Gliceria Rosete, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Provincial Sheriff of Zambales, Simplicio Yap and Corazon Yap, defendant-appellants, G.R. no. L-6335, July 31, 1954 [Supreme Court decisions]

Title

Language

English

Source

XIX (10) October 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Indemnity

Personal liability

Real property

Marital relations

Actions and defenses (Law)

Philippines. Supreme Court

Appellate court – Zambales

Rosete, Gliceria

Yap, Simplicio

Yap, Corazon

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

The plaintiff Gliceria Rosete redeemed two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which was sold for the payment of the damages, the money she used was r from her father’s two parcels of land. She has acquired it by right of redemption as a successor in the interest of her husband and has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer consequently be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter.

Fulltext

confined in the Philippine General Hospital for only eighteen days and, acc.ording to Exhibit B-8, he underwent only two minor operations, one on December 13, 1937, and one on February 19, 1938. In other words, if plaintiff had choosen to sue defendant for compensation, an action which would have subrogated defendant into plaintiff's right of action against the Bachrach Motor Company· or any other person responsible for his injuries, such compensation would have been less than the amount he has actually received from both the Bachrach Motor Company and the defendant, namely P2,570. Upon all the foregoing consideratiDn, the appealed decision is reversed and the action dismissed, with costs against plaintiff-appellee. Bengzon, Padilla, Lopn Vito. and Alez Reyes, J.J., concur Judgment revet' Bed. XIV Gliceria Rosete, Plaintiff-Appeltec, vs. Provincial Sheriff of Zambales, Simplicio Yap and Corazon Yap, DefendantsAppellants. G. R. No. L-6335, July 31, 1954, Bautista Angelo, J. EXECUTION; REDEMPTION BY WIFE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION; REDEEMED PROPERTY BECOMES PARAPHERNAL. - Inasmuch as the wife redeemed two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were sold on execution, with money obtained by her. from her fathElr. th" t:wo parcels of land has become paraphemal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution. (Section 23 of Rule 39; .l Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., pp. 841-842; article 1596, old Civil Code; Hepfner vs. Orton, 12 Pac., 486; Taylor vs. Taylor, 92 So., 109; Malone vs. Nelson, 167 So., 714.) She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It ca~ no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exlusively iiffecting the personal liability of the latter. Ricardo N. Agbunag for the defendants and appellee. Jorge A. Pascita for the plaintiff and appellee. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: In Criminal Case No. 2897 for murder of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Epifania Fularon was convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of f'2,000. On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. These parcels of land were sold at public auction as required by the rules for the sum of !'1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied balance of P739.34. On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels of land which were sold at public auction for the sum of r"879.80, the sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed of repurchase. On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the indemnity and the sheriff levied upon the tv.•o parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for their sale. Prior to the arrival of this date, however, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for injunction to rest.min the sheriff from car~ rying out the SD.le praying at the same time for a writ of preli~ minary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who put up a counter-bond. The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as orginally scheduled and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P'970. This dC\•elopment pram.pt... ed the plaintiff to amend her complaint by praying thuein, among other things, that the sale carried out by the sheriff be declared null and void. After due trial, wherein the parties practically agreed on the material facts pertinent to the issue, the court rendered decision declaring the sale null and void. The defendants appealed, and the case was certified to this Court on the plea that the appeal involves purely questions af law. The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 of the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her right c,f redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The lower court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling laid down in the case of Lichauco v. Olegario, 43 Phil. 540, and this finding is now disputed by thP appellants. In the case above adYerted to, Lichauco obtained a judgment against Olegario for the sum of '"72,766.37. To satisfy this judgment, certain real estate belonging to Olegurio was levied in execution and at the sale Lich"auco bid for it for the sum of r"l0,000. Olegario, on the same day, sold his right of redemption to h.is cousin Dalmacio. Later, Lichauco asked for an alias writ of execution and the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the right of redemption of Olegario whereas Lichauco himself bid for the sum of r"l0,000. As Lichauco failed to register the sale owing to the fact that the sale executed by Olegario in favor of his cousin was already recorded, Lichauco brought the matter to court to test the \•alidity of the latter sale. One of the issues raised was, "Whether or not Faustino Lichauco, as an execution creditor and purchaser at the auction in question was entitled, after his judgment had thus been executed but not wholly satisfied, to have it executed again by levying upon the right of redemption over said properties." The court ruled that this cannot be done for it would i·ender nugatory the means secured by law to an execution debtor to avoid the sale of his property made at an auction under execution. Said this Court: "We, therefore, find that the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor, was not, and is not, entitled, after an execution has been levied upon the real properties in question by virtue of the judgment in his favor, to have another execution levied upon the same prope1-ties by virtue of the same judgment to reach the right of i·edemption which the execution debtor and his privies retained over them." Inasmuch as the Lichauco case refers to the levy and sale of the right of redemption belonging to a judgment debtor and not to the levy of the very property which has been the subject of execution for the satisfaction of the same judgment, it is now contended that it cannot be considered as a precedent in the present ~ase for here the second levy was effected on the same property subject of the original execution. But this argument falls on it! own weight when we consider ihe following conclusion of the court, "x x x what we wish to declare is that a judgment by virtue of which a property is sold at public auction can have no furth.11r 11f{ecC on such property." (Underlining supplied) Nevertheless, when this case came up for discussion some mem· bers of the Court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the Lichauco case considering that it does not decide squarely whether the same property may be levied on an alias execution if it is reacquired by the judgment debtor in the exercise of his right of redemption, and as on this matter the requisite majority could not be obtained the inquiry turned to another issue which for pur· poses of this case is sufficient to decide the controversy. The issue is: Since it appears that pla.intilf redee.med the two parcels of land in question with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become paraphemal and u such ia October 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 519 beyond the reach of further execution! ment of marriages by summary proceedings. We are of the opinion that the queation should be answered in 2. the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria Rosete, ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF GENUINE ISSUE DOES NOT JUSTIFY MISINTERPRETATION OF RULES OR VIOLA· TION OF POLICY. - The Rules of Court expresaly prohibit annulment of marriages without actual trial <section 10, Rule 85). The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented cannot justify a misrepresentation of the rule or a violation of th~ avowed poJjcy of the State. the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision (a), Section 23, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her by right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to hn (Article 1396, old Civil Code). The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a homestead. in American juribdiction. That interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent inte1·est.11 By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as succcasor in interest of her husband. Thus, in Hepfner v. Urten, 12 Pac., 486, it was held that by the declaration of homestead by the husband of the property sold a portion of his title passed to his wife, and "she had the right of 1·esidence thereon with him and the family during their joint lives, with some rights in case she should survive him. She had a right of redemption as his snccessor in interest." (Underlning supplied) In Taylor v. Taylor, 92 So., 109, where a mortgage was executed on a homestead and the husband refused to pay the indebtedness, it was held that "the wife's 'inchoate right of dower', which is more than a responsibility and may well be denominated a contingent interest, was a sufficient interest in the lands to confer the right of equitable redemption under the mortgage." And in Malone v. Nelson, et al., 167 So., 714, it was declared that "the right of the wife to redeem is rested upon her interest - inchoate right of dower - a right subject to a mone-' tary valuation." These authorities have persuasive effect consider· ing the source of our' rule on the matter. The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of t he plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successo1· in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not wa!'l'anted by law. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for f970.00 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on !\larch 8, 1950 is hereby revived and maintained. The rest of the decision is declared without effect. No pronuoncement ·as to costs. Paras, Bc11gzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Alex Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and J. B. L. Reyes, JJ., concur. Pablo, J.: took no part. xv Asuncion Roque, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Demetrio B. E.'ncarnncion as J11dge of the Court of First lustanc1J of Manila, and Francisco Reuss, R6spondents, No. L-6505, Aiigust 23, 1954, Labrador, J. 1. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS; ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING. - A counterclaim seeking to and'ul defendant's marriage to plaintiff, although not denied or resisted by the latter, cannot be decided by summary judgment proceeding - first, because such action is not one to "recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," and se<:ond, because it is the avowed policy of the State to prohibit annul· J. C. Orendain, Canuto Pefianco, Jr. & Luz Tonlerill.a3 for petitioner . Celestino L. dt> Dios and Jose S. Atienza for respondent.a. DECISION LABRADOR, J.: In Civil Case No. 16787 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Asuncion Roque Reyes vs. Francisco Reyes, plaintiff, petitioner herein, alleges that she married defendant in Novembt'r, 1943, and that out of their marri::ige two children were born; that during the marriage plaintiff acquired certain personal and real pl'Operties which produce a monthly income of 1"3,530; that defendant committed concubinage with . a woman named Elena Ebarle, and in 19:>2 he attempted to take away her life, giving her blows and attempting to strangle her. She, therefore, prays for Ca> legal separation, Cb> legal custody .:>f tlie children, Cc) liquidation of the conjugal property, and Cd> alimony and support for the children. In his answer, the defendant admits their marriage, claiming, however, that it took place in February, 1944, but he denies the alleged concubinage by him and the alleged income of the properties, or the squandering of the same. He presented a counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff was already a married woman when she contracted the marriage with him, having been married with one Policarpio Ba yore since February 19, 1930; that she fraudulently represented herself as single, without inpediment to contract marriage; that she has been squandering money obtained from him, trying to acquire property in her own name, etc. He prays for Ca) the annulment of his maniage to plaintiff, Cb) custody of the children, and Cc) damages in the amount of 1"30,000. Her answer to the counterclaim is one mainly of denials. As to the express allegetion contained in the counterclaim that plaintiff is a married woman at the time of their marriage, plaintiff makes this denial: 6. That the plaintiff denies specifically each s.nd e\'ery allegation averred in paragraph 6 of the counterclaim, the truth being that said Policarpio Bayore (plaintiff's husband) has been absent for 14 consecutive years. On October 21, 1952, defend<int filed a motion for summary judgment, opposition to which was filed by plaintiff on the ground that an action for annulment can not be a ground for summary judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, the desposition of Policarpio Payore, former husband of the plaintiff, was submitted. A supposed certified copy of his marriage to plaintiff was identified by Bayore at the time of the taking of his deposition. Plaintiff did not present any affida\'it, deposition, or document to support his objection. Without much ado, the trial judge granted the motion for summary judgment, immediately rendering a decision (a) declaring plaintiff's marriage to defendant null and void ab rnitio, CbJ declaring that plaintiff concealed her true status and awarding the custody of the children to defendant, and (c) declaring plaintiff's rights to the conjugal properties forfeited in favor of their children, although granting the custody of the smaller child to plaintiff. The petitioner seeks to annul the judgmtmt on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdic!-ion to render a summary judgment in the action to annul the marriage, and on the furlher ground that there were real issues of fact raised in the pleadings, as she believed t hat her husband was already dead at the time of her marriage to defendant, etc. The plaintiff does not deny the foct that she was married 520 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL October 31, 1954

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