Jose De Leon, et.al., petitioners, vs. Asuncion Soriano, et.al., respondents, G.R. no. L-7648, 1954 [Supreme Court decisions]

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Title: Jose De Leon, et.al., petitioners, vs. Asuncion Soriano, et.al., respondents, G.R. no. L-7648, 1954 [Supreme Court decisions]
Language: English
Source: XIX (10) October 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Estate distributions; Real property; Certiorari; Appellate procedure (Civil procedure); Appellate court; Philippines. Supreme Court; De Leon, Jose; De Leon, Cecilio; De Leon, Albina; Soriano, Asuncion
Rights
Abstract: The respondent, Ms. Asuncion Soriano, and her natural children had an amicable settlement, which is to deliver a certain number of sacks of rice every year as her share of the conjugal property with her late husband. Unfortunately, the children failed to deliver the agreed number of sacks of rice to Dona Soriano. Dona Soriano filed an action against them for the payment of the deficiencies of the agreed sacks of rice. The court ordered an immediate decision in favor of Dona Soriano because she is already old and sickly, without any close relatives and any means of support.
Fulltext: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS Jose De Leon, et al., Pe.titioner1.1, vs. Asuncion Soriano, et al., Respondents, G. R. No. L.-7648, 1954, Montemayo1", J. / JUDGMENT; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FILING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND BY APPELLANTS. - A and her natural children had an amicable settlement according to which the latter would deliver to A more than 1,000 cavanes of rice from 1~43, until the latter's death. The children defaulted in the delivery of the rice as provided for in the agreement by not making full delivery. A filed an action against them for the payment d the value of the deficiencies of 3,400 cavanes of palay, corresponding to the years 1944, 1945 and 1946. On November 7, 1950 judgment was rendered in favor of A; on J anuary 15, 1951, judgment was executed, nnd A received the cash in satisfaction of the judgment in 1952. In the meantime, the children had been defauJting in their pnlay deliveries from 1947 up. A filed another action in September 1950 to recover the value of their deficiencies. Judgment was rendered by the Bulacan court on December 3, 1953, again in favor of A. Defendants appealed. In order to stay the order of execution, defendants filed a supersrdeas bond in the sum of P30,000. 00, but A insi~tfid on execution. Notwithstanding the filing of the supersedeas bond as required by the Court, said court issued a second speCial order dated March 18, 1954, ordering the immediate execution of the judgment and requiring A t(l file a bond of P50,000. Defendants filed a petition for certiorari to set aside the special order of March 18, 1954, on grounds of abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. By this time, A was alrearly 75 yean old, sickly and without relatives &nd heirs and without any mean<:: of support. HELV: (1) Even after the filing of a supersedeas bond by an appellant, intended to stay executicn, the trial court may in its discretion stU! disregard said supersedeas bond and (lrder immedi11.te t>xecution provided that there arc special and compelling reasons justifying immediate execution. (2) There are speC"ial cases and occasions where the surrounding circumstances are such as to point to and lead to immediate execution. We admit that such special cases and occasions are rare, but in our opinion the present case is one of them. A's nt'ed of and rig-ht to immediate cxccutio~ of the decision in her favor amply satisfy the requirement of a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and justice, outweighing the :security offf-.red by the supersedeas bond, because she is already 70 year£ old. sickly, without any close relatives and heirs, and without a!ly means of support. J1w.n R. IAu:ag, Jou P. de Leon, and Manuel V. San Jose, for thP. Petitioners. Vicente J. Francisco, for the Respondents. DE CIS IO N MONTEMAYOR, J.: Briefly stated, the facts in the cr se are as follows. When Dr . Felix de Leon and Asuncion Soriano married, they were more than well-to-do, and during their marriage, with the fruits of tl1eir individual properties and their joint efforts, they acquired valuable properties so that when Dr. De Lem\ died in 1940, he left exttnsive properties, including ricelands in the pro\"inces of Bulacan and N'.lcva Ecija, listed in his name. To the couple no children wer<' born, but the husband had three acknowledged natural childr('n named Jose, Cecilio, and Albina, all surnamed DE LEON. As surviving spouse, Asunci(m, initiated intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband under Special Proceedings No. 58390 of the C.ourt of First Instance of Manila and she asked that 11he be appointed administratrix. She also asked that some of the properties included in the inventory filed by thP. special administrator as properties of Felix de Leon, be rleclared as her paraphernal prnpHty and the rest as conjugal property. Thi? three natural children abovementioned opptJsed the petition, claimi11g all the properties listed in the inventory as belonging exclusively t(l their father. The parties - Asuncion on one side and the natural children on the other - finally came to an amicable settlement "in deference to the memory of Dr. Felix de Leon, and with the v_ if'.w k expediting the final distribution of 'his estate." The ~greement was marked Exhibit "F" and we reproduce the pertinent portfons thereof: "WHEREAS, the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART is !he surviving :;;pouse and the PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART are the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Felix de Leon wJ-.o died in Manila on November 28, 1940; "WHEREAS, the estate of the deceased Dr. Felix de Leon is now the subject of intestate proceedings, numbered Sp. Proc. No. 58390 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; " WHEREAS, the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART filed a petiticm dnted May 31, 1941 asking that ce1tain properties in the ssid inventory be declared her paraphei-nal properties aml ns such be ~xcluded therefrc,m, which petition was opposed by the PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART in their pleading dated J une 9, 1941; "WHEREAS, the parties hereto, in deference to the memory of Dr. Felix de Leon, and with a view to expediting the final distribution of his estate, have agreed to settle the exi~ting differences between them under the terms and conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereto have agreed, each with the other, as follows: "That Dofia Asuncion Soriano 'will receive as her share in the conjugal partnership with the deceased Felix de Leon and in full satisfaction of her right, interest or participation she now has or may hereafter have in the properties acquired by the deceased during his marriage to Asuncion Soriano: ta) 'A parcel of land, situated in the City of Manila which was mortgaged f.or P9,000.00 and which the children of the deceased Felix de Leon assumed the obligation to release and cancel the mortgage; Cb) 'At the end of each agricultural year, by which shall be understood for the purposes of this agreement the month of March of every year, the following amounts of palay shall be given to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART by the PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART in the month of March of the current year 1943, one thousand two hundred 0,200) cavanes of palay tmacan); in the month Of March of 1944, one thousand four hundred 0,400) cavanes of palay {macan); in the month of March, 1945, one thousand five hundred 0,500) cavanes of palay (macan); and in the month of March of 1946 and every succeeding year thereafter, one thDusand six hundred Cl,600) cavanes of palay (macan). Delivery of the palay shall be made in the warehouse required by the government, or if there be none such, at the warehouse to be selected by the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, in San Miguel, Bulacan, free from the cost of hauling, transportation, and from any and all taxes or charges. "It is expressly stipulated that this an'nual payme11t of palay shall cease upon the death of the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART and shall Mt be transmissible to her heirs or to any other person. ' tc > 'The residue of the entire estate of the deceased shall 500 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL October 31, 1954 pass to the children of the deceased De Leon." Because the De Leon children defaulted in the delivery of the palay as provided for in the agreement or rather did not make full dl'Jivery, as for instance, instead of delivering all the 1,400 cavanes of palay in March 1944, they gave only 700 cavans; in 1945 they delivered only 200 instead of 1,500 cavans; and in 1946 they gave Asuncion only 200 cavans of palay instead of 1,600, Asuncion filed an action against them, Civil Case No. 135 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for the payment of the value of the deficiencies of 3.400 cavanes of palay corresponding to said three years. The three defendants therein admitted their short deliveries but alleged as special defense that the deficiencies were caused by force majeure occasioned by Huk depredations, floods, and crop failure, and th::it the parties intended that the palay to be delivered yearly be harvested from tl1e ricelands in Bulacan, and consequently, the failure of the Bulacan ricelands to produce the yearly amounts nf palay agreed upon absolved them from any \iabillty. The Bulacan C<'Urt on August 16, 1947, rendered judgment in favor of ASuncion 2.nd against the defendants, holding t\1at the obligation imposed upon the defendants to make yearly deJi,,eries of palay was a generic one and was Mt excused by force majeure. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed on the same grounds. We quote a part of the decision of the sairl Court of Appeals: "We find the above-mentioned contention of the defendantsappellants untenable. Exhibit "E'' clearly calls for the deli.very of certain number of cavans of palay of the macan class, which are undoubtedly indeterminate or generic thing. The claim that the above-mentioned stipulations contained in agreement Exhibit "F" converted defendants' undertaking into a specific obligation to deliver palay that would be produced by the ricelands of Felix de Leon in San Miguel, Bulacan, is unwarranted. The aforesaid stipulations simply refer to the time, place and manner of payment. There is nothing in the agreement from which such pretended real intent of the parties may be deduced or inferred xx x." (Decision of the Court of Appeals.) Defendants again appealed to this Tribunal which on August 24, 1950, affirmed the decisions of the trial court and the Coul't of Appeals on the same grounds. Because of defendants' motions for reconsideration and later their opposition to the execution of the final judgment, it was only on November 7, 1950, that the trial court ordered the execution thereof, and because of defendants' motion for reconsideration it was only on J anuary 15, 1951, when the judgmt:nt was executed, and we understand Asuncion received the cash in satisfaction of the judgment only in the year 1952. Jn the meantime, the De Leon children had again been defaulting in their pti.lay deliveries from 1947 up. Thus, in March 1947 they deliTf'1·ed only 600, leaving a balance of 1000 cavans; in March Hl48 they delive!'ed only 500, with a ddiciency of 1100 cavans; in Marci: 1949 there was a deficiency of 800 cavans; and in March 1950 the delivery of valay was short by !JOO cavans. To recover the value of these deficiencies as well as the amount of palay for t.very yC'ar after 1950, she (Asuncion) filed another action in September l~fiO in the same Bulacan court, Civil Ca11c No. 488. While said case was pending the De Leon children continued in their default and short deliveries; as for instance, for the year 1951, they delivered only 800, leaving a balance of 800 ca vans; in 1952 they delivered 800, with a deficiency of 800 cavans. After hearing, judgment was rendered by t.he Bulacan court on December 3, 1953, the dispositive part thereof reading as follows: " IN VIEW OP THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff a.nd orders the defendants: (l) To ;>ay the plaintiff t.he amount of P60,450.00, corresponding to th2 price of 5,400 cavanes of palay that the defendants failerl to deliver in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952, and to deliver to her 1,000 cavanes of palay corresponding to the short delivery in 1953; (2) To pay the plaintiff as dam~gcs interest at 6% on r12,ooo.oo from October 10, 1947; on Pll,000.00 from December 8, 1948; on Pll,880.00 from December 8, 1949; on 1"9,450.00 from September 4, 1950; on P8,560.00 from October 2, 1952; and on P8,560.00 from October 2, 1952, up to the .:iate of payment; CSJ To pay further to the plaintiff twenty percent C20%) of the total amount of plaintiff's l'ec0ve1y excepting Lhe intere!;ts as damages in the form of attorney's fees; The def"!ndants are also hereby ordered to deliver to the plaintiff 1,600 cavanes of palay in the month of March 1954 and every month of March of the succeeding years during the lifetime of the plaintiff, and to pay also the costs of this suit." In Civil Case No. 488, the defendants De LC!ons put up the same defense, namely, that it was the intention of the parties that the pulay to be delivered by them yearly to Asuncion was to come from the ricelands in Bulacan, and that because of failure of said ricelands to produce palay sufficient to cover the deliveries agreed up•m, due to force majeure caused hy H uk trouble and crop failure, they were excusC!t.l or absolved from the full fulfillment of their obJ;gation. The trial court in its decision eaid that this was the s;i.me Q~fense rind issue put up and raised in Civil Case No. 135 in 1946, und that because of the final decision in that case by the trial CC'urt, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and reaffirmed by the Suprf'me Court, the present defendants in Civil Case No. 488, in the words of the trial court at·e "foreclosed from putting up this defense of force majeure in crop failure on the principle of estoppel by or conclusiveness of judgment." Defendants have appealed frc·m that decision. However, pending the pt<rfection of their apJlf'al, plaintiff Asuncion petitioned for th€ execution of the judgment pending appeal on the ground that the appeal wus frivolous, int.ended rnly for purposes of delay. Over the opposition of thC' defendants the trio.I court issued a special order dated February 12, 1954, accepting the reasons given by Asuncion in her petition as good and sufficient grounds for execution, and granting the petition unless the defenda11t.c put up a supers<?deas bond · in the sum of P3U,OOO.OO. As11nci011 moved for the reconsider"Ltion of the order insisting on execution. The defendants fiiecl the corresponding 1mpersedeas bond. After the filing of sever&! pleadings and a prolonged discussion of the lcg-.n!ity and propriety of executing the judgment pending appeal, notwithstanding the filing of the supersedeas bond as required by the court in its special order. said court issued a second special orJ,.,r elated l\farch 18, 1954, ordering the immediate execution of the judgment in spitE' of the filing of the supersedeas bm1d, but requiring plaintiff Asuncion to file a bond in the sum of P50,000. 00, which .;;he did. To give some idea of the reason promptin,t the trial cou-i:t in ordering immediate execution we quote a paragraph of its order, to wit: "Therefore, in conclusion this Court is of the opinion and so hold that the fact that the uppeal is frivolous and intended for the purpose of delay, and cor>sidering that the hernin plaintiff is an old woman of 75 years, sickly and without any means of living, are all in the opinion of the Court strong grounds to justify the execution of the judgment in spite of the supersedeas bond, because the right of the plaintiff to live and to pursuC' her happiness are paramount rights which outweigh the security offered by the supersedeas bond." Claiming that the appeal is not frivolous and that there is no good reason for ordering immediate (:Xecution of the judgment pending uppeal b~cause the appel\ee has the security of their supersedeas bond; but that on the other hand a premature execution wonld cfluse irreparable damage to them (appellants) should they finally win the case because said execution would mean the sale of extensive prope;ties of the appellants, the latter have filed the present petition for certiorari to set aside the special order of March 18, 1954, nn grounds of abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners invoke the provisions of Rule, 39, Section 2, which for purposes of ready reference, we reproduce below: October 31, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 501 "SEC. 2. Execution discretWnary. - Before expiration of the time of appeal, execution may issue, in the discretion of the wurt, on motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter,the special order shall be included therein. Exeeution issued before the expiration of the time to appeal may be stayed upon the approval by the court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned for the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case it be affirmed wholly or in part." They lay stress on the last sentence, particularly that phrase referring to stay of execution, whose provision, in their opinion is mandator} ir. the sense that upon the approval by the court of the supersedeas bond filed by appellants, the court has no choice and must stay execution. We are favored with able briefa and memoranda filed by counsels for both parties, and after a careful study and consideration of the authorities and arguments contained in them, we have arrived at the conclusion that even after the fili11g of a supersedeas bond by an appellant, intended to stay execution, the trial court may in its (liscretion still disregard said supe'!"Sedeas bond and order immediate execution provided that there are special and compelling reasons justifying immediate execution. In the case of Caragao vs. Maceren, promulgated on October 17, 1952, this Court said: "The general rule is thJl.i the execution of judgment is staycrl by the perfection of an appf::b.l . While provisions al°e inserted in the rules to forestall cases in which an executed judgment is reversed on appeal, the execution of the judgment is the exception, not the rule. And n.n exccutfon may issue only 'upon good i·casons stated in the vrder'. The ground for the granting of the execution must be good ground <Aguilos vs. Barrios, 22 Phil. 285). It follows that when the Court has alr0ady granted stay of execution, upon the adverse partly filing 'a supersedeas bond, the circmnsta.nces justifying exe<:ution in !;!J!te of the supersedeas bond must be paramount; they should outweigh the security offered by the 81tpersedeas bond. In this case only compelling rea.son.s of ttrgency or justice can justify the execution." From the above quoted ruling one may gather that there are special cases and occasions where the surrounding circumstances are such as to point to and lead to immediate execution. We admit that such special cases and occasions are rare, but in our opinion the present case is one of them. Asuncion's need of and right to immediate execution of the decisicn in her favor amply satisfy the requirement of a paramount and cr.mpelling reason of m·gency an:l justice, outweighing the security offered by the supersedeas loncl. Without necessarily· anticipating the result of the appeal which involves, according to the trial court, the same issue raised and decided in Civil Case No . 135 between the same parties, one rr:ight venture to speculate and to say that as between the parties appel19.Pts: and appel\ee, the odds are a little against the former. First, appellants have to convince the appellate court or courts that althoui;rh nothing is said in the agreement between the parties <Exhibit. Fl ah<)ut the palay which the defendant£ undertook to deliver ywrly, as coming from the ricelands of Dr. de Leon in the proYince of Bulacan, still, that was the intention of the parties, this, in Rpite> of the fact that the courts, trial and appellate, including this Tribunal, in Civil Case No. 135 ha,·e finally interpreted said agrf'eml!nt and decided against tl1em; and secondly, and equally 1mporiant, they ntust convince the appellate court or courts that they (appel· )ants) may again raise this same question or issue before the courts in this case, involving as it does, the same parties. Because of this, the trial court in ordering immediate execution, considered the appeal frivolous and made for purposes of delay, which reasons we held in the case of Sawit et al. vs. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310 to be go.>:i reasons for ordel'ing execution pending appeal. Now, to justify e.'l:ecution in :.pite the filing of the supersedeas bond required by the trial court, we find added, weighty reasons, (,.1e of which is that if the execntion of the judgment is to await the final decision of the case by the appellate court or courts, considering the age and state of health of appellee Asuncion Soriano, even if !'.he won thf:: case eventually, she may not be 3live by then to rnjoy her winnings. It will be remembered that Asuncion obtained a judgment in the Bulacan court in 1947 ordering the herein defendants to pay to her the value of the deficiencies in palay deliveries !or 1944, 1£145, and 1946, but that judgmLnt was not finally satisfied in cash until 1952, that is to say, a period of about five years after the judgtr1ent of the trial court i~ 1947. According to counsel for respondent Asun:::ion this was due to the numerous motions f('lr reconsiderations and written oppcsition~ of the defendants therein which he considered dilatory tactics. Petitioners De Leon in this case have appealed from the decision in favor of Asuncion in Civil Case No. 488. Considering the fact that the decision appealed from involves questions of fiict such as the value of palay in the yeare 1947, 1948 up to March 1953, the appeal may have gone tc. the Court of Appeals, and it is not improbable that the case may further be appealed to this Tribunal. And if what happened in Civil Case No. 135, as regards the interval of about five years between the trial court's judgment in 1947 anri the satisfaction thereof in 1952, is any indication, Asuncion may yet have to wait about four or five years before this case is finally terminated. And she is afraid that considering her delicate health and her age <she is now 75 years old> she mi;,y not live that long. We fully agree with her and her counsel. She is nearing the end of life's span. Of course, it is to be hoped that she may have many more years to live; but we all know that man's hopes and wishes on that point have little, if any effect. If we examine the contents of the agreement <Exhibit F> par· ticularly the period of time within which the palay deliveries are to be made, we will notice that it is only during Asuncion's life time. Says the agreement - "it is expressly stipulated that this annual payment of palay shall cease upon the death of the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART <Asuncion);" it further says that the right to said palay deliveries "shall not be transmissible to her heirs or to any other person." Clearly, the right is peculiarly personal, only for Asuncion, and only as long as she lived. In other words, the palay was intended in the nature of a life pension for her main· tenance, support and enjoyment, and if that was the intention of the parties, it is evident that said purposes would be frustrated and the benefit to Asuncion intended would be futile and unavailing, if the palay deliveries are too long delayed and are to be deferred until after final decision of this case, which may be after her death. The case is not unlike that of a judgment for support and education of children. The money or property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to await the final judgment, thP. children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the rea!':on that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused . The children with such belated payment for SUP· pc.rt and education cannot as gluttons eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation . Neither may they enroll in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed. Neither can one say that it is perfectly fair and to delay the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of Asuncion even after her death because her heirs will inherit it anyway, because it is a fact that she has n. ; direct heirs and she is living all alone without any near relatives. All these circumstances combine and make up a compelling and paramount reason to warrant immediate execution of the judgment despite the filing of the supersrdeas bond. Far better that respondent-plaintiff Asuncion be allowed and granted the opportunity to receive and enjoy the palay she is entitled to under the agreement as interpreted by the courta, now, even at the inconvnience of 502 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL October 31, 1954 petitioners-defendants, but with the security of the P50,000-bond, than that she be required to await final judgment which may yet take a few years, and ,wh.ich for her may come too late. In the f~regoing considerations as to the necessity of immediate execution of the judgment, we have in mind and refer only to that part of the dedsion <paragraphs 1 and 2 of the dispositive Ji&rl) regarding the value of the palay not delivered from 1947 to 1952, inclusive; the palay or the value thereof OOM'Csponding to the deficiencies in March 1953 and March 1954, and for the years thereafter, including the interest . mentioned in paragraph 2. With respect to attorney's fees, as to the propriety of whose award and the amount thereof, has yet to be passed upon by the appellate courtl or courts, we feel that it should await the final decision in this crse. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied in part as regards execution of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the dispositive part of the trial court's decision, and as mentioned herein; it is in part granted as regards the payment of attorney's fees. No costs. The writ of preliminary injunction heretof<1re issm•d i<1 dissolved. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Alez Reyes, Juuo, Cmcepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, J.J., concur, Bauti!Jta Anuelo o.nd Labrador, J .J., did not take part. n Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., Petitioner vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, Respondent, No. L-7084, October 27, 1954, Pablo, J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEASE OF PRIVATE PROPERTIES TO ALIENS. - The Constitution and the Civil COde of the Philippines do not prohibit the lease of private properties to aliens for a period which does not exceed 99 years. The oontract, the registration of which is the object of litigaEm, lastB 25 years only cxtendable for another 25 years; it does nbt reach 99 years. Therefore, it is in accordance with law an1 is valid. Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for Petitioner. Patrocinio Vega Quintain for Respondent. DECISION PABLO, M., La recurrente pide una orden perentoria contra el Registrador de Titulos de il4 ciudad de Davao para que registre el <.'ontrato de arrentlamiento otorgado a su favor por la Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. of Manila. Los hechos son los siguientes: La rerurrentc es una corporaci6n extranjera, organizada ·de acuerdo con las !eyes de Filipinas, con oficinas en Manila. En 9 de junio de 1953 la Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. of Manila, una corporaci6n organizada de acucrdo con las ]eyes de West Vi1·ginia, Estados Unidos de America, con licencia para negociar en Filipinas, di6 en arrcndamiento a las recurrente el Lote No. 1241 del catastro de Davao. La claUsula de la escritura pertinente al caso cs de\ tenor siguiento: "2. That the term of this lease shall be twenty five (25) years from the date hereof, subject to renewal or extension for another twenty-five (25) years, under such terms and conditions as the parties hereto may theretipon mutually agree. For the purposes of such renewal or extension, the LESSEE shall !lO convey in writing to the LBSSOR at least ninety t90) d<tyS before the expiration of the lease." En 13 de julio del mismo ai'io la recur rente, por media de su abogado, present6 la escritura de a rrendamientll para su inscripci6n al Registrador de Tltulos de Davao, el cual cxpres6 sus dudas acerca de la procedencia de! registro, teniendo en cuenta la circular No. 189 de la Oficina General de Registro de Ter renos; y si la reeurrente insistia en el registro, dicho registrador elevaria el asunto en consulta a la 4.a sala de! J uzgado de P rimera Instancia de Manila. El abogado de la recurrente, creyendo que tardaria mucho tiempo un3 consulta al juzgado, acudi6 a la Oficina General de Registro de Terrenos, cuyo jefe, el Sr. Enrique Altav3s, resolviendo la consult&, expidi6 el siguiente dictamen: "With reference to your Jetter of the 13th insta nt, inquiring as to whether or not the Register of Deeds of Davao was justified in refusing the registration of the lease. agreement over a parcel of land executed by Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. <American owned) in favor of your client. Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd ., an alien corporation, for a period of 25 years with option to renew for another 25 years, I have the honor tll quote hereunder the dispositive portion of the resolution of the Court of First Instance 0£ Manila. 4th Branch, to Con•rnlta No . 136 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, as follows: "After a careful study of the facts stated in the abnvementioned transcribed consulta, the undersigned is of the opinion that, until otherwise fixed by a superior authority, twenty.five years is a reasonable period of duration for the lease of a private agricultural land in favor of an alien qualified to acquire and llllld such r ight, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds of Manila.' "In view thereof, the Register of Deeds of Davao, was justified in refusing the registration of the aforesaid lease as it is in contravention of the said resolution o! the Court which has been circularized to all Registers of Deeds in our Cfrcular No. 139 dated May 6, 1952." El jefc de la Ofina General de Registro de Terrenos funda au opini6n en una circular del Secretario de Justicia, que en parte dice asl: "since it is ownership by aliens which is prescribed, the t"st in determining the reasonableness of the period should be whether the lease in effect amounts to a c.onferment of dominion on the lessee" so that 'the period of the lease should not be of "such a duration as to vest in the lessee the possession and enjoyment of land with the permanency which proprietorship ordinarily gives." Fund:indose en el p:irrafo 6 del articulo 1491, relacionado con el articulo 1646 del C6digo Civil d~ Filipinas, algunos contienden que los extranjeros quc no pueden coniprar bienes inmuebles por dispod - ci6n constitucional CKrivenko contra Director de Terrenos) tampoco pueden obtenerlos en arrendamiento. En nuestra opini6n, la contenci6n carece de base por varias razones. Para saber el alcance de estos tres articulos del nuevo C6digo Civil, investiguemos la raz6n por que fueron adoptados. Dichos articulos dicen asi: "ART. 1646, The persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqlialified to become lessees of the things mentioned therein. "ART. 1490. The husband a nd the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separat ion of property was agreed upon in1 tho marriage settltmients; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation of property <in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI, Title III, of this book> unde.r article 191. "ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by pur· chase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: <U The guardian or PROTUTOR, the property of the person 9r persons who may be under his guardianship; <2J Agents, the property whose administration or ule may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of tM principal has been given ; ~. aubrn1Adn1 eon adictoncs a l Codill'O Civil a nticuo. 1 09 Que HUlll •mt re pare nteei1 *'" tu •u1tltuldu 7 lu Que utan en letrae mayu.culu eon lu paneo 1uprlmida1. October 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 603