The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Samaniego y Young alias Sy Liong Bok alias Tony, defendant-appellant, no. L-6085, June 11, 1954; The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ong Ing alias Cresencio Ong, and Alfredo Torres y Sagaysay, defendant-appellant, L-6086, June 11, 1954. [Supreme Court decisions].

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Samaniego y Young alias Sy Liong Bok alias Tony, defendant-appellant, no. L-6085, June 11, 1954; The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ong Ing alias Cresencio Ong, and Alfredo Torres y Sagaysay, defendant-appellant, L-6086, June 11, 1954. [Supreme Court decisions].
Language: English
Source: XIX (10) October 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Criminal evidence; Murder; Admissible evidence; Appellate court; Philippines. Supreme Court; Young, Antonio Samaniego; Sy Liong Bok; Ong Ing; Ong, Cresencio; Sagaysay, Alfredo Torres
Rights
Abstract: The testimonies of peace officers for the prosecution in other criminal cases which were dismissed upon the ground that the confessions obtained by them, in connection with those cases, were tainted with irregularities and are not admissible in evidence. The unverified testimony of one of the appellants that he was sick at home when the offense charged was committed, cannot offset the positive testimony of witnesses who saw him near the scene of the crime. Where the alleged newly discovered evidence merely tends to corroborate the appellant's alibi to the effect that they were not present at the scene of the crime and could not have participated in its commission, the motion for a new trial should be denied.
Fulltext: graph 1, harl been completely installed at the beginning of the month of 1''ebruary, 1947, at the " APBA" building Calape, Rohol. and since then the said 11how house beiUn its operation; 4. That up9n inquiry, the JJlaintiff was informed and so allege that the "APBA" Cinematographic Shows Inc., has never been registered, hence Dumadag anrl J umamuy who acted as the president and general manager respectively are the once made a s party defendants: Plaintiff did not include the members of the unregistered corpvration as p:irtics defendants. an<'l so they were not summoned. On September 14, Ul53, the court ti quo entered the order complaint>d of, which is as follows: The aseociation represented by defendants Pedro Dumadag and Esmenio Jumamuy, is not included a3 party clefendant in the fourth amended complaint. It is a legal requirement that any act!on should be brought against thr, real party in interest. In view of the opposition fi led by the defendants PedrO" Dumadag and Esmenio JumamuY, the court denies the admission of plaintiff's fourth amended complaint dated February 17, 1953, and objected to on the date of the trial. The fourth amended complaint <paragraph 2, supra) allegt>s that defendants, purporting to l:e tht: president and general manager of the unrcg-istered corporation, leased the theatrical equipments fr(lm the plaintiff, petitioner herein. Said defendants, according to the complaint, did not enter intc thr. contract in the name ·or on behalf of the corporation; consequently, the law applicable ls Article 287 of the Code of Commerce, which provides; of an action. The members <'f the unregistered corpon.tion could be responsible for the rental of the equipments jointli with thcir officers. But the complaint specifical.ly alleges th:it SAid office.rs entered into the contract by themselves, hence the presence of the members is not essential to the final determination of the iuue presented, the evident intent of the complaint being to make the officers directly responsible. CArticle 287, Cc-de cif Commerce.. supra.) The alleged responsibility of the members of the corporation for the contrict to the officers, who acted as their agents, is pot in issue and need not be determined in the action to fix the responsibility (If the officers to plaintiff's intestate, hence said members are not indispensable in the action instituted. WC! find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit plaintiff's fourth amend('d -:omplaint. The writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order e<1mplained of reversed, and the complaint ordered admitted, and th£ court a q1to is hereby directed to proceed thereon according to the rules. With costs against respondents Pedro Dumadag and Esmenio Jumamuy . Paras, Pablo, Beng=ou., Padilla, Montemayor, Ale~ Reyn, Jugo, Bautistri Angelo, Concepcio11 and J. B. L. Reye$, J.J., concur XI The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Ant0'1'lio Samaniego y Yoimg alias S11 Liong Bok alias Tony, Defendrint· .A_ ppellant, No. L-6085, Jnne 11, 1954, Concepcion, J. The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-A ppellec, vs. Ong fnf1 alias Cre.~encio Ong, and Alfredo Torres y Sagaysay, Defendant.1ppellant, No. L-6086, June 11, 1954, Co:ncepcion, J. Art. 287. A contract entered into by the facl:(lr in his own name shall bind him directly to the person with whom it was made; but if the transaction was made for the account of the 1. principal, the other contracting party may bring his action either against the factor or against the principal. EVIDENCE; "RES I NTER ALIOS ACTA". - The testimonies of peace officers for the prosecution in other criminal cas<>s which were dismissed upon the ground that the confessions obtained by them, in connecti-.n with those cases, wC>re tainted with irregul:lrities are res mter alios acta and are not admissible The oppositicn of the responde:"lts to the admission of the fourth amended complaint is procedural in nature, i.e., that notwithstand· lng the fact that the APBA was not registered, all its members should be included as parties defendants as provided in section 15 oi Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The trial court was of the opinion , ~n evidence. Y. JD.; ID.; ALIBI. - The uncorroborated testimony of one of the appellants that he was toick at home, when the offense charged was committed, cannot offset the J)()Sitive testimony of witnesses who saw him near the scene of th.:: crime. that the inclusion of the members was necessary as it considC'red them as "real parties in interest." In this respect, the trial court committed an error as the rule requiring real parties to be im· pleaded is applicable to parties plaintiffs, not to parties defendants. 3 · ID. ; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DI SCOVERED EVIDENCE. - Where the alleged newly discovered evidence merely tends to corroborate appellants' alibi to the effect that they were not present at the scene of the crime and could not have participated in its commission, the motion for new trial should be denied. It is the absolute prerogative of the plaintiff to choose the theory upon which he predicates his right of action, or the parties he desires to sue without dictation or imposition by the court or the adverse party. Tf he makes a mi!'takc in the choice of his ~!g~~r~!c:c:!~";h~; ii; 1~:at0;! ~::c~:.;ti:: ~~a:i~~ew;:;;e:ae t~::~~ 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO OFFSET THAT FOH THE PROSECUTION WHICH HAS BEEN POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED. - The testimony of the new witness for the appellants to the effect that they were the authors of the crime charged and that no other persons could have committed it can not offset the positive testimonies of two unbiased witnesses for tl'ie prosecution that they have st>en the appellants at the place of the occurrence at about the time of th~ perpetration of the offense charged, testimonies which were partly corroborated by one or the appellants himself. from. Granting that the members of the unregistered corporation may be held responsible, partly or wholly, for the agreement enter· ed into by the officers who acted for the corporation, the fact remains that the plaintiff in the case at bar chose not to implcad them, suing the officers alone. If the officers desire to implead them nnd make them equally responsible in the action, their remedy is by means of n third party complaint, in accordance with Ru!~ 12 of the Rules of Court. But they con not compel the plaintiff to choose his defendants. He may not, at his own expense, be forced to implead any one who, under adverse party's theory, is to answer for the defendants' liability. Neither may the court compel him to furnish the means by which defendants may J.void or mitigate their liability. This was in effect. what counsel for respondents wanted to compel the petitioner to do, and which the court wns persuaded to do force the plaintiff to include the members of the unregistered corporation a& parties defendants and when plaintiff refused to do so, it registered his fourth amended complaint. The court's or<ler, in so for a:. it demands the inclu<iion of the members of the unregistered corporation, has evidently been induced by a confusion between an indispensable party and o. party jointly or ultimatC>ly respom.ible for the obligation which is ~he subjE:ct Si:cto S, J. Carlos, Guillermo S. Santos, Eleuterio S. Abad, and Constantino B. A costa for the defendants and appellants. Gaudencio C. Cabacungan for defendant Antonio Samaniego. Solicitor General ,111an R. Liwag :ind Assistant Solicitor Gen6"'a/ Francisco Carreon for the plaintiff and appellee. DECISION CONCEPCION, J.: Un April 28, ) 950, at about 11 :00 p.m., the dead body of Ong Tin H11i wns found gagged and blindfolded in the Oxford Shoe 61'1 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL October 31, 195.i Emporium, at No. 329 Carriedo Street, Manila, where he wae working, with his wrist. tied and a cord around his neck. The medical examiner found, on said body, the following: "Lacerations, auricular and occipital arteries and vein11. Lacerations, superficial, cerebral veins, basal portion, brain. Marked congestion and edema, lungs, bilateral. Old pleural adhesions, lungs, right. Congestion, spleen. Congestion, pancreas. Congestion, kidneys, bilateral. Hemorrhages, diffuse, huhdural and subarachnoid, specially base, brain. Fracture, cribiform plate, ethmoid bone of cranium. Wounds, lacerated, multi!lle CZ> forehead. Wounds, lacerated, temporal region, left. Wound, lacerated. splitting, extermalacar, pinna, left. Wounds, (2) lacerated, with extensive, contusion, scalp, posterior occfpital region, head, left. Wounds, iaCerated, multiple <2> extensive, scalp, with contusion hematoma, occipital-parietail region, posterior head, right. Tight-gag, mouth, and tight blind fold (piece of cloth), face. Strangulation by cord, neck. Tight cord around both forearms and wrist joints. Cause of Death: Asphyxia and diffuse subarachnoid hemorrhage specially over the base of the brain due to suffocation by tight gagging of the mouth and whole face with cloth, and multiple laceration injuries by blows on the head and face:" <Appellants' brief, p. 31>. The peace officers who investigated the matter were tipped that Ong ·Tin Hui had an enemy by the name of Go Tay, whose brother-in-law, ·Ong Ing, had the reputation of being a tough guy and was unemployed. Upon questioning, Ong Ing, who, sometime later on, was seen loitering 11round Carriedo Street, stated that, at about the time of the occurrence, he had seen Alfredo Tones, one Antonio Tan and a Filipino whose name he did not know, coming from the Oxford Shoe store'. Hence, Alfredo Torres, whose whereabouts were located with the assistance of Ong Ing, ~·11.s nrrest~d. Upon investigation, Torres, in turn, declared that Ong Ing had participated in the commission of the crime. When Ong Ing and Alfredo Torres were made to face one another, they mutually recriminated und incriminated each other. Moreovet, Torres, Ong Ing alias Cresencio Ong nnd Go Tay made their res)Jective statements in wdting, Exhibits X, W and Y, implicatin<? one Tony. Upon examination of the pictures of police characters in the files of th<' Police Department, Ong Ing and Torres identified the picture of one bearing the name of Antonio Tan, as that of Tony. Antonio Tan turned out to be known, also, as Antonio Stt.maniego, alias Sy Liong Tok, who, on June 15, 1930, was arrested in Mnpirac. Naga, Cnmnrines Sill·, where he went late in May, 1950. Upon being questioned by the police, Samaniego rleclared substantially, that he was merely posted, as guard, at the door of the Oxft.Jrd Shoe Emporium, during the commission of the crime charged, and that thereafter, he received from Alf1.:do Torres a certain sum of money as his share of the loot. Samaniego, likewise signed the statement Exhibit CC. As a consequence, three criminal cases for robbery and homicide were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, namely: Case No. 12734, against Ong Ing and Alfredo Torrt's y Sagaysay; Case No. 12941, against Antonio Samaniego; and Case No. 13031, ngninst Ang- Tu alias Go Tay. After entering a plea of "not guilty," which was subsequently withdrawn, Ong Ing was allowed to plead, in lieu thereof, and, after bemg carefully Informed by the court of the serious nature of the charge and uf the poqible consequences of his contemplated step, did plead, "guilty," with the understanding that he would introduce evidence on the pruentt of some ruitigating circumlrtances. Upon the presentation of aaid evidence, Ong Ing was sentenced t.o life imprisonment, with th• accessory penalties prescribed by Jaw, to indemnify the heirs o! th• deceased Ong Tin Hui in the sum of !"5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, end to pay one-half of the costs - which sentence is now being served by him. In due courae., the Court of First Instance subsequently rendered a decision convicting Alfredo 'Dorres and AnWnio Samaniego, as principal and as accomplice, respectively, of the crime charged, and sentencing the former to life imprisr.nment, and the latter to an indeterminate penalty ranging trom 8 yP.ars and 1 day of prisiOTt mayor to 14 years, 8 months snd 1 day of reclusion temporal, with tht acces~ory penalties provided-by law and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Ong Tin Hui in the sum of !"5,000 and the Oxford Shoe Emporium in the sum of !"104, and, Alfredo Torres to pay one-half of thf! coEts in case No. 12734, and Antonio Samaniego the costs in case No. 12941, and acquitting Ang Tu alia.r Go Tay upon the ground of insufficiency of evidr.nce, with costs de oficio in casr No. 13031. Torres and Samaniego have appealed from said decision. It is not disputed that the Oxford Shoe Emporium was burglarized and Ong Tin Hui killed therein by the thieves in the Eivening of April 28, Hl50. The only question for determination in this case Dre: CH . whether appellants f.nmed part of the group that perpetrated the offense, and <2> in the affirmative case, the nature of their participation therein. The evidence thereon consists of the following: Ca> Ong Ing, alia..r Cresencio Ong, testified that, pursuant to instructions of Ang Tu, alias Go Tay, who begged him to look for thugs to kill Ong Tin Hui, he <Ong Ing) sought appellants hereit1; that Ong Ing gave Samaniego thE: sun\ of f200, which had come from Ang Tu; that, upon hearing of the latter's plan, Samani<!go remarked that Ong Tin Hui should really be killed, he being his cSamaniego's) creditor; that both nppellants agreed to go t.o tho> Oxford Shoe Emporium in the eve11ing of April 28, 1960; that on the way thereto, said evening, Samsni<'go suggested t.he advisability of finding a good excuse to knock at the door, in order that his companions could enter the store; tlrnt upon arrival thereat, Samaniego knocked at the door, which was CJpencd by Ong Tin Hui; that, thereupon, TC'rres. anothf!r Filipino and one Chinese, whose name was not given, entered the store; that the unnamed Filipino expressed the wish to go to the toilet, for which reason Ong Tin Hui led him to said place; that, thereupon, the former struck the latter, from behind, with a piece of wood; that To1Tes tied the hands of Ong Tin Hui, whom Torres and the other Filipino drngged to the kitchen; that when Torres aud his companions left the store, they stated that Ong Tin Hui was dead already; and that, soon later, they went to the house of Tones at Grace Park, where the loot of M04 was divided. Cb> Nazario Aquino and Apolinario Ablaza, watchman and inspector, respectively, of the PAMA Special Watchmen Agency, dP.clared that, on April 28, 1950, between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Aquino saw Torres at Baz.ar 61 in Carriedo Street, whereas Ablau met said appellant near the Alcazar Building, in the same street; that Aquino cbatted with Torres, who said that soon he could buy whatever. he needed, for he would gt>t his backpay; that Torres WIUI perspiring and his hair was ruffled when Ablaza saw him; that, that evening, Aquino, likewise, saw appellant Samaniego, wiilt four companions, at the corner of Carriedo and P. Gomez streets, and this was admitted by Samaniego; and that Samaniego greeted him on that occasion. Cc> In his extrajudicial statement <Exhibit C>, Torres declared that, pursue.nt to a previous understanding, he, Samaniego. Ong Ing, and others gathered at the Cliners Restaurant, where it wu agreed that Torres would disuade the 8pecial watchm~n from patroling the vicinity of the Oxford Shoe Emporium; that Samaniego knocked at its door at about 10:45 p.m.; that while Samaniego and Torres October 311 1954. THE LAWYERS JOURNAL ''" atood on guard outside, Ong Ing, the unnamed Filipino, and another Chinaman, entered the store; that after leaving the store, the group proceeded to the house of Torres, where the st.olcn money was divided; and that the blood stains found in his trousers and coat (Exhibits Mand N J, must have been caused by the umiamed Filipin"l, who had blood in his hands. Cd) Detective Lieutenant Enrique Morales and Detective Corporal Jose Sto. Tomas, testified that upon investigation, Samaniego i;tated that he was merely posted at the door of the Oxford Shoe Emporium during the occurrence. (e) In his extrajudicial confession <Exhibit CC), Saman;E-go declared that he h:id known Ong Tin Hui since August 1949, beC3t1Se the Oxford Emporium wac; behind the store where said appellant used to. wcrk; that he was not im.irle the Oxford Shoe Emporium, but merely stood on guard at its door when tl1e crime was committed; that Ong Ing gave him P200, which came from Ang Tu, in order to induce Jijm to kill Ong Tin Hui; and that, after the occurrence, he received !'23 or P-24 as his share of the loot. · (f) In his extrajudicial statement lExhibits W and AA), OngIng said that, in addition to agreeing to participate in the commission of the crime, Samaniego hsd suggested that it be perpetrated on a Friday; that it was Samaniego who knocked at the · door of the Oxford Shoe Emporium in :irder that his cor.1panions could enter the store; and that Torres was one of those who particinated in the commission of the crime charged. (g) Jn Exhibits X and DB, the extrajudicial confessions of Torres, stated that besides knocking at the door of the Oxford SCoe Emporium, Samaniego received P26 as his share of the stolen money. Torres likewise identified Samaniego's pieture, Exhibit, J. lh) The sales book Exhibit S, and the cash slip booklet anrl cash slips of the Oxford Shoe Emporium (Exhibits S, T, T-1 to T-16, U and U-1 to U-1:3), show that the sales made in said store on April 28, amounted, at least, to f'104.00, thus corroborating the foregoing evidence on the amount of money taken from said store and divided among th9sc who perpetrated the offense charged. Appellants ckim that the nforemcntioned statements were St:curcd from them by members 'lf the police department thr'lugh duress. In the language, however, of His Honor, the Trial Judge, this pretense cannot be sustained, for: "First, the written statements of Torres and Samaniego, taken by question and answer, are too rich in details which only they themselves could furni sh. It will be readily seen that in thdr respective statements each of these two defendants attemnted as best he could to minimize the gravity of his participation in the crime. This is specially true in the case of Samaniego - the morP intelligent of the two - who had finished tl1e second y~ar course in Commerce. If really the Police office:rs tort1trcd the two defendants and manufactured their statements, the cou1·\. has no doubt 'tl1nt the responsibility of the latter would have been placed in black and white in their respective statements. "Second, anothe1· proof of weight against the claim of torture is the case of defendant Go T::iy alias Ang Tu alias Kiko. The known theory of the police ia that Go Tay was the instig11.tor of the crime. In the eyes <;f the police, he was the whale; Torres and Samaniego, compared to Go Tay, were but mere winnows . A written statem(lnt of Go Tay (Exhibit Y) was taken. The statement Exhibit Y reflects all that Go Tay reRllv stated to the investigator. Go Tay said so in court. No inculpntory answer appears therein. This shows that. the police officers did not inject into that statement facts which would bring about the conviction of this principal defendant. Yet, when Go Tay afterwards changed his mind and refused to sign the stutement, no force was exerted against him - lt remained unsigned. "Thirrl, in t11e ease of Torres, he himself stated in court Wint he did not sign a- document pt·esented to him whenever hf' did not WRnt to. (Tr. pp. 1077-1079). "Fourth, in the case of Samaniego, the court observed that he speaks Tagalog rather fluently. <Tr. p. 1309> . He re.ada and writes English. He can not say that he did not know the contents of his own statement, because if he reads English and he speaks Tagalog, undoubtedly he oould read Tagalog words." <Decision, pp. 50-51, appellants' brief>. lBrief of the Solicitor General, pp. 10-11 •. Appellants insist that the testimonies of Lieutenant Morales an1'. Detectives Sto. Tomas, Walker, Alday and Gorospe, to the that said statements were made freely and \"oluntarily, do not deserve crf'dence, said pe'lce officers having testified for the prosecution In other criminal cases which were e\'entually dismissed upon the irround that the confessions obtained by them, in connection with these cases, were tainted with irregularities. But, the evidence sought to be introduced by the defense, in support of its aforementioned pretense, was not :'ldmittcd by the lower court, and the ruling thereof is not assailed in appellants' brief. At any rate, what those witnesses did or said in relation to other cases is Tes inter alias acta and, as such, irrelevant to the case at bar. Appellants have set up their respective alibis. Torres said that he was sick at home, when the offense charged was committed. Obviously, his uncorroborated testimony cannot offset the incriminating evidence already adver_ted to, particularly considering the positive testimony of Aquino and Ablaza, who saw him at Carriedo Street, near the scene of the occurrence, at about the time of the perpetration of the crime. As regards Samaniego's alibi, we fully agree with the view of the lower court thereon, which we quote from the :lecisior. appealed from: "Weaker still is the alibi of dC'fendant Samaniego. Samaniego testified in court that he went to Quiapo Church at around 8:30 in the evening of April 28, 1950; that after a few minctes there he went out and passed by Calle Carriedo; tfiat he then proceeded to Avenida Rizal where he purchased a newspaper and thereafter went to Cine Capitol; and that ho! left the show before 11 o'clock in the evening. This admission of Samaniego by itself alone is sufficient w overcome his defense of al1hi. The reason is t.hat he could ht.VE: been in the sc.cnc of the crime at the time of the commission thereof." <Appellants' brief, p. 50>. It is clear from the foregoing that the lower court hM not erred in rejecting said alibis and in convicting appellants herein as above stated. - In a motion filed before this Court, during the pendency of the present appeal, appellants pray for a new trial upon the grounrl of newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimony of Narci"o de la Cruz and Enrique Mojica, whose joint affidavit is attacht>d to said motion a.:> Annex C. Affiants declare therein th11.t they a .. e ~erving sentences, De la Cruz, of imprisonment for 20 years, for tht. crime of robbery with homicirl.e, and Mojica of imprisonment £0r l'l years. for robbery; that they nae the assasins of Ang Tin Tiui; that n'l other persons have com•'l\!tted said crime; and foat C:ey perpetrated the eame at the insti,t!'ation of Ong Tu alias Go Tav Upon careful consideration of said motion for new trial, we are clearly of the opinion, and so hold, that the same should be, aa it is hereby, denied, for: 1l The allegedly newly discovered evidence is merely corroborative of appellants' alibis. It :nerely tries to strengthen appellants• evidence to the effect that they were not present af the scene of the crime and could not h~vP partiC'ipated, therefore, in its rommhisiou. 2) Even if introduced in evidence, the testimony of Narci!o Dt la Cruz and Enrique Mojica would not, in all probability, affect the result of the case. Considering the source of said tcstimon}· ; the fact that the presence of appellants at the place of the occurrence, at about the time of the perpetration of the offense chargpd, h'.'!..s been positively estabilshed by the testimony of two unbiased witr.esses, Nazario Aquino and Apolinario Ablaia, who were partly corroborated by the testimony o! appellant Samaniegc; and the circumstance that, credence .:annot be given to the ter.timony of THE LAWYERS JOURNAL October 31, 19S. sa1d affianh without asrominq that Ong Ing had pleaded guilty of, and is willingly serving sentence for, a crime he had not cozr.mitte.J, 1he allegedly newly discovered evidence is, to our mind, insufficient 11.J effect the evidence for the prJsccution, or even to create 11 rt'aEonable doubt •'.>n appellants' guilt. Moreover, as we said in eas" G. R. No. L-5849, entitled "Peo1,Je vs. Buluran," decided Ma} 24, 1954: "x x x for some time now this Court has been receiving, in connections with cr iminal ~kSP.I! pt-nding before it, a num~1 of motions for new trial, simil!lr to the one under con3ideratir.m, based U!JOn affidavits of pm1or.us - either se1'Ving sentenct11 Clike Torio and Lao) or merely under preventive detentiPn, pending final disposition of the charges against them - who, in a sudden display of conc~rn for the dictates of their conscience - to which they consistently turned deaf ears in the past - assume responsibility for crimes of which .others have been found guilty by competent courtlil. Although one might, at first, be impressed by said affidavits - particularly if resvrt thereto had not become so frequent as to be no longer an uncommon occurrence - it is not difficult, .on second thought, to realize how desperate men - such as those already adverted to - could be induced, or could even offer, to make such affidavit.!, for a monetary consideration, which would be of some help to the usual!y needy family of the affiants. At any rate, the risks they assume thereby are, in many cases, purely theoretical, not only because of the possibility, if not probability, of establishing <in connection with the crime for which respMsibility is assumed) a legitima~ alibi - in some cases it may be proven positiYely that the affiants cculd not have committed s~id offenses, because they wer~ actually confined in prison at the time of tht> iccurrcnce - bat, also, because the evidence alr~ady introduced hy the prosecution may be too strong to be offset by a reproduction on the witness stand of the contents of said affidavits." Wherefore, the deciskm appealed from is hereby affirmed, the same being in accordance with the facts and the Jaw, with cost11 against the app21lanta. IT IS SO ORDERED. Paras, CJ., and Pablo, J., XII S. N . Picornell & Co., Plainti{f-Appellee, vs. Jose M. Cordova, Dl;!fendunt-Appellant, G. R. No. L-6338, August 11, 1954, J. B. L. Reyes, J. 1. JUDGMENTS; WHEN JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL: PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS FROM DATE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT. - An appealed judgment of a Court of First Instance in an original prewar case does not become fina l until it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals, precisely beca1ose of the appeal interposed therein; hence the period of limitation does not begin to run until after the Court of Appeals denies the motion to reconsider and final judgment is entered (old Civil Code Art. 1971; new Civil Code Art. 1152). 2. ACTIONS; ACTION TO REVIVE JUDGMENT, WHEN BARRED BY PERIOD OF LIMIT A TIO NS. - In this case. from the date the final judgment was entered until the present proceedings were commenced on January 16, 1950, less than ten years have elapsed, so that the action to revive the judgment has not yet become barred (sec. 43, Act 190; 31 Am, Jur. p. 486). 3. ID.; DEFENSES; MORATORIUM ACT, NO LONGER A DEFENSE. - Republic Act No. 342, known as the Moratorium Act, having been declared unconstitutional, by this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban (49 Off. Gaz., No, 5, p. 1807), it may no longer be invoked as a defense. FutgenC"io V ega for defendant and appellant. Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda and Delfin L. Gonzales fol" plaintiff and appellee. DECI S IO N REYES, J. B. L., J.: This is an appeal from the judgment rendered on Novem~r 15, 1950, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in it.a Civil Cue No. 10116, reviving a prewar judgment (Civil Case No. 51265) a1r· ainst the defendant-appellant J ose M. Cordo"a and se.nteneing him to pay the plaintiff-apµellee the sum of Pl2,060.63, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from May 27, 1941, until full payment; with the proviso that the judgment shall not be enforced until the expiration of the moratorium period fixed by Republic Act 342. The material facts are as follows: In Civil Case No. 51265 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the appellant J ose M. Cordova was sentenced on March 4, 1039, to pay the firm of Hair & Picornell the amount of P12,715.41 plus interest at the legal ratfi from May 4, 1937 and costs (Exh. B). Cordova appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the dedsion of the Court of First Instance was affirmed on December 27, 1940 (CA-GR No. 5471) (Exh. C). A motion for reconsideration was denied on F ebruary 7, 1941, and the parties were notified thereof on February 11, 1941 (Exh. D). Thereafter, the judgment became final and executory. Execution was issued; several properties of the defendant were levied upon and sold, and the proceeds app" lied in partial satisfaction of the judgment, but there remained an unpaid balance of Pt 2,0G0.63 (Exh. E, F, G). Subsequently, the interest of Hair & Picornell in the judgment was assigned to appellee S. W. Pieornell & Co. <Exh. HL The latter, on January 16, 1950, commenced the present action (No. 10115) to revive the judgment in case No. 51265; but Cordova defended on two grounds : (1) that the action had prescribed; and (2) that the action against him was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sec. 2, of Republic Act No. 342, since he (Cordova) had filed a claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission, bearing No. 978113 (Exh. 1). Both defenses were disallowed by the Court of First Instance, which rendered judgment as described in the first paragraph of this decision. Cordova duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified the case to this Court, as involving only questions of law. Clearly, the appeal is without merit. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in the original prewar case, No. 51265, did not become final until it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, precisely because of the appeal interposed by appellant Cordova; hence the period of limitation did not begin to run until final judgment was entered, after the Court of Appeals had denied Cordova's motion to reconsider on February 7, 1941 (old Civil Code Art. 1971; new Civil Code Art. 1152) . From the latter date until the present proceedings were commenced on January 16, 1950, Jess than ten years have elapsed, so that the action to revive the judgment has not yet become barred (Sec. 43, Act 190; 31 Am. Jur. s. 846). As to the defense based on the Mortttorium Act, R. A. No. 342, our decision in Rutter vs. Esteban (1953), 49 0. G. (No. 5) p. 1807, declaring the continued operation of said Act to be unconstitutional, is conclusive, that it may no -longer be invoked as a defense. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, except as to the proviso suspending execution of the judgment until eight years after the settlement of appellant's war damage claim. Said condtion is hereby annulled and set aside, in accordance with our ruling in the Rutter case. Paras, Pablo, Beng:;on., Padilla, Montemay&r, Ale:i: R~oa, Jugo, Rautistn An.gtlo, Labrador and Cc:mccpcion, J.J., concur. XIII Brigido Lolwin., Plaintiff and AppdlH, vi. Sif'tger Sttwing Mrr chin~ Company, Defe-ndcnt and Appellant, No. 5751, Nat1ttmbtor 15, 1940, Tu.aaon, J. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, SECTION 6; INTERPRETATION; INJURED EMPLOYEE CANNOT RECOVER October 81, 1964 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 617