Nicanor Padilla, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Andres De Jesus, Pablo De Jesus, Josefa De Jesus, Doroteo Celis, Jr., Natividad De Jesus, Romeo Morales, and Manuel De Jesus, defendant-appellants, no. L6008 [Supreme Court decisions]

Title

Language

English

Source

XIX (10) October 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Land titles

Adverse possession

Real property

Land tenure

Actions and defenses (Law)

Philippines. Supreme Court

Appellate court

Philippines. Court of First Instance – Manila

Padilla, Nicanor

De Jesus, Andres

De Jesus, Pablo

De Jesus, Josefa

Celis, Doroteo, Jr.

De Jesus, Natividad

Morales, Romeo

De Jesus, Manuel

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

The plaintiff Nicanor Padilla filed an action for ejectment against the defendants to recover the ownership of a parcel of land located in Paco, Manila. The condition that there is a pending case in the court in which defendants are seeking the termination of the deed of mortgage of the property in question, executed by their father without their knowledge and consent, cannot and does not deprive the municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the ejectment case filed against them by the plaintiff, in the light of the tact stated in the complaint about ejectment, and supported by evidence, that plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the property in question, having purchased it at an auction sale in 1948.

Fulltext

to Policarpio Bayore in the year 1930, and that the latter is alive and the marriage still subsisting. May this counterclaim be decided by the summa ry judgment proceedings? Vur answer must be in the negative, first, because an action to annul marriage is not an action to "recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," and, second, because it is the a\·owed policy of the State to prohibit. annulment of marriages by summary proceedings. An action "to rl:cover upon a claim" means an action to recover a debt or liquid'.!.ted demJind !::r money. Thi.i is the restricted application of the rule in jurisdictions where the proceedin!;' has been adopted. In Virginia this proceeding is limited to actilns "to recover money"; in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, to recover a debt or liquidated demand; in Michigan, for an amount arising out of contract, judgment, qr statute; in Columbia, to recover sums of money arisin~ e:r contra.du; in Illinois, for the payment of money; in Delaware, to sums for the payment of money, .>r recovery of book accounts, or foreign judgments; and in England, in actions upon bills and pr(}missory notes, etc. <Yale Law Journal, Vol. 38, p. 423.> In federal courts the proceeding ha ~ been used in patent, copyright, and trade mark cases, and in cases arising upon statutes or un· disputed contracts or instruments. (See cases cited in I Morar.. 719·726, rev. 1952 ed.) The fundamental policy of the State, which is predominantly Catholic and considers manikge as indissoluble <there is no divorce under the Civil Code of the Philippines), is to be cautious and stri"ct. in granting annulment of marriages (Articles 68 and 101, Civil Code of the Philippines). Pursuant tn this policy, the Rules of Court expressly prohibits annulment of marriages without actual trial <Section 10, Rule 35). The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented, and we desire to expedite the dispatch of the case, can not justify a misinterpretation of the rule we have adopted or a violation of the avowed policy of the State. We find that the trial court committed an error in annulling the marriage of plaintiff to defendant in a summary judgment proceeding without the formality of a trial. The trial court's error is not, however, limited to this. In spite of the fact that a genuine issue of fact was raised by plaintiff's pretense that she entered the marriage in good faith, this issue was ignored and the court declared her rights to properties e>btained during the marriage forfeited, and the custody of one of the children denied to her. These constitute an abuse of judicial discretion amounting to excei:s of Jurisdiction, properly the subject of a proceeding by certiorari. The judgment entered in the case is hereby annulled, and the lower court ordered to proceed in the case according to the Rules. Parae, Pablo, Bengzon, Pu.ditla, MtintemayM", A. Rsyea, Jugo, lJatdista Angelo, Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, J.J., conocur. XVI Nfoanor Padilla, Plaintif/-Appellee, vs. Andres De Juits, Pablo De Jssits, Josefa De Je1ms, Doroteo Celis, Jr., Natividad De Jesus, Romeo Morales and Manuel De Jelfl.ts, Defendants-Apellant11, No. LGOOS, .41tg1rnt 81, Hl54, Bautista Angelo, J. EJECTMENT; JURISDICTION; EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER ACTION TO ANNUL MORTGAGE OF THE PROPERTY DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE MUNICIPAL COURT TO TRY CASE OF EJECTMENT.-The circumstance that there is pending in the court of first instance a case in which defendants arc seeking the annulment of lhe deed of mortgage of the property in question, executed by their father without their knowledge and consent, cannot and does not deprive the municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the ejectment case filed against them by the plaintiff, in the light of the tact averred in the complaint for ejectment, 4.nd supported by evidence, that plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the property in question, having purchased it at an auction sale in 1948. Macario Guevarm for defendants and appellants. Padilla, Carlos & Fernando for plantiff and appcllee. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .: On August 24, 1950, plaintiff filed an action for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila against defendants to recover the possession of a parcel of land located at Paco, Manila. On September 7, 1950, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, (1) that there is another case pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila between the same parties and over the same subject-matter; (3) that the claim suught by plaintiff has been condoned; nnd C3) that the ·court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action. Plaintiff fil ed an opposition to this motion but the same was denied. On November 27, 1950, defendants filed their answer setting up certain special defenses and a counterclaim. Plaintiff filed a n10tion to dismiss the counterclaim, to which defendants filed a written opposition. After the reception of the evidence, the c.ourt rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the property involved and to pay the plaintiff a monthly rental of r100 from October, 1949 up to the time the defendants shall have vacated the property, and the costs of action. On June 2, 1951, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and the same having been denied, they brought the case on appeal to the Court of First Instance where they filed another motion to dis~ miss based on the .rnme grounds set forth in the municipal court. This motion was also denied for lack of merit. On August 14, 1951, defendants filed their answer wherein they reiterated the same special defenses and counterclaim they set up in the municipal court. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim, and this motion was granted . When the case was called for hearing on March 14, 1982, defendants moved for postponement on the ground that their principal wit· ness could not be present.. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the postponement. However, the parties agreed to hear the testimony of one L . G.-Marquez, an expert witness for the plaintiff, who testi· fied and was cross-examined by counsel for the defendants. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the continuation of the hearing was set for March 24, 1952. When the case was called for the continuation of the hearing on said date, neither the defendants, nor their counsel, appeared, whereupon the court allowed U1e plaintiff to present his evidence, and on March 15, 1952, it rendered decision ordering defendants to vacate the pro~rty and to pay 11 monthly rental of P200 from Octo!>er. 1940 until the time they shall have actually surrendered the property, with costs. On April 14, 1952, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, accompanied by affidavits of merits, on the ground that their failure to a ppear on March 24, 1952 was due to "mistake and excusable negligence" as provided for in Section 1 (a), Rule 87, of the Rules of Court. And when this motion was denied, defendants took the case directly to this Couri imputing three errors to the lower court. October Sl, 1964. THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 521 Defendants contend that t he municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain the case because, in their answer, they averred that, l:mg before the filing of the present cast of ejectment, they l:ad filed against the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila a case in which they seek the annulment of the deed of mortgage executed by Roman de Jesus, their father, without their knowledge and consent, on a property which belonged to the spouses Roman de Jesua and Maria Angeles, and that, inasmuch as the annulment case, wherein the ownership of the property is in issue, is still pending determination, the municipal court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case upon the theory that the same cannot be deter· mined without first pausing upon the question of ownership of the property. Thia contention cannot be s•1stained in t.he light of the hcts averred in the complaint which appear supported by the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. These facts show that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the property in question having purchased· it at the auction sale carried out by the sheriff sometime in October, 1948, and that because of the failure of the mortgagor, or his succt:sors in interest, to redeem it within the period of redemption, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23590 in favor of the plaintiff. The facts also show that after plaintiff had become the owner of the property he found the de· fendants occupying it without having entered into a contract of lease with him, or having made any arrangement for its occupan: cy, or without paying any rental therefor, and for this reason, he filed this ejectment case against them before the municipal court. These facts clearly show that this case comes within the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The circumstance that there is pending in the court of first instance a case in which defendants al'C! claiming one-half of the property as heirs of the deceased wifo of the mortgagor cannot and does not deprive the mUnicipal court of it8 jurisdiction. The most that could be doJJe in the light of . the present situation is to suspend the trial of the ejectment case pending final determiriation of th£> annulment case, but the pPndency of the latter cannot have the effect of removing the former from the jurisdiction of the municipal court. This case may be likened to that of Fulgencio v. Natividad, 45 0. G. No. 9, 3794, decided on February 14, 1948, in which petitioner pleaded that, before the complaint for detainer was filed against him, he had brought an action in the proper court to compel the respondents to resell to him the lot and the house erected thereon upor.. payment of the purclrnse price, and, therefore, the case does not come within the jurisdiction of the municipal court. In overruling- this plea, this Court said: "Granting tha~ petiti011er has the right to repurchase the property, he cannot invoke it until after the competent court shall have rendered judgment as prayed fo1· by him. Hence the allegation in the detainer case that he had brought an action in the p1·oper court to compel the resale to him of the lot and the house erected thereon, did not raise the question of title to tl1e property and for that reason did not remove t he case from the jurisdiction of the municipal court. As already stated, t he plea of another pending action to compel the resale to the petitioner of the property involved in the detainer case is an admission that the title thereto is not vested in him. Such being the case, the municipal court had jurisdiction to ~ry and decide the detainer case." A different consideration, however. should be made in connection with the second issue to the effect that the lower court erred Jn denying the motion for reconsideration of the defendants notwithstanding the explanation given by U1em of their failure to appear at the continuation of the trial and the affidavits of merit attached to the motion showing unmistakably that such failure was due to "mistake and excusable t\ea-liirence" and not for purposes <>f delay . It should be recalled that when this ease waa called for hearing on March 14, 1952, counsel for defendanU! moved for postponement on the ground that their principal witness was sick and could not appear. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the postponement. However, the parties agreed to hear the testimony of one L. G. Marquez, a witness for the plaintiff, who testified and was crossexamined by counsel for defendants. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the continuation Qf the hearing was set for March 24, 1952. And when the case was called for continuation on that date, neither defendants, nor their counsel, appeared. Ne,·ertheless, the court allowed the plaintiff to present his evidence, and thereafter rendered decision accordingly. But when, days after, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that their failure to appe!l.r was due to "mistake and excusable negligence" of their counsel, supporting their claim with the requisite affidavits of merit, the court curtly denied the motion. We believe that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the court did not act properly when it denied said motion for reconsideration considering the explanation given by defendants and their counsel in their affidavits of merit. This is what counsel says in his affidavit: · "That upon moticn of the ur.dersigned a ffiant, the Honorable Judge Higinio Macadaeg postpom. -d the hearing of sei<l case on March 24, 1952, but the under· sigb.ed affiant in noting the date of the postponement on his diary or memorandum, committed an honest mistake by noting it down opposite March 25, 1952, instead of March 24, 1952, consequently he was not able to appear in court on the proper date, and so with the defendants, as they were of the belief that the hearing was on March 25, 1952 and not on March 24, 1952." And these facts also appear in the affidavits subscribed to by the defendants. These facts, which are not contradicted, constitute in our opinion a proper ground for a new trial under s~tion 1 (a), Rule 37, for, no doubt, they contsitute "mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by rt:ason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights." This is more so considering that, according to the answer, defendants have a meritorious defense. Wherefo1·e, the decision appealed from is reversed. It is ordered that this case be remanded to the lower court for a new trial with the understanding that the new trial should await the final termination of th~ annulment case pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 11267), without pronouncement as to costs. Partis, Beng::o11, Montemayor, Jugo and Pablo, J.J., concur. Concepcion and Padilla, J.J., took no part. LABRADOR, J., dissenting: I dissent. The land subject of the action appears to have been conjugal property of the deceased Roman de J esus and his wife, whose successors in interest are the defendants-appellants. The deceased Roman de Jesus mortgaged the propert).' to plaintiff-appellee, it is true, but the mortgage affected only his undivided one-half share in the property. The action by the defendants-appellants to annul the mortgage over 'their undivided one-half share necessarily involved both title to the property and the right to the possession thereof. The present action of plaintiff-appellee really and actually, under the cireumstances, in· volves or should involve both the title and the right to possession. The action by the defendants-appellants to annul the mortgage over their share bars the present action, therefore. And 011 the iRSUe really involved is title, the municipal court which entertain· 622 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL October 31, 1954 ed the action of unlawful detainer has no jurisdiction. The action should, therefore, be dismissed on two grounds, lack of jurisdiction Dnd ()endency of a nothe1 aclion between the same pa1 ties over the same cause. Nothing can be gained by the continuation of the case in the court below. XVII In re: W ill and Te!fl,at11-c.it of the dece.ited Rei>erend Sancho Aba.-dfo. Sc verina A. Vda. De Enriqu.ez, et al., Petitione-rs-Appellees, vs. Miguel A badia, et al., Oppositiors-Appellants, No. L-7188, August !), 1954, Montemayor, J. I. WILLS; PROBATE OF WILL; VALIDITY OF WILL AS TO FORM DEPENDS UPON LAW IN FOP.CE AT TIME OF EXECUTION; TITLE OF LEGATEES AND DEVISEES UNDER WILL VESTS FROM TIME OF EXECUTION. - Thcvalidity of a will as to form is to he judged not by the }aw in forct: at the time of the testator's death or at thE: time the r;upposed will is presented iu court for probate or when th" petition is decided by the court hut at the time the instrumen! was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon :ind after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator nbout the dispositiG'ln of his ~state among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the wil! is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. 2. ID.; EXECUTION OF WILLS; LAW SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED, ADDING NEW REQUIREMENTS AS TO EXECUTION OF WILLS; FAJLVHF: TO OBSERVE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS A'r TIME OF EXECUTION INVALIDATES WILL; HEIRS I NHERIT BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION; LEGISLATURE CAN NOT VALIDATE VOID WILLS. - From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a wi-ll, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a ves!cd right, protecti:!d under the due process clause of the Constitution against a subsequent chan.~t; in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills, which would invalidate l'Uch will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal reqliirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should bt> regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirn will then inhl'rit by intestate succession, and no subs<::quent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirement!" as to execution should be allowed to validate a defecti\"e will and thereby divest the heirs of their . vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Le~slature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193). Manriel A. Zosa, Luis H. Lri.do11ga, Mariario A. Zosa and B. G. Advinrnla for Op11csitors and Appellants. C. 1fo. la Viclorfo for Petitinncrs and Appellees. DECIS I ON MONTEMAYOR, J.: On September 6, 1!123, Father SANCHO ABADIA, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacue. He left properties estimated at fS,000 in \'a\ue. On October 2, 1946, one A:'ldres En1 ·iquez, one of the legn.tees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First InsUmce of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the est.&.te of the dettased if he left no will, filed opposition, During the hearing one of the attesting witneasea, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his two co-witnesses, Father Sancho Wl"Ote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke Dnd understood; that he (testator> signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses afteT telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The opposiU>rs did not submit any evidence. The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the tin1e it was executed and at the time or the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to bP decided the new Civil C.Ode w1s already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal "iew, and to carry out the intentiori of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated Janua ry 24, 1952, admitted .to probate Exhibit "A'', as the Last Will and Testament c.f Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appPaling from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals. The new Civil Code <Republic Act No. 386) under Art . 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a ho1.ogra phic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testa tor himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the t ime that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic will were not permitted, a nd the Jaw at the time imposed rertain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlativ(>ly each page (not folio or sheet> in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testaWr and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the fi rst two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the te11tator and were not numbered, :;.nd as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator. Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil. 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said : "x x x. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough ihat the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pflges having been written on, the a uthenticity of all three of t!1em should be goaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses." And in the case of Aspe v. Prieto, 46 Phil . 700, re>fer rins- to the same requirement, this Court declared: "1"rom an e.'l':amination of thr: document in question, It ap~ pears that the- left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Pl'ieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleg-ed to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fa tal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate." What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"! !fay we a pply the provisions of the new Civil Code which now allows hologrnphic wills, like Exhibit "A" which pro0 visions were irwohd by the appel\ce-petitioner and applied by the lower court! But October 31, 1954 THE I.A\VYERS JOURNAL 623

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