Mateo Canite, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., et al., defendants-appellees, G. R. No. L-17836, August 30, 1962 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title
Mateo Canite, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., et al., defendants-appellees, G. R. No. L-17836, August 30, 1962 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language
English
Source
The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year
1962
Subject
Court rules -- Philippines
Court of First Instance -- Manila
Res judicata
Rights
In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
Abstract
[Plaintiffs impleaded defendants before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain sums of money representing the salaries and allowances due them from March 17, 1948 to September 30, 1948 as members of the crew employed by defendants to fetch the ship S.S. BRIDGE from Sasebu, Japan to Manila by virtue of a certain shipping contract entered into between them.]
Fulltext
the very bands of society, argues recreancy to l1is position and ::>fficc and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangrrous clements of the body politic." Wherefore, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of lhe crime for which respondent D iosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbal'l'ed and his 11amc stricken from the roll of lawyers. Bengzo11, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, flor l'Crn, Parnle.~ , Di':'MI am/ Regala. JJ., concurred. Padilla, J., took no part. IV Matro Ca11it.?, et c!l., plui111iffs-appcllm1ts vs. Macfrigul & Co., Inc., et c1/, dcfendants-appcllees, G. fl. i\"o. l-1 78Jo;, All!//!:;/ 80, 19U.:, Dcwtista Angelo, J. I. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MOTION TO D!Si\IISS COMPLAINT; GROUNDS l\IA Y BE BASED ON FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN THE COl\IPLAINT.-Undcr Ruic 3 of our Hules of Coui·t, a motion to dismiss is nol like a dcmutTCI' pr-.::vidCd for in the old Code of Civil Proc~dui·c that must be b~scd only 011 facts alleged in the com1>laint. Except where 1.h(' gl'ound is that the complaint does state no cause of action which must be based only on the allegations of the co111plaint, a mot\on to dismiss may be based on facts not alieged and may even deny those alleged in the complaint (Ruperto vs. Fernando, 83 Phil., 943}. - · ID.; JD.; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITHOUT RES E RVATION IS AN Al)JUDICATION UPON THE l\IERITS."Section 4, Rule 30, of the Rules of Coul't provides that "Unlf>SS otherwise ordered by the court, any d ismissal not provid('d for in this rule, other than a dismissal fo1· lack of jurisdiction, operates as ai1 adjudication upon thC' merilll". Where a com1 >laint had b('Cn dismissed without reservation, the dismiss~1l opcrnted as an adjudication upon the merits. 3. RES JUDICATA; AS GROUND TO D!Sl\IISS A COl\IPLA lr\T. - Where all the e.ssential requisites fo1 the existence of ffll' jmlical(t ar(' 1iresent, name\~·. final judgment, jurisdiction of the court, judgment on the merits, and identity of parties, cause of action and subjC'ct matter, the motion to dismiss the complaint on the gl'Ou11d of res judicattt must be grnnted. 4. STATUTE OF LJl\llTATIONS; WHEN ACT ION IS BAHRED BY STATUTE OF LlMITATIONS.-Whcl'<! the facts disclose that more than ten years had already elapsed since the cauf;e of action accrued on September 30, 1948, the action of pluintiffs is baned by the statute of limitations. DECIS I ON Plaintiffs impl('aded defendants before the Court of First Instance of Manila to rC<!over certain sums of money representing the salaries and allowances due them from March 17, 1948 to Sep· tember 30, 1948 as members of the crew (::mployed Ly defendants to fetch the ship S.S. BRIDGE from Sasebu, Japan to Manila by virtue of a certain shipping contract entered into between them. Within the reglcment:ny period, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the gl'Ounds (a) that plaintiffs' cause of action is already barred by a prior judgment rendel'ed by the Coul't of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 29663 and (h) that plaintiffs' cause of action is also barred by prescription. Counsel for plaintiffs filed his opposition to this motion, and after both the motion and the opposition were Sf:t for hearing, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint C'll the grounds set forth in the motion h; dismiss. Plaintiffs mterposed the present appeal before this Court on purely questions of law. It appears that 1 irior to the filing of the i:1stant ease, :i complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance of l\lanila by the same plaintiffs herein and other co-members of the same crew to which they belonged seeking to recover from the same defendants the total amount of 1'14,254.12 representing their unpaid salaries as crew members of the vessel S.S. BRIDGE concsponding to the period from March 17, 1948 to September 30, 1948, whid1 amount includes the same sums now sought to be recovered in the insta11t case. Plaintiffs' cause of action is predicated upon alleged violation of the same shipping contract entered into between hC'rein plaintiffs a nd defendants. After trial on the mer its, the court rende1·c<l decision ordering defendants to pay to one· J\ligucl Olirnpo th(' amounts of Pl,OHi.13 as wages and 1'300.00 as atlot'ney's fees and costs, but dismissing the comt>!aint with regard lo the other plaintiffs among them the ckims of l\Iatco Canite, Abdon Jamaquin and Filomena Sampinit, who are the plaintiffs in lhc instimt ease. The dispositivc part of the decision states that "the case of the other plaintiffs is dismissed as well as defendant's counterclaim for iiisufficiency of evidence." ( Underlining supplied} The 1 ilaintiffs, whose complaint was dhm1issed, gave notice of their intention to appeal, but the same was denied because it was filed out of time. They f il0<l a petition for mandamus with the Cou1·t of Appeals m an altc.-mpt to havf' the low0r coui·t approve and give course to their appeal, but their petition was dismissed, and so the decision became final and execulory. It is because of these facts which appear to be undisputed that the court a quo found no other alternative than to dismiss the JJl'CScnt action on the ground of 1"C'8 ;11dicala. I n this we find no ('J'l'Or for evident!}· all the essential requisites for the existence of lhc principle of 1·es judicatti a re here present. These requisiteii " In order that a Judgment rendered in a case may be con· elusive and bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must he a final judgment ; (b) the court rendering it must have jurisdiclion of the subject mattc1· and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between lhe two cases identity of pa1'lies, identity of subject matter, and identity of cause of action." (Lapid v. Lawan, ct al., C.R. No. L-10686, May 31, ]!)57) It is, however, contended that the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint on the gl'Ound of res ;iulic!tla there bciug no allegation m the complaint t hat the present action has heen the subj('ct of a decision in a previous case. This contention is clearly unmeritorious, for under Rule 8 of our Hules of Court, a motion to dismiss is not like a demurrer pt·ovhled for in the Old Code of Civil Procedure that must be based 011/y on facts alleged in the complaint. "Except where the ground is that the complaint does state no cause of act.ion which must be based only on the allegations of the complaint, a motion to d ismiss may be based on facts not alleged and may even deny those alleged in the com· plaint x x x."l The court « quo, therefore, acted properly in susta ining the motion to dismiss. The contention that only the claim of Miguel Olimpo was adjudicated on the merits while the claims of the other plaintiffs, including the plaintiffs in the instant case, were dismissed merely for failure of the parties to testify in the hearing of the case .and so not on the merits, cannot also he sustained in view of what is pl'Ovided for in Section 4, Rule 30, of our Rules of Court. Thus, under said Section 4, '•Unless otherwise ordNed by t he court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, opel'atcs as an adjudication upon the merits", and in the aforesaid case there is nothi11g in the decision that would take the case out of the operation of the general rule. T he compla int having been dismissed without rescr\'ation, the dismissal operated as an adjudication UJ)()n the merits. It appcai·ing that all the essential 1 ·equisites for the existence of res j1uliC(ila are here present, namely, final judgment, jurisdiction of the cou1·t, judgn1ent on the merits, and identity of parties, cause of action and subject matter, as laid down in t he case above-mentioned, the court a quo l1ad no other alter native than to dismiss the pl'escnt action on lhe ground of res judicata. Aside from the foregoing, the facts also discloses that more than ten years lrn<l already elapsed since the cause of action herein accrued on September 30, 1948, which justifies the contention that the action of plaintiffs is also barred by the statute of limit· ations. 1 Ruperto v. Fernando, 83 Phil., !J43. Page 272 LAWYE RS J OURNAL September 30, 1962 Wherefore, the order appealed from is a ffirmed, without pronounccment as to costs. Beny;:on, C.J., Padilla, [,rtbntdor, Co11cepcio11, J.B.L. Reyes, D1o·rern, Pal'e<les, Di;:on, Rega/a and McU:alinWI, JJ., concurred. v Lwieta Motor Com1xrny, Petitioner, 1•s. A .D. Santos, Inc. ct ul .. R"spoudenls, C.R. No. L-17716, J uly 31, 1!)62, Diwn, J. 1. CORPORATION; AUT HORITY TO P URCH ASE , HOLD OR DEAL I N REAL AND P E RSONAL PROPE RTY.-Under Section 13 (5) of the Corporation Law, a corporation created thereunder may purchase, hold, etc., and otherwise deal in such real and personal IH'Operty as the purpose for which 1he co1porat.ion was formed may permit, and the transaction oJ its lawful business may reasonably and necessarily require. ci CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ; IT IS LIA BLE TO EXECUTION.- A certificate of public convenience grnnted to a public operator is liable lo cxceution ( Huymundo vs. Lunct::i Motor Co., 58 Phil. 889) and may be acquired by purchase. :3. CORPORATION; COHPORATE P URPOSE S; CE RTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENI E NCE TO OPERATE WAT ER TRANSPORTATION IS NOT AN AUl HORITY TC ENGAGE IN LAND TRANSPORT ATION BUSINESS.-Petitioncr daimed that its corporate purposes arc to carry on a ieneral mercantile and commercial business, etc., and that it is authorized in its articles of incorporation to operate and otherwise deal in and concerning automobiles !!nd automobile accessories' business in all its multifarious ramification and to operate, etc. and otherwise dispose of vessels and boat.s, etc., and to own and operate steamship anc! mailing ships and othCL· floating craft and deal in the same and engage in the Philippine Islands and elsewhere in the transportation of persons, merehandize and chattels by water; all this incidental to the transportation of automobiles. Held : There is nothing in the legal provision and the provisions of petitioner's articles of incorporation relied upon that could j ustify petitioner's contPntion to engage in land trnnsportation business and operate a taxicab servi~. To the contrary, they arc precisely the best evidence that it has no authority at all to engage in such transportation business. T hat it may ope1·atc and otherwise deal in automobiles and automobile :1cccssorics; that it may engage in the trnnspoJ"tation of persons by water does not mea n that it may engage in the business of land transportation - an entirely different line of business. If it could not thus engage in this line of business, it follows that it may not acquire a11y certificate of nublic convenience to opcratr a taxicab sei·vice, such acquisition would be without purpose .and would have no necessary connection with 1 >etitioner's legitimate business. D EC I S I ON Appeal from the dceision of the Public Service Commission in case No. 123401 dismissing petitioner's application for the approval of the sale in its favor, made by the Sheriff of the City of Manila, of the certificate of public co:wcnience granted bCfo!·e the war lo Nicolas Concepcion (Commission Cases Nos. 60GO<:t and 60605, reconstituted after the war in Commission Cas~ N<}. 1470) to operate a taxicab scn•ice of 27 units in lhc City of Manila and therefrom to any point in L-uzon. It appears that on December 31, 1941, to secure payment of loan evidenced by a promissory r.ote E:xeculcd by Nicolas ConcC>pcion and guaranteed by one Placido E steban in favor of retitioner , Concepcion executed a chattel mortgage covering the above mentioned certificate in favor of petitioner. To sccul'c payment of a subsequent loa n obtained by Concepcion from the Rehabilitation F inance Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines) he constituted a !:.ccond mortga\.":e on t he si>-:ne certificate. This second mnrtgage was approved by the res1 fondcnt Commission, subject tc. the mortgagl: lien in favoi· of pet_itioper_ The certificate was later sold to F rnncisco Benitez, J r., who l'Csold it to Rcdi Taxicab Company. Both sales wc1·~ m ade with assumption of the mortgage in favor of the RFC, a nd were also approved provisionally by the Commission, subject tu petitioner's lien. On October 1'0, 1953 petitioner filed an action to foi·eclose the chattel mortgage executed in its favor by Co1 1cepcio11 (Civil Case No. 20853 of the Court of First Instance of Mani\a) in view of thi> failure of the latter and his guarantor, Placido Esteban, to pay their overdue account. While the above case was pe~ding, the RFC also instituted foreclosure proceedings on its second chattel mortgage and, as a result of the decision in its favor therein- l'cndercd, the certificate of public convenience was sold at p ublic auct ion in favor of Amador D. Santos for P24,010.00 on August 31, Hl56. Sant-Os immediately ap1ilicd with the Commission for the a pproval of the sale, and the same was approved on January 26, 1957, subject to the mortgage lien in favor of petitioner. On I.Tune 9, 1958 the Court of First Instance of l\Ianila rendered judgment in Civil Case No. ~0853, amended on August 1, 1958, adjudging Concepcion indebted to petitioner In the sum of 1'15,197.84, with 12'1{ interest thereon from December 2, 1941 until full payment, plus other assessments, and ordered that the certificate of public convenience subject matter of the chattel mortqage be m id at public aucti<Jn in accordance with law. Accordingly, on March 3, 1959 said certificate was sold at public auciion to petitioner, and six days thereafter t-he Sheriff of the City of Manila issued in its favor the correspondng certificate of sale. Thereupon petitioner filed the application mentioned heretofore for the approval of the sale. In the mc.'.lntime and before his death, Amador D. Santos sold and transferred (Commission Case No. 1272231) all his !'ighls and interests in the certificate of public convenience in question in favor of the now respondent A. D. Santos, Inc. who opposed petitioner's a pplication. The iecord discloses that in the course of th~ hearing on :mitl application and after petitioner had rested its ease, the respondent A.D. Santos, Inc., with leave of Court, filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds; ' "a) u nder the petitioner's Articles of Incorporat ion, it was not authorized to engage in lhc taxicab business or operate as a common carrier; "b) the decision in Civil Case No. 20853 of the Court of First Instance of Manila did not affect the op1 >0sitor nor its predecessor Amador D. Santos inasmuch as neither ('f them had been implcaded into the case; ·;c) that what was sold to the petition~!' wcrP. only t he 'right<;, interests and participation' of Nicolas Concepcion in the certificate that had been granted to h im which were no longer existing at the time of the sale." On October 18, 1960 the respondent Commission, a fter considering the memoranda submitted bs the parties, rendered the appealed decision sustaining the first g round relied UJlOn in support thereof, namely, that under petitioner's articles of incorporation it had no authority to engage in the taxicab business or operate as a common carrier, and that, as a result, it coulJ not acquire by Jlurchasc the certificate 0 of public convenience refcned to above. Hence the present appeal interposed by petitioner who claims that, in accordance with the Corporation Law ~nd its articles of incorporation, it can acquire by purchase the certificate of public convenience in question, maintaini11g ii1fcrcntially t hat, after acquring said ce1 t ificate, it could make use of it by operating a taxicab business or operate as a common carrier by land. There is no question that a certificate of public convenience granted to a public operator is liable to execution (Raymundo vs. Luneta Motm· Co., 58 Phil. 889) and may be acquired by purchase. The question involved in the present appeal, however, is not only whether, under t he Corporation Law and petitioner's articles of incorporation', it may acquire by purchase a cel'tificatc of public convenience, such as the one in question, but also whether, after !ts acquisition, petitioner may hold the ccrt'.ificate a11d thereunder September 20, 1962 LA WYERS JO URNAL Page 273
pages
272-273