lopez; y (f) Condenando a los recurrentes, excepcion de Felipe Enelo y Luis Marte, a. pagar las costas de! juicio. From this judgment the 1 ietitioners, with the exception of Fe.lipc Enelo and Luis Marte, appealed. Re~pondents Bienvenido Gonzales and Conotancio Acasion appe?.led fr.::>m the decision in so far as the trial court found them not entitled to the positions claimed by them. The respondents Isidro Magallanes, Pedro Flores, Fnmcisco 'favera and Narciso Ravago, all civil sen·icc eligibles, replaced the does not include the right to continue to hold the position to which he was appointed until an eligible is certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service, then he would be in no better situation than a noneligible who is not a veteran. The appointment of a veteran, however, is subject to cancellation or his removal from office or employment must be made by competent authority when the Commissioner of Civil certifies that there is an eligible. There is no a.verment in the petition that the positions held by Manuel Kangleon and Alfredo Lucin were usurped or that they were replaced.by others in their positions as provincial guards. Hence the petition in so far as it concerns them must be dismissed. Republic Act Ko. 5!i7 is also invoked by the appellants Bienvenido Gonw.les and Constancio Acasio. The net guarantees the tenure of office of provincial guards and members of cit~· and municipal police who are eligibles. Non-eligibles like the two appellants do not come under the protection of the act invoked by them. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without cosl;;;. Paras, Benyzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Pablo, Tuazou, Reyes, Bau. tisto., Angelo and L<ibrador, J. J., concur. VI The Leyte-Samar Sales Co. and Uaymond Tomas;;i, versus Sulp1'cio V. Cea, in his capacity as Judge of the Coit·rt of Pirst Instance of Leyl.;,; and Atty. Olegario Lastrilla, G. R. Nu. 1 .--5063, May 20, 1953. CIVIL PlWCEDURi'J; EXECUTlON; WHERE PROPBH'TY SOLD AT PUBLIC AUCTION IS CLAIMED BY '!'HIRD .PERSON.Jn a suit for damages by S Co. and RT a.'!'ainst L Co., AH FB and JR, judgment against defendants, jointly and s1:verally, for the amount of !'31,589.14 ,,·as rendered. On June 9, 1951 the February 28, 19!J4 THE LAWYEHS JOUHNAL sheriff sold at auction to RD and PA "All the rights, interests, titles and participations" of the defendant in certain properties. But on June 4, 1951 OL filed in the case a motion in which he claimed to be the owner by purchase on September 29, 1949, of all the "shares and interests" of FB in L Co., and requested "under the law of preference of credits" that tl1e .sheriff be required to retain in his possession so much of t he proceeds of the auction sale as may be necessary "to pay his right." The court granted OL's motion, which was later modified to the effect that it merely declared that OL was entitled to 17% o( the properties sold. HELD: The judge's action on OL's motion should be declared as in excess C'f jnrii;c!lrtion, considering spt!ci!llly that HD and PA, and the defendants themselves, had undoubtedly the right to be heard - but were not not-i/ied, and it was necessary to hear them on the merits of OL's motion because RD and PA might be unwilling to recognize the validity of OL's purchase, or, if valid, they may want him not to forsake the partnership that might have some obligations in connection with the partnership properties. And what is more important, if the motion is granted, when the time for redemption comes, RD and PA 'viii receive .from retlemptioners seventeen per cent (17 % ) less limn the amaimt they had paid for the same properties. AH and JR, eyeing OL's financial assets, might also oppose the substitution by OL of FB, the judgment against them being joint and :;eueral. They might entertain misgivings about FB's slipping out of their common predicament thru the disposal of his shares. Lastly, all the defendants would have reasonable moth,es to object to the delivery of 17 % of the proceeds to OL, because it is so much money deducted, and for which the plaintiffs 1night ask another le vy on their other holdings or resources on the assumption that there was TIO fraudulent collusion among them. Assuming that OL's sha1·es ha\re been actually - but unlawfully - sold by the sheriff to RD and PA the remedy can be found in Sec. 15, Rule 39. /i'ilenw11 illo11tejfl 1J-11d Rumon T. J imcnc: for petitioners. Olegario Ln~trillu i11 !ii;-; uwn behalf. DECISION Bengzon, J. Labeled "Certiorari and Prohibition with Prelimina1·y lnju~c tion" this petition actually prays for the additional writ of man~ damus to compel the respondent judge to give due course to petitioners' appeal from his order taxing costs. However, inasmuch as according to the answer, petitioners thru their attorney withdrew their cash appeal bond of P-60.00 after the record on appeal had been rejected, the matter of mandamus may summarily be dropped without further comment. From the Jlleadings it appears that, In Civil Case No. 198 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. which is a suit for damages by the Leyte Samar Sales Co. (hereinafter called LESSCO) and Raymond Tomassi against the Far Eastern Lumber & Commercial Co. (unregisterf'd commercial partnership hereinafter called FELCO>, Arnold Hall. Fred Brown and Jean Roxas, judgment against defendants jointly and severally for the amount of P-31,589.14 plus costs was rendered on October 29, 1948. The Court of Appeals confirmed the award in Novembe1·, 1950, minus P2,000.00 representing attorneys' fees mistakenly included. The decision having become final, the sheriff sold at auction on June [J, 1961 to Robert Dorfe and Pepito Asturias "all the rights, interests, titles and participation'' of the defendants in certain buildings and properties described in the certificate, for a total price of eight thousand and one hundred pesos. But on June 4, 1951 Olegario Lastrilla filed in the case a motion, wherein he claimed to be the owner by purchase on September 29, 1949, of all the "shares and interests" of defendant Fred Brown in the FELCO, and requested "under the law of vreference of credits" that the sheriff be required to retain in his possession so much of the proceeds of the auction sale as may be necessary "'to pay his right". Ov~r the plaintiffs' objection the judge in his order of June 13, EHil, granted Lastrilla'ii motion by requiring the sheriff to retain 17% of the money ''for delivery to the assignee, administrator or receiver'' of the FELCO. And on motion of Lastrilla, the court on August 14, 1951, modified its orders of delivery and merely declared that Lastrilla was entitled to 17% of the properties sold, saying in part "x x x el Juzgado ha encontrado quc no sc ha respetado los derechos del Sr. Lastrilla en lo que Se refiere a Sll adquisicion de las acciones de C. Arnold Hall (Fred Brown) en la Far Eastern Lumber & Commercial Co. porque las mismas han sido' incluidas en la subasta. "Es verdad que las acciones adquiri<las por el Sr. Lastrilla representan el 17% de! capital de la sociedad 'Far Eastern Lumber & Commercial Co., Inc., et al' pero esto no quiere decir que su valor TIO esta sujeto a las fluctuaciones del negocio <londe las invertio. "Se vendieron prnpieda<les de la C-Orporacion 'Far Eastern Lumber & Commercial Co. Inc.,'' y de la venta· solamente se obtm•o la cantidad de PS,100.00. "EN SU VIRTUD, se declara que el 17 % de las propiedades vendidas en publica subasta pertenece al Sr. 0. Lastrilla y este tiene derecho a dicha porcion pero con la obligacion de pagar el 17% de los gastos por la conservacion de dichas propied:idt:s poi· parte del Sheriff; xx x." <Annex K) It is from this declaration and the subsequent orders to enforce it ( ll that the petitioners seek relief by certiorari, their position being that such orders were null and void for lack of jurisdiction. At their request a writ of preliminary injunction was issued here. The record is not very clear, but there are indications and we shall assume for the moment, that F red Brnwn (like Arnold Hall and J ean Roxas) was a partner of t he FELCO, was defendant in CiYil Case No. 193 as sucli partnc1-, and that the properties sold at auction actually belonging to the FELCO pa1·tnership and the partners. We shall also assume t.hat the sale made to Lastrilla on September 29, 1949, of all the shares of Fred Brown in the FELCO l\'as valid. (Remember that judgment in this case was entered iii the court of first instance a year before.) The result then, is that on June 9, 1951 when the sale was effected of the properties of FELCO to Roberto Dorfe and Pepito Asturias, Lastrilla was already a partner of FELCO. Now, does Lastrilla have any proper claim to the proceeds of the sale? If he was a creditor of the FELCO, perhaps or maybe. Rut he was not. The partner of a partnership is not a creditor of such partnership for the amount of his shares. That is too elementary to need elaboration. Lastrilla's theory, and the lower court's, seems to be: inasmuch as Lastrilla had aClJUired the shares of Brown in September 1949, i.e., befoi·e the auction sale, and he was not a party to the litigation, such shares could not have been trausfencd to Dorfe and Asturias. Granting, <try1umdo that the auction sale did not i.nclude the inteJ"est or 1>ortion of the F9LCO properties corresponding to the shares of Lastrilla in the same partnership <17%), the resulting situation would be - at most - that the purchasers Dorfe and Asturias will have to recognize dominion of Lastrilla over 17% of the prof>el'ties awarded to them.2 So Lastrilla. acquired no right to demand any part of the money paid by Dorfe and Asturias to the sheriff for the benefit of LESSCO and Tomassi, the plaintiffs in that case, for the reason that, as he says, his shares (acquired from Brown) could not have been and were not auctioned off to Dorfe and Asturias. Supposing however that Lastrilla's shares have been actually (but unlawfully) sold by the sheriff (at the instance of plaintiffs) to Dorfe and Asturias, what· is his remedy? Section 15, Rule 39 furnishes the answer. Precisely, respondents argue, Lastrilla vindicated his claim by proper action, i.e., motion in the case. We ruled once that "action" in this section means action as defined in section 1, Rule 2.3 Anyway his remedy is to claim "the property", not the proceeds of the sale, which the sheriff is directed by section 14, Rule 39 to deliver unto the judgment creditors. In other words, the owner of property wrongfully s" old may not voluntarily come to court, and insist, "I approve the sale, therefore give me the proceeds because I am the owner". The reason is that the sale was made for the judgment ei.:e.ditor (who paid for the fees and notices), and not for anybody else. (1) Requiring she riff to turn O\"t'r 17% of the IH'OC"c<fa t.o Lastrilla. (2) Thia is a feature to be dii;cussed betw«>u the 1111·..., of them at Lhc 1.ru1"'r time - and this &t.a.temcut does not attempt to settle their rc s p~-ctive ri1;:hts. (31 CL Maoila Herald Publishing Co. \". Judge Ramos, L-4268. January 18, 1%1, Moran. Comment•. 19S2 Od. Vol. 2. p. 46. 74 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL February 28, 1954 On this score the respondent judge's action on Lastrl\la'P acquired a definitiv-e charaeteP", And still in another ease, an motion should be declared as in excess of jurisdiction, which even order granting a review of a decree of registration issued more amounted to want of jurisdiction, considering specially that Durfe than a year ago had been declared null and void. In all these _ and Asturias, and the defendants themselves, had undoubtedly the cases the existence of the right to appeal has been disregarded. r;glit to be heard - biit the11 1t·ere not not1fied.4 In a probate case, a judgment according to ~ts own recitals was Why was it necessary t(l hea o· them on the merits of Lastrilla's rendered without any trial or hearing, and the Supreme motion? Court, in granting certiorari, said that the judgment was by Because Dorfe and Asturias might be unwilling to recognize its own recitals a patent nullity, which should be set aside the validity of Lasttilla's purchase, or, if valid, they may want though an appeal was available but was not availed of. x x x" him not to forsake the partnership that might have some obligations Invoking .:>ur ruling in Melocotones v. Court of First Instance, in connection with the pai-tnership properties. And what is more 57 Phil, 144, wherein we applied the theory of !aches to petitioners' important, if the motion is granted, when the time for redemption 3-year delay in requesting certiorari, the respondents point out comes, Dorfe and Asturias will receive from redemptioners seven- that whereas the orders complained of herein were issued in June teen per cent (17%) less than the amount they had paid for the 13, 1951 and August 14, 1951 this special civil action was not filed same properties. until August 1952. It should be observed that the order of June The defendants Arnold Hall and Jean Roxas, eyeing Lastrilla's 13 was superseded by that of August 14, 1951. The last order financial assets, might also oppose the substitution by Lastrilla of me:rely declared "que el 17% de las propiedades vendidas en publiFred Brown, the judgment against them being jrtint a.ml several. ca subasta pertenece al Sr. Lastrilla y este titme derecho a dicha They might entertain misgivings about Brown's slipping out of their porcion." This does not necessarily mean that 17% of the nwney common predicament thru the disposal of his shat·es. had to be delivered to him. It could mean, as hereinbcfore indiLastly, all the defendant& would have reasonable motives to cated, that the purchasers of the property ( Dorfe and Asturias) object to the delivery of 17% of the proceeds to Lastrilla, because ~;:1 ~Ai~e=n~~ ~:sttr~~:·:0~:vt~:::~~· a!t 0 ;;esr ~~:ec~~g A~:u s~!: ~~8 a:t~e~c~e:0:e: t~~~~c~~~ra';!1!~:g;~~chre~::1~:i.~ti~f:P;~;~ riff "to tum over" to Lastrilla "17% of the total prnceeds of the of course, there was no fraudulent collusion among them. ~i~~~~~ ~:!:·;~, ;:~r~h:y t~:u;~1~e:t t~~~i~c;:eal:~sr:;~:;c~~ ~:Jyp~t~: Now, these varied interests of necessity make Dorfe, Asturias 1952 (Annex Q>. Surely a month's delay may not be regarded and the defendants indispensable. pa-rties to the motion of Lastrilla , as !aches. ___..granting it was a step allowable under our regulations on exe- In view of the foregoing, it is ou1· opinion, and we so hold that cution. Yet these parties were not notified, and obviously took all orders of the respondent judge requiring delivery of 17% of the no part in the proceedings on the motion. proceeds of the auction sale to respondent Olegario Lastrilla are "A valid judgment cannot be rendered whei·e there is a null and void; and the costs of this suit shall be taxed against the want of necessary parties, and a court cannot properly adju- latter. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made perdicate matiers involved in a suit when necessary and indis- manent. So ordered. pensable parties to the proceedings are not before it." {49 C. Pa11•as, Feria, Pablo, Tuazon, Mo1itemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Baidista J. S. 67.) Angelo and Labrador, J. J., concur. "Indispensable parties are those without whom the ac!ion cannot be finally determined. In a case for recovery of ret1l property, the Qefendant alleged in his answer that he was occupying the property as a tenant of a third person. This third person is an indispensable party, for, without him, any judgment which the plaintiff might obtain against the tenant would have no effectiveness, for it would not be binding upon, and cannot be executed against, the defendant's landlnrd, against whom the plaintiff has to file another action if he desires to recover the property effectively. In an action for partition of property, each co-owner is an indispensable party, for without him no valid judgment for pa-rtition may be rendered." (~loran, Comments, 1952 9d. Vol. I, p. 56.) <Underscoring si.ipplied.) Wherefore, the orders of the court i·ecognizing Lastrilla's right and ordering payment to him of a part of the proceeds were patently cn-oneous, because they were promulgated in excess or outside of its jurisdiction. For this rea.son the respondents' argument resting on plaintiffs' failure to appeal from the orders on time, although ordinarily decisive, i:arries no persuasive force in this instance. , For as the former Chief Justice Moran has summarized in his Comments, 1952 9d. Vol. II, p. 168 - "x x x And in those instances wherein the lower cou1"t has acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or where the order or judgment complained of is a patent nullity, courts have gone even as far as to disregard completely the question of petitioner's fa.ult, the reason being, undoubtedly, that acts performed with absolute want of jul°isdiction over the subjectmatter are void ab initio and cannot be validated by consent, express or implied, of the parties. Thus, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certio1·ari and set aside an order reopening a cadastral case five years after the judgment rendered therein had become final. In another case, the Court set aside .an order amending a judgment six years after such judgment (•) TrQe, Lairtrilla wa. attorney for defendanh. but he was careful in all his moUon1 on the matter lo ~ign "Jn hla own representation" ~r "for himself and in hlsbeba\f." VII Tomasci V. Bulos Vda.. de 1'1icso11, as administra.tri:t of the testttfr n~tate of the deceased Pablo Tecson Ocampo, versus Benjamin, et ul., all surnamed Tecson, G. R. No. L-5233, September 30, 1953. CIVIL PROCBDUHE; PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDliMENTS. - While a petition for relief as a rule is add1·e!lsecl to the sound discretion of the court, however, when it appears th" ai. a party has a good and meritorious defense and it would be unjust and unfair to deny him his day in court, equity demand!' that the exercise of judicial discretion be reconsidered if there are good reasons that warrant it. Castillo anrl Gnevam a·ltd Lc-0, Feria and Manglapus for appellants. CCaro J U. Recto for a.ppellce. · - DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .: The incident involved in this appeal stems from an action for forcible entry originally commenced on June 12, 1941 in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, by Tomasa V. Bulos Vda. de Tecson in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the tleceaiwd Pablo Tecson Ocampo against defendants-appellants. In that case, defendants filed a written answer. After trial, the court dismissed thr, case. From the decision plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8889. Having failed to answer the complaint within the time prescribed in Section 1, Ruic 15, of the Rules of Court, defendants, on motion of plai11tiff, were declared in defa· lt and thereafter plaintiff present('d her evi<Jcnce. On OctobeJ' 9, 1!)41, a judgment by default \ras rcndet"ed against defendants, and on October 10,' 1941, copy of the decii:ion was served on defendant.e' couruiel. Three days after receipt of copy of the decision, or on October 13, 1941, counsel for defendants filed a writte'11 manifestation stati11g that he would file u petition to set aside the decision by default but that he needed more time to do so lo enable him to gather eviaence February 28, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNA~ 75
Date: 1954
Rights