Supreme Court Decisions, Mejia Vda. de Alfafara vs. Secretary Mapa et al. - Justice Bautista Angelo.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Mejia Vda. de Alfafara vs. Secretary Mapa et al. - Justice Bautista Angelo.pdf

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extracted text: na. ang ha.lagang aming inutang ay ibabalik o babayaran na .. min sa ka11ya sa katapusan ng buwan ng Encro, taong 1949. Pinagkasunduan din naming magasawa na saka.ling hlndi kami makabayad sa taning 11a panahon ay a.mbtg ipifrenda o isasangla sa kanya ang isa naming pafagay na niogan 1rn lugar nang Cororocho, barrio ng Ralogo, municipio ng Santa Cruz, lalawigang l\larinduque, kapu!uang Filipiuas at ito ay nalilibot ng · mga kahangauang summmnod: Sa Norte - Dalmacio Constantino Sa Est:~ - Catalina Reforma Sa Sur - Dionisio A,rioln. ~a Weste -- Reodoro Ric:unora na nat,;tala sa g-obierno ~a ilalin1 ng Dedaracion No. nasa pangabn ko, Josefa Postra.dv. The def~md&nts-appellants admit the execution of the documC'nt, but claim, as special defense, that since t'hc 31st of January, 1949 they offered to pledge the land specified in the ttgrecment and transfer possession the1·eof to the plaintiff-a.ppellee, but that the latter refused said offer. Judgment having been rendered by the justice of the peace court of Sta. Cruz, the de!endanl's-1:1.ppellarits appealed to the Court of First !ni;tance. Tr. that court they reil'erated the defense that they presE-nted in the justice of the peace court. Tht: case was set for hearing in the Court of First Instance on August 16, 1951. As ea.1·ly as J uly 30 counsel for the defendants-appellants presented an "Urgent Motion for Continu. ance," alleging t.'hat on the day set for the hearing <Augusi 16, 1951), they would appear in the hearing of two criminal cases previously set for trial before they i·eceived notice of the hearing on the aforesaid date. The motion was submitted on August 2, and was set for hearing on August 4. This m:>tiun was not act:ed upon until the day of the trial. {;n the date of the trial thP court denied the deiendants-appellants' motic..n for cont'inuancc, and aftc,. hearing the evidence for the plaintiff, in the abstnce of thr. de. frndants-a11pellar.ts and their ccunse1, nmdered the deci&ion appealed from. Defend.:mtS-appelb.nrs, upon receivinf copy 'Jf .the decision, fikd a motion for reconsideration, 1irayinJ that the dttl. sion be set aside on the ground that sufficient time in advnnce was given to the court to pass upon their motion tor c1,.ntinunnce, bot that the same W~'! not passed upon. This motion for reconsidera.. tion was denied. The main question 1·aised in this appeal is the nature and l'ffect of the actionable document ment.'ioned above. The trial court evidently ignored the i;erond part of defendants...appellants's writ.. ten obligation, and enforced its last first part, which fixed payment on January 31. 1949. The plaintiff-appellee, for his part, claims that this part of the written cbligatfon is uot binding upon him for the reason that he did not Eign the agreement, and that even if Jt were so the defendants...apy;ellants did not execute the document! as agrE'ed upon, but, according to their t..nswer, demanded the plaintiff-app.ellee to do so. This last contention of the plain. tiff-appellee is due tO a loose language in the answer filed with lht;i Court of First Inst'ance. But llpon careful scrutiny, it will bo seen that what the de!endants.appellants wanted to allege is that they l.'.hemtP]ve!I hud offered to execute the document oi mC'rtgagC' l'.nd deliver the Emme to the plaintiff. appellee, but that the latter refusl'!d to have it t!Xecute<i uuless an addit.~qnal security was furnished. Thus the answer 1·eads: 5. That immediatC'ly aftc1· the duE! date of the loan Annn "A" c;f thC' complaint, thP defcnrl(mts made ejforts to ezecut11 th,• neces.itlrv documcntl' ol morfyp1gP a ~rl io delive'f the sa'1'e to the plaintiff, in compl1'ance with the term.s and conditiom1 thereof, but the plaintiff refu~ed to execute the proper docu. ments and insisted on anol'her portion of de!(!ndants' J11nd RS additional flecurity for the eaid loan; <UnderscorinK ours> Jn our opinion it is not true that defendants..apJl(.llants hod not offered to execu\!e the dead of mLrtgaire. The other reason adduced by the plaintiff.appellee for claiming that the agreement was nut Oinding upon him also desenes Geant considerution. When plaintiff. appellee received the document, without any C'bjec.tion on his part to the paragraph thereof in which the obligors offered to delivsr a mortgage on a propert.'y of theirs in ca.<ie \!hey failed to pay the de.ht on the day stipulated, he thereby accepted the s:iid condition of the agreement. The accept.. ance by him of the written obligation without objection and pro. test, and the fact t'hat he kc>pt it and based his action then:on, are concrete and positive proof that he agreed and consented to all its terms. including the paragraph on the const'itution of the mortga~e. The decisive question at issue, therefore, is whether the recond (> Urt of the written obligation, i11 which t.'he obli-sors agreed &nd promised t'l deliver a mortgage over the parcel ,Jf land described therein, upon their failure to pay the debt on a date specified in i'he prf'ceding paragraph, is ve.Jid and binding and effective upon the plaintiff-appellee, the creditor. This second part of the obliga.. lion In {]Uestion is what is known in law as a facultativ~ obligation, defined in Articlr. 1206 of the Civil Code of the Philippinf's, which provides: Art. 1206. When only om:; pl'estation has been agreed upon, but the obligor may l't uder another in substitution, the obligation is c~lkd fa.cuh.'ative. This is a new provision and is not found in the vld Spanish Civil Code, which was the one· In force at the time of the execution of the agreemem'. There is nothing in the agreement which would argul! against it3 enforcement It is not l!ontrary to law or public morals c..r public policy, nn<l notwith~tanding t'1e abs!:!nce of any legal provision at the time it was entered into governing it, as the parties had freely and voluntarily entered into it, there is no ground or r£·asun why it sh<.1uld not bl' given effrct. It is a new right which should be declared effeetive at oncf', in consonance with t-he pr<.1· visions of Article 2253 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, t'hus: Art. 225S. x x x. But lf a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effectivt: at once, even though t'he act or event wl1ich gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, . provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. In view of our favorable resolution on the important question raised by the defendants-appellants on this appeal, it becomes un. necessary to consider the oth~1· qut:sti•m of pl'occdure raised by them. For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and in accordunce with the provisions of the writ~n obliga.tior., the ca~e is h~reby remanded to the Court of First Instance, iu which court the defendants-appellants shall prest=nt a duly executed deed of mortgage over the property described in thf' written oNigation, with a period af payment to be agreed upon by the parties with the approval of the court. Without cost.s. Paras. Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, J,J., concur. Vil Cfotildc Mejia Vda. de Alfafara, Petitioner.Appellant, vs. P/,acido Mapa, in his capacity a.o; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Rrsourccs, Benita Compana, et al., Respondents.Appellus, G. R. No. L-7042, May 28, 1954, Bautista An,r1elo, J. 1. PUBLIC LAND LAW, DISPUSl'l'ION OF Pt:'BLIC LANDS; DIRECT9R OF LANDS CAN NOT DISPOSE LAND WITHIN THE FOREST ZONE. - Whe:re the land covered by th11 homestead application of petitioner was still wit'hin the forest zone ~r uud.!r the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, the Direct'lr of Lands h'.ld no jurisdiction t'o dispo~e of ::ia1d land under the provisions of the Public L·and Law and the peti. tioner acquired no right to the land. 2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF CONTRACT OF LANDLOJtD AND TENANT EXECUTED IN GOOD FAITH. - l!:ven if the per. mit gram:cd to petitioner's dece~scd husband oy the Bureau of August 81, l954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 413 Forestry to poss1::ss the land and work it out for his benefit waf!I against the law and as such could have no legal effect. yet v:here he had acted t'hereon in good faith honestly believing that his possession of th<' land was legal, and had entered into a contTactual relation cf landlord and tenant wit'h the respondents in good faith, the contract had produced as a ne.cei::sal'y consequence the relat:ion of landlord and tenant; therPforc, his widc.w should be given the preference to apply !or the land for homestead purposes. 3. ID.; DECISIO?i RENDERED BY DIRECTOR 01•' LANDS AND APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGHICULTliRE ANO NATURAL HESOlTRCES, CONCLUSIVE EXCEPTIONS. - The doctrine that "a decision rmdered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agricult'ure and Natural Resources, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be rt'viewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgmenC in estimating the value or effect of evidence" does not apply to a Jecision of the Director of Lands which has been revoked by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Even if there is unanimity in the decision, still the doctrine would not apply if the conclusions rirawn by the Secretary from the facts foun dare erroneous or not wo.rranred by law. · Maria.)•O M. Florido for t-he petitioner and appellant. Abundio A. 11ldemita for respondents and appellees Benito Camp:ma, et al. Assid'tant Solkitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicit<J1· Jaime de los Angeles for respondent and appeilee Placido J\.fapa. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari filed in i'he Court of First Instance of Cchu in which p11titioner seek'J to nullify a rtecision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Re.sources in D.A.N.R. Case .No. 224 concerning lot No. 741 of t'he Carciir cadastre on the ground that he acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grav1:: abuse of discretion. It appe11.rs that pet'itioner a.nd respondents filed separately with the Bureau of Lands an application claiming as homestt':d lot No. 741 of the Carcar Cadastre. After an .i.nvestigatfon ~on ducted in accordance with the rules and regul.;.tions of said Bureau, a decision was rendered in favcr of petitioner thereby givinR" couree t'o her application and c.verru!ing the application and protests of respondents. In due course, respondents appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who reversed the decisi'ln of the Director of La11ds. And her mot'ion for reconsidcre.tion having been denied, petitioner interposed the present petition for certiorari. Responrtcnts in t.'heir answer alleged that, under Section S of the Public Land Law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural fli?som·ces is the t'xecutive officer charged with the duty to carry out the provisions of said law relative to the administration and disposition of the lands of the i;ublic domain in the Philippines; that the deci~ion which is uow disputed by petitioner was rendered after a formal investigatfon conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the basis of the evidence adduced therein and, i'herefor{', said Secretary has not abused his discretion in rendering 1t; and that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resc.urces on the matter is conclusive and not subject to review by th~ courts, in the absence of a showing that it was rendered in consequence of fraud, iinpositfon, or mista.ke other than an error of judgnu·nt in estimating the value or effect of the evidence presented, citing in support of this contcnt'ion the case of Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440. The lower court, after the rcc~11tion of the evidence, upheld the conhmtion of respondents, iu1d dismissed the petition, whereupon petitioner took the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The case, however, was certified to 1his Court on t.'1e ground that the appeal involves purely questi,ins of law. The facts of this case as fouPd by the Director of Lands are: By virtue of an application filed by Maximo Alfafa.ra, t'he Bureau of Forestry grantP.d him a permit en February 1, 1923, by virtue of which he was authorized to construct and maintain a fishpond within lot' No. 741 of the Carcar cadastre. Said 11ermitt{'e constructed fishpond dikes along the side of the li>.nd facing General Luna street and running parallel to the river. Sailli dikes werr? destroyed by the flood which occurred in the same year. In Hl26, the permittec abandoned the idea of converting the land into a fishpond and, instead, he decided to convert it into a ricefield. To this effect, the permittce l!ntered into an agreement: with res. pondente whereby the latter would convert' the land into a. Ticefield <·n condition that they would take for themselves the harvests for i'he first. three years and thereafter the crop would be divided share and share alike between thC' pcrmittee and thP. respondents. In 1930, the permittel! ceded his rights and interests in t11e land to his son, Catalino Alfafara, who continued improving the sa.me by constructing more rict> paddies and planting nipa palms along its border. Having converted the Jund into a ricefield, Catalino Alfafara fifod a homestead application therefor in his name while at the same time continuing the same arrangement with respondf'nts as share croppers. ·Upon the death of Catalino Alfafara in 1945, the respondents, after the barvest in 1946, began asserting their own righr over tl1e land and rt•fuscd t.c1 giv~ the share car. responding to Catalino Alfafara to his widow, the herein petitioner. The claim of res(londt'nts that they improved the land in t'heir own right :ind not with permissiun of petitioner's predecessors-ininterest, was not given credence by the Bureau of Lands, for its agents found, not only from the evidence presented, but u.lso from t:hcir ocular inspection, that the land has been under the rightful possession of Maximo AlfaCara since 192::1, and that r1::spondents were only able to work thereon upon his permission on a !hare basis. By virtue of these findings of the Director of Lands, the homestead application of petitioner w11s given due course. On appeal however to the Secrr?tary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official revl!r">ed the decision of th(; Director of Lands invoking the ruling long (lb!::erved hy his dt::pJ.rtnwnt' in connection with the disposition of public lands which are formerly within tht:: forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry. He held t1iat neither petitioner nor any of her predecessors-in-interest had acquired any right under the homestead application filed by each inasmuch as the land covered by thLm was still within the foresC zone when applied for and that, for that reason, the Director of Land:i had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Law. He likewisP. held that, inasmuch as the Alfafaras have not est'ablished any right to the la.nd at the time they entered .into t'he contract with rr?s1,ondents to work on the land on a share basis, t'he relf,_ tion of landlMd and cropper between them did not legally exist and u such did not produce any legal effect. Consequently, --h~ heldlhe Alfafaras cannor be considP.rcd as landlords of respondents, and b£:tween ~ actual occupant of 3.n agricultural la11d which is rclf'?.sed from the forest zone ·and C'ertified as dispcsable under the Public Land Law, and an applicant whose application expired prior to its ccrt.Hicaticn, the actual oecupr.nt is given 1ireferential right thereto over the applicant. The rulin£ above adverted to reads as follows: "It is the rule in this jul'isdiction which has been followed consistent.1y in the dis11osition ~f forest land which have been declared agriculturfll lands that occupation flf a forest land prio1· to the certification of the Dil'ector of 1'\lrestry \'hat the sRme is rf!!ensed from the forest zone and is disposable un<ler the provisions of the Public LRnd Law · does not confer upon the occupa.nt thereof the right of preference thereto under the said law. In t-lie snme manner, this office does not givc and does not recognize any right of preference i~ favor of homestead whose applications were filed prior to the certification that' the 414 THE LAWYERS JOUTINAL August 31, 1954 land covered thereby has already been released from the forest zone and .is disposable under the provisions of the Public Land Law. In other wo1·ds, pl'ioL· to t.'he certification by the Bun'au of Forestry that a parcel of forest land is aheady released from th~ forest .zone and is disposable under the p1·ovisions ot· the Public Land Law, this Department does riot recogni.ze any right of preference in favor of either the actual occupant thereof. or any homestead applicant therefor. The reason for t.'his is that any permit or license issued by the Bureau of Forestry for a parcel of fo1·est land can not bind the Bureau of Lands to recogni.ze any rif?ht ir. favor of the Public Land Law; and any homestead application filed prior to the certifi. cati .. .m by t'he Director of Forestry is ineffective and subject to rejedion. Frnm the time, however, that a parcel of fore~t land is released from the forest .zone and certified as disposable under the provisions of the Public Land Law, t.'he occupntion of the actual occupant becomes effective and is re. cognized by the Public Land Lu.w under Section 95 thereof. Also the homestead application filed prior tb the certification by tf)e Director of Forestty will becomf' eHr.ctive from the date of th11 certification. if th9 same hn.d M~ been rejected prior to such certification. But, between rhe actual occupant of ::i parcel of agricultural Jami and an applicant therefor whose application was filed prior to its certifi<'ati9n as such by i'he Dil'ector of Forestry, this Of£ice always rec!lgnizeS the preferential right thereto of the actual occupant thereof. In a Jong line of decisions in appealed cases, this Office alwa)'S recoirnizes the preferential right t'hereto of Ute actuhl occu.. pant thereof. In a fong Jin(\ of decisions in appealed cases, this Office always maintains that agricultural lands already and actually occupied and cultiYated cannot: be applied for under the homestead !aw t!XC!>pt by the actual occupant tl.:i.':!rt!· of.'" (Vicente Rui.z et al. '" H. A. (New), Mariano Ba. Mtm. cao, Isabela, City of Za.mbonnga, de.clsion dat:cd April 13, 1949 and order dated July 22, 1949.J The que.nion now to bo determined is: Has the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcef: abused his discretion in ·re. versing the decision of the Direct~r of Land:)? A~ the outset, it should be stated that the findings of fact made by the Director of Lands Jiad been substam:ally upheld by the Secret:i.ry of Agriculture and Natural Resour.:es. Th~y only differ on the conclusions derived therefrom and on the effect upon them of t.'he law regarding thP. disposition of public lands which formf'rly were within the fon>.s:t %one or under the juriRdic.. tion of the Bureau of Forestry. Thus, the first question dt:cidl!d by the Secretary of Agricui. l.'ure and Natural Resources is: Has petitiont:r nr any of her predecessors.in.interest acquired any right to the land under the provisions of the Public Land Law? Ar.d the Secretary, following the nllng aboYe stated, answ~red in the nega.i.he. His reasoning follows: '·Neither Clotilde Mejia Vda. de Alfafara nor any of her pred2cessors.in.interest could ~cquire any right under the home. stead application filed by each of them inasmuch as i.'he land co. vered thereby WF.s still within the forest zone and tha.t for that l"f'ason, the Direct:or of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of t.aid land under the provi~ions of the Public Land Law." To this we agree, for it appears that the land was released from the forest zone only on August 10, 1949, and the permit' granted to Mri.itimr> Alfafara to possess the land for the purposes of homeste::1d was in 192.'l. And with regard to CRtalino Alfafara, his son, his ap. plication was filed only in 1930. The second question decided by the Secretar... is: What: is the legal effect of the contractual relation of landlord and temmt <'Xif:ting between i.'he Alfafaras and the respondents? The answe.,. ~f the Secret.ary is: ''Considering that none of th~ Alfafara~ has e!ltablished any right \vhatsoever to the land in questinn at: th11 time the contractual relath.in bt!ga.n, this office ts of the opinion .:!.nrl so holds t'hat the relation of landlord and cropper cm1ld not and did not produce any legal effect hr.cause the supposed. land!ordf., thr- Alfafaras, have no title or right to the land in question under the provisions of the Public Land Law. In other words, t.Me of. !ice cannot see how any of the Alfafaras could be considered landlord of the claimants on the land in question when none of tl:~m has any right over said land ur.der the Public Land Law." With this conclusion we disagree. Even in the supposition t.'hat the P<'rmit granted to Maximo Alfahra by the BurPau of Forestry to possess the land and work it out for his benefit be against the law and as such can have no legal effect, the fact however is that Maximo Alfafara has act:ed therec·n in govd faith honestly believing that his posses3ion of the land was legal and was given to him under and by virtuP of the authodty of the la.w. Likewise, it cannot: be reasonably disputed that when Maxim<' Alfafara entered into a contract with the respondents for the con. Yersion of the land into a ricPfield with the understandiug that the respondents, as a rewnrd for their service, woul:I get for them. selves .-i-11 the h~uvcsts for the first three years, and th~rcafter the han•ests woud be divided bchwen them and Maximo Alfafara share and i>hare alike, both Alfafara and respondents have acted in good faith in the honest belief th11.t what they were doing was legal and in pursuance of the po?rmit granted to Alfafara under the authority of the le.w. Having entered into that contractual relation in good faith no other conclusion con be drawn than that such contract has produced as a necessary consequence the relation of landlord and tcna.nt "° much so that "i:he reEpondeut<; worked the land only on· thP basis of such understanding. And this relation continued not only when Maximo Alfafara assigned his right under the permit to his sc.n Catalino, bi:t also when the Jatte1· died znd his widow, the herein petitioner, took over and ' continued possesl'ing the land as successor.in-interest of her hus. band. And it was only in 1946, after the death of Catalino Alfafara, that respondents got wise and, taking advantage of the helplessness of his widow, coveted the land and decided to assume the right over it by filing their own application with Burt0au of Lands. Such a conduct cannot be .ea.id as one done in i;-ood faith, and, In our opiniou, cannot be a basie for a grant of public land under the ruling invoked by the Secretary of Agriculture aud Na. tural Resources. The possession therefore of the land by respondents should be • considered as that of a t:enant and in this sense that possession cannot benefit them but their lanrllord, the widow, in contcmpJa. lion of the rule. As such, the widow should be given the preferf':nce fu app!y for the land for homf'!stead put·poses. We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid d'.>wn in the case <·f Ortua v!I. Singson Enca.rnacio11, 09 Phil., 440, to the effect that the decision rendered by the !Jirectcr of La.nds and approved by t'h~ Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resuurces, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subj..-ct to bE revfowed by the courts, i!l the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other 1!11an error of judgment tn estimating the value or effect of evidence." But we hold thn.t this doctrine does not' apply here because we :ire not concerned with a decision of th<' Director of l .ands which was approved by the Secretary of Agricultu1·e and Natural Resources, hut: one which has been re\•oked. 'l'r.e philosophy behind this ruling is that if the decision of the Directer of Lands on a question of fact is ct•ncurred in by the Secretary of Agricultur~ and Natural Hesourccs, it beromes conc!Usive upon the court's upon the theory that the subject h.o.s been thoM\.ighly weighed and discussed a.nd it must be given faith and credit, but not so when \.'here is a disagreem<'nt. And even if there i:, unanimity in the deci~ion, still we believe that t.'he doctrine would not apply if the conclusions drawn by the Secretary from the fa.cts found are erroneous or not warranted by law. These cvnclusions can still be the subject of judicial review. These are questicins of l&w that: are reserved to the courts to determine, as can be inferred from the following ruling laid down in the same case of Ortua: "There is, however,. anot~er side to the case. IC certainly was not intended bf the le~islative body to remove from thl' jurisdiction .:if courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally. Giring force· to all possible intendment:s regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands, AugUst 31, 1954 THE L.'\.WYF.i!S JOURNAl~ 415 yet so much of the decision of the Director of Landa as re. lates to a question of law is in no sense conclusive upon the c.om·ts, but is subject to r eview. In other w<.1rds, :i.ny acl'ion of the Director of Lands whfrh is based upon a misconsh neA removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Such is no\: the case of petitioner ~erein, for Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement Bureau and, by implication, the office o.f director thereof, which petitioner held. tion o! the Jaw can be correct<!d by the c'>urts." <Shepley v. Cowan (1876], 91 U.S., 330; Moore '" Robbins (1878], 96 U.S. 3. 530; ·Marquez vs. Frisbie [1879], 101 U.S., 473; Black v. JackCONSTITUTION_.\L LAW; ABOLITION OF BUREAU EX. TINGUISHES RIGHT OF INCUMBENT TO THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR THEREOF; NO VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON CIVIL SERVICE. - Where the law expressly abolished t~e Placement Bureau, by implica. tion, the office of direcCor thtoreOf, which cannol exist without said Bureau, is deemed abolished. By the i1bolitio11 of said Bure:i.u and of the office of its director, tho right thereto of petitioner w:i.s necessarily extinguished thereby, There bc·ing no removal or suspension of the petitioner, but r.bolition of his form~r offic~ of Director of the Placement Bureau, which is within the !JOWer of Congress to underl'ake by legislation, the: constitutional mandate to the effect that "no officer or emplo)'·ee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except' for cause as 1irovided by law" is not violated. son {1900], 177 U.S., 349; Johnson v. Riddle, supra .) Wherefore, the decision :i.ppcaled from is reversed. ThE: court sets a.side the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated Se11tember 15, y949 as well as his order dated January 3, 1950, reaffirming eaid d~i1'ion. Thf' court i~vives the decision of t'he Director c,f Lands dated March 18, 1948 end orders that it be given due course. No pronouncement as to costs Bengz<m, .Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador and Concepcion, J.J., conMr. Justice Alex. Reyes took no pal't. PARAS, C.J. , dissent'ing: 4. ID.; ID.; TRANSFER OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FROM ONE OFFICE TO ANOTHER. - Where the law abolishing the l'lacement Bureau explicitly provided for the transfer, amon2' others, of the· qualified p~rsonnel of the lati:er to the National Employment Service, such transfer co:motes th2t the National Employment Service is different: and Jisti11ct from the Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transf,'ned only from one place to another, not t<' the same place. Had Congrf'ss Intended the National Employment Service to be a mere am. plification or enlargement of the Placement Bureau, the law would have directed the retention of the "qualified personnel" of l'he latter, not theii· transfer to the former. It is true that Maximo Alfafara was granted on F:ebruary 1, 1923, a permit to construct and mamtain a fishpond within lot No. 741 of the Carcnr cadasCre, but it nevertheless appears that said permit was cancelled in 1P26 after said fishpond was destroyed by a typhoon. In said year, Maximo Alfafara induced the -respondent Benita Campnna, et al. to convert the former fishpond into a riceland, t.'he agreement h-1ing that the crops for the first three years would be for said respondents and that thereafter the crops would be divided equally bdween the former and the latter. According t.o the findings of t.'he Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource.s, not contradicted in any way by those of the Director of Ltmds, M:axin10 Alfe.fara and his SUct'.essorS-in-interest 5. ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF NEW A"PPOINTMENT; EFFECT 11ever worked on the land or spent, anyt'hing for the impt'ovements ON RIGHT OF INCUMBENT TO THE OFFICE. - Where, thereon. The question tha.t arises is, after the land was declared as it is :i.dmittcd by petitioner, there is necessity of appointing available for homestead purposes by certification of the Director Commissioner of the Nati<:n'a! Employment Service, it follows of Forestry in 1949, or Jong after the permit of Alfafara had been tha~ he does not hold or occupy the latter's item, inasmuch as cancelled, whether the Alfafaras should be preferr.:d to those who the right thereto may be ac(]uired only by appointment. :;!::~~ ';.~~=;:r:n c!~:e!a~:· h~~~te:n~he r~;:tce~l:t::tho:ri~~s t~er:~t: 6. ID,; SCOPE OF TERM "QUALIFIED PERSONNEL". - tinue holding th'-! land. Yet, he was given for several years one If the Director of the Placement Bureau were includ~d in the halC of the crop harvested by the respondents who took over the phrnse "qualified personnel" and, as a. consequence, he autoJand in good faith and could already occupy it in their own right. matically became Commissioner of the National· Employment ~f :~~ :~~~}t:!;;:;::::,::;;:',::~::Y1~~~'.p~~:;:~;;;~!:~::]!:!: :15::~:::~~~:,::!~[:!~~~~t~::,:rE:,:";~: i:T,'!~;·:;:~: 1 ,f their priority to the portion of the land actually held by t.hem "qualified personnel" of the Placement Buurea.u "upon th as a homestead. 1t apptia.rs, however, t'hat there were occ-.iptmts organization of the Service." which connotes that the new of other portions of the lot who did not apply for hQmesteads, with office would be established at some future tir.i€. In common the res'.llt that said pcrt'ions may be awarded to the A!fafaras parlance, the word "personnel" is used generally to refer to if they are still entitled thereto under the law. the subordinnte officials '>r dP.rical employees of an office or enterprise, not to the managers, directors or heads thereof. I vote for the affirmance of t:he appealed dP.cision. Concurro con esta disidencia. (Flo.) G1dllermo F. Pablo VIII Luis Manalang, Petition~r. vs. Aurelio Quitoriano, Emiliano Morabe, Znsimo fJ. Linafo, and Molmmad de Venan.cfo, Respondents, G. R. No. L. 6898, April 30, 1954, Concepcion J. 1. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS; REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICERS. - Where the petitioner has never beon commissioner of the National Employment Service, he could not have been, and h:\s not been, removed t'hel'efrom. 2. ID.; lD.; ABOLITION OF OFFICE. - To 1·emove an officer is to oust him from his office i;efore the expiration of his term. 7. ID.; PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWER OF CONGRESS TO APPOINT COl\IMISSIONER OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMEN'f SERVICE; APPOINTING POWER EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF PRESIDENT; LIMIT A TIO NS ON POWER TO APPOINT. - Congress can not, either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the President the duty to appoint eny particular person to said office. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations m:i.y be imposed by Congress, except those' l'esult'ing from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and !tom tho? ex('rcise of the limited legislative power t'o prescribe the qualifications to a given apµointlve office. 8. ID.; ID.; RECORD OF PUBLIC SERVANT DOES NOT GRANT COURT POWER TO VEST IN .ffJM LEGAL TITLE; DUTY OF COURT. - Petitioner's r€cord as a public servant - no matter hc,w impressive it may be as an ur&ument in favor of his consideration for appointment either '.IS Commissioner or as Deputy Commissioner of the Nat.'ional Employn1tnt Ser416 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL August 31, 1954
Date: 1954
Rights