Court of first instance decision: Morfe vs. Hon. Executive Secretary et al

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: Court of first instance decision: Morfe vs. Hon. Executive Secretary et al
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: Republic Act 3019; Public officers -- Corrupt practices; Mutuc, Amelitu R.; Diokno, Jose W.; Court of First Instance -- Pangasinan
Rights
Abstract: [Jesus P. Morfe attacking the constitutionality of Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, filed a complaint for declaratory relief where the defendants are the Executive Secretory and the Secretary of Justice, Honorable Amelitu R. Mutuc and Honorable Jose W. Diokno, respectively. ]
Fulltext: COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE DECISION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF FIRST I NSTANCE OF PANGASINAN T hird J udicial District JESUS P. MORFE Plaintiff CIVIL C.o\.SE NO. 14166 A.MELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary and JOSE W, DIOKNO, as Secretary of J ustice, Defend.an.ts, x - x - - - - - - x DEC I S I ON Plaintiff, attacking the const itutionality of Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, filed a complant for decla ratory relief where the defendants are the Executive Secretory and the Secretary 'of J ustice, Honorable Amelitu R. Mutuc and Honorable J ose W. Diokno, resJlCctively. In support of his contention that said sect ion of said Act is unconstitutional, plaintiff enumerates the fol\ow;ng as basis for its unconst itutionality: "(a) Said provision of law is an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of the plaintiff in particular, and of officers of t his Republic similarly situated, for it is premised on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption th:-.t officers and employees of this Republic arc corrupt at heart and, unless restrained by the necessity of J'eriodically baringtheir financial condition, incomes, expenses, etc., they cannot be trusted to desist from committing t he corrupt practi~es defined and punished in Rep. Act No. 3019 and in 8ther law:;; of this Republic;. "(b) It requires sworn information on the pure[~, personal and/ or private interests or concerns of the plaintiff, such as the amount of his personal and family expenses, cash on hand, and bank balances, and thereby impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of life and liberty without due process of law. " (c) It amounts to a fishing expedition for non-cxist!ng incriminat ing evidence; serves no useful purpose; and wittingly or unwittingly attempts to violate the constitutional prohibition against making the citizens of this Republic testify against themselves. "(d) It is an indirect way of making an unreasonable search of the money, properties, effects, books, and J'ecords of the plaintiff be.fore the latter forfeits his right to complete privacy by actual commission of a public offense or the means used in its commission, thereby infringing the existing constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and sci"(e) It offends t he aforementioned constitutional guarantees which have been held to serve a dual purpose : ( 1) Proteetion of the privacy of the individual, i.e., his right to be let alone; and (2) Protectiun of the individual against compulsory production of evidence to be used against himself (Davis v. United States, 238 U.S. 582, 90 L. ed. 1453, 68 S. Ct. 1256). "(f) In relation to the last paragraph of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act No. 3019, it impairs the security of tenure of office of members of our judiciary by adding as a ground for dismissal from office the failure to file said oppressive and unnecessary statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities. "(g) There is no need for the said required sworn statement as the income tax law and the tax census law alsa require statements which c.an serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported incomes." The defendants, answering thru the Solicitor General, assistant Solicitor General and Solicitor, sustain the constitutionality cf said Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 by setting UJ> special and nffirmative defenses a s follows: " 1. That when n gover nment .,fJicial. like pla intiff, arccpts a pubPc position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give informat ion about his personal affairs, not only at the t ime of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an emnloyee cannot be segregated from his nublie life (Nera vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-13169, Jan. 30, 1960). "A government official undertakes obli.1?ations of frankness, candor and cooperation in answering inquiries made of him regarding his fitness to remain in the public service. He cannot. for example, hide behind the "no self-incrimination" clause in refusing to answer t.he question whether he had been a communist partr member (Bailan vs. Board of Educat ;on of Philadelphia, 367 US 1414). " The State can inquire of its emplovees matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitnbility for the public service <Gardner vs. Board of Publ!c Works, 341 US 716, 95 L. ed. 1317; 71 Set. 909). "The matters sought to be elicited in the sworn statements in qurstion are relevant to one's integrity and, hence, to his continued fitness to remain in office. "2. That the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked on the bare claim that it is an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of plaintiff and other pub!ic officers and that it casts a doubt on their integrity. An Act, lawful in all other respects, cannot be nullified just because it touches the tender feelings or sensibilities of the citizens. "Courts cannot invalidate statutes just because they arc harsh (State vs. Swagerty, 203 M. 617, 102 S. W. 483, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 601; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. US Minnesota 218 U.S. 57, 54 L. ed. 930; 305 Set. 663; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 52 L.ed. 151, 28 Set. 40) , or may be mischievous in their effects and burdensome on the people (U.S. ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Delaware & H. Co .. 213 US 366, 53 L.ed. 836, 27 Set 527) as with respect to such defects the remedy of petitioner is a n appeal to Congress, not to the courts. "3. That the law is not based on nor does it create the presumption that public servants arc lacking in integrity but lmt assuming arguentlo that there is in reality such presumption, the same can be upheld. Prc11umptions shifting to :\ party the burden of persuasion or the burden of going forward are valid (Hawes vs. Georgia, 258 US 1 (1922) ; Casey vs. United States, 276 US 413 (1928). Thus in Shore vs. United States (56 F (2d) 490; App. D. C. 1932) the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld a section of the Tariff Act which made the possession of foreign whiskey presumptive of unlawful importation (See also People vs. Bullock, 123 Cal. pp. 299, 11 Pac (2d) 44.1 (1932). " 4. That the privilege against self-incriminat ion covers only statements made in courts under process as a witness (3 Wigmore, Evidence, ser. 2266; Ex ·Partc Kneedler, 147 S. W. 983) . Assuming that the privilege can be extended to Page 280 LAWYERS JOURNAL September 30, 1962 proceedings out of court, still it cannot cover the pcrf,..1·m· ancc of acts which, by mf'r(' possibility, no matter how remote, may incriminate him. Otherwise, the Jaw requiring display of . licO?nsc plat.cs in plain sight a nd under illumination at night, would be invalid because the license plate would be a means in the identification of the owner !n case of accident. But this bw has been upheld in the case of People vs. Sl"hneider, 13!) l\Iich. G73. Statutes 1·equiri11g druggists to make weekly sworn st~1iements of thE:ir sales of liquor has ~en upheld even if these records can be used in their pro· sccutions for illegal sales (State vs. Henwood, 123 Mich. 317; State vs. Davis, 69 S. E. 639 (\V. Va.); State ex ·1·el. M>:· C'lo\·ey vs. Donovan, 10 N. D. 203; State vs. Davies, 108 No. CGG) . .. 5. That questi01H; whether the law will serve nny "use· ful 1 1urposc" or not (par. 5 (c ) comprnint ); whether there is no necessity of periodl<:ally baring financial condition, in· comes and expenses of public officials to eradicate corrnption in the government (par. 5(a) complamt) ; and wh~lher then' is no need for the sworrt statemE:nt in question because the income tax law and tax census law require the same informa· tion (par. 5(g) complaint) - a re matters within the exdusi,•e prerogative of the legislature. The court~ cannt)t inquire into the wisdom, or lack of it, of a piece of legrslation. Le· gislative acts may be judicially assailed only from the standpoint of power granted by the Constitution. "6. That the law docs not violate the constitutional' right against unreasonable searches and seizure (par. 5(d), (e ) complaint) . ··The constitutional gua rantees against unreasonable searches and seizures do not intel'fere with investiga tion into matters of a public or quasi.public nature or which the public has an interest (Sec discussion in 29 LRA 81!)). It ha:< also been held that orders requi:-ing common caniers lo furnish information as to their operations do not amount to ~mr<'a.sn•1· able search and seiz1 1re (Jsbrandlsen.l\liller Co. vs. U.S., 300 US 139, 81 ~ ed. 562, 57 Set ·10). .. 7. That petitioner is estopped from questioning the validny of section 7 of Rep. Act No. :;019 after his udmiss•on that he believes the same to be a '"reasonable requirem~nt for em1 >loyment in a public office" upon assumption of office ~u~d after he had filed the sworn stat~ment 1·cquircd by said section in compliance with the law t_par. 3, "Ca11.~e ."lf Ac· lion'', p. 3, complaint). .. 8. That the sworn statement required under Sec. i , Rep. Act 3019 is also required under the Income 'fax Law and Tax Census Law and yet plaintiff, instead of questioning the validity of the aforementioned laws, apparently ac· ccpts their validity (par. 5(g) complaint). "9. T hat the provision of law in question cannot he at· tacked on the ground that it impail':i plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of in. suring the interest of genera l welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police f'OWC'r." After the defendants have filed their answer durlng the re· glementary period, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the 1 >leadings on February 27, 1962, and to said motion for judgment on t.he pleadings, the defendants did not file any opposition. F or which reason, this Court, upon motion of the plaintiff, gave to each of the parties in this case a period of thirty (30) days from March 10, 1062, within which to file their respective memoran· dum. Plaintiff, in compliance with the aforementioned order of the Court, filed his memorandum, but the defendants' counsel submitted the case without memorandum as, according to them, their answer already contains a full discussion of the authority in sup· po1-t of their side. It must be stated at the beginning that the plaintiff does not seek to declare the nullity of the whole of Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, but only that portion thereof which r equires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditio;1s, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of this Republic after such official or employee had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming the duties of his office. F or clarity's sake, Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019. provides as follows : "Statement of assets anti liabilit1~s. Every public officer, within thirty days aftC'r the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of J anuary of every othe!· year thereafter, as well as upon the expirntion of his term of office, or upon his resignatiun or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corres· ponding Dcp:ntnH:nt Head, or in the case of a Head of De-·· partment or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, 01· in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thCl'eof, with the Office of the Seci·etary of the conesponding House, a trU{! deta iled and SW Ol'n statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amount of his personal Hild family expenses and the amount of_ in· come taxes paid for the next prC'ccdillg calendar year: P 1·011 ided, That public officers assuming office less t han twP. months before the end of I.he calen<lar ycat", may filC' their first stutcments in the following months of J a1rnary." As already mentioned above, plaintiff questions the consti· tutionality of said Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 vn several grounds. The defendants sustain the constitutionality of said portion of the above·mcntioned section on the principal ground of general welfare. In other words, the said section was enacted under the police power of the State. Vei·ily, police power is one of the three fundamental preroga. tives of the State and any private right must be sac1·ificed in th~ exercise of the same. But, it must also be admitted that the exercise of said power must be reasonable and, if possible, should not infringe upon the constitutional and inalienable rights of a citizen of a free and democratic country. T his Couit considers the filing of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an official or cmi>loyec had already filed statement of assets and liabilities after assumption of office to be a violation of the constitutional r ights of a citizen not to testify against himself. While the def('n<lunts maintain that the immunity from self-incrimination only extends to a citizen testifying in an investigation or t rial, yet, this Court believes th!lt the purpose of sccu1·1ng the sworn staten1ent of asset;; and lia· bilities. is to prove lnte1· on in a jurlicial proceeding th.at the offi· cial or employee has been guilty of graft and corruption, or has amassed a fortune very much in e:xecss of his assets or of his salary during the time he had been in office. The required statement of assets and liabilities constitutes advanced testimony extracted from the accused to be used against him late1 · on. Fo1", it cannot be denied that the cnly purpose iu requiring a sworn statement of assets and llabilitles after one has already been filed after assumpt ion in office by an official 01· employee is to determine whether he can be prosecuted under the graft a nd corruption act. The section in question renders an official or employee defenseless when confronted wlth such sworn statement of assets and liabilities ; it facilitate~ the conviction of a n accused, and is just a sword of Damocles hanging over h is hea<I. The officials and employees of our government suffer by said section a continuous nightmare, for although they h:-.ve br~n l1onest in their statc:nent of a ssets and liabilities, yet, th.;oy might have committed an enor of computation, or might ha\>e failC'd to ui1intentionally mention an asset. · September 30, 1962 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 281 That freedom {rom se\C-incrimination does not only extend lo oral testimony in Couit O!' in an investigation has been sustained in various cases. Thus, in State of Michigan ex rel. S. J\foll v. Jacob C. Densign, et al., 238 J\fich. 39; 213 NW ·'48 ; 1 ~2 A.L.R. 136, 141. ·'The authorities are quite uniform i11 holding that where a bill is filed solely for a discovery, and the facts upon which the discovery is sought arc such as would tend to incriminatr the de(endant, the bill cannot be maintained at all, and should be dismissed on demurrer. As equity follows the common law in respect to the privilege of a witness to reCuse to testify (see 28 R.C.L.. 426), it would certainly seem that considering that the nature of a pure bill of discovery is to obtain evidence to be used in some other suit, the defendant should, at least, be permitted to asse1t a privilege against being 1 ·equircd to answer. "This privilege against self-incrimination would pe reduced to a hoJ\ow mockery, if its exNcise could b1~ taken as equivalent to either a confession of guilt 01· a conclusive presumption fo perjury. The privilege serves to protect the 1111wce11f who otherwise would be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances." (Slochower v. Board of H igher E ducati011, 350 U .. S. 551, 557, 558, 100 L. ed. 700, 76 S. Ct. G37, emphasis supplied). That the police power of the St!lte cannot be invoked to violate a fundamental, constitutional and pe1·sonal right of a citizen, more espe-cially so when there is no purpose in the enactment of a Jaw by virtue of said pe>lice powe1· has also been Sl1Stainl'd in this jurisdiction as well as in the States. " In accord with the rule laid <low" in the case of Lawton v. Steele (152 U .. S. 132-134), quoted at some length in fhe in the opinion in the case of U. S. v. Toribio, to justify the State in the e'xercist: of the police puwers on behalf of the public, it must appear: "lo~irsl, that the interests of the public irenet'ally, a-: distinguished from those of a particuln class, 1·equire such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary fol' the nccomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislators may not, under the guise of pl'otecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a prope1· exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is imbject to the supervision of th.e courts." (Fahie v. City of Manila, 21 Phi!. 48G, 490). '"T he Legislature's determination that its acts are a proper t:xercise of its police power is always subject to the scrutiny of the courts and legislation will not be sustained if its sole excuse is the exercise of the police power when such power is abused or where there is no relation between the purported basis for the legislation and the enactment. Stated differently, the Legislature cannot use the police power as a subterfuge to do something that it otherwise could not do in the infringement •Of private interests or the restraint of private rights." (Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates, 61 Fed. Suppl. G88, page 691). "The r.xe1 ·cise of the police powei· is under the control of the principles of constitutional law, and the police power must at al! times be exercised with scrupulou3 regard for constitutional guaranteed rights. It ha!:> been stated that con· slitutional guarantees stand in equal strength and force with the police power, and are not suoordinate to it," (State v. Gleason, 227 P.2nd 530; Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 58 A.2d 4G4, 359 P a. 25, 7 A.L.R. 2d 438; State v. Paille.' D A.2<l 663, 90 N. H. 347). "Notwithstanding pe1·sonal rights al'C subject to the police power, these rights arc not to be totally annihilated by the police power, or interfered with to a great~r extent than reasonably necessary, taking intC1 account the re:d object to be accomplished. The police power must at all times be exercised with scrupulous regard for private r ights guarnnteed by t he constitution, and even then only in tht> public interest, and not for the benefit of a private company of individual. Thus, the police power may not be resor ted to as a cloak for the invasion of personal rights guarantl'ed b~· the various constitutions, a nd may not be exercised capri· ciously or unrea~onably; and a statute or ordinar.cc which deprives one of his individual rights cannot be sustained under the police power when the regulation does not reaw nab!y come within the ~cope of th'! police p<>wcr. " It ii:; apparent from the o.bovc that eac .. h case must br. determined on i!s individual facts, and t hat prec:rntionary measures must be used to guard agninst two <lang-ers, first, lest the civil libHties guaranteed under out· Bill cf R ightf; be unnecessarily invaded, and second, lest, using the Bill of Rights as a cloak, an individual is allowed to commit a nui;;. ancc or wo1·se against the public." (16 C.J.S., pp. 083-984). Aµparently, ther~ is a conflict bBtween the purported exercise of the police power of the State and the constitutional r :ght to privacy, the right to be let nlone (Davis v. United States, 32& U .. S. 582), the "clear and present dangcl' rule" should be applied. In other words, the test should be whether or not the p1·0vision of our Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Ai:t, requiring perioclical baring of assets and liabilities of government officials and employees, is so necessary to the ge:ieral welfare that to do away with said requirement would "likely produce a clear and present danger" to the peace and liberties of the people composing the community. To the m ind of the Court, it is ubvious that the answer must be in the negative. With the above discussion of the issues involved in this case, the Court finds it unnecessary to go to the other reasons and legal points advanced by the contending parties in supJ)ort of their stand. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby rendered, declaring unconstitut ional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, in so far as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities_ of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; without co.!:ts. SO ORDERED. Done at Lingayen, Pangasinan, this 19tH day of July, 1962. ELOY B. BELLO Judge Page 282 LA WYERS JOURNAL September 30, 1962
pages: 280-282