The Legitimate of Acknowledged Natural Children as sole and concurring forced heirs in intestate succession

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Title: The Legitimate of Acknowledged Natural Children as sole and concurring forced heirs in intestate succession
Creator: Covita, Angel
Language: English
Source: VIII (3) February 15, 1940
Year: 1940
Subject: Legitimation of children; Acknowledgment of children; Parent and child (Law); Inheritance and succession
Rights
Fulltext: February 15, 1940 T~E LA WYERS' JOURNAL 91 THE LEGITIME OF ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN AS SOLE AND CONCURRING FORCED HEIRS IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION By ANGEL COVIT A . Philippine Law School TB!W!~I~~Lth~~D!l.~c~::s0;t~!~~~~c~h~; parents who, at the time of the ·conception of such child1·en, could have legally married each other. As they are born out of wedlock, they are, thet·efore, i!legitimat.e children. Natural children are either acknowledged or unaclrnowledged. When either or both of their parents recognize them as their children, it is said thl!,t tqey are a~siwl edged natural children. rn the absenc such recognition, they are considered as unacknowledged natural children. Unacknowledged natur,al children are not entitled to any right whatsoever aiainst their putative parents except, perhaps, the right to compel acknowledgment wh~n they have proper grounds therefor according to law. Acknowledged natural children, on the other hand, are entitled to certain rights against their acknowledging parents among which is the right to inherit as the forced ~ of the latter. The difference lies on the ground that unackr nowledged natural children are legally without parents against whom such right· may be asserted-a natural and physical impossibility which by fictio'n the law makes as possible for purposes of public policy. In the law of succession, acknowledged natural children inay either be the sole or concurring forced heirs of the acknowledging parent. They .are said to be the sole heirs of such parent when the latter died without leaving legitimate descendants or ascendants. In whiCh case, Article 939 of the Civil Code provides that they succeed to the entire inheritance without prejudice, however, to the ri~ht of the surviving spouse of the deceilsed according to law. When, however, they survive with legitimate descendants or ascendants of the deceased parent who acKnowlcdgcd them, such children are said to be concurring forced heirs of such parent. When the acknowledged natural chil .. dren concur· with the legitimate ascendants of . the acknowledging parent, Article 841 of the Civil Code provides that such children are entitled to one-half r,f the estate of the 'deceased, which share is to be taken from the half available for free disposal. This is understood, however, to be without prejudice· to the legitime of the surviving spouse, which con'sists c.f the usufruct of one-third of the inheritance to be taken also from the half available for free disposal, according to Article 83G of the Code. So that, when the spouse survives with the acknowledged natural chil<lren together with the legitimate as· cendants of the deceased, whatever is Jacking to complete the' legitime of the children shall be allotted to them only in 1 naked ownership as long as the survr'Ving spouse lives. When, however, the ackno~vledged natural children concur with the legitimate descendants of the acknowledging parent, Article 840 of -the Civil Code lays down the rule that each of the acknowledged natural children is entitled to a share equal to onC-half of that which pertains to each of the legitimate children .not bettered, proYidcd that it be comprised within the one-third part for free disposal from which it must be taken after deducting the burial and, funeral expenses. Sanchez Roman, explaining ihis rUle, said that the equality refers both to quantity as well as to quality. (6 Sa11chez Roman, 901908). This opinion" of the distinguished commentator is also the opinion of our j3up. reme Court expressed in the case of In 1·e Tad-Y, 46 Phil. 557. However, Article 834 of the- Civil Code Jffovides that when the deceased is survived by his widovJ or her widower who, at the time of his or her death is not divorced or is so due to his or her fault, such widow or widower shall be entitled in usufruct to a portion of the estate of the .deceased equal to that which p~rtains as legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants not bettered. And if only one legitimate child or desceJadant survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled in usufruct to the third portion of the estate destined for betterment, the fo:-mer retaining" the -naked ownership until dominion is consolidated in him by the death pf the surviving spouse. Let us now assume that the deceased died intestate leaving his widow and two children, one legitimate and the other acknowledged natural ch,ild. Applying the rule, the acknowledged natural 0child gets os his share a portion of the inheritance equal t'o one-half in quantity and in quality to that which pertains to the legitimate . child, which share is to be taken from the free po1tion. In this case, the share of the natural child is equal to one-third 11f the entire inheritance and, therefore, consumes the entire free portion, which constitutes one-third of the entire est~te. The iegitime of the widow, consisting in usufruct, is to be taken from the third portion of the estate available for. betterment and, in this case, consumes entirely that portion. The legitimate child 'gets the naked ownership of that same portion and in full ownership the third remaining pa1·t or the short Jegitime. But will the natut'al child get the entire free portion in i'ull ownership? Manresa answers the question in the affirmative. He says: "La concurrencia dcl c6nyuge superstite no influye en la legitima del hijo natural en los casos normales en que debe gravar el tereio de la mejora." (6 Manresa, 597). Sunchez Roman, on the other hand, As of different opinion. He saYs: "Si existiere viudo, • pero no mejora, la cuota viudal consistiri en el usufructo de! segundo tercio, destinado por la ley a mejora, reduciend6se la legitima del hijo 6 descendiente legitimo que le represente a un tercio de la herencia en ' pleno dominio, y el otro, cuyo usufructo se adjudica al viudo, en nuda propiedad (art. 834 2.o p!itTafo, y 840); haciendose, por necesaria analogia, distinci6n seml,iante en el doble concepto de aplicaci6n de llienes en pago de la legitima al hi)o natural, la mitad de cuyo importe se le adjudicara en pleno dominio, y la otra mitad en nuda propiedad, y el usufructo de esta segunda mitad quetar: ~~e~~e1i~~~~~~~ ~ud~/0n(~lii~~~ ch~ Roman, 901). This opinion finds explanation in the fact that if the acknowledged natural child gets as his share the entire free third in full ownership, then he gets more than what the law gives him; that is, one-half in quantity and in quality to that which the legitimate child not bettered gets as his legitimc. And in this case, the legitimate child gets his share one-half of which is in naked ownership and the other haif in full ownership. Therefore, in order to maintain the proportion established by law, Sanchez Roman says "that the natural child should also get his share one-half of which is in naked ownership and the other half in full ownership; the usufruct of that which he receives in naked ownership constitutes a free .portion, but ' upon the death of the widow, shall be consolidated to the natural child. / Again, on this particular point, our Supreme Comt has the same opinion as that of Sanchez Roman as expressed in the Tad-Y case, supra. In that case, the following facts were proven: ' On December 26, l922, Vicente Tad-Y died in the Municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, leaving his widow Rosario , Elser, a legitimate son Jose •Tad-Y, and an acknowledged. natural daughter Maria Tad-Y, who are declared ·in the judgment appealed from as his on!Y legal heirs. In said judgment there was adjudicated to RosariO Elser the usufrutt of the third 92 of .the estate of the deceased available f'll' betterment, to Jose Tad-Y the third constituting the short Icgitime in full ownership, and the naked ownership of the third ~wailable for bettern1cnt, tmd to. Maria Tady the free third in full ownership. This allotment made by the tTial court was held l:y the Supreme Court as against the law. In reversing the decision appealed from, the Supreme Court laid down the following 1·i.-Je: "To' determine the sh~ne that pertains to -the natural child which is but one-half (lf the pol,'tion that in quality and quantity belongs to the legitimate child not bctte1·ed, the latter's poition must first be asce1tained. If a widow share in the inheritance, together with only one legiti!'late child, as in the instant case, the chdd gets, according t'o the l~w, the .third co.nstituting · the legitime in full ownership. und the third available for betterment m naked_ownership, the usufruct of which goes to the widow. "1'he natural child must get one-half of the free third ii~ full. o~ ership and the other half of this th1Td m naked ownership, from which third his portion must be taken, so far as possible, after deducting th~ funeral and burial expenses. And excess would result consisting in the usufruct of , the surplus remaining of the othc1· half of this third, which for lack of testamentary provision must go to the legitimate child. As upon the death of the widow ';he usufruct of the third available for beherment will pass to the legitimate child, in order to maintain this proportion established by the law, the natural child must in turn get the usufruct of the sur)llu~ Of this half of the free third." th~~c;;11::~\~1~" a~~:tm~~~~~~c c;~;:io:;a~~ l<.~ed to 'Jose Tad-Y was tl;e third constitutirig the short legitime in full ownership, and the third available for bctt~ ment in naked ownership; to Maria Tad-Y, one-half of the free third in full ownership ":ind the other ha!.£' of this third in naked ownership, after 'dedu'cting the burial and funeral expenses; to' Rosario Elser, the usufruct of the thil:d available .for betterrrient; and to Jose _ Tad-Y, the usu. iruct of the remaining half. of the fr(!e third, which upon the death of Rosario Elser shall pass to Maria Tad-Y, It should, however, be noted that -from the l:mguage of Section 735 of the Code of Civil Procedure, repeated in Section 7, Rule 87 or' the New Rules of Court, which will tak\ effect on July 1, 1940, it is evid· .ent that in all cases the funeral and burial expenses arc to 1,>e paid from the mass of the estate of the deceased. Therefore, so much of the rule which refer to funeral and burial expenses Should now be eliminated. So that the rule is settled that the share of each of the acknowledged na- ' tural children, concurring with the legi-timate children and descendants of the deceased parent, is equal to or:.e-half in quantity an.d in quality to• that which pertnins 'to each of the legitiniate children not bettered. I But is the rule applicable in all cases where natural children concur with legitimate children and descendi\nts of THE LA WYERS' JOURNAL the deceased? In other wot·ds, does nO:t the TU le admit of any exception? This brings · us to the provision oI Article 839 of the yivil Code in relation to Articles 834 and 840 cf the same Code already cited and discussed. Article 839 of the Civil Code.. pr9vides that in case there survive child1·en of two or more marriages, the' usufruct pertaining to the widowed spouse of the second\ marriage (which means the last marriage of the deceased) shall be taken from the third . available 'for the· free disposal of the parents. Dt us now suppose that the deceased is' survived by his widow and four children; two of who~ are legitimate belonging to two different marriages, and the other two are acknowledged natural children of the deceased. Acording to Article 834, the widow is entitled in usufruct to a portion of the inheritance equal ·to that which pertvins as legitime to each of the legitimate children or decendants not bettered. Therefore, in the example given, she is entitled in usufruct to one-third of the ~n tirc estate whicl\ usu!ruct according to Article 839, is to be tak.en from the third available for free disposal, because the legitimate children belong to two different marriages. Her usufruct, therefore, burdens the entire free third. But according to the rule, each of the acknowledged natural children is entitled to a share in the inheritance equal to onehalf in quantity and in quality to that which pertains to each of the legitimate children not bettered, which share is also to be taken from the free third: Inasmuch as the share of both of the natural children herein is " equal to one-th)rd cf the entire inheritance, it therefore consumes 'also the entire free portion. 13ut because that entire portion is totally bu!·dened by the usufruct of the widow, therefore, tl\;he share of the na'tural children is reduced to a mere naked ownership, while the share of the legitimate children is in full ownership. The1·efore, ~ the share of . each of the natural children in this case is not anymore equal to one-half in quantity and in quality to that which pertains as Jegitime ·to epch of the legitimate children or descendants not bettered. Is not lhe~ the rule applicable in this instance? February 15, 1940 we· can only apply the rule by d.oing either of two ways: (1) by applying Article 834 instead of Article 839 with regard to the portion from which ~he usu- . fruct of the widow is to be taken, or (2) by reducing proportionately the share of the legiti~.ate children. If we apply Article 834 instead of :Article 839 in this case, in the sense that the usufruct of the widow is to be taken from the betterment instead of the" free portion, then the rule can be applied by merely fo\lowing .the a1lotment made in the Tad-Y case, supra. But it seems that thi,s couise is not warranted by the law. It ~ is because Article 839 Or any other article of the Civil Code does not provide for any such exception. And if there be noue, · the court cannot, by interpretation provide for one\ The application of Artic;Je 839 in this case might work an injustice tq the natural children. But the court· cannot do otherwise but to apply it. l.: is only for the Legislature to alter the law so as to make it conformable to justice. I We can also apply th!;! rule by reducing proportionat~ly the share ~ the legitimate children. This is done by reducing it into a mere naliied ownership like that of the natural children, so that the usufruct thereof b~comes a free portion which the deceused could have freely disposed of by will. But again this comse does not seenl to find any justification in the law. It is · because it is not legally possible to create a free portion ,from the legitime of the legitimate children. It seems clear, therefore, that when the acknowledged natural children concur with tr.at of the widow and the legitimate chil· <tr€n of the deceased, the rule that each of the natural child1·en receives as· his share a porlion of the inheritance equnl in quantity and in quality to one· half of that which as legitime pertains to each of the legitimate children not bettered, suffers, an exception where the legitimate children belong to different marriages. In which case, the natural chjldren may suffer a reduction to their inherit_ance caused by the usufruct of the widow, without any corresponding reduction to the Jegitime of the legitimate children. STATUTE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED ISOLATEDLY "A STATUTE is not to be construed' as if it dood solitary and alone, complete and perfect in itself, and isolated from all other laws. It is not to be expected that a statute which tales its place in a general sydem of jurisprudence s~all be so parfect as to require no support from the rules and statutes of the sydem of which it becomes a part, or so clear in all its terms as to furnish in itself ... 11 the light needed for ih con+ruction. It is proper to look to other statutes, to the rules of the common law, to the sources from which the statute was derived, to the general principle$ of equity, to the object of the statute, and to the condition of affairs existing when the statute was adopted .... 'C~druction has ever been e potent egency in hermoniiing the operation of datufes, with equtty and iustice.' Stetutes ere to be construed as to me\e the law one uniform system, no;it e collection of divene end disjointed fregments."-Elliott, J. in Humpbries v. Devis (·1884), 100 Ind. 27-4. 284. (From the United Stales law Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 12 p. 701 ).