An appealed decision by the Court of First Instance of Manila in a civil case against Jose M. Cordova in an original prewar case does not become final until it is declared by the Court of Appeals. The period of limitation did not begin to run until the final decision was submitted to the Court had denied Cordova’s motion to reconsider. The Court’s decision petitioned from is confirmed, except as to the provision of suspending implementation of the sentence until eight years after the settlement of the appellant's war damage claim following our ruling in the Rutter case.

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Title: An appealed decision by the Court of First Instance of Manila in a civil case against Jose M. Cordova in an original prewar case does not become final until it is declared by the Court of Appeals. The period of limitation did not begin to run until the final decision was submitted to the Court had denied Cordova’s motion to reconsider. The Court’s decision petitioned from is confirmed, except as to the provision of suspending implementation of the sentence until eight years after the settlement of the appellant's war damage claim following our ruling in the Rutter case.
Language: English
Source: XIX (10) October 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Civil procedure; Appellate procedure (Civil procedure); Appellate court; Philippines. Supreme Court; Cordova, Jose M.; S.N. Picornell & Company
Rights
Abstract: An appealed decision by the Court of First Instance of Manila in a civil case against Jose M. Cordova in an original prewar case does not become final until it is declared by the Court of Appeals. The period of limitation did not begin to run until the final decision was submitted to the Court had denied Cordova’s motion to reconsider. The Court’s decision petitioned from is confirmed, except as to the provision of suspending implementation of the sentence until eight years after the settlement of the appellant's war damage claim following our ruling in the Rutter case.
Fulltext: sa1d affianh without asrominq that Ong Ing had pleaded guilty of, and is willingly serving sentence for, a crime he had not cozr.mitte.J, 1he allegedly newly discovered evidence is, to our mind, insufficient 11.J effect the evidence for the prJsccution, or even to create 11 rt'aEonable doubt •'.>n appellants' guilt. Moreover, as we said in eas" G. R. No. L-5849, entitled "Peo1,Je vs. Buluran," decided Ma} 24, 1954: "x x x for some time now this Court has been receiving, in connections with cr iminal ~kSP.I! pt-nding before it, a num~1 of motions for new trial, simil!lr to the one under con3ideratir.m, based U!JOn affidavits of pm1or.us - either se1'Ving sentenct11 Clike Torio and Lao) or merely under preventive detentiPn, pending final disposition of the charges against them - who, in a sudden display of conc~rn for the dictates of their conscience - to which they consistently turned deaf ears in the past - assume responsibility for crimes of which .others have been found guilty by competent courtlil. Although one might, at first, be impressed by said affidavits - particularly if resvrt thereto had not become so frequent as to be no longer an uncommon occurrence - it is not difficult, .on second thought, to realize how desperate men - such as those already adverted to - could be induced, or could even offer, to make such affidavit.!, for a monetary consideration, which would be of some help to the usual!y needy family of the affiants. At any rate, the risks they assume thereby are, in many cases, purely theoretical, not only because of the possibility, if not probability, of establishing <in connection with the crime for which respMsibility is assumed) a legitima~ alibi - in some cases it may be proven positiYely that the affiants cculd not have committed s~id offenses, because they wer~ actually confined in prison at the time of tht> iccurrcnce - bat, also, because the evidence alr~ady introduced hy the prosecution may be too strong to be offset by a reproduction on the witness stand of the contents of said affidavits." Wherefore, the deciskm appealed from is hereby affirmed, the same being in accordance with the facts and the Jaw, with cost11 against the app21lanta. IT IS SO ORDERED. Paras, CJ., and Pablo, J., XII S. N . Picornell & Co., Plainti{f-Appellee, vs. Jose M. Cordova, Dl;!fendunt-Appellant, G. R. No. L-6338, August 11, 1954, J. B. L. Reyes, J. 1. JUDGMENTS; WHEN JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL: PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS FROM DATE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT. - An appealed judgment of a Court of First Instance in an original prewar case does not become fina l until it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals, precisely beca1ose of the appeal interposed therein; hence the period of limitation does not begin to run until after the Court of Appeals denies the motion to reconsider and final judgment is entered (old Civil Code Art. 1971; new Civil Code Art. 1152). 2. ACTIONS; ACTION TO REVIVE JUDGMENT, WHEN BARRED BY PERIOD OF LIMIT A TIO NS. - In this case. from the date the final judgment was entered until the present proceedings were commenced on January 16, 1950, less than ten years have elapsed, so that the action to revive the judgment has not yet become barred (sec. 43, Act 190; 31 Am, Jur. p. 486). 3. ID.; DEFENSES; MORATORIUM ACT, NO LONGER A DEFENSE. - Republic Act No. 342, known as the Moratorium Act, having been declared unconstitutional, by this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban (49 Off. Gaz., No, 5, p. 1807), it may no longer be invoked as a defense. FutgenC"io V ega for defendant and appellant. Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda and Delfin L. Gonzales fol" plaintiff and appellee. DECI S IO N REYES, J. B. L., J.: This is an appeal from the judgment rendered on Novem~r 15, 1950, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in it.a Civil Cue No. 10116, reviving a prewar judgment (Civil Case No. 51265) a1r· ainst the defendant-appellant J ose M. Cordo"a and se.nteneing him to pay the plaintiff-apµellee the sum of Pl2,060.63, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from May 27, 1941, until full payment; with the proviso that the judgment shall not be enforced until the expiration of the moratorium period fixed by Republic Act 342. The material facts are as follows: In Civil Case No. 51265 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the appellant J ose M. Cordova was sentenced on March 4, 1039, to pay the firm of Hair & Picornell the amount of P12,715.41 plus interest at the legal ratfi from May 4, 1937 and costs (Exh. B). Cordova appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the dedsion of the Court of First Instance was affirmed on December 27, 1940 (CA-GR No. 5471) (Exh. C). A motion for reconsideration was denied on F ebruary 7, 1941, and the parties were notified thereof on February 11, 1941 (Exh. D). Thereafter, the judgment became final and executory. Execution was issued; several properties of the defendant were levied upon and sold, and the proceeds app" lied in partial satisfaction of the judgment, but there remained an unpaid balance of Pt 2,0G0.63 (Exh. E, F, G). Subsequently, the interest of Hair & Picornell in the judgment was assigned to appellee S. W. Pieornell & Co. <Exh. HL The latter, on January 16, 1950, commenced the present action (No. 10115) to revive the judgment in case No. 51265; but Cordova defended on two grounds : (1) that the action had prescribed; and (2) that the action against him was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sec. 2, of Republic Act No. 342, since he (Cordova) had filed a claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission, bearing No. 978113 (Exh. 1). Both defenses were disallowed by the Court of First Instance, which rendered judgment as described in the first paragraph of this decision. Cordova duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified the case to this Court, as involving only questions of law. Clearly, the appeal is without merit. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in the original prewar case, No. 51265, did not become final until it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, precisely because of the appeal interposed by appellant Cordova; hence the period of limitation did not begin to run until final judgment was entered, after the Court of Appeals had denied Cordova's motion to reconsider on February 7, 1941 (old Civil Code Art. 1971; new Civil Code Art. 1152) . From the latter date until the present proceedings were commenced on January 16, 1950, Jess than ten years have elapsed, so that the action to revive the judgment has not yet become barred (Sec. 43, Act 190; 31 Am. Jur. s. 846). As to the defense based on the Mortttorium Act, R. A. No. 342, our decision in Rutter vs. Esteban (1953), 49 0. G. (No. 5) p. 1807, declaring the continued operation of said Act to be unconstitutional, is conclusive, that it may no -longer be invoked as a defense. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, except as to the proviso suspending execution of the judgment until eight years after the settlement of appellant's war damage claim. Said condtion is hereby annulled and set aside, in accordance with our ruling in the Rutter case. Paras, Pablo, Beng:;on., Padilla, Montemay&r, Ale:i: R~oa, Jugo, Rautistn An.gtlo, Labrador and Cc:mccpcion, J.J., concur. XIII Brigido Lolwin., Plaintiff and AppdlH, vi. Sif'tger Sttwing Mrr chin~ Company, Defe-ndcnt and Appellant, No. 5751, Nat1ttmbtor 15, 1940, Tu.aaon, J. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, SECTION 6; INTERPRETATION; INJURED EMPLOYEE CANNOT RECOVER October 81, 1964 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 617