Asuncion Roque, petitioner, vs. Hon. Demetrio B. Encarnacion as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and Francisco Reyes, respondents, no. L-6505, August 23, 1954 [Supreme Court decisions]

Title

Language

English

Source

XIX (10) October 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Marriage -- Annulment (Canon law)

Summary proceedings

Civil procedure

Actions and defenses (Law)

Philippines. Supreme Court

Appellate court

Philippines. Court of First Instance – Manila

Judges

Roque, Asuncionisco

Encarnacion, Demetrio B.; Reyes, Franc

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

A counterclaim seeking to annul Francisco Reyes marriage to the plaintiff Asuncion Roque, although not contradicted by the latter, cannot be decided by summary judgment proceeding for the reasons that such action is not one to obtain a declaratory relief and it is the declared policy of the State to prohibit annulment of marriages by summary proceedings. The rules of the court expressly ban annulment of marriages without actual trial and it cannot justify a misrepresentation of the rule or violation of the avowed policy of the State.

Fulltext

beyond the reach of further execution! ment of marriages by summary proceedings. We are of the opinion that the queation should be answered in 2. the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria Rosete, ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF GENUINE ISSUE DOES NOT JUSTIFY MISINTERPRETATION OF RULES OR VIOLA· TION OF POLICY. - The Rules of Court expresaly prohibit annulment of marriages without actual trial <section 10, Rule 85). The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented cannot justify a misrepresentation of the rule or a violation of th~ avowed poJjcy of the State. the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision (a), Section 23, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her by right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to hn (Article 1396, old Civil Code). The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a homestead. in American juribdiction. That interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent inte1·est.11 By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as succcasor in interest of her husband. Thus, in Hepfner v. Urten, 12 Pac., 486, it was held that by the declaration of homestead by the husband of the property sold a portion of his title passed to his wife, and "she had the right of 1·esidence thereon with him and the family during their joint lives, with some rights in case she should survive him. She had a right of redemption as his snccessor in interest." (Underlning supplied) In Taylor v. Taylor, 92 So., 109, where a mortgage was executed on a homestead and the husband refused to pay the indebtedness, it was held that "the wife's 'inchoate right of dower', which is more than a responsibility and may well be denominated a contingent interest, was a sufficient interest in the lands to confer the right of equitable redemption under the mortgage." And in Malone v. Nelson, et al., 167 So., 714, it was declared that "the right of the wife to redeem is rested upon her interest - inchoate right of dower - a right subject to a mone-' tary valuation." These authorities have persuasive effect consider· ing the source of our' rule on the matter. The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of t he plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successo1· in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not wa!'l'anted by law. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for f970.00 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on !\larch 8, 1950 is hereby revived and maintained. The rest of the decision is declared without effect. No pronuoncement ·as to costs. Paras, Bc11gzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Alex Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and J. B. L. Reyes, JJ., concur. Pablo, J.: took no part. xv Asuncion Roque, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Demetrio B. E.'ncarnncion as J11dge of the Court of First lustanc1J of Manila, and Francisco Reuss, R6spondents, No. L-6505, Aiigust 23, 1954, Labrador, J. 1. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS; ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING. - A counterclaim seeking to and'ul defendant's marriage to plaintiff, although not denied or resisted by the latter, cannot be decided by summary judgment proceeding - first, because such action is not one to "recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," and se<:ond, because it is the avowed policy of the State to prohibit annul· J. C. Orendain, Canuto Pefianco, Jr. & Luz Tonlerill.a3 for petitioner . Celestino L. dt> Dios and Jose S. Atienza for respondent.a. DECISION LABRADOR, J.: In Civil Case No. 16787 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Asuncion Roque Reyes vs. Francisco Reyes, plaintiff, petitioner herein, alleges that she married defendant in Novembt'r, 1943, and that out of their marri::ige two children were born; that during the marriage plaintiff acquired certain personal and real pl'Operties which produce a monthly income of 1"3,530; that defendant committed concubinage with . a woman named Elena Ebarle, and in 19:>2 he attempted to take away her life, giving her blows and attempting to strangle her. She, therefore, prays for Ca> legal separation, Cb> legal custody .:>f tlie children, Cc) liquidation of the conjugal property, and Cd> alimony and support for the children. In his answer, the defendant admits their marriage, claiming, however, that it took place in February, 1944, but he denies the alleged concubinage by him and the alleged income of the properties, or the squandering of the same. He presented a counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff was already a married woman when she contracted the marriage with him, having been married with one Policarpio Ba yore since February 19, 1930; that she fraudulently represented herself as single, without inpediment to contract marriage; that she has been squandering money obtained from him, trying to acquire property in her own name, etc. He prays for Ca) the annulment of his maniage to plaintiff, Cb) custody of the children, and Cc) damages in the amount of 1"30,000. Her answer to the counterclaim is one mainly of denials. As to the express allegetion contained in the counterclaim that plaintiff is a married woman at the time of their marriage, plaintiff makes this denial: 6. That the plaintiff denies specifically each s.nd e\'ery allegation averred in paragraph 6 of the counterclaim, the truth being that said Policarpio Bayore (plaintiff's husband) has been absent for 14 consecutive years. On October 21, 1952, defend<int filed a motion for summary judgment, opposition to which was filed by plaintiff on the ground that an action for annulment can not be a ground for summary judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, the desposition of Policarpio Payore, former husband of the plaintiff, was submitted. A supposed certified copy of his marriage to plaintiff was identified by Bayore at the time of the taking of his deposition. Plaintiff did not present any affida\'it, deposition, or document to support his objection. Without much ado, the trial judge granted the motion for summary judgment, immediately rendering a decision (a) declaring plaintiff's marriage to defendant null and void ab rnitio, CbJ declaring that plaintiff concealed her true status and awarding the custody of the children to defendant, and (c) declaring plaintiff's rights to the conjugal properties forfeited in favor of their children, although granting the custody of the smaller child to plaintiff. The petitioner seeks to annul the judgmtmt on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdic!-ion to render a summary judgment in the action to annul the marriage, and on the furlher ground that there were real issues of fact raised in the pleadings, as she believed t hat her husband was already dead at the time of her marriage to defendant, etc. The plaintiff does not deny the foct that she was married 520 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL October 31, 1954 to Policarpio Bayore in the year 1930, and that the latter is alive and the marriage still subsisting. May this counterclaim be decided by the summa ry judgment proceedings? Vur answer must be in the negative, first, because an action to annul marriage is not an action to "recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," and, second, because it is the a\·owed policy of the State to prohibit. annulment of marriages by summary proceedings. An action "to rl:cover upon a claim" means an action to recover a debt or liquid'.!.ted demJind !::r money. Thi.i is the restricted application of the rule in jurisdictions where the proceedin!;' has been adopted. In Virginia this proceeding is limited to actilns "to recover money"; in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, to recover a debt or liquidated demand; in Michigan, for an amount arising out of contract, judgment, qr statute; in Columbia, to recover sums of money arisin~ e:r contra.du; in Illinois, for the payment of money; in Delaware, to sums for the payment of money, .>r recovery of book accounts, or foreign judgments; and in England, in actions upon bills and pr(}missory notes, etc. <Yale Law Journal, Vol. 38, p. 423.> In federal courts the proceeding ha ~ been used in patent, copyright, and trade mark cases, and in cases arising upon statutes or un· disputed contracts or instruments. (See cases cited in I Morar.. 719·726, rev. 1952 ed.) The fundamental policy of the State, which is predominantly Catholic and considers manikge as indissoluble <there is no divorce under the Civil Code of the Philippines), is to be cautious and stri"ct. in granting annulment of marriages (Articles 68 and 101, Civil Code of the Philippines). Pursuant tn this policy, the Rules of Court expressly prohibits annulment of marriages without actual trial <Section 10, Rule 35). The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented, and we desire to expedite the dispatch of the case, can not justify a misinterpretation of the rule we have adopted or a violation of the avowed policy of the State. We find that the trial court committed an error in annulling the marriage of plaintiff to defendant in a summary judgment proceeding without the formality of a trial. The trial court's error is not, however, limited to this. In spite of the fact that a genuine issue of fact was raised by plaintiff's pretense that she entered the marriage in good faith, this issue was ignored and the court declared her rights to properties e>btained during the marriage forfeited, and the custody of one of the children denied to her. These constitute an abuse of judicial discretion amounting to excei:s of Jurisdiction, properly the subject of a proceeding by certiorari. The judgment entered in the case is hereby annulled, and the lower court ordered to proceed in the case according to the Rules. Parae, Pablo, Bengzon, Pu.ditla, MtintemayM", A. Rsyea, Jugo, lJatdista Angelo, Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, J.J., conocur. XVI Nfoanor Padilla, Plaintif/-Appellee, vs. Andres De Juits, Pablo De Jssits, Josefa De Je1ms, Doroteo Celis, Jr., Natividad De Jesus, Romeo Morales and Manuel De Jelfl.ts, Defendants-Apellant11, No. LGOOS, .41tg1rnt 81, Hl54, Bautista Angelo, J. EJECTMENT; JURISDICTION; EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER ACTION TO ANNUL MORTGAGE OF THE PROPERTY DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE MUNICIPAL COURT TO TRY CASE OF EJECTMENT.-The circumstance that there is pending in the court of first instance a case in which defendants arc seeking the annulment of lhe deed of mortgage of the property in question, executed by their father without their knowledge and consent, cannot and does not deprive the municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the ejectment case filed against them by the plaintiff, in the light of the tact averred in the complaint for ejectment, 4.nd supported by evidence, that plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the property in question, having purchased it at an auction sale in 1948. Macario Guevarm for defendants and appellants. Padilla, Carlos & Fernando for plantiff and appcllee. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .: On August 24, 1950, plaintiff filed an action for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila against defendants to recover the possession of a parcel of land located at Paco, Manila. On September 7, 1950, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, (1) that there is another case pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila between the same parties and over the same subject-matter; (3) that the claim suught by plaintiff has been condoned; nnd C3) that the ·court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action. Plaintiff fil ed an opposition to this motion but the same was denied. On November 27, 1950, defendants filed their answer setting up certain special defenses and a counterclaim. Plaintiff filed a n10tion to dismiss the counterclaim, to which defendants filed a written opposition. After the reception of the evidence, the c.ourt rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the property involved and to pay the plaintiff a monthly rental of r100 from October, 1949 up to the time the defendants shall have vacated the property, and the costs of action. On June 2, 1951, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and the same having been denied, they brought the case on appeal to the Court of First Instance where they filed another motion to dis~ miss based on the .rnme grounds set forth in the municipal court. This motion was also denied for lack of merit. On August 14, 1951, defendants filed their answer wherein they reiterated the same special defenses and counterclaim they set up in the municipal court. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim, and this motion was granted . When the case was called for hearing on March 14, 1982, defendants moved for postponement on the ground that their principal wit· ness could not be present.. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the postponement. However, the parties agreed to hear the testimony of one L . G.-Marquez, an expert witness for the plaintiff, who testi· fied and was cross-examined by counsel for the defendants. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the continuation of the hearing was set for March 24, 1952. When the case was called for the continuation of the hearing on said date, neither the defendants, nor their counsel, appeared, whereupon the court allowed U1e plaintiff to present his evidence, and on March 15, 1952, it rendered decision ordering defendants to vacate the pro~rty and to pay 11 monthly rental of P200 from Octo!>er. 1940 until the time they shall have actually surrendered the property, with costs. On April 14, 1952, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, accompanied by affidavits of merits, on the ground that their failure to a ppear on March 24, 1952 was due to "mistake and excusable negligence" as provided for in Section 1 (a), Rule 87, of the Rules of Court. And when this motion was denied, defendants took the case directly to this Couri imputing three errors to the lower court. October Sl, 1964. THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 521

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