Supreme Court Decisions, Rehabilitation Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al - Justice Conception.pdf · Rare Periodicals

Supreme Court Decisions, Rehabilitation Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al - Justice Conception.pdf

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extracted text: x Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, Petitioner, 'Vt. The Honorable Court of Appeu-ls, Estelito Madrid and Jesus Anduiza, RtspOndents, G. R. No. L-5942, May 14, 1954, Concepcion, J, 1. OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS; PROMISSORY NOTE PAYABLE IN INSTALLMENT. - Where the makers of the promissory note promised to pay the obligation evidenced thereby "on or he/ore October 31, 1951," although t'he full amount of said obligation was not demandable prior to October 31, 1!151, in view of the provision of the note relative to the payment in ten annual installments, the makers or debtor11 Wtte entitled to make a comp!rte setl1emcnt of the obligation at any time before said date. 2. ID.; RIGHT OF CREDITOR. -- The Bank, as creditor, has no other right than to cxacC payment, after which the Qbliga.tion in question, as reg!lrds 'lsid creditor, and, hence, the latter's status and rights as such, become aut'omatical\y extinguished. 3. ID.; PAYMENTS MADE BY THIRD PERSONS. - Unde.r article 1158 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines when the payments under consideration were made, "pa.ymerit may be made by any person, whether he has an interest: in the performance of the obligation or not, and whether the payment is known and approved by the debtor or whether he is unaware of it." 4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENTS MADE AGAINST WILL OF DEBTOR. -The provision that the payor "may only recover from the debtor insofar as t.1le payment has been beneficial to him," when made against his express will, is a. defense that may be availed of only by the debtor, not by the Bank-eredito1·, for it affects solely the rights of t.11e former. Besides, in order that the rights of the payor may be subject to said limitation, the debtor must oppose t:he payments before or at the time the same were made, not subsequently thereto. 5. ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF PAYMENT DETERMINED AT THE TIME IT WAS MADE; RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY PAYOR DEPEND UPbN LAW. - The effeds of payment must be determined at the time it: was made and the rights acquired by the payor should not be dl'!'eudent upon, or subject to modification~ by, subsequent unilateral acts or omissions of t'he debtor. The question whether the payments were beneficial or not to the debtor, depends upon t'he law, not upon his will. Si.xto de la Costa for the petitioner. Zacarias Gutierrez f,f>'ra for the respondent Jesus de Anduiza. DECISION CONCEP<;:ION, J.: This is a.n appeal by cert'iorari, taken by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Bank, from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts are set forth in said decision, from which we quote: ''On October 31, 1941, Jesus de Anduiza and Quintana Cano executed the following promissory note - Pl3,800.00 Lega.spi, All.Jay, October 11, 1941 On or before October 31, 1951 for value received, I/wt!, jointly and severally, promise to pa}' the AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, or order, at its of. fice at Manila or Agenoy at: Legaspi, Alba.y, Philippines, the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS CP'13,800.00>, Philippine currency, ·,vith interest at the rate of six per centum (6%), per annum, from the date het·eof until paid. Payments of t.'he principal and the corresponding interest arc to tw made in ten <10 yrs.) equal Annual installments of Pl,874.98 each in accordance with the following schedule of amorti1ations: All unpaid inst:allments shall bear interest at tht: rate of six per centum (6%), per annum. <Sgd.> QUINTANA CANO \Sgd.) JESUS DE ANDUIZA Mortgagor Mortgagor" CExhlbit ·'C") Mortgagors Anduiza 9nd Cano failed to pay the yeart} amortizations that fall due on October 31, 1942 and 1943. As plaintiff Estelito Madrid, who was at the outbreak of the last war the manager of the • branch office of the National Abaca and other Fiber Corporation in Sorsogon, and who temporarily lived in the house of Jesus de Anduiza in said province during the Japanese OCC\.l~ation, learned of the lat.ter's failure to pay the aforesaid amortizations due the creditor Agricultural and Industrial Bank, he went to its central office in Manila on October, 1944, and offered t.o pay the indebtedness of Jesus de Anduiza. Accordingly, he paid on October 23, 1944, f'7,3'14.83 for the principal, and P2,265.17 for the interest, or a t'otal of !"10.000.00 <Exh. 'A'), thereby lea.ving a balance of P6,425.17 which was likewise 9aid on October 30th of the same year <Exh. 0 B'L Alleging that dl?'fendant Jesus de Anduiza has failed to pay the plaintiff in the amounC of Pl6,425.l 7 inspite of demands therefore, and that defendant Agricuultura.l and Induatrial Bank (now R.F.C .) refused to cancel the mortgage executed by said Anduiza. Est:elito Madrid instituted the present action on Juiy 3, 1948, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for judgment <a) declaring as paid the indebtedness amounting to P16,425.17 of Jesus de Andui:ta. to the Agricult:ural and Industrial Bank; <b) ordering the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now R.F.C.) to release the properties mortgaged to it and to execute the corresponding cancellation of the mortgage; (c) condemning defendant! Jesus de Anduiza to pay plaintiff the amount of !'16,425.17, with legal interest from the filing of the complcint until complet:ely paid, declaring such oblig<ition a preferred lien over Anduiza's properties which plaintiff freed from the mortgage, and sentencing the defendants to pay \.'he plaintiff the sum of 1"2,000.00 as da.: mages and the costs, withaut prejudice to conceding him other remedies just and equitable. On July 14, 1948, defendant Agricultural and Industrial Bank <now R.F.C.) filed its answer, alleging that the loan of Pl3,800.00 had not become due and demandable in October, 1944, as the same was payable in ten years at !'1,874.98 annually; that up to October 30, 1944, plaintiff delivered the total sum of Pl6,425.l 7 lh the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and which accepted the same as deposit pending- proof of the existence of Jesus de Anduiza's authority and approval which plaintiff promised to present; that' it was agreed that if plaintiff could n.Jt prove said authcrity the deposit will be annulled; and that the Agriculi.\ual and Industrial Bank and it1 successor the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation cannot release the properties mortgaged because defendant Anduiza refused t!o ;;,pprove, authorize or recognize sa.id deposit made by plaintiff. It is further averred, as special defense, that the amount of Pl6,425.p, in view of the refusal of defend.int Jesus de Anduiza to apprmtc and authorize same for payment of his loan, was declared null and void by Executive Order No. 49 of June 6, 1945; that on June 4, 1948, defendant Anduiza personally came to the office of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, apprising it that he did not: authorize the plaintiff to pay for his loan with the Agricultural and Industrial Bank; and that on June 4, 1948, he paid t.'he sum of P-2,000.00 on account of his loan and interest in arrears.. Defendant Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now R.F'C. l therefore prayed (1) to dismiss the complaint and tO declare plaintiff's deposit in the sum of rl6,425.17 null and void in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 49, series of 1945; (2) to concede to defendant Agricult:unl and Industrial Bank such other legal remedies which may be justified in the premises; and C3> tn order plaintiff to pay the costs. August 31, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL Defendant Jes us de Anduiza filed his answer on August' 9, 1948, with special defenses and counterclaim, alleging that when plaintiff paid the total :imount of P16,425.17 to the Agricultural and lndust:rial Bank his indebtedness thereto was not yet due and demandable; that the payment was made without his knowledge and consent; that the Agricultural and Indu.st'rial Bank did not accept the amount of !"16,425.17 from Estelito Madrid as payment of his loan but as mere deposit to be ,applied later as payment. in the event he would approve the same; that said deposit ·..r.is declared null and void by Executive Order No. 49 of June 6, 1945; that on Jmie 4, 1948, he personally informed the officials of the Rehabilit:llfon Finance Corporation that he did not authorize the plaintiff to pay the AgrlcuJtura.1 and Industrial Bank for his loan; and that on the same date he paid the corporation the swn of P2,000.00 on accowil! of his loan and the interest in arrears. On June 20, 1949, the trial court rendered in favor of the plaint-iff a judgment which was set aside later on upon motion of counsel for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation on June 28t!h, in which it was alleged that his failure to appear at the hearing on June 9, 1949, was due to a misunderstanding. Consequently, and after defendant corporation had introduced ita evidence, the court on August 11, 1949, rendered decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint without pronouncement as to costs. On or about September 7, 1949, defendant Jesus de 4\nduiza filed an amended answer which the trial court, upon considering the same as well as his eo-defendant's opposition t:hereto, denied its admission on September 20, 1949. The motion for new trial filed by defendant Anduiza and plaintiff Estelito Madrid was likewise denied for la.ck cf merit on the same date, September 20th. Consequently, plaintiff Estelito Madrid and defendant Jesus de Anduizc brought this case to this Ccurt by way of appeal, x x x." (pp. 1-6, Decision, C.A.l Upon the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered the aforement.'ioned decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: ''WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, directing the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, successor in interest of the Agricultural :ind lnd'..lstrial :Bank, to cancel tlte mortgage executed by Jesus de Anduiza. and Quintana Cano in favor of said bank; and ordering Jesus de Anduiza t.o pay plaintiff Estelito Madrid the amount of 1"16,425.17 without pronouncement as to costs." (pp. 17-18, idem. l The Bank assails said decision of t'he Court of Appeals upon the ground that payments by respondent Estelito Madrid had been made agai~st "the express will of Anduiza and over the objection of the Bank; that the ~atter accepted said payments, subject to the condition that a written instrument, signed by Anduiza, authorizing the same, would be submitted by Madrid, who has not! done so; that the paynients in question were made by Ma.cl.rid in the name of Anduiza and, therefore, through misrepresentation and wil..'hout good faith; that said payments were not beneficial to Anduiza; and that the obligat'ion in question was 11ot fully due and demandable at the time of the payments aforementioned. At the outset, it: should be noted that the makers of the pro... missory note quoted above promi~d to pay the obligation evidE-nced thereby •·on or before October 31, Hl51.'' Although the full amowit: of said obligation was not demandable prior to October 31, 1951, in view of the provision of the note relative to the payment in ten <10) annual installments, it is clear, therefore, that the makers or debtors were entitled to make a comple~ settlement: of the obligation at any time bef01'6 said date. With reference t:o the other arguments of petitioner herein, Article 1158 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the payments under consideration and of the institution of the present. case <JuJy 3, 1948), reads: "Payment may be made by any person, whether he ha.i. an interest in the performance of the obligatiol' or not, and whether the payriienl is kuown ::ind approved by the uebtor 01 whether he is unaware of it. "One who makes a payrnt>nt for the account of anothe1 may recover from the debtor the amount of the payment, un. less i~ wa.s made against his express will. "In the latter case he ~an recover from the debtor on))· in so far as the payment ·has been beneficial to him." It is clear therefrom that respondent Madrid was ent~tled to pay the obligation of Anduiza irrespective of the latter's will or that of die Bank, and even over the objection of dthcr or both. Ccmmenting on said Article 1158, Manresa says: "Si cs amplio el principio deelarado en el art. 1158 por raz6n de las personas a que se cxtiende, no lo cs menos por la ausencia de restricciones basadaa E.n la voluntad del deudor. La primera parte de dicho a.rticulo parece limitar la posibili. dtd del pago por un tercero a Joe casos en que el deudor eonozca y apruebe tal hecho o lo ignore. Pero hs dos pirrafos siguicnt'es exticnden tal posibilidad al caso en que el deudor desapruebe el pago y aun se oponga a que lo verifiquen, pues. to que determinando la. ley los efectos, si bien parciales, limitados, que un pago hCcho en tales C•.mdiciones puede producir contra cl mismo deudor que a tl se opuso, es claro que al atribuirlt tales efeetos le atribuyc plena eficacia respecto de! acreaJor, que 110 esta autorizado para hace-r oposici011 alguna. "Menos duda aU.n puedo ofrecer la validez <lei pago, conociendolo el deuder y omitiendo exprcsar su conformidad; hipOtcsis menos extrema que la anterior, y en la cual puede verse incluso una aproba.cion tacita, aprobacion quc autoriza, incluso la subrogaciOn misma del tercero, segun veremos al hablar de la novacicin. "Tenernos, por tanto, que sea cual fuere la situaciOn en que este' o se coloque el deudor respec& del pago hecho por un terttro, no irnpide a e'ste verificarlo con eficacia respecto del acreedor, y aUn ta.mbicn respecto de aquill mismo, segun se expresa lucgo. "La jurisprudencia, confirmando el sentid.:i de la ley, ha venido a declarar tambie'n que no es neccsario para el 11ago el concurso del deudor; asi vienen a estableccrlo la scntencis de 4 de .Novicmbre de 1897, que ratifica los j)l-eceptos contcnidos en cl a.rt. 1158 yen el siguicnte, y la de 5 de Abril de 1913, declarativa de que, sicndo el pago de una deuda e} medio mlls directo de extinguir la oblif!'acicin, aclo quc mejora la situaciOn del prestatario, juede realizarlo cualqui'."ra aun contr«diciencfolo o ig11-0rd11dolo aquel. En la jurisprudencia hipotecaria hay una resolucici'n de la DirecciOn general de los Regist'ros de 22 de Marzo de 1893, nmy explicfta c im1iortante, en las cual se dcclara respccto de esta cucstiOn que 'el pago es un acto jur,dico ta.n independiente dtf deudor, que puedc ser firme y valedero hecho por tcrcera persona que no tenga interCs en la obligaci6'n, y aUn cuando el deudor Jo ignore tot'almente, segUn cl art. 1158 de] COdigo civil'; que 'de csC' principio legal se deduce qur, no cabe reputar nulo el pago de una obligaciOn porque faltc el consentimiento del deudoi, ni menos estimar nula. la escritura en que el pago constc, por carecer de la firma de este'; que 'en ese modo de extinguirse las obligaciones, lo verdadcramente capital es la voluntad dcl acrccdor, y asi 1o ha ent!endido el articuki 82 de la ley Hipotecaria, al no cxigir pa..ra la cancclaciOn de las hipotecas mis quc cl conscntimiento de aquel en cuyo favor se hallen conatituldas'; y por ultimo, que 'aunque cl art. 27 de la ley de! Notariado exige bajo pena do nulidad quc se firmen las escrituras, se r efiere a los que en clla.s interviencn en calidad de otorgantcs, denominaciOn que en los actos unilakrnles cuadra t.o.n &!Io al que en vi rtud de los mismos queda obligado' . "No ha sido menos cxplfoita y fundada la jurisprudcncia en cuanto a decla.rar que tampoco £l «creedor 1medc impedir vi'tlidaniente el pa.go M.clw por UIL tcrcero, declariCndosc en la sentencia de 4 de Novicmbre de 18!:17, a que aiites &e hizo referencia, que ni estos preceptos que comentamos, ni Joa demas de csta 422 THE LAWYERS JOURNAJ, August :n, 1954 seccion o de otros luga res de! C6digo, aplicables a la mat'erii.., 'ni el a.rt . 1161 de la ley Proccsal, requieren el consentimiento dC?l acreedor para la eficacia del pago y para la consiguiente subrogaciO'n, 11orq1'e su derecho, que no va mt!:; alla del cumplimi~nto <le las oblioa.ciC1ne11, se acabct o e::x:tingue con. el pago' . Pudiera creerse que la doctrina de dicha sentencia era opuesta a la deo la DirecciOn, que antes hemos transcrito, y que est'a reconoc(a la facultad del acreedor para conSentir o impedir el pago; pero lcjos de ser as{ no hay contradicci6n, limit:lndose dicho Centro directivo a exponer el evideni:e requisito de que para Jos efec:tos del registro no puedcn considerarse extinguidos los derechos del acreedor sin que e'ste intervenga en al pago, pero esto no e::x:cliJye q1i.e los le pueda imponer la admi.tio"n de eate contra su voluntad." <8 Mamesa, 4th ed. , pp . 242-243; underscoring supplied.) This is in line wi\.'h the view of Mucius Scaevola, which is ss follows: "En efecto; el unico drreclw del acreedor en las obligaciones t:s el de que se le pague. No puede, por lo tanto, oponerse a que la obligaci6n le sea cumplida por una persona distinta del deudor. Por otra parte, el deudor queda libre de su compromiso desde el momento en que el credito esta satisfecho, puesto quc a partir de entonces, nada se dehe. Podran, pues, discutirse los efectm: del pago hecho por una tercera persona en cuanto a la relac1on que de es~o se deduzca para lo sucesivo cntt-e el tercero 11 el deudor; pero negar que la deuda queda liberada, desatado el vinculo, perdida en el acreedor la facultad de reclama r ii insubsistente sobre el deudor el pago de su compromiso seria de todo punto ~merario. "Lo presumible es que tenga interes en el cumplimiento de la obligaciOn quien trata de snstituirse al deudor en el pago; es natural !a defensa de los intereses propios, y poco corrient:e y poco acostumbrado, que por purn generosidad, se satisfaga la deuda de otros sin algun beneficio por pa rte del que de estas rnanera procedc. En este sontirlo, el fiador, que es, si no un deoudor principal, deudor al fin, puesto que ha enlazado sus interes'es, con su cuenta y razon, a los de la persona obligada, y se ha comprometido siibsidiariamentc con ella al pago de lo que se debia, se adelantara muchas veces, por dislintos motivos a pagar la deuda, teniendo en ello propio y legitimo beneficio. A pa rte del interes juridico, motivos parti<'ulares de otro orden, que implican un genero cualquiera de provecho, pueden mover t:ambien el animo de una tercera persona para sustituirse en el lugar de! deudor. .. Pero ni siquiera se necesita que es to suceda. Laa doctrinaa ju,{dfoas han permitido que haga el pago cualquiera per30fttl., tenga o no interes en el cumplimiento de la obligaciOn, segun expresamente det'ermina el art. 1158 del CO digo. Es de 1>uponer el intere's, naturalmente, por lo que decimos m8s ar riba; pero la Icy se reconoce sin facultades para entrar en este terreno, y obediciendo a las meras consideraciones jurfdicas de la satisfi!cciOn del compromiso por la entrega de la cosa o prestaciO'n de! hecho y de la libera.ciO n consiguiente de! deudor, prescinde del genera de motivos interesados o desinteresados, incluso de mera liberalidad, que hayan pedido producir la determincion de la tercera persona que ofrece al acreedor la realizaciOn del compromiso. " Y no para en esto ; sino que el mismo art. 1158 esta.blece que Podra hacer el pago cualquiera persona, ya lo conozca o lo apruebe, ya lo ignore el deudor. Anticip3ndose, adem3s, a la pregunCa de lo que sucederi en cl caso de que el deudor lo conozca y no lo apruebe, afiade a continuaciOn que el que pague por cuenta de otro podra reclam3r del deudor lo que hubiese pa(!:ado, a no haberlo hecho contra su expresa voluntad. Es lo que se decia. en la ya citada ley de ]>a.rtUfas: 'aunque el deudor lo supiese 11 lo contradijese' . "Ahora bi en ; en al gun caso de estos, podr& el acreedor negarse a recibir la deuda? Yo lumws dicko que no. Su derecho se reduce en todo caso a pedir y a recibir lo que se le debe. Es indiferente para el la cualitls.d de la persona que llega a au prcscncia, poniendo en sus manos el he<:ho o lo cosa que son debidas. Habra ocasiones en que, por motivos de lndole particular, el acrcedor se sienta ccntrariado en r(!cibir la presentaci6n de un tercero. El prestamista, por ejemplo, que crea. haberse asegurado el disfrute pcrpctuo de las rentas de su deudor. ae vera amargamente sorprendido con el pago hecho por un tercero, que da al traste de esta manera en un segundo con las risueiias esperanzas de toda la vida. :Motivos de esfe orden, y tam bi en otras veces algunos mas el<?vaJ.os, impulsaran al acreedor a resistir el pago de lo que se le debe. Sin embargo, el derecho no ha podido tomar en cucnta nini;una de talcs consideraciones, con las que sc iria en definitiva. contra el principio de haber de aceptarse todo aqucllo que resulte favorable para el deudor. Por Io tanfu en caso de resistencia, el tercero que ofrece el pago tendr:i dereclio a consignor la cosa debida como si fuese el deudor mismo, dando a la. consignaciO n cuantos efectos le estan asignadoe por la ley:" <19 Soaevola, pp. 881-88~ ; underscoring supplied.> The opinion of Sanchez Roman is couched in the following language: "Los terccros extrafios a la obligaci6n pueden pagar, ign0ra"ndolo el deudor, sabiindolo y no contradicie'ndolo o sabii'ndolo y con.tradiciCndolo. En el primer ca.so existe una gestion de negocios; en el segundo, un mandato eacito; y en el tercero, se produce una cesiOn de credito, x x x." '"En el caso de pago hecho por un tercero, el acreedor n.o puede negarse a recibirlo, y cualquiera resistencia le constituira en la responsabilidad de la mora accipiendi. Cierto que esta. no es regla exprcsa de ley ni de jurisprudencia, pero es buena doctrina de Derecho cientifico, generalizada entre los escritores, y de la cu al dice Goyen a, con razor,: La ley no puede pennitir que el acreedor se obst'ine maliciosa.mente en conservar la facultad de atonnentar a su deudor, que un hijo no pueda extinguir la obligaciOn de su padre, ni esta la de su hijo o su amigo, o un hombre benefico la de un desgraciado ausente. Y no se diga que el tercero no tiene mis que entregar el dinero aJ deudor ' para que haga directamente el pago; pues en el caso de ausencia esto cs imposible, y en otras ocnsiones la delicadeza fru1\.'raria las miras del hombre bienhechor." (4 Sanchez Homan, 259-260; underscoring supplied.) It may not be amiss to add that, contrary to petitioner's pretense, the payments in question were not made against the objection either of Anduiza or of the Bank. And although, later on, the former questioned the validity of the payments, subsequently, he impliedly, but clearly, acquiesced therein, for he joined Madrid in his appeal from i'he decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, referred to above. Similarly, the receipts issued by the Bank acknowledging .said payments without qualification, belie its alleged objection thereto. The Bank merely demanded a signed statemc mt: of Anduiza sanctioning said payments, as a condition precedent , not to its ae. ceptance, which had already been made, but to the execution of the deed of cancellation of the mortgage constituted in favor of said institution. Needless to 11ay, this condit.'ion was null and void, for, as pointed out above, the Bank, as creditor, had no other right tha.n to exact payment, after which the obligation in question, as rega.rds said creditor, and, hence, the latter's status and rights as such, become aUtomatically extinguished. Two consequences flow from the foregoing, namely: 1) ThE' good or bad faith of the payor is immaterial to thE' issue before us . Besides, the exercise of a right , vested by law without any qualification, can hardly be legally considered as tainted with bad faith. Again, according to Sanchez Roman ''para que el pa.go hecho por el tercero cxtinga la obligaciO'n, es preciso qiu ae realice a nOmbre del dendor ." (4 Sanchez Roman, 260 .) Accordingly, the circumstance that payment by Madrid had been effected in the name of Anduiza, upon which the Bauk relies in support of its aforesaid allegation of bad fait.h, does not prove the existence of the latter. August 31, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 423 The above pl,oto, a Journal exclusive, shows the Supreme Court~ during the hearing of the "Judg~s' case" (Felicisimo Ocampo, et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, ct al., G. R. No. L-7910) . At issue is the constitutionality of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1186 which abolished the positions of judges-at-large and cadastral judges. l'en judges-at-Ia1·ge and cadastral judges who were eased out of the judiciary in virtue of this provision alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee of judicial tenure, Shown standing at the extreme right is former Senator Vicente J. F1·ancisco, chief c,ounsel for the ten judges, as he pleaded the cause of judicial independence and the inviolability of judicial tenure. The former senator contended that the office of judgesat-large and cadastral judges is the exercise vf jurisdiction in Courts of First Instance throughout t.he country. Since, he argued, REpublic Act No. 1186 maintalned all the Courts of First Instance established under the Judiciary Act of 1948, the office of judges-at. large and cadastral judges still exists and consequently, the ouster of the ten judges amounted to their removal from office, in violation of the constitutional guarantee of tenure of judicial office. Other lawyers who appeared for the judges were former Ambassador Proceso Sebastian who maintained that Republic Act No. 1186 ''virtually convicted the ten judges before the bar of pu})lic 2) The Rank can not invoke the provision that the payor "may only recover from the debtor insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him," when made igainst his express will. This is a defense that may be availed of by the debtor, not by the Bank, for its affects solely the rights of the former. At any rate, in order that the rights of the pa.yer may be subject to said liMitation, the debtor must oppose the payments before or at the time the same were made, not subsequently thereto. "Entendemos como evident.e, que los preceptos de! art. 1158 que comentamos, y las distintas hipOtesis que establece, giran sobre la base de que la oposici&n del deudor al po;go ha de mos. trarse con anteriorida.d a la realizaci6n de cste pues de ser aqui!lla posterior, no cabe estimar verdadera y eficaz oposiciOn de buena fe, ya que en el caso de que antes hubiera conocido el proyecto de 'pago, habrla en RU silencio una aproba.ciOn tilcita que ahtorizaria incluso la subrogacion del tercero, y si lo habta ignorado antes de realizarse, se cstari"a en la .;itua.cion distinta prevista y regulada en los dos primeros p3rrafos del articulo 1158 yen el i159." <8 Manresa, 4th ed., pp. 248-249.> SUPREME COURT HEARS "JUDGES' CASE" opinion without due process," and Professor Amado G. Salazar of the Francisco College Law Faculty who stressed the limitations on the power of Cong:·css to abolish judicial offices. Congressmen Ferdinand Marcos, Diosdado Macapagal and Cornelio Villareal, as amici curiae, deplored the political motives which they alleged brought about the enactment of the controversial Act. On the other hand, Solicitvr General Ambrosio Padilla who appeared in behalf of the respondents, upheld the constitutionality of the law, invoking the right of Congress to abolish courts as corollary to its power of creating the same. He argued that the Act in question was intended to put an ~nd to "rigocion de jueces," or the practice of arbitrary assignments of judges from one province to another. Other members of the bar who argued before the Court were ex-Justice of the Court of Appeals Mariano de la Rosa and Attorneys Mariano Nicomedes and Abelardo Subido. • LA'h to R ii:hl: Justic1; Ilautiota Ani:telo, Justice Alex Reyes. Ju1tice Sabino Padilla. Ju•tice Guillermo F. P;1.blo, Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, Justice Cesar Bengzon, J ustice Marcelino Montemayor, Justice }'ernando Jul!"o, Ju s~ice Al~io Labrador an<! Juatice J. B. L. Reye.. Not seen in th.e picture is Just1c" Roberto Concepcion. Indeed, it is only fair that '.;he effects of said payment be determined at the time it was made, and that the rights then acquired by tht payor be not dependent ·upon, or subje:t to modification by, st:bsequent unil11teral acts or omissions of t'he debtor. At any rate, the theory that Anduiza had. not been benefited by the payments in ·question is predicated solely upon his original refusal t'o acknowledge thC" validity of said payments. Obviously, howevt?r, the question whether the same were beneficial or not to Anduiza, depends upon the law, not upon his will. Moreover, if his former enimosity towards Madrid sufficed to negate the beneficial effects of the payments under consideration, the subsequent change of front of Anduiza, would constil'ute an admission and proof of said beneficial effects. Being in confo;mity with Jaw, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, in toto. Paras, Pablo, BITTtgzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, J.J., concur. Mr. Justice Padilla. did not ta.lee part. Mr. Justice Labrador did not take part. 124 ,\\ THE LAWYERS .JOURNAL August 31, 1954
Date: 1954
Rights