Paulino Garcia, petitioner vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, and Juan Salcedo, Jr., in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board, respondents, G. R. No. L-19748, September 13, 1962 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Paulino Garcia, petitioner vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, and Juan Salcedo, Jr., in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board, respondents, G. R. No. L-19748, September 13, 1962 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: Civil service -- Philippines; Philippines -- Officials and employees; Administrative law -- Philippines
Rights
Abstract: [This is a petition filed by petitioner, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, Chairman of the National Science Development Board created by Republic Act 2067 otherwise known as the "Science Act of 1958" against the respondents Executive Secretary and Juan Salcedo, Jr., the latter in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the same National Science Development Board, in the form of quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction, with prayer that the further preventive suspension of petitioner beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), be declared illegal and void, and that respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr., be likewise declared guilty of unlawfully holding and exercising the functions of the office of Chairman of the National Science Development Board since April 10, 1962, date of the expiration of the said 60-day period. ]
Fulltext: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS Paulino Garcia, petitimr,<>.ft' vs. the H onomble E xecutive Secretary, a11d J?1an, Salcedo, Jr., fo his cap<J.city as A cting Chairman of the National Science Dcvelopme11t Board, 1·cspondents, G. R. No. L-19748, Septe;1nb-sr 13, 1962, Bltrrera, J. I. CIVIL SERVlCE; ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTlGATION; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; AS PROVIDED JN THE NEW CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND REVISED ADl\IINISTRATIVE CODE; LIFTING OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING ADI\IINISTRATIVE I NVESTIGATION NOT FOUND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. - Section 35, Hcpublic Act 2260 (Civil Act of 195(1) is a new provision in our Civil Service lnw. In the RcvisC?d Administrative Code, in its A rticl<! VI on " Discipline of Person~ in Civil Service", is found the same power of JirCventive suspension exercisable by the P residf:;lt and the chi,>f of a bureau or oHicc. with the approval of the proper head of department, as is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no counterpart in thr:. Administrative Code, of Section 35 pending administrative investigation. 2. ID.; ID.; EVILS OF INDEFINITE SUSPENSION DUR.ING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. - The insertion for the first time in our Civil Service law of an express provision limiting the duration of preventive suspension is i:ignificant and timely. It indicates realization by Congress of the evils of indefinite suspension during investigation, where the re:;pondent employee is deprived in the meantime of his menns of livelihood, without an opportunity to find work elsewhP.re, lest he be considered to have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that it has been truly said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is equally true whether i!'!e UNITED STATES . . (Continued from page 264) Further, the issue of voluntariness of the confession in Turner was submitted to the jury, but the trial judge refused to charge "that in considering the voluntariness of the c<>nfession the prolonged interrogation should be considered." At p. 65. And the appellate court considered it an indifferent circumstance that "convicted murderer" was held five days in jail. 358 Pa 350, 357, 58 A2d Gl. Finally, in Turner the Supre:ne Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction in an opinion stressing the probable ·guilt of the petitioner and assuming that the alternatives before it were either to approve thC! conduct of the police or to turn the petitioner " 'lOOSC! upon [society] after he has confessed his guilt.' " 338 US,° at 65. This Court might well have disagreed in that case with findings so made, and, with less hesitation than is appropriate here, where the determinations of voluntariness have been so constant and so numerous, have reached an opposite conclusion. In this case we are not consider· ing the validity of a conviction by ce1·tiorari kl the court afCirm· ing that judgment. Voluntariness has not been here inadequately tested by a standard which refuses to take account of relevant factors. Cf. Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 634, 5 L ed 2d 760, 81 S Ct 735 ( 1961). To the eonhary, a proper standard has been successively applied by at least two trial courts and several appellate courts, no one of which felt itself forc.ed to choose between what it considered equally undesirable results, and with whose conclusions this Comt may not so lightly disagree. Similarly, in Fikes v Alabama, 352 US 191, 196, 197. l L ed 2d 246, 250, 251, 77 S Ct 281 (1957), also relied on by the Court, the confession was wrung from an "uneducated Negro, c.ertainly of low mentality, if not mentally ill." Fikes "was a weaker and more susceptible subject than the record in that case reveals Turner to have been." Unlike Reck, Fikes was removed from the local jail to a state prison far from his home and the Court recognized ·suspended officer or employee is in the classified or unclassi· tied service, or whether he is a presidential appointee or not. 3. ID.; 10.; NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF OFFICER APPOI NTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SUSPENSION OF SUBORDiNATE OFFICERS OR El\IPLOYEES.- There is nothing in Section 35, Civil Service Act, which distinguishes between the preventive suspension of an officer appointed by the President and the susp.:nsion of subordinate officers or employee undergoing administrative investigation. •I. ID.; ID.; LIFTING OI<~ PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SUSPEN· OED BY THE PRESIDENT.- The phrase "officer or employee" used in Section 35, Civil Service Act, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in Section 34 when speaking of the preYentive suspension ordered by the chief of a bmean or office. In fact, the last scnte11ce <•f Section 35 which ptovides that, "if the respondent officer or employee is t:xonerated, he shall be restol'ed to his position with full pay from tht:' pedocl of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and employees whether suspended by the President or by the Chief of office or bureau, or investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service, or by a presidential investigating committee. 5. ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATIVE CASES SHOULD PASS THROUGH SCRUTINY OF COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE; APPEAL OF DECISION TO CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS.-The first sentt>nce of Section 35, Civil Service Act, stating that "when the adminis· trative case against the officer or employee under preventive (C~ntinued next page) that petitioner's location was a fact "to be weighed." So, too, in Fikes the petitioner's lawyer was barred from seeing him, unlike the situation here, where no request for counsel was made. Of cours", I agree with the Court that confession eases are not to be resolved by color·matehing. Comparisons are perhaps upon occasion unavoidable, and, may even be proper, as in a case "on all foms" whose facts approach identity with those of one claimed opposite. I do not find that to be the situation here, however. Jn my view, the Court today moves onto new ground, and does not merely retread the steps it took in Turner. In my judgment, neither the elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion heretofore developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, nor the disposition made in Turner requires us to disagree with more than a score of impartial judges who have previously considered these same facts. Perhaps, as these cases indicate, reasonable minds may differ in the gauging of the cumulative psychological factors upon which the Court bases its reversal, but in what case, r ask, llBs a court dealing with the same extrinsic facts, a quarter of a century after conviction, overturned so many decisions by so many judges, both state and federal, entire. ly upon psychological grounds? When have the conclusions of so many legal minds been found to be so unreasonable by so few? Certainly, I walk across this shadowy field no more surefootedly than do my brothers, but after reading the whole record and the opinions of all of the courts that have heard the case I am unpersuaded that the combined psychological effect of the cir· cumstances somehow, in some way made Reck speak. The fact is, as the Court of Appeals said, when oonfronted with and accused by all three of his confederates, Reek kne\~ the "dance was over and the time had come to pay the fiddler,'' quoting from Mr. Justice Jackso11's opinion for the Court in Stein v N;ew York, 346 US 156, 186, 97 Led 1522, 1543, 73 S Ct 1077 (1953). September 30, 1962 LA WYERS JOURNAL Page 265 suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of 60 clays after the date of suspension of the rt>spundent, the 1·es1iomlcnt shall be reinstated in the service", merely demonstrates the feeling of Congress that, in llne with its policy of strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the inroads of partisan Jiolitical considerations, pursuant to the spirit of the Consti· tution, all disciplinary administrative cases pass through the impaitittl scrutiny of the Commissioner of Civil Service, even though th~ final decision on 11H. matter may not b~ his, as an appeal from such decision of the Commisi;ioner to the Civil Servi~c Board of Appeal is expressly authorized hy Section 36 of the same law. G. ID.; ID.; SPONSOR OF REP. ACT NO. 2260 STATED THAT PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CANNOT BE MORE THAN GO DA YS.-As explained by Senator Francisco A. Rodrigo, sponsor of the bill which later became the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), "suspension cannot be moN than 60 days - preventive suspension. Even if the case dn1gs on for six months or a year, after 60 days of preventive !'Uspension, the suspended employee is reinstated." (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. JI, 69, p. 2001). 7. ID.; ID.; NO DISTI NCTION BETWEEN PRE_YENTlVE SUSPENSION OF OFFICERS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THAT BY CHIEF OF OFFICE OR BUREAU.-It may be noted that Senator Rodrigo did not moke any distinction between t.he preventive suspension of officers by the President and that by th'? chief of office or bureau, and Sect ion 35, Republic Act 2260 as passed did not contain any such distinct ion. Neither is such distinction justifiable, for there is nr> cogent rea son - a nd none has been suggested - why t he protection grnnti:<l to subordinate em)>loyees is not to be ap· plied to more important public officers. S. ID. ; ID.; PERSONS IN THE UNCLASSIFIED SERVICE NOT EXCLUDED FROM BENEFITS EXTENDED TO THOSE I N THE CLASSIFIED SERVICE.-There is no re.-,. son for excluding persons in the unclassifird service from thr benefits extendG <l to those belonging to the classifit'd servic!.'. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service, hence, the £ame rights and privileg.:s should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified Stlr\'ice are so designated because the nature o( their work and classification, which is not tr ue of those appointed to the classified service. This can not be a valid reaw n for denying privileges to the former that a re granted to the latter. (Unabia vs. Hon. City Mayor, 53 O.G. No. 1, p. 133-134) 9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; INDEFINITE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION NOT ALLOWED; CONTRARY TO ROBUST, EFFECTIVE, AND EFFICIENT CIVIL SERVICE.- To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by t he President, facing administrative charges, can be p~eventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has, in this ju· risdiction, received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. 10. CIVIL SERVICE; ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; PUBLIC OFFICERS WITH FIXED TERM CANNOT BE PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED I NDEFINITELY.-But where the tenure of Office is fixed, as in the case of herein petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for G years and shall not be re· moved therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspe'lded indefinitely, would be to nullif y and render useless such speci· fie condition imposed by the law itself, 11. I D. ; ID.; ID.: JNDEFTNITE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WOULD RENDER MEANINGLESS FIXED TENURE OF OFFICE AND REMOVAL FOR CAUSE.-IC petifaner could be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the fir.al deter· mination of the administrative char ges against him (and Un· der the circumstances, ii would be the President hunself who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause would be meaningless. In the guise of a pr eventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be remov· ed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would set at naught the !audible purpose of Congress to surround the tenur e of office of the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its h;ghly scientific and technolo~ical nature, beyond extraneous influ· ences, and of insurin'g continuity of research and <levelopment activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so ne· cessary for the fulfillment of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause. 12. ID.: ID.: TD.; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF OFFTCERS APPOTNTED BY THE PRE!=;TDENT WJTH A FTXED TF\RJ\.f AND REl\lOVABL'F. ONLY FOR CAU~E CANNOT BE JNDF:FTNTTE: REASONS OF THE RULE. - There is unanimity of O J>inion amonir the mi>mbers of the S1 1'lremtl Cnurt that the preventive suspension in the case uf officers, althou""h anoointi>d bv the Presidrnt but w;th a fixerl term anrl J'Pmov:ibl0 onlv for cl'lnse, cannot be inrt~fin;tc. To some of thn rr>PmbPrs. th<> provision<: of Ser,tion 35 nf R.Pnublic Act ?.24'0 l;mitinit the rl11rat;on to f O davs is anoli,.able to here;n pet itir>n<'r, as, in thoir view, it t>vinc"s a legislative nolicy that prcvent:ve susoension of a publ;c officer is not lightly to bP. resorted to, but only after a nrevious serious and thn.-rme:h scr11tinv of the charges and that the promot and continued hearinv.: thereof should not be hampered. both in just ice to the susnen<lf'rl officer who is without salary <luring f'uspi>nsion, and in the interest of public service to avoid :is much as ))(l~s;ble the interruDtion of the efficient functioning of the office that the suspended official hold<>. Other justices. however, are of the opinion that while sa;d period may not anoly strictlv to cases of pres;dP.,t;al aonointees facing administra. t ive charges to be de,.;de<I bv the President, the preventive suspension shall nevertheless be limited to a responsihle period, and in the circumstances of the present rase, they too believe that the further suspension of herein petititmer. who has been under preventive suspension since February 18, 1962. would no lon1rer be reasonable. CONCURRING OPINION OF J USTICE J.B.L. REYES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; REQUISITES.One of the elementa ry requisites of due process is that a case should be declded by a n impartial tribunal or authority. The requisites of due process are: (1) that he shall have due no· lice, which may be actual or constrnctive, of the institution of the proceedings by which his legal rights may be affected; (2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, including the right himself k testify, to produce witnesses, and to int roduce relevant documents and other evidence; (3) that the triburwl i11 or before which his rights are adjudicaterl is so constitutetl as to give t·easm1a/1fo assurance of his honesty and impartiality; and (4) that it is a court of competent jurisdiction. (3 Wiltoughby - Const it ution of the United States, 1709) Page 266 LA WYERS JOURNAL September 30, 1962 2. ID.; ID.; LAW OF THE LAND; REQUISITES.-The law of the land is one that "hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial". (Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518). DEC I S I ON This is a pdition filed by petitioner, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, Chairman of the National Science Development Board created by Republic Act 2067 otherwise known as the "Science Act of 1958" against the respondents Executive Secretary and Juan Salcedo, \Jr., the latter in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the f'ame National Science Development Board, in the form of quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction, with prayer that the further preventive suspension of petitioner beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil S<'rvice Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), be declared illegal and void, and that respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr., be likewise declared guilty of unlawfully holding and exercising the functions of the office of Chairman of the National Science Development Board since April 10, 1962, date of the expiration of the said 60-day period. Succinctly stated, the pertinent facts of this case are RR follows: Upon the enactment on June 13, 1958 of Republic Act 2067, creating the National Science Development Board for ihe avowed purpose of implementing the declared policy of the State to integrate, coordinate, promote and intensify scientific and technological research and development and to foster invention und utilize scientific knowledge as an effective instrument for the promotion of national progress, petitioner herein, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, was appointed by the President of the Philippines, whh:h appointment was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as the first Chairman of the National Science Development Board for a fixed term of six years, pursuant to Section 6 of the Science Act. Acceptine- such appointment, petitioner duly qualified. assumed the performance of the functions of the office <>n \July 15, 19!l8, and organized and since then built up the Board into a ~al P.ffective instrument for scientific advancement that it is today. As a result of the last national elections held in November, 1961, a change of administrat ion took place. Shortly thereafter, or on February 9, 1962, after petitioner declined to heed what respondents admit as the new Assistant Executive Secretary Rodrigo Perez's "friendly gesture of advising petitioner to resign from his position in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences of having to face an administrative action for violation of the Revised Administrative Code on the basis of evidence then on hand'', respondent Executive Secretary required petitioner in writing to explain charges for alleged electioneering based on the affidavits of four individuals. On February 15, petitioner submitted his written explanation denying under oath the said charges claiming them to be false, malicious and unsubstantial. On the following day, February 16, respondent Executive Secretary advised petitioner, by authority of the President, that his explanation was found unsatisfactory, and immediately ordered his preventive suspension from office effective upon receipt of the communication. Thus, the preventive suspension took effect on Monday, February 18. 1962. On the day previous, or on Sunday, February 17, 1962, the re~pondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board. By Administrative Order No. 5 dated February 17. 1962, an investigating committee was created. On February 2:l, another charge of dishonesty in office was filed with the investigating committee against petitioner. On February 27, the investigating committee commenced the investigation of the administrative charges and, after some delays caused by the unpreparedness of the prosecution, the hearing was indefinitely postponed because of the departure for abroad, on March 19, 1962, on an extended vacation, of one of the members of the committee (former Justice Ramon San ·Jose) who, before his appointment, apprised the President t hereof but was advised he could go as the investigation could be postponed during his absence. · In view of his indefinite suspension, petitioner, on May 5, 1962, filed the present petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service law for preventive suspen· sion having already expired on April 19, 1962, he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. Tl1e clear-cut issue, therefore, before us is the effect and scope of the aforementioned Section 35 of the Civil Service Act, which reads: SEC. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or empolyee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be r~instated in ·the service. Ii the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension." Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the provisions of the above-quoted section are mandatory and applicable to him, respondents sustain that the compulsory lifting of the preventive suspension pending administrative investigation provided in thfs action, applies only to officers or employees whose administrative cases are to be decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, and that with respect to any. officer appointed by the President, there is no provision of law regulating the duration of the preventive suspension pending investigation of charges against such officer, as is the case of petitioner. In other words, it is respondents' contention that Section 35 of the Civil Service Act does not apPly to officers appointed by the President answering administrative charges against them. At the outset, let it be said that S(,>etion 35 is a new provision in our Civil Service law. I n the Revised Administrative Code, in its Article VI on "Discipline of Person in Civil Service", we find the same power of preventive suspension exercisable by the President and the chief of a bureau or office with the approval of the proper head of department, as is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no counterpart in the Ad- · ministrative Code, of Section 35 of Act 2260 regarding the lifting of preventive su>u>ension pending admir.istra.t.ive investigation. This insertion for the first t ime in our Civil Service law of an express provision limiting the duration of prev~ntive suspension is significant and timely. It indicates realization by C~ngress of the evils of indefinite suspension during investigation, where the respondent employee is deprived in the meantime of his means of livelihood, without an opportunity to find work elsewher~. lest he be considered to have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that it has been truly said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is equally true whether t he ~uspendcd officer or employee is in the classified or unclassified service, or whether he is a presidential appointeee or not. Having in mind the remedial purpose of the law, is respondents' contention justifiable that Section 35 of the Civil Service Act is applicable only lo employees whose administrative cases are submitted to the Commissioner of Civil Service? Except for the insertion of the clause "is not finally decid~cl by the Commissioner of Civil Service" (which would presently be discussed), there is nothing in Section 35 which distinguishes between the preventive suspension of an officer appointed by the President and the suspension of subordinate officers or employee undergoing administrative investigation. Note that the phrase "officer or employee" used in Section 35, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in Section 34 when speaking of the preventive suspension ordered by the chief of a bureau or office. In fact, the last sentence of Section 35 which provides that, "if the respondent officer or employee is exon~rated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay from the period of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and employees whether suspended by the President or by the chief of office or bureau, or investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service, or by a presidential investigating committee. ' September 30, 1962 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 267 The first sentence of Section 35 stating that "when the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of GO days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service," merely demonstrntes, we believe, the feeling of Congress that, in line with its policy of strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the inroads of partisan political considerations, pursuant to the spirit of the Constitution, all disciplinary administrative cases should pass through the impartial scrutiny of the Commissioner of Civil Service, even though the final decision on the matter may not be his, as an appeal from such decision of the Commissioner to the Civil Service Board of Appeals is expressly authorized by Section 36 of the same law. So also, it may be conceded without deciding, may the President, in the exercise of his power of control and supervision over all c.ffices and departments of the executive branch of the government, 1·.:!visc, review, or revoke the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service and of the Civil Service Board of Appeals. But this power has nothing to do with the preventive suspension, because this is not intended to be a pe1ialty. As explained by Senator F rancisco A. Rodrigo, sponsor of the bill which later became the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), "suspension cannot be inore than 60 days - preventive suspension. Even if the case drags on for six months or a year, after GO days of preventive suspension, the suspended employee is reinstated." (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 69, p. 2001). It may be noted that Senator Rodrigo did not make any distinction between the preventive suspension · of officers by the President and that by the chief of office or bureau, and Section 35 as passed did not contain any such distinction. Neither is such distinction justifiable, for there is no cogent reason - and none has been suggested - why the protecton granted to subordinate employee is not to be applied to more important public officers. As this Court has ruled in th{' case of Severino Unabia v. The Hon. City Mayor, et al. (53 O.G., No. 1, pp. 133-134) - "x x x There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified se~ice from the benefits extended to those be· longing to t he classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong the Civil Service; hence, the same r ights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service arc so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed t-0 the classified service. This can not be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted to the latter." To ndopt the theory of respondents that an officer '.!prointcd by the President, facing administrative charges, can be prf'V<'ntivcly suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a -;ituation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding Of guilt after due hearing, contr:uy to the express mandate of the Constitution! and the Civil Service law.2 This, it is believed, is not conducive to the maintenanc<' of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has, in this jursdiction, received constitutional guarantee, !IS it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of public officers. Of couue, this is not so in the case of these officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of herein petitioner, which accorcling to the law he could hold "for G years and shall not be removed therefrom except for cause," to sanction the stand of respondents would be to nullify and render useless such specific condition imposed by the law itself. If he could be preventively 1. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended exec-pt for cause as provided by 'iaw. (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines). 2. No officer or employee in .the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due 1n-ocess. (Sec. 32, Rep. Act 2260). suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the admin· istrntive charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the President himself who would decide the same nt a a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause would be meaningless. In the guise of a prevellt ive suspension, his term of office couJd be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would set at naught the !audible purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatibh: with the purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly scien· tific and technological nature, beyond extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and development activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause. Upon these considerations, there is unanimity of opinion among the members of this Court that the preventive suspension in the case of officers, a lthough appointed by the Prei;irlent but with a fixed term aiid removable only for cause, cannot be indefinite. To some of the members, the provisions of Section 35 limiting the duration to 60 days is applicable to herein petitioner, as, in their view, it evinces a legislative policy that preventive suspension of a public officer is not lightly to be resorted to, but only after a previous serious and thorough scrutiny of the charges and that the prompt and continued hearing thereof should not be hampered, both in justice to the suspended officer who is without salary during suspension, and in the interest of public service to avoid as much as possible the interruption of the efficient functioning of the office that the suspended official holds. Other justices, however, are of the opinion that while said period may not apply strictly to cases of presidential appointee facing adminisfrative cha rges to be decided by the President, the preventive suspension shall nevertheless be limited to a reasonable period, and in the circumstances of the present case, they too believe that the further suspension of herein petitioner, who has been under preventive suspension since February 18, 19G2, would no longer be reasonable. WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered holding p<.'ti· tioner Dr. Paulino J. Garcia entitled to immediate r einstatement to his position as Chairman of the National Science DPvelopment Board, without JJrejudice to the final outcome of the investigation of the cha rges against htm on which no opinion is here exprcseed. Respondent \Juan Salcedo, J r. is hereby orederd to immediate· Jy vacate and cease to exercise the functions of the said offic<' and to deliver the same to herein petitioner Paulino J. Garcia, No costs. SO ORDERED. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Baitti.sta A ngcfo, Labrador, Concepcion, Dizon and Macalinta1, JJ., concurred. Parede11 and !Ugala, JJ.,. took no part. REYES, J.B.L., J ., c<mcurring. I concur in t he opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barren., but for the main reason that in this case there has been a denial of procedural due process in SI) far as petitioner Gal'cia is concer ned. One of the elementary requisites of due process is that a case ehou!d be decided by a n impartial tribunal or authority. Willoughby, in his classic on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 17{l!l, enumerates the requisites •)f due process to be - " (1) that he shall have had due notice, which mar be actual or constructive, of the instituticn of th·~ proceedings by wh'ich his legal rights may be affected; (2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to ap· pear and defend his rights, including the right himself to testify, to produce witnesses, and to introduce relevant docume:nts and other evidence; Page 268 LAWYERS JOURNAL September 30, 196"2 (3) that the fl'ib10wl iu fir befo1·c which his ri{!ht.~ w·e wljudicatccl i.'I so co11slitutcd a~ to give ri>a.<lonable «S1>'1u1111te of lt i.Q honesty crnd impcn·liality; and ( 4) that it is a court of Nm1>elent jul'isdiction." Indeed, a ll the other requisites vf notice and hearing would he meaningless if the ultimate dedsion is to e<•me from a partial and biased judge. Now, the evidence submitted to 1his Court, particularly the photostatic copies of press reports, marke•I as Annexes G to K , to the reply, and which ha\'e been neither denied or contradicted, show that from the very beginning the President ha<: insisted in Dr. Garcia's vacating his office as Chainnan of the National Science Development Board, alleging at first that th" position was a confidential nature, and later, when confronted with the fact that the tenure of the office w:u; fixed by stnt\1tc, by charging openly and publicly that - "The trouble with this c:fficial is that he is an activ<' politici~n who 01 >enly campaigned in his province fo1· the NP candidates." (Annex J. Heply to Answer, Philippines Herald January 20, 1%2; quotes in th~ original) These statements, which were made without qualification, sr, far as the record goes, reveal that even bi/ore the formnl char!}"-'{ were made in the letter of E xecutive Secretary Amelito R. l\lctnc to he1·cin petitioner under date of F'cbruuy 17, l!JG2, the President. who is to be the ultimate arbiter io cieei<le the administrative c:t<iC' aga inst the petitio11er, had aheady prejudged the case and •uac!C" up his mind that the JJf:titioner had been guilty of electionecl'il!f.:'· which is the pri11cipnl charge against Garcia. While ~ he evidence was heard and ihe chat·ges tried by a commit.tee of former ma:;isirates whosC> impartiality and sense of justice are beyollCI cha!· lcnge, the fact is that the committee's powers arc pul'ely 1·eCflmmenciatory, The last and final word, under the Jaw, pertains tr. the President, who may set aside the recommendations of the investigating committe,e and unfortunately, the Chief E xecutive's words and conduct have evidenced an attitude that is difficult to reconcile with the open mind, soberness, and restl'aint to be expected of an impartial judge. The law of the bnd, as observed by Webster in Dartmouth College vs. Woodwa rd (4 Wheaton 518), is one that "he:irs before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." II Leonardo Dfoz, <.t al., Petitioners-appellants vs. Felix Amant ... , t·e;;J)(IJ1(/e11t.cfp]>C/lee, G. R .• Vo, L-92!!8, De~mber 20, 1958, Banti"to A ngelo, J. 1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; POLICEMEN; DISMISSAL CONTHARY TO REPUBLIC NO. 557 IS ILLEGAL. - The dismissal of a civil service eligible policeman who was extemkd a p<>rmanent appointment as member of the police force was iilegal when it had been made in a maimer contrary to the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 557. (Mission vs. Del R0sario, 50, O.G., No. 4, p. 1571). - · ID.; ID.; EXECUTI VE ORDER NO, 264 IMPLIEDLY REP E ALED BY REP. ACT 557. - Executive Order No. 2G4 is no longer in force for the same had been impliedly repPaled by Republic Act No. 557. 3. JD.; ID.; TEMPORARY APfOIN'l'MENT; DURATION. - T he appointment of a person who is not a civil service eligiblr at the time of his appointment, and it does not appea1· that he have since then qualified for the position he is holding, his appointment was only for a period of three months and not more." (Pana, et al v. City Mayor, et al., G.R. No. L-2700, December 18, 1953) . Under the new Civil Service Act (Rep. Act 2260), temporary appointment is limited to six months.I 4. ID. ; ID.; DAMAGES; BACOLOD CITY; CITY NOT LIABLE 1• A person may receive a temporary appointment in a posit ion needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months, provided that preference in filling such position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists. Sec, 24 (d ) Rep. Act 2260 (Civil Service A ct of Ul59). FOR DAMAGES DUE TO FAILURE OF l\IAYOR TO E NFORCE PROVISIONS OF LAW. - Th<> respondent city mayor should be made to pay the back sala ries of petitioners for the l'C'a son that under the Cha rter of the City of Bacolod (Section ::., Commonwealth Act No. 326), the city cannot be made liable fol' d;unages arising from the failure of the mayor to enforce any provisions of the law or from his negligence in the enforcement of any of its provisions. 5. ID.; ID.; MORAL DA!\lf\GES ABSORBED BY BACK SALARIES. - The respondent City Mayor in separating the petitioners from the sei·vice acted with gross negligence, if not in bad faith, conside1 ·ing the events of contemporary history that had happened in his province and his official acts amounting to abuse .of authority of which the trial court took j udicia! notice in lts decision. The sum of P5,000.00 it slapped upon respondent as moral damages is not justified, for the same i'> already included in, if not absorbed by, the back salaries the City Mayor was onlered to pay to petitioners. G. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; IT IS I MPOSED TO CURTAIL ABUSES Oli' SOJ\IE PUBLIC OFFICIALS. - With regard to the sum of 1'2,000.00 which respondent City !\layor was ordered to pay as exemplary damages, t he same is somewhat excessive, considering that respondent acted in the belief that he had tl;e requisite authority under Executive Order No. 264 of I.he President which at t hat time as not yet been declared rcp<'l-lled by the Supreme Court, but these dama~es should be imposed if only to curtail the abuses that some public officials are prone lo commit u11on coming to power in utter disrci;ard of the civil service rules which constitute the only safeguard of the tenure of office guaranteed by <•;.11• Constitution. These damages should therefore be reduced to Pl,000.00. DE C I SIOK Leonardo Diaz and Alberto Aguibr filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of F irst Instance of Negros Occidental against F elix P. Amante in his capacity as Mayor of Bacolod City to compel the latter to reinstate them to theit· positions as members of the police force of said city. The t rial court, after hearing, rendered judgment onlcring the respondent to reinstate petitioners as prayed for and to pay them (a) their unpaid salaries from Aui;rust 16, 1951 up to -::he date of their reinstatement ; (b) the sum oi 1'5,000.00 as moral damages. : (c) the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) to pay the costs of the preceedings. Respondent look the case 0n n9pr.al to this Court on the ground that the only issue involved is one of law. Leonardo Diaz was given a temporary appointment as third cla ss patrolman on July 23, 1946 with an annual salary ,){ P-180.00. On October 1, 1!>46, he was given a pi·omotion in salary in tl~e amount of P600.00 per annum, On November 18, 1946. he w:is appointed also in a temporary capacity as second clas.:; officer with a salary of P6GO.OO per annum. On llanuary 16, 1947, he w:H< promoted to fi rst class t raffic officer with a salary of P69U.OO per annum. On April 1, 1947, he was promoted in salary to P720.00 per annum. On J uly 1, 1947 he was given for the first time a permanent appointment as sceond class detective with a salary of P900.00 per annum. On July 1, 1948 a nd July 1, 1!>49, he was given a salary increase as permanent second class detcct:ve with a salary of 1~60.00 a nd Pl,020.00 per annum respectively. On J une 1, 1950, he was again prnmoted to first class detective with a salary of l'l,080.00 per annum. And on J uly 1, 1951, l1is salary as permanent first class detective wa.~ increased to 1'1,320.00 ing examination for patrolman with a rating of 83%. Alberto Aguilar is not a civil service eligible but on September 8, 1!)4 !) he was appointed as patrolman effective lluly 1, 1949. On February 8, 1050, he was promoted to second class detectiv<', and when he was dismissed on August 15, 1951, he was a first class detective. He is an old veteran, haVing been a guerrilla under LL Col. Salvador Abccde. On August 15, 1951, both Diaz and Agu,ilar were notified by respondent of their sep<iration from the service effective at the September 30, 1!>62 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 260
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