The natural law theory and the Philippine Supreme Court.pdf

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

extracted text: UUUJ.lJ,,,E JEUPAKUY UNDER THE ARTICLES OF WAR By MAJOR CLARO C. GLORIA, * JAGS Stoff Judye Advocnlc Philippine Army Training Command One of the most conboversial matters in the administr(l,tion of military justice today is the plea of doubk jeopal'dy under Article 44 (a) of the Uniform Cod£:: of Military Justice (U.S.A.) and AW 39, PA, viz: - "No 1)erson shall, without his crmsent, be tried a second time fo1· the same offense."1 As a general rule, in the criminal procedure the accused invokes the principle of jeopard~ by means of one of the two pleas of former acquitt?.l (m1 . trefois acquit), or former conviction (nntrefois cmwict). according as he has been acquitted THE AUTHOR or convicted at the former trial. These two pleas arr governed b:,i the same rules and each is but the declaration of the same fact - that a trial has been h:td. The rulings thereupon by the civil courts. art! ar•plicable to similar cases under the military law.2 Jt is an anci!'nt maxim of the common k.w a1:d of the civil law that no man :;hail be "put twice in jeo1rnrdy" for the same offense. The significance of this clause is so important that it hns been since incorporatd not only in the constitution of the United States but also in the Constitution of the Philippines. 3 The prohibition (ln double jc(lpardy contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the Uniled States has, however, provoked conflicting issues brought about by unusual cil'cumstance; arising mostly from the exig~ncies of Wo1·\d \Var II. The lcac!.ini; cr.se on the mallC'l' ii; the recent case of 1Vmlc v. lfo nter,4 whicl: has elicited considerable attention .'.l.mon~ jurists and legal writers. In the Jluntcl" case, petitim1er, an American soldier, was char2'.cr! with rape alleged to have been committed in Germ~rny. He waf.: placed on trial by a general court-martial. After hearing evidence .i.nd arguments of counsel, the court-marti;i.\ closed to consider th<' case. Later that day, however, the court retJpcned and granted a continuance to enable the prosccutic,n to prcsc1·,1. additional '.vitnesscs, then absent rlue to ilhwss. Before the tri:il could he resume<l, the ?6th Infantry Division to which petitioner was attached moved !o a distant town. The c~c was then wilbdrawn from the oric:;nal court-martial and referred for trial to a court-martial conven<)~] by the Commanding General of the Third Army. The frial was not, however, concluded due t0 the tactical situation of the Third A~·my and the distance to tile assistance of witnesses, in which c?..sc the trial could not be completed within a reasonz.b!e lime. Accordingly, the Com111anding Genernl of the Third Army transmitted the chal'ge-; to the Fifteenth Army stating that the action was necc:ssary to c~1· ry out the policy of the United States Army in Europe to accelcra.t<? prompt trials "in the immediate vicinity of the alleged offenses." Pursuant to this transmittal, a court-.maitiai was convc11cd. P<'titioner represented by counsel, fih.d a pica in bar alleging that he had been put in jeopardy by the first coui·t-mu.rtial 1)1'ocee<lings and could not be tried again. His pica was ovcnuicd, the case was tried, and a conviction followed. On petition for writ of habeas cor;rn~, the Federal District Court ordered l1is release, holding that his plt>'l of former jeopardy shculd have been sustained. The court further held tha.t the proceedings of the seconJ court-martial were void as THE NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE PHILIPPI.NE ~UPREME COURT By CRISOLITO PASCUAL• (Continued from the last issue) 2. Appliwtion of Nrtlnral, Law in the Lc!)'il Order. I;i applying the continuing protcetive postula.tcs ;:,f natural law tv the Rutter Case, the Supreme Court expressed its position in this way: "Laws altel'ing existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they arc unreasonable und unjustified in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment." After examining the satisfactory i;ituation and condition prevailing in th<? country from Hl48 to 1952,lB the Supreme Court JJl'Occedcd without hesitation to dcclure the 1>eriod provided in Republic Act No. 342 as contrary to the continuing pl'otectivc postulates of justice fairness, righteousness, and equity. Said the Court: "This period seems to us unreasonable . . the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who arc practically left at the mercy of the debt01·s. Their hope to effect collection become extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecul'ed. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor i.i not even required to pay intNcst <luring the operation of the relief . . " "In the fac(' of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what WC! believe to be ai; the only course dictated by justice, fair'rn.•ss and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued opcn1Jio11 and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 a.t the present time is unrl"asonable rind oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the samE: should be daclared null and void and without effect. And what we say hc:rc with respect to said Act also holds true as rega rds Executive Ordl"r Nos. 2fi and 32, pel'ha.ps with greater force and reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as rcgaJ"ds the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.'' 3. U11e/ul Huie a11d F1t11rliu1t u/ N(ltu.ru/ Ltw; ill the Lcr1«l Orclcr. The protective postulates of naturnl law are ever present in all men everywhere. While it may b~ said different peoples may not liavc the same ideas about the continuing protective JJOstulates of natural law on the ground that different peoples do not have the same level of intelligence and ethical concepts and hence the same comprehension of thci1· contents and dcgl'CC of award, the postulates of natural law are nonetheless present in all peoples at all t imes as the dictates of their moral naturl". As such, they a.re authoritat~ve and paramount to aU.39 Consequently, right reason dictates their recoguition and validation in the lag'a\ order bccctuse obedic!lcc to llatural law and its continuing protective p<•stula.tcs brings advantage wl1ile disregard brings disadvantage. Natural law, therefore, holds an exalted position in the heirnl'chy of norms. Failure then to heed the 38- Said the Supi·cmc Cou1·t on thia llOint: "Wo rlo not need LO i:o far to appreciate this i ituatlon. We can :$1!e it and !eel lt ns "'e gaze 11.round lo obsen"e the wavco( rcconstt·uetionandrehabilitation thF1thuawcptthecountryaineclibcration thanks to the aid of America ·and the innate progressh·e SIJil'it of our people. This uid and this spirit hn\'c worked wondHs in so •hort a time that it can now be snfely •lated that;., the main the financial condition of our country und our 1 1eoplc, indlvidually a nd rnllccti.-cly, hns prncticnlly returned to normal. notwithstanding occusioroalrcvcrscscauscdby localdissidcnccandthca1>0radicdisturbunceofpeace nnd order in our mi•bl. Jluslncss, industry and ugriculture hiwc pic k<0d U\> and de•·eloped at such stride that we can say that we arc now well on the road to recovery and IH'ogress. This is so not only as tar a s out• observation nnd knowledge ""c ea11 .. blc to tako note aml comprehend but also liecause of the official pronouncements made by ou!' Chid l;xecutive in 1>uLlic 11ddrcsscs ~nd in &cnrnl mc ss.~ges he sulimittcd to Congress on the general state of the nation." To bcM this out, the Court tlUolcd at length from the uublie statements ol the President which the Court dL...,med to he most c,1'1>rcnivo <1nd representative o{ the Kcncral situation. The Court <1.,otcd from the .. Stale of the Nation" message to the J oint Session of Congress of J anuary U. 1949 (46 O.G. Jan. '~!II and from the addo·css i:iven on the occa.ion of the cclcbrnlion of the shth anni•·crsary of the lndo11endencc of the Philil)J>incs. July t Hl!i2 (48 O.G. 3287-3289). 39- l>cclaralion of Human Right Rl>llTO\'al on Dece mber 10, ID48 by the United lization illuslrates this point rather well. 64 THE LAWYEHS JOURNAL February 28, 1954 DOUBLE JEOPARDY ... constituting double jeopardy since no "urgent necessity'' existed for the removal of the case from t he first court-martiaJ.S In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, federal courts have held that jeop~n<ly attaches when any evidence has been heard in either a jury6 01~ non-jury7 trial. Despite this attachment of jeopardy, however, a se<'Ond trial is not baned if an urgrmt necessity caused the stop11ing of the first trial before conviction or acquittal.8 f<'or that t·~ason, a court considering a plea of double jeopardy must weigh the alleged necessity against the dangers tha.t apprnval of s..ich un exception to the general 1·ulc may result in loss of the fresh evidence available in a prompt prosecution, or in repeated harassment of the accused in the endeavor to assure conviction.9 The ne<'essity has been found to override these considerations in the followi11R" situations: (1) when the tc1·111 of coul't. ends befoi·e a decision is reached; Cll wh( t? the jm·y is unable to :1g1·ee within a reasonable ti111e; (3) when a biased judgment ls feared; and (4) when persons essential to the proper completion of the trial are excusably absent.10 In the 1-lmiter case, the question that arises is whether the Constitution of the U11ited States protects a n;ember of the armed forces ag-ainst double jeopard~·- It has been argued that only such statute:ry safeguards as CongTcss enacts ;1rny control the conduct o( military t ribunals, and that the gon~ rning prnvision is AW 40, USA (now Article 44-a) which makes a plea of double jeopm·dy available only whe1·c a finding was previously i·eached.11 However, the fact that militai·y per:;onnel arc e:.:pt·essly excepted from the a1mlication of a separate :!ll'OVision of the Fifth Amendment, implying their inclusion under its other protection, rrnd the fact that there is no- equivalent of A \V 40 in legislation for the naval foi·ccs indicate the applicability of the double jeopardy clause upon courts-martial.Ill And yd the Supreme Court of the United States in the final detel'lninatioi1 of the Hm1lc1· cuse said that "the interpre1ation and application of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision have been C"nsi<lcrcd chiefly in ch·il J"athcr than !nilitai·y court procccdings."IJ The U.S. Supr1;-mc Court is further of the opinion that justice r('(juires ~hat a particular trial may be discontinued when particular circu111stances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failu1:e to discontinue would defeat tl1e Cll(],;: of justicc.14 Frnm this opinion J\fr. Just.ice Murphy, with whom J\fl'. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge joii1cd. di":-:sented. Said J\h. Justice Murpl1y: "'I agree with the court below tl:at in the military courts, as in the civil, jeo1>ardy \\ ithin the meaning of the Fifth Amendment attaches when the court begins the i1earing of evidence. xx x "Then• is no doubt that Wade was placed in jeopardy J,y his first t1·ial. The Court now h"olds that tl1c decision of his commanding officer, u.ssessing the tactical military situation, is sufficient to deprive him of his right under the Constitution to be free from being twice subjected to trial fo1· the Sf:lll(.l offense.:.: x:.: "The harassment to the defendant from being rcpcal4'dly tried is not less because the Army is advancing. T!1c guan111tce of the ~onstitution .'.l~ai11st double jeopat'dy is nut t~ be 1•1·odr.d away Oy a tide of plausible-appearing ~xceiJ tion!'. The command of the Fifth Amendment does not allow tcmj}orizing with the basic rights it declares. Adaptions of military justice to the cxigeneie3 of tactical situations is the prerogative of the comm:mck·r !II the field, but the price or such ex1 Jediency is compli~cce with the Constitution:''IS lJoubt!ess, 1liffe r~11t holdings c:.:ist 'lue to different phrasing of the constitutional prohibition against placing a 11crson twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Ignoring these holdings, however, tre.at u_ ncertainty e:.:ists as to ( 1) the stage of the proceedings at which Jeopardy attaches; (2) the rules to determine the idenMty of the offenses; (3) the grnde of offense for which a defendant may be tl"ied when a new ti·ial has bcc11 granted at his n .. -quest.16 ~ Id •• 72 t'. Su 1•11 ;,-;5 fll. Kan.•a>. 19 17 ). ~ g~~:~n~r,~uti,2es~- 1~'.:~1'•·.1 62d1 \.:~-~A';;:,. (~t32/~:;91. : : :. (.;olum b1a L•w lie•. 299 09411). 10 l d.a1300 II Id. H ~~~ec~~·~~~~l.~~'.i•J~ a;;_d t~~ s~::·~i;~u~i~~~9)3.l ~hr.,uettc L. lie\'. 1:; mm. 15 ld.at 840 16 3 The Am-Law Institute l'rocetdin2'.s HO (192~) THE NATURAL LAW ... sumnl(lns anrl constrain of the continuing protective postulates of natural le.w is a dcrngation or perversion of natural law and the legal order. Accordin~ly, positive law should conform to the postulates of natural law in order to be valid and binding. The great authority of Cicern is focused on this point. For him, natural law has definitely this useful functi011. "It is not allowable," posited Cicero; "to alter thir. law nur df'viatc from it, no1· can it be abrogated. Nor can we be released from this law ~ithc 1' by the Senate or by the people."40 Thus, any provision of positive law that is at variance with or in derogation of the postulates of natural law is not a iaw but an invalidatior: 01· conuption of the law. In othe1· words, natural law can be employed as a juristic basis or ci·iterion for testing the validity of positive law. An enactment 'lf the legislature of a State is not thercfoi·c valicl if and when it rJdlccts from the continuing protective postulates of natul'al law. The view ad\·anced by some writers th2.t a law passed with constitutional authority or a law pass.id in accordance with thc Jll'OVisions of the Constitution remains valid even tl1ough it violates the continuing protective postulates of natural law is !'ather incorrect and fraught with danger. T h('t·c are at letist twu ieasons why this is r.o. Jn the first place, nu nositi\·e or hum1111 bw cuuld flagrantly violate the sununoni:-: and con~train of naturnl and its continuing protective postulates with(lut Jil"')ducin_; or uroi.:sing a Uecidedly adverse reaction from the members of the community themselves. It is 'Jnthi11kable that the people would l1~ve ''yielded 1:1owcr" to the legislators to make or pass such kind of laws. Thcl"c are mc.ny provisions of Philippi1 1e positive law itself, some of which are given here, that support this ground. Article 10 of the Civil Code of the Philip\Jill<·S provides for the presumption that the lawmaking body itself intended right and justice to prevail whenever it acts. Article HI of the same code provides that in the Hercise of one's l'ights or in t he performance of one's obligation every 1)crson .must act with justice, honesty, and good faith and give cvcryo11e hi8 ju~t, due. Article 1379 of the sa.me code appeals to the pt"inci1)lcs co11tahwd in sections 58 lo G7 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court in the l'hilippines in the construction and interpretation of contracts, where it is provided that construction and interpretation in favor of natural rights is to be adopted. Thus, pui·suing this point· further with a concrete illustration, in a sale of real property to two different vendccs, although a preference is expressed or created by la\v foi· the title of ownership first recorded, this positive rule must be understood to be based on 11atmal good faith as it is inconceivable that the people would have yielded authority to their lawmakers to do away with good faith and sanction bad faith by requiring comJ~hance only with the formality of registration.41 The seconrl reason ii; as significant and imperative as the first one. if not more so. Thf· members of a community may have, in a solemn compact, secured foi· themsdves a.nd their posterity a regime of justice, liberty, equality, and de1wJcracy. In such a situation therri is no question that there is a d1~ar anrl present, not a doubted and remote, a1111cal to natural law itsdf.~~ Jt is a solemn pronouncement or declara.tion of the volksgeist ot· diwa. Indeed, it is an articulation of the soul a nd spirit of the people making a direct appeal to natural law fol' :;uch c.:incf'pts as justice, liberty, equality, and democrncy or 40- RcJ)ublica, llook Ill , chap. xxii. Keyes t ranslation. G. P. l'ulman"$ Sona New York. 4t-See Section 50, Act No. ' 496. n~ amended. Sec also Government of the Phili1>pines vs. Abuel ct a!.. ~5 O.G. ~405. ~'l-The Pre:imhte of the Gon~titution <if the Philippines 1>rovides : Fili1•lno pco1Jle. implorin~ the aid .,r Uivin" l'ro\'idcncc, iu order to c~t.ahlish ,. ..;o,·ernmcnt that shall embody their ideals. conserve and dernlo1J the patrimony of \he nation. 111·omote the i,:cncrnl welfare. and secu1·e to thcm:scl\•es and thdr 1){1stcriw the blessings of independence undel" a regime o{ justice, liberty and democracy. do ordain and promulgate this coMtitution."" lt may be said that tho Preamble. strictly speaking. is not 1iart of the Constitution. But it serves. nevertheless. three vei·y imVort.ant end. Professor. 1'anada and l'crmrndo in their Constitution of the Phili1>1•incs. 4th 1':11 .• Vol. I, 11. 33. give the first two: l) it iudicatc• that the \>eovle is the source of the 1.;onstitution and form which it derives it~ claim to 01".'<lience, and 2) it scl$ forth the e11<ls t~at th<i Constitution and the Government established by it are intended to vromot.<:. 'l'he third is that it states unequivocally that the le11al 01·dcring to effect the 1>romolion of the '"'owed ends should always be undc1• a r<igi me of justice, liberty. equality. and democracy. 'l'hus, the Preamble has value for pu;IJ<IS<lS of construction and intcr1>rdation and kgul ordering. At the ley t. it is c .... euual with the iirincipl...s enumerated in the Declaration or Principles. Article II of the Constitution. February 28, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 65 DOUBLE JEOPARDY ,, . Some states hold that the accused is twic€ put in jeopardy when th.i jury was impaneled and sworn, a.nd, consequently, if the jury fails ·to agree, even if it appears that there is no reasonable expectation that they ever can agree, the accused cannot, on the discharge of the jury be again placed on trial. However, othc:: courts allow a second trial in 1mch cases.17 011 the constitutional prohih;tion against double jeopardy for the same offense, much diversity of decision exists in regard to the identity of offenses. "Different legal tests arc employed in different stBtcs to <letHmine whether the 'offense' for which the accused is being- tried is the 'same offense' a.s that for which he has already been tried. In some '?ases t.wo different tests, bringing the same results, arc applied in the same stat·e in different cases. There are all sorts of variants of the question. A simph1 illustration is the case where one by the same act injures or kills two or more 1iersons. Having been acquitted or convicted of assault or murder of one of these persons, can he be tried fo1; assault or. murder of the other? This question is answered in the negative in some states and in the affirinati\'e in others."18 As to the grade of offense, in some states, if a new trial is granted an accused, he cannot, on the second tl'ial, be- prosecuted for higher degree or grade of the offense than that of which he was convicted on the first trial. Thus, if an accused has been indicted for murder, convicted of manslaughter and appeals, he can1iot, if a new ll'ial is granted, be tried again for murder, but· only for manslaughter. Iii the Federal Courts and in other states, the contrary rule prevails.19 Persuasive arguments abound - that the ]lrotection afforded b~ the Fede!'al Constitution and many of the constitutions of the states 1·eaffirms the old common law pleas of former acquittal and former conviction. But it is now the great weight of authority in the United States that "jeo1iardy attaches if it attacl1es at all in a given case, when a trial jury has been impaneled and sworn, although not before. x x x. "lO Sound opinion dictates that in a. plea of double jeopardy,. no judgment or sentence is requisite to complete the trial.21 This was the view of Justice Story,22 from which the decided weight of modern authority emanated. The traditional military pica of former acquittal (autrefois acquit) is completely inadequate to safeguard the constitutional rights of <!. soldier or a sailor who has bee11 exposed to successive tl'ials, none of which resulted in judgments. In 11assing, it is a matter of common knowledge that due to military necessity, the greatly increased possibility of witnesses becoming unavailable, the probability of defense counsel being assigned e!sewhere, and the absence of the right to bail operate against the accused in a court-martial concept of jeopardy.23 In an inconvenient situation such a.; that. the dignity of the individual and his right to due process should not be subordinated to mere legal technicalities. The much broader meaning of the phrase ·•twice in jeopardy," gi\'en by the courts today is a product of the practical administration of the law. The modern trend on the subject seems to in1ply that the doctrine of double jeopardy is "not a rule of law at all, nor can it be enforced by hard and fast rules without, in many cases, working injustices a.lmost as great as that which the doctrine itself was designed to prevcnt."24 As can be seen the doctrine is nothing more than a "declaration of an ancient and well-established policy, and that when some O\'erruling consideration of policy intei;venes the doctrine is frequently disregarded." Thus, there arc cases in which a new trial is allowed although there has already been a justified discharge of the jury; cases permitting a sec:ond prosecution after there has already been a conviction or acquittal obtained through fraud; and cases al\owi11g <!. trial for murder where t!1e injured person dies after his assailant has been prosecuted for assault. These arc instances where, notwithstanding the • .Cu1ttiniu,d 1•1~ lJayc 108J H !~: 20 2 ~ Minnuota L. lle 1. 522 \1940). 21 Winthrop, 11. 260 22 U.S. v. Gihu t, 2 Summer I~ 083') . 2l 33 Mar<iuette L. !lev. 25 ~19-19). 24 H Minn. L. flu. 522. (;6 1 OHO). z.; Id.a1a211 THE NATURAL LAW,,, public weal, are but other terms for the continuing protective postulates of natural law. Natural law is thus not lllt!rc]y an ideal to which positive Jaw ought to conform without otherwise affecting its legal validity. The everlasting and prntcctive postulatt::; of natural law are genuine and real basis for testing the validit'y of positive law. This means that it is down. This is the well-known tool of unconstitutionality. A statute ca.n likewise be struck down as null and void when and if it is not only when positive law is unconstitutional that it can be struck against the continuing protective postulates of natural Jaw though there be no constitutional prohibition which it transgresses or to which it is contrary. This is the tool of natural Jaw. 4. Conclusion. It is fortunate that at a time when legal positivism for all its strength is foiling man the Philippine Supreme Court has, with confidence and belief and reason, utilized the iiatural law in the manner it did in the Rutter Case. It has demonstrated quite well that 11.gecld concept of the natural law is C'apable indeed of a modern content or application. Even the cynical legal realist would find he1·c the realization and validation of the natural Jaw in the legal ot·deriilg. As for the Rutter Case itself, the writer takes it as indicative of the renaissance of the natural law in Philippine jurisprudence. The case of De la Cruz vs. Sosing et aJ,43 promulgated by th(; Supreme Com·t of the Philippines on November 27, mu:::, came to the writer's attention too late for inclusion in the main text. But the Scsing Case is yet another indicium of the present detectable t.rend in the Court's thinking un natural law. In this case, the Court, with coherence, logic <ond reason, sacrificed legal positivism to the continuing rnotective postulates of natural law. Perhaps the "pure tl1co1·y of Jaw" attack of Hans Kelscn on the natural lawdoctrine is unwarranted after all. E\•cn in Germany today, German scholars headed by the late great leg:i.l philosopher Gustav Hadbruch, ha~e J'ecognized the utter helplessness of German jurisprudence in resisting Hitler's demand for the unqualified abandonment of the individual to the German Heich. All because , of lega.l positivism. P.adbl'Uch stressed the necessity of recognizing the continuing prntcct.ive postulates of 11&.tural law "in the light of which the arbitrary and inhuman features of Nazi legislation would retro- ' actively be l'egarded as never JlOSsessing the force of law."44 Professor Heinz Gurarize, in his cited wol'k, stated that Radbruch's proposition is by no means of mere theoretical significance. Quoting Radbruch, Guradze said that "Jurisprudence ought to remember the age-old wisdom . . that there is a natural law under \vhich wrong 1·emains c~·en though it assumci; the form of a law."U At present, i.e., from l!J47, at least one law school, the College of Law of the Uni\'ersily of Notre Dame, has conducted a series of Annual Na.turn! Law Institutes designed to provide a center where the best minds of the world - 1 > hilosophers, lawyers, judges, jurists, and laymen - can re-examine the history and <levclo1nnent of the naturnl law and its practical application to modern legal orders.46 Raymond J\foley, Professor of Public La.w at Columbia University and widely known as one of the Editors 0f Newsweek .Magazine, stated in a book review of the 1950 proceedings of the Natural Law Institute: "I am bold to say that we are witnessing another renaissance in thought, based, as was the former one, on a rediscovery of the past. A nation almost blinded and partially, drngged by false philosophy and treacherous politics may yet find its W3Y through the inspiration of Natural Law." How true this is in every politically organized society especially in the intellection of the great social interests, particulal'ly the social intel'cst with reference to the maintenance of human life, personality and dignity.41 Only through the natural law can the uniqueness of the infinite worth of human life, personality and dignity be asserted. It needs no dialectics to show how legal positivism has 43- G. IL N<.> . .lr4Sj5. 44- Radbruch, Vor•cbule rfor Vechtsphiloso1>hle. !US !1947), •1uoted in Heini Curath'e's The E1>iatcmologic11 I Backgrnuml of Natural Law, 27 Notre Dame, Law· ycr, No. 3, 360 )l!l!iZ). 45- l!adbnich, Die 1':rneurung des ltecht•, S ( 194') 1....,. cit. 46- 0LJr own Carlus P. Romulu read " p;11>cr culillcd The Natural Law and International Law during the 1!)49 procccdiui.;s of that ln•titutc. H - 1'his s<1Cial interest is uow expressly rccog'nfa~d in Cha1•tcr ~ <.>f the l' •~· Jimiuary Title of the Civil Code of the Philip11 incs. (Conti11wd on page 106) 66 THE LAWYEHS JOUHNAL r~ebruary 28, 19fi4 LAUGHTER IS LEGAL A LETTER TO THE TAX COLLECTOR ANONYMOUS YOU HAVE BEEN TH.YING to collect an income tax balance. from one R ..... R .... ., late of Winchendon, Massachusetts. This, despite the far,t that you have been informed, several times, that the man in question departed fr::im this wicked world on May 11, 1943, leaving no estate to be administered but many sorrowing creditors who wished that he had. Now you send a final notice to this deliquent that you hoid a warrar:t of distraint for the ~aid taxpayer. In these circumstances, the family and friends of the deceased have given this problem a thorough intellectual mastication, after which, they retained me in the name of their departed relative and friend to convey to you the sum total of their collective wisdom and co-operative spirit. If you should decide to send a U.S. Marshal or other off;cer t<i serve the warrant, you will find the taxpayer, his kith an<l kin avow, comfortably ensconced in a cubicle 7 x 3 x 6 in St. Mal'v'1> Cemetery on Glenallen Street in .said Winchendon. Your M:l ~·i,al might first try whistling. If that brings no response, p:a.ce ;, pint of Johnny Walker <Black label> within arm's reach of the to11bFtone. If that doesn't bring him up, then you will surely know tr.at he is deader than a doornail. If your Marshal kno~s how fo, commune with the dead, he might be ~hie to coax " the fellow to explain his apparent delinquency. However, if your Marshal is in no hu1Ty - and I nf:ver saw one that was - let him bring some sandwichl's and a comfot·tahfo chair with him and sit himself down with a COJJY of "Forevf:r Amber" and wait amund until Ressurrection Day. On that Day of Days, the man you are looking for will undoubtedly stand up for a ghost. ly seventh-inning stretch, at which time the warrant can be Ferved. Ano"~her happy thought might be of added cons0lation to ~'OU. If the taxpayer refuses to budge until he hears Gabriel blow his horn, don't let it bother you. For on that day, when th(' dead I shall live again, you will be able to demand, not on\; the tax due but also you clo'n ask for interest to the Day of Judgment. What you get from this guy alone will be enough to pay f.lff all t.hc, ira. ~ tional debt :iccumul.ated during the past golden decade. If you a!·e a good Democrat - as you should be - thRt feat alone should entitle you to a gi·eat reward in th!:' gre11t Hereafter. There is one possible hitch to this happy thought. You sec, my dear Colleetor, it all depends on whether the m~n you want is in Heaven or in Hell. If he's in Heavf'n, you have nothing to worry about - your money is as good "lS a Victcry Ilond. But, if by chance he should be in the other place, I'm afraid you're going te have a hell of a time. becE.use some damn-fool lawyer is sure to get hoid of him and put him through banhuptc~'· Then, you'll be out of luck for fair. But meantime, do as I suggest. Go down to see him and have a little chat with him. He may t.ell you where his permanent domicile is, in which case you'll know where you can go if you w;i.nt y.:mr money. If y:>u should decide to ta.lk to him, will you be good enough to tell him that my charge for writing this letter is $5.00 and that I don't want to go chasing all over Hell for it. Sa.id section reads as follows: "'SEC. 2319. l,etting of t1mnieipal ft rry, market, or salughterhouse to highest bidder.- When any ferry, market, or slaughterhouse belonging to a municipalit.y is to be let to a private party, the same shall, unless otherwise directed by the Department Head, be let to the highest and best bidder for the period of one year or, upon the previous approval of the provincial board, for a longer period not exceeding five years, urder such conditions as shall be prescribed by the Department Head.' "We cannot agree with appellant in her interpr;;itations of the above-quoted section. Said section clearly refers to the letting or leasing of a ferry, mark~t or slaughterhouse in its entirety, to a private party to be operated by the lattc1·. For instance, when a municipality does not wish to operate a slaughterhouse by administration but prefors to have a private party or {:ntity operate 1·he same for, 1' fixed sum, for a pel'iod of say one year, unrler certaiJJ conditions, the Council calls for bidders and then makes the. ward to the best and most responsible bidder. The same Client (just acquitted on bm.·glary charge) - "Well, goodbye. I'll drop in on you some time." Counsel - "All right, but make it in the daytime, please." "I shall have to give you ten days or $20," said the judge. I'll take the $20, Judge," - said t.he prisoner. '•Repeat the words the defendant used," s:.iid the lawyer. "I dici mther not. The.y were not fit word.!> to tell a gentleman." "Then," said the a.ttorney, "whispher them to the judge." - (2,500 Jokes For All Occrulion.sl Perfume salesgirl: "You've gottii. keep changing. They build you an immumty to them." - Charles Skiles - King Features The mini;;tur to drive home a point about the punishment due to wicked people in hell ended his sermon with the following: "And there will be quasliing of teeth in hell" . . but an old man stood up, "how about me, I ain't got no teeth." The minister answered, "Don't you won·y, you will be provided with." 1 DOUBLE JEOPARDY lContini1ed from }J(tge 6!D fundamental constitutional guaranty to the contra.ry, the accused is placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. It is, therefore, 11.:ell reco9nized that /he doctrine of donble jeopardy is predicated 11pon considerntWn of public policy which volicy has become its ult.fouite and fundamental ba.11i11. (underscot'ing ours.) For that rea.son no legal impediment exists to apply to the military establishment the prevailing view that "if the jury, after it has been duly sworn, is discharged before it has rendered a verdict, a second prosecution for the same offense is thtreby barred, since to permit it to proceed would be to place the d~fendant twice in jeopardy.''2& The rulings dis~ussed above violate the democratic ideals of equal justice under the Constitution, which is the embodiment oi all high hope:; and aspirations of free men. That Constitution is applicable to all regardless of race, creed, or .color, whatever their station in life may be. By that token, there are no such things as one plea of douhle jeopardy for civilians and another for military personnel. The fact that the military personnel are often exposed to inconvenience insofar as the administration of justice is concerned, means that the broadCI' meaning of double jeopardy should apply to their case. After all, it i.s the prevailing view in the American courts vf justice which the Philippine " courts have traditionally followed As it applies to the civilians, there is no reason to deny it to the military personnel. thing is done as regards a nrnnicip&I market or ferry. But what is meant is the whole ferry, the whole market or the entire slaughterhouse and not any portion or any fractional part of the space therein. When a municipality itself administers a market, then under ihl authQrity regulate the use thereof, it may distribute and award spac<>s therein to be occupied by stores and stall~ ~nder conditions and regulation!> it may impoi:;e, but not by public bidding. Otherwise, the with the great number 'lf stalls, numbering hundreds or even thousands, depending upon the size of the market, some stalls or spaces measuring only by a few square feet or square meters, public bidding would entail too much unnecessary proceedings and would result in unnecessary rivalry and competition betw~en numerous parties and also differences in rate and amount of rent paid for the stalls instead of a i:;imple uniform rate based only on the space occupied. It is therefore, clear that on legal grounds the stand taken by the appellant is "untenable.''127 127 Lorenw et al va. Mun. Council o( Naie. Cavitc 0. G., 2360·23G3. THE LAWYERS JOURNAL Febl'Uary 28, .1954 J
Date: 1954
Rights