The Philippine law on organized labor – Com. Act no. 213 · Rare Periodicals

The Philippine law on organized labor – Com. Act no. 213

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Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: The Philippine law on organized labor – Com. Act no. 213
Creator: Lazo, Melanio F.
Language: English
Source: VIII (3) February 15, 1940
Year: 1940
Subject: Labor unions; Commonwealth act 213; Employee rights; Labor disputes
Rights
Fulltext: February 15, 1940. THE LAWYERS' J OURNAL .93 THE PHILIPPINE LAW ON ORGANIZED LABOR-COM. ACT · NO. 213 By MELANIO F. LAZO M ember, Philippine Bor (CONCLUD ED] CHAI?TER V THE PENAL PROVISION OF THE LAW Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 213 provides as follows: Any person or persons, land.lord or lan<;J:lords, corporation or corporatio1,1s or the~r agents, partnership or partnerships or their :!;?e~' o~hJa~~:!~1i~:t~c~~n~o~r~de:n~iser;:; ~i"s~~pl~~p~~~ ~: :~~~~;r ofo/\~:e:~t from joining any registered legitimate labor organization of his own cho~sing, or who dismiss" or threaten to dismiss such employee o·r laborer or tenant :from his employment for having joined, or for being a member of, any registered legitimate labor organization, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment of not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or both, at the discretion of the court. There are two classes of acts punishable under this article: 1st The act of intimidating or CQercing any employee or laborer or tenant with th~ intention of preventing such employee or Jabor~ r or tenant from joining any registered legitimate lab.or organization, of his own choosing. 2nd. The act of dismissing or threatcnin-g to dismiss such employee or laborer or tenant from his employment for having joined, or for being a member of, any registered legitimate labor organization. The :first class of acts are concededly within the power of the National Assem~ 'bly t.ll' punish. The use of force or intimidation disturbs the public peace and interferes with the personal liberty and security of the laborers, and as such, it is not only the right but also the duty of the National Assembly to suppress. As to the power of the legislature to J'Unish the second class of acts, however, this had been for so many years the subject of controversy among leading American jurists and legal talents. Some of them believed that the legislature is without power to punish suc!1 act for to do so would deprive the employers of their ·constitutional rights,ios while others believed the contrary.'°" To be able to appreciate the merits Qf the two conflicting Views I shall frame a hypothetical case which involves this controversial part of the Jaw. Let us assume that an information was ffed by the City Fiscal of the following tenor: ~$'th~juristsmaybementioned JU!rtJce H arlan and J ustice Pitney. ,,,. Amo-r.i;t" t hem may be mention~. Justice Holm~, Chief J111;tice Hughes and Justice Day: "The undersigned accuses Mr. Reyes for violating Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 213 committed as follows : "That on or about October 5, 1938 in the City of Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, being th~ _managing partner of Reyes & Co., m_ahc1ously and feloniously dismissed from his employ !d3'df;n~s:~d '~a;~~~u~oj~~te ~~:;:~d~:t~! having discovered the fact that Said employees are members of Labor Union 'X, Y, Z.' Ali contrary to law." The defendant after having been duly summoned and arraigned pleaded not ,;uilty. He· admits all the allegations in the complaint, but sets the defense that the section of the law under whiclt be is prosecuted is uncQnstitu~ional. The Arguments for the Defense L It Deprives Employer of Liberty and Property Without Due Process of Law: "The right of a person to sell his la~or upon such terms as he deems prope:i: is, in its essence, the sa_me as the r'ght of a purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to .sell. I n all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of rights, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arb'trary interference with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land, under a constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his l'bcrty without-due process of law." (Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161; to the samQ effect in Lochner v. New' York, 198 u. s. 45.) "Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property-partaking the nature of each-is the right to - make contracts for the acquisition of property. Ch'ef among such contracts is thp.t of personal employpient, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there -is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established sense . .. " (Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1) "J...'berty includes not only the right to labor, But to refuse to labor, or for labor and to terminate such contracts and to refuse to make such contracts. • • "' Hence, we are of the opinion that this Act contravenes those provision of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees that no person shalf be deprived o:f life, liber ?', or property without due process of Jaw.'' tGillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176). 2. It Depl'ives Employer of the Equal Pr.otection of the Law. The Aci is unilateral in its application. ; H takes into account the interest of the laborers at the expense of the employers. And "the r ight (to enter into contract of employment ) is essential to the laborer as to the capitalists, to the poor as to the sick." (C.oppago v. Kansas, supra) and "in the making of such contract-the parties liave an equal right to obtain f rom each other the best terms they can as the result of,.. private bargaining." (Adair v. JJnited States, supra). 3. The Law Cannot be S'"Ustained as a Proper E,rercise of the Police Power of the St~:e~h a statute makes the levelin~ .of inequalit'es of fortune "an end in itself,_ and not an incident to the promotion of the gi!neral welfare. Indeed, to punish an employer for simply proposing terms of etnployment \mder circumst;nces - devoid of coercion, duress, 1 or undue influence, has no reasonable relation with public health, safety, morals and general welfare," (Coppage v. Kansas, s1tpra) and as such, "the legis~a~ ture has no author'ty to pronounce ·an innocent act cril;llinal." · /1rgumcnt for the Prosecution . I. The Employer is not Deprived of Liberty and Property Without Due Process of Law. ' " The section is in substance, a very limited interference with freedom of con· tract, no more. Iti does not require the carriers (employers) to ·employ anyone. It does not forbid them to. refuse to emplo'y 'anyone, for .any reason they may dee~ good . . . The seetion simply prohibits the more powerful party to exact certain undertakings, or to tbreate~ to di~ missal or ' unjustly discr;minate on 7ertam grounds against those already _emplo~e.d." (Adair v. United States, dissenting opm1on of J ustice Holmes). _ . "That the right to contract is a part of the indiv-idual freedom within the protection of this Amendment, and i:uay not be arbitrarily interfered with is conceded. While this is true, nothing is better settled by the repeated dec'sions of this court than that the right of contrnct is not absolute and unyielding, but is subject to li111itation and restraint in the inter(\!st of the public health, safety, and welfare, and sucb limitations may be declared in legislation of the slate." (Coppage v. Kansas, dissenting opinion of Justice Day). · "Due process of law is not denied by the provision" of this section. "It does not interfere with the normal 'exercise of the right of an employer to select his employees 94 or discharge them so long as he does not under cover of such right intimidate or coerce his employees with i·espcct to their · self-organization and representation. "Employers have their correlative l'ight to organize for the purpose of securing the red1·ess of grievances and to promote a¥'reements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work.-Res~raints for ~the purpbse of preventing an unjust interference with that right cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious." (National Labor Relations Bd. v. Laughlin S. Corp., 301 U. S.1). 2. It Does Not Deprive the Employer of the Equal Protection of the Law. "The Act has been criticised as one· sided in its application; that it subjects , the employer to supervision and restraint and leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may be responsible. That it fails t-0 provide a more comprehensive plan,-with better assurance of fairness to both sides and with increased chances of success in bringing about, if not compelling, i!= declared to be beyond the legislatiye authol'ity of t.he State. "But "°it are dealing with the powcl' of Congress, not with a particular policy, 01· with the e::d;ent to 'Vhich policy should go~ We have frequently said that the legislatfre authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach. Th,e Constitution does not forbid 'cautious !ldvance, step by step,' in dealing with evils within the range of legislative power." (Jones Laughlin S. Corp., etc., BUpra.). "In present conditions a workingman not unnaturally may believe that only by belonging to a labor union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it s~ms to me that it rfiay be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between thl parties in which liberty of contract begins. Whether in the long run it is wise for the legislature to enact legislation of this sort is not my concern, but I am strongly of the opinion that there is nothing in the constitution of the United States to prevent it and ~at Adair v. United States should be overrul~d." (Coppage v. Kansas, dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes). 3. The law is a Valid Exercise of the Police Power of the State. "Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees THE LA WYERS' JOURNAL February 15, 1940 with freedom of choice." And hence, the prohibition, "instead of being an· invasion 14. of the constitutional right of either, was -Injunction Courts Having Jul'isdiction in Industrial Disput.es based on the recognition of the rights of both." (National Labor Rel. Dd. v. Jones 11. Labor Vn1on~ As Pai-ties to an Actioti. & Laughlin S. Corp. 301 U. ~·. 1). (a) Registered Labor Unions. As we "The right to join labor unions is undispµted, and has been the subJect of frequent affi1·mation in judicial opinion. Acting within their legitimate rights such associa~ tions are as legitimate as any organization of citizens formC!d to promote their common interest. They are 01·ganized under the law of many states, by virtue of express statutes passed for that purpose, and, being legal, and acting within their constitutional rights, the 1·ight to join them, as against coercive action to the conb:ary may be the legitimate subject of protection in the exercise of police authority of the state. "It is UI"ged that the statute has no object or purpose, express or implied, thrit has reference to health, safety, morals, or public wel1larC!, beyond the supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of fortune by depriving him of. his property or some part of his financial independence. "But this argument admits that financial independence is not independence of law or of the authority of the legislature to declare the policy of the state as to matters which have a reasonable relation of the welfare, peace, and security of the community. "Opinions may differ as to the remedy, but we cannot understand upon what ground it can be said that a subject so intimately related to the welfare of society is removed from the legislative power ... It would be difficult to select any subject more intimately related to good order and security of the community than that under consideration." (Coppage v. Kansas, dissenting opinion uf Justice Day). Possible Decision of the Court The Court is of the opinion that the authorities cited by the prosecution represent the law. The arguments presented by the defense, whate\o& , be their merits, cannot be maintained under the strain of recent decisions of the Federal Court of the United States. ,wherefore, the court finds that defendant is gq_ilty of the crime charged and gives judgment convicting the defendant to six months imprisonment. So order1'!d. CHAPTER VI ACTIONS AND REMEDIES have seen lab.or unions that arc registered are considered juridical persons distinct and separate from q1c laborers composing it. Having such c'ategory, registered labor unions may sue and be sued in their corporate name without including their officers and members. This should not be taken, however, as to imply that officers and members of the same are immune from legal processes. The officers and members are still amena'ble to the prnvisions of our penal laws for crimes committed by them, whether or not the crime arose from ads which received the official sanction of the organization.10.;; Likewise, torts committed by office1·s ot members which did not receive the. sanction of the union will hold such members solely responsible for damages.106 (b) Unregistered Labor Unions. Previous to the year 1925 it was the established law in American jurisprud9:e that a labor union not incorporated can nut sue10 1 or be sued10B in its common name, for it is not a legal entity distinct from its members; but that actions in which such association is , involved must be brought byto11 or against11 0 all of its members. In 1925, however, the United States Supreme Court held in the case of United States Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (259 U. S. 344) that in view of the affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection, and of the fact that they act as entities distinct from their memberS", \\nregistered labor unions become in effect, quasi-cOrporations against which action may be brought in !he association name. An action may also be brought f&r or' against a particular officer or member as a representative of a labor union unaer the authority of our local !;tatute which provid~s as follows: "Sec. 118 (C.C.P.) Numerous PartiesWhen the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or mo1'e may sue or defend for the benefit of all. ·." to self-organization and representation is a 11. proper subject for condemnation by com pc- 12. tent legislative authority;" for "experience has ~bundantly demonstrated that the re.cognition of the right of employees to sclforganization and to have representatives of Labor Unions As Parties to an Action Remedies Against Labor Unions -Actions for Damages It has been held that under a like provision one or more members of a labor union may sue' on behalf of themselves and the their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condi- 1..3. tion of industrial peace." But "such collecthre action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by interference -Enforcement of Contractual ObJi. gatiom . -Injunction in Labor Disputes -Violation. of Injunction Remedies Available to Labor Unions -Actions for Damages -Act{ons for the Enforcement of Contractual Obligations ioo Moeller v. People, 70 Colo., 223, 199 Pac. 414: Com. v. Hurt. 4 Whc.-at, Ill. '""Hill v. Eagle Glau & Mfg. Co-. 219 Fed. 719. m Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600. 41 N. E. 100~; Do.novan v. Danielson, 244. ?11:.a.sa. 432, 134 N, E. Sit. ~oe American St.eel, etc. v, 'Vire Drawers & Di" :Maken -Onion 90 Fed. 698; Allis-Chalmers Co. v. In>n MoldC'l'!I Union. 160 Fed\ 1G6. , .. St. Paul Typotheta.e v. St. Paul Dookbiru:len' Union. 94 Minn. 351. 102 N. W. 726. =Cahill v. Plumber~·. G<ts' & St.e;unfitters• '& ficlpen' Local '.?3S ' Ill. 123. February 15, 1940 otherslll and that an action may be brought against the memb~rs of a union by suing some of them as representatives of the class.in 12. Remedies Against Labo1· Unions. (a) Actions for Damages. Art. 1902 of the Civil Code provides: "Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to anvther by his fault or negligence shall be answerable for the damage caused!' This provision of the law applies with as much force W labor unions as to natural persons. Thus, it has b.een held that a per- , son against whom an unlawful boycott, strike, or picketing has been instituted may have his action for the damages thereby occasioned against the labor union which caused the injury113 provided there is a causal connection between the acts complained of :ind the damage suffercd.11'~ Aside from liabilities for damages arising from torts, labor unions arc also liable for damages due to breach 1 of contract between <!mployer aud union ;11~ so als.o will labor unions be held liable for . damages in case of injury resulting from criminal conspiracy.ll<' A labor union may likewise be sued for damages for unlawfully suspending or expelling a member frorri the organization1i: or for any other breach of contr~t with its members. Another interesting phase of this topic is the e..xtent of liability of unregistered labor unions. Since the case of United ~tates Mine Worke1's v. Coronado Coal Co. (supra) was decided unregistered labor unions seem to be burdened with double form of liability. The labor unions are liable io the extent of its funds for damages done by individual members, in case the union sanctioned the act causing the damage, while at the same time the individual rQembers are unlimitedly liable for the acts of their elected officials. For unregistered labor unions, this result is not merely exasperating but positively threatening. At any moment, their funds may be wiped out by the acts of uncontrolled individuals. And members themselVes may have enormous damages assessed upon them by the action of remote officials. This double liability above-mentioned can, of course, be a\'oided by registering labor unions in the Department of Labor. Under the favorite le'gal fiction of artificial personality, acts of laborers which had the s&nction of the union will only hold the l!nion for damages, and vice-versa, acts of laborers not having the sanction of the union will only subject the individual members to damages. =Strasser v. Moone\is, etc, 11 N. Y. S.R. 270. =.Basscrt v. Oh11ny, 251 N, Y. Supp. 877, ~~tl.u~?~£·Wi1~~;~~n!~in~~~.nv~;::de~: ~·~: ~.~ v. Grundy, 82 L, Y. N. E. 769: 48 Week. = Nederlaudscb etc. v. Stevedores• & L. Benev. Soc .• 265 Fed. 397. "" Sornll v. Smith A. C. 709. 13 B. R. C. I. "'Campbell v. Johnson, 167. Fed. 102. THE LAWYERS' JOURN~ (b) Enforcement of Contract Obligations. Employers who entered into a contract with a labor union may enjoin the officers and agei1ts of such uni.on from violating said contract and a suit to enforce a contract between employers and labor unions is maintainableus unless it is for the specific performance of contract for personal se1·vices.H9 (c) Injunctions in Labor Disputes. An injunction is a court order issued to prevent injury to prnpeTty or properly i·ights for which there is no adequate remedy at law.aJ In industrial conflicts, this remedy was originally intended to protect property from irreparable injury during a strikci or boycott. But a~ present the injuction has been called upon to perform a much wider service. Union workers and officials have at. times been enjoined by colll't orders to urge non-uuionmen to join a union;121 to picket;122 to issue slanderous statement against the employer which will likely damage the complainant's business1n to induce a third person to break the latter's contract with the employer;1u or to the putting of employers in the unfair list, in furtherance of a strike for an illegal purpose.12~ It was also held that injuuction has been properly issued restraining t~e sending by the national organization in the locality of funds to aid or promote acts of unlawful interference' with complainant's busincss;126 against the display of banners, in proper cases;12 1 against applyiiig vile names or words Of ridicule or contempt to complainant's employers or partners, or persons intending to become such;12s against lawful acts interwoven with unlawful ones; 120 against secondary boycotts;uo against the payment of strike benefits where the strike is for unlawful purpose;131 against the making of false or misleading stateme~ts, to the injury of the complainant's business, is2 against the destruction of property;1u etc. It is thus seen, that with the wide variety cf the use of injunction the labor unions are at times weakened to such a degree as to render strikes, boycotts and other labor's weapons of little use. The writer b!.:!lieves that any abuse of judicial discretion in the issuance of injunction would mean a widespread loss of confidence in the integrit.y of the courts. (d) Violation of In'junction. Officers and members of !abor organization violatLl.!l,Ba.rnc., v. Be:r~. 166 FOO. 72, 167 l~«J. 883. u. Chambers v. Dnvis, 128 Min. 613. l20Look UP Sees. 164·172, Act 190. W Floo::eua v. Smith, 19\} Pa. St. 128, 48 Atl. 894. ""'Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Maas, 92. 44 N. E. 1077. l.!.' Spririgbeadr Spinning Co. v. Liiiey. 16 W<"ek. Rep. 1138. ""'Jitchman Con! & Coke Co. v. Mitchel!, 246 U. S. 229: Montgomei-y "· Pncilic Elec. R. Co. 293 Fed. 680. '""Reynolds v. Da~i~. uo Gaaaway v. Borderland Coal Corp. 278 Fed. 56. U!Sherry v. Perkins, IH llfass. 212. W Cs.saway '" Borde-rland Coal Corp, 278 Fed. fib. ""'United States v. Railway Employeu• Dept. 283 Fed. 419. llO Thomsom Mach. Co. v. Brown. S9 N. 'J. F.q. ~29. =Barnes v .. Berry. 156 F~d. 72. =Inter. Orzanizntion v, Lewal Coal Co., 286 Fed. "· =Arthur v, Oakes, 63 Fed. 320. 95 ing an 01·der C?f injunction issued by the court will be punished as for contempt;t3• and an injunction against members of a uniqn as individuals may be \'io\ated by illegal action by "them in associated capacity.136 13. Remedies A·vailable to Labor Unions 1. Actions for' Damages. On the side of labor, the law grants the same prot:cction a·S it· gives to employers by giving to labor unions the same right to bring an action for damages in case an actionable wrong is inflicted upon them. 'fhus, a labor union may bring action for damages arising from torts1l 6 or breach ·of contractual obligations,13• which may be brought against employers, other persons, or .even against their own members; so also may a labor union bring an action for damages arising from crimes committed against them, unde.r the rule that every person criminally liable for a fcloity is likewise civilly liable.138 2. Civil Actions to Enforce a Contract. A labor union may bring an action fpr the enforcement of its contractual , rights as long as the contract is lawful.139 Thus, an action may be brought ·by a ~11bor union to enforce an agreement with an employer to give all his wmk to members of the unionuo or to emJlloy union laborers e'xclusively;u1 or to enforce previous stipulations regarding wages and other terms anr.'. conditions of work.IO There is also a case which held that the articles of agreement of a labor union, whether callS?d a constitution, chart.er, by-1!1.w or any othet; name, constitute a eontraet between the members which the courts will enforce, if not immoral or contrary to pub-lie policy or the law of the land.143 3. Injunction. Injuction may issue as well in behalf of labor unions where adeciuate i·cmedy in law is not available. The i·em"edy had been granted in cases where the rights of labor unions would be infringed by blacklisting; 1u or in case their picketing members are molested or coerced, and such acts of interference or violence will result in the infliction of substantial money damages;us or in case of an alleged conspiracy to cripple and destroy a labor union by preventing persons from j.oining it and by forcing tts members to leave it by unlawfully procuring their discharge f.rom employment because they are members of such union.aG (Continued on page 105) •ii' United States v. Colo. 216 Fed. ~54. uo Amuiean. Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Di·aw .. rs' etc. 90 Fed. &98. .-""'Art. 1902 Civil Code. ,., Art. 1101, Civll Code. J.39 Art. 100 Revised Penal Code: Slooe & Tel<li!e El<arninen 1 & Shrinkers Emplon~u· Assa. 122 N . Y. Supt>.460. 130 Post v. Black's Stone, ete. Co. 200 F~d. 918; Art, 1255 Civil Code. >«>Smith v. Bowen, 232 Masa. 106 ,.,_ Loc11l Branch v. Sold, 8 Ohio App. 437. , ... Greenfield v . Central Labor Council. 1114 O'r. 236, 192 P11e. 783. •<3Browen v. Storekel, 74lllich. 269, 41 N. W. 921, 3 L. R. A. 430. 1u B11yer v. Western v, Telcg. 'Co_. 124 Fed. 246. , .. Atkins v. W. A. Fletcher Co, Cs N: J. Eq. &68. li5 At!. 1074 • . 1 .. United Slates v. Moore, 129 FW. 630.