Leonardo Diaz, et al., Petitioners-appellants vs. Felix Amante, respondent-appellee, G. R .No, L-9228, December 20, 1958

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Title: Leonardo Diaz, et al., Petitioners-appellants vs. Felix Amante, respondent-appellee, G. R .No, L-9228, December 20, 1958
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: Police; Public officers; Republic No. 557; Court of First Instance -- Negros Occidental
Rights
Abstract: [Leonardo Diaz and Alberto Aguilar filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against Felix P. Amante in his capacity as Mayor of Bacolod City to compel the latter to reinstate them to their positions a s members of the police force of said city.]
Fulltext: (3) that the fl'ib10wl iu fir befo1·c which his ri{!ht.~ w·e wljudicatccl i.'I so co11slitutcd a~ to give ri>a.<lonable «S1>'1u1111te of lt i.Q honesty crnd impcn·liality; and ( 4) that it is a court of Nm1>elent jul'isdiction." Indeed, a ll the other requisites vf notice and hearing would he meaningless if the ultimate dedsion is to e<•me from a partial and biased judge. Now, the evidence submitted to 1his Court, particularly the photostatic copies of press reports, marke•I as Annexes G to K , to the reply, and which ha\'e been neither denied or contradicted, show that from the very beginning the President ha<: insisted in Dr. Garcia's vacating his office as Chainnan of the National Science Development Board, alleging at first that th" position was a confidential nature, and later, when confronted with the fact that the tenure of the office w:u; fixed by stnt\1tc, by charging openly and publicly that - "The trouble with this c:fficial is that he is an activ<' politici~n who 01 >enly campaigned in his province fo1· the NP candidates." (Annex J. Heply to Answer, Philippines Herald January 20, 1%2; quotes in th~ original) These statements, which were made without qualification, sr, far as the record goes, reveal that even bi/ore the formnl char!}"-'{ were made in the letter of E xecutive Secretary Amelito R. l\lctnc to he1·cin petitioner under date of F'cbruuy 17, l!JG2, the President. who is to be the ultimate arbiter io cieei<le the administrative c:t<iC' aga inst the petitio11er, had aheady prejudged the case and •uac!C" up his mind that the JJf:titioner had been guilty of electionecl'il!f.:'· which is the pri11cipnl charge against Garcia. While ~ he evidence was heard and ihe chat·ges tried by a commit.tee of former ma:;isirates whosC> impartiality and sense of justice are beyollCI cha!· lcnge, the fact is that the committee's powers arc pul'ely 1·eCflmmenciatory, The last and final word, under the Jaw, pertains tr. the President, who may set aside the recommendations of the investigating committe,e and unfortunately, the Chief E xecutive's words and conduct have evidenced an attitude that is difficult to reconcile with the open mind, soberness, and restl'aint to be expected of an impartial judge. The law of the bnd, as observed by Webster in Dartmouth College vs. Woodwa rd (4 Wheaton 518), is one that "he:irs before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." II Leonardo Dfoz, <.t al., Petitioners-appellants vs. Felix Amant ... , t·e;;J)(IJ1(/e11t.cfp]>C/lee, G. R .• Vo, L-92!!8, De~mber 20, 1958, Banti"to A ngelo, J. 1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; POLICEMEN; DISMISSAL CONTHARY TO REPUBLIC NO. 557 IS ILLEGAL. - The dismissal of a civil service eligible policeman who was extemkd a p<>rmanent appointment as member of the police force was iilegal when it had been made in a maimer contrary to the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 557. (Mission vs. Del R0sario, 50, O.G., No. 4, p. 1571). - · ID.; ID.; EXECUTI VE ORDER NO, 264 IMPLIEDLY REP E ALED BY REP. ACT 557. - Executive Order No. 2G4 is no longer in force for the same had been impliedly repPaled by Republic Act No. 557. 3. JD.; ID.; TEMPORARY APfOIN'l'MENT; DURATION. - T he appointment of a person who is not a civil service eligiblr at the time of his appointment, and it does not appea1· that he have since then qualified for the position he is holding, his appointment was only for a period of three months and not more." (Pana, et al v. City Mayor, et al., G.R. No. L-2700, December 18, 1953) . Under the new Civil Service Act (Rep. Act 2260), temporary appointment is limited to six months.I 4. ID. ; ID.; DAMAGES; BACOLOD CITY; CITY NOT LIABLE 1• A person may receive a temporary appointment in a posit ion needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months, provided that preference in filling such position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists. Sec, 24 (d ) Rep. Act 2260 (Civil Service A ct of Ul59). FOR DAMAGES DUE TO FAILURE OF l\IAYOR TO E NFORCE PROVISIONS OF LAW. - Th<> respondent city mayor should be made to pay the back sala ries of petitioners for the l'C'a son that under the Cha rter of the City of Bacolod (Section ::., Commonwealth Act No. 326), the city cannot be made liable fol' d;unages arising from the failure of the mayor to enforce any provisions of the law or from his negligence in the enforcement of any of its provisions. 5. ID.; ID.; MORAL DA!\lf\GES ABSORBED BY BACK SALARIES. - The respondent City Mayor in separating the petitioners from the sei·vice acted with gross negligence, if not in bad faith, conside1 ·ing the events of contemporary history that had happened in his province and his official acts amounting to abuse .of authority of which the trial court took j udicia! notice in lts decision. The sum of P5,000.00 it slapped upon respondent as moral damages is not justified, for the same i'> already included in, if not absorbed by, the back salaries the City Mayor was onlered to pay to petitioners. G. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; IT IS I MPOSED TO CURTAIL ABUSES Oli' SOJ\IE PUBLIC OFFICIALS. - With regard to the sum of 1'2,000.00 which respondent City !\layor was ordered to pay as exemplary damages, t he same is somewhat excessive, considering that respondent acted in the belief that he had tl;e requisite authority under Executive Order No. 264 of I.he President which at t hat time as not yet been declared rcp<'l-lled by the Supreme Court, but these dama~es should be imposed if only to curtail the abuses that some public officials are prone lo commit u11on coming to power in utter disrci;ard of the civil service rules which constitute the only safeguard of the tenure of office guaranteed by <•;.11• Constitution. These damages should therefore be reduced to Pl,000.00. DE C I SIOK Leonardo Diaz and Alberto Aguibr filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of F irst Instance of Negros Occidental against F elix P. Amante in his capacity as Mayor of Bacolod City to compel the latter to reinstate them to theit· positions as members of the police force of said city. The t rial court, after hearing, rendered judgment onlcring the respondent to reinstate petitioners as prayed for and to pay them (a) their unpaid salaries from Aui;rust 16, 1951 up to -::he date of their reinstatement ; (b) the sum oi 1'5,000.00 as moral damages. : (c) the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) to pay the costs of the preceedings. Respondent look the case 0n n9pr.al to this Court on the ground that the only issue involved is one of law. Leonardo Diaz was given a temporary appointment as third cla ss patrolman on July 23, 1946 with an annual salary ,){ P-180.00. On October 1, 1!>46, he was given a pi·omotion in salary in tl~e amount of P600.00 per annum, On November 18, 1946. he w:is appointed also in a temporary capacity as second clas.:; officer with a salary of P6GO.OO per annum. On llanuary 16, 1947, he w:H< promoted to fi rst class t raffic officer with a salary of P69U.OO per annum. On April 1, 1947, he was promoted in salary to P720.00 per annum. On J uly 1, 1947 he was given for the first time a permanent appointment as sceond class detective with a salary of P900.00 per annum. On July 1, 1948 a nd July 1, 1!>49, he was given a salary increase as permanent second class detcct:ve with a salary of 1~60.00 a nd Pl,020.00 per annum respectively. On J une 1, 1950, he was again prnmoted to first class detective with a salary of l'l,080.00 per annum. And on J uly 1, 1951, l1is salary as permanent first class detective wa.~ increased to 1'1,320.00 ing examination for patrolman with a rating of 83%. Alberto Aguilar is not a civil service eligible but on September 8, 1!)4 !) he was appointed as patrolman effective lluly 1, 1949. On February 8, 1050, he was promoted to second class detectiv<', and when he was dismissed on August 15, 1951, he was a first class detective. He is an old veteran, haVing been a guerrilla under LL Col. Salvador Abccde. On August 15, 1951, both Diaz and Agu,ilar were notified by respondent of their sep<iration from the service effective at the September 30, 1!>62 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 260 close of business hours of said day for lack of lntst nnd conficlence upon the recommendation of t-he chief of lJOlice. With regard to Aguilar, he was f::eparatcd on the aclditionnl gi·ound of immornlity and of maintaining a house of prostitution. His position was filled by a civil service eligible on August 16, 1951. As n justification for the action he has taken against petitioners, respondent invoked the provisions of Executive Order No. 26-l prnmulgated by President Quezon on April 1, 1940 believing that petitioners as detectives who occupy confidential positions could be separated UJlOn a moment's notice for lack of trust and confidence, and his authority to dismiss them was sustained by the Executive Sccrcta1-y who in an indorsement intimatl"!d that the n·moval o{ a <ktcctive from the service fo1 · lack of confidence was lawful. His action was also sustained by a provincial circula r issued on April 3, 1954 by the Executive Secretary confirming the propriety of his action. With regard to petitioner Diaz, who :'idmittedly w~1l' n civ1: service eligible nnd was extendetl on moro! than one C'!'Casion a permanent appointment as member of tho! police force C ·f B:tcolod City, there is no question that his dismissal was illegal fo1· huving been made in a manner co11trnry to the proccdui·e pl'e~cl'il•ed i1! Republic Act No. 557.t Executive Order No. 2G4 is no longer in force, t.he same hanng been impliedly repealed by said A<:t. Thus, i1: ~li;;sbn v. Del Rosa1io, ;JO 0. G., No . .i, 1571, this Cou1·t said: " It appearing that petitioners, as detectives, 0 1· members of thC' JJOlice force of Cebu City, were separ~l<:?d from the se1 vice not for ar.~ of the grounds enumer2tc<l in Hepublic. Act No. 557 nnd w.ithout the benefit of investigation or trial therein prescl'ibcd, the condus1on is mescupable that then 1emovnl 1s 11legnl and of no valid effect In this sense, the p1ov1s1ons of Executive Oide. No 2G4 of the President of the Philippines should be deemed as having been impliedly repealed in so far as thC'y may be inconsis1·en!. with the p1'Qvisions of said A~t." A different con:iiderntion should be made with regard to 1wtitioner Aguilar for it appears that he was not a civil service eligible even if he was C'Xtende<l several appointmenb as detective or 1 m.tn?lman by the City 1\Iayol" of Bacolod, for not being a civil ~;crvice eligible, he is not qulllified for a permanent uppointmC'lll. Thus, in one case, this Court said; " In accordance with Section t;82 of the Rev. Adm. Code, when a position in the classified service is fille<~ by one who is not a qualified civil service digible, his appointme11t is limited to the pel'iod neces~ary to enable the uppoi11t111g officer to secure a civil service eligible, qualified for the positio11, and in no case is such temporary appointment fol' a long 1>ariod than three months. As petitioners herein were not civil se1 vie·~ eligibles at the time of their appointment, and it docs not a ppear that they have since then qualified for the positions they arc holding, their respective appointments were only for a per iod of thrcf' months and not more." (Pana, et al. v. City Mayor, et al., G. R. No. L2700, Derember 18, 1953) ,2 The case of Aguila1· comes squarely within the purview of this ruling. T he lower court oi·dcred respondent 1wt only to n•instatt! petitioners but also to pay them their back salaries and moral and exemplary damages in the aggt·egatc amount of P7,000.00. We agree with the trial court that respondent should bo made to pay the back sala1·ies of petitioners for the reason that under the Chartei- of the City of Bacolod (Section 5, Commonwealth Act No. 326), the city cannot be made liable for damages arising from the failure of the mayor to enforce any provisions of the law or from his negligence in the enforcement of any of its provisions. We may also ag1ee with the trial court in holding that respondent in separating the petitioners from the service act~d with gross negligence, if not in bad faith, considering the events of contemporary history that had happened in his province and his official arts amounting to abuse I. Uy v. Rodriguez, July 30, 1954, 50 0.G., No. 8, pp. 3G74-·76 : Abella v. Rodriguez, June 29, 1954, 50 0 G., No. 7, pn. 3039-41; !\'lission v. Del Rosario, Feb. 26, 1954, 50 O.G., No. 4, pp. 1571, 1573-74; Palamine v. Zagado, !\larch G, 1!104, 50 O.G., No. 4, pp. 1566-67. 2. See also Reyes, et al. v. Dones, et al., G.R. No. L-11427, May 28, 1958. of authority of which the trial court took judicial notice in its decision, but we believe that t he sum of 1 '5,000.00 it slapped upo!l 1 ·espondent as morn! damages is not j ustified, for the s:ime is already included in, if not absorbed by, the back salaries he was ordel'e<l to pay to pet itioners. And with regard to the sum of 1'2,000.00 which respondent was ordered to pay as exemplary damages, the same is somewhat excessive, considering that 1 ·espondent acted in the belief that he had the requisite authority u nder E xecutive Order No. 264 of the President which at that time has not yet been declared repealed by tl1e Supl'eme Court. But ti1ese damages should be imposed if only to cm'.tail the abuses that. £ome public officials are prone to commit upon coming to power in utter disregard of the civil service l'Ulcs which constitute the only safegua!'d of the tenure of office guaranteed by our Constitution. These damages should therefore be reduced to 1'1,000.00. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modific-d :ui follows: respondent, or the incumbent Mayol' of Bacolod City, is onlercd to reinstate J)etitioner Leonardo Dinz as prayed for; respondent Amante is ;:irdered lo pay petitioner Diaz his unpaid salaries from August 16, 1951 up to the date of his reinstatemf'nt and the sum of l'l,000.00 as exemplary damages. I n all othe1· 1·espects, the de<:ision appealed from is hereby J"eversed. With costs ag:iinst respondent. Para.s, C.J., Padilla., . L(lbra<lor, Co11ccvcion, J.B.L. Reyes <i>i.-l Emlcncin, JJ., concurred. Bc11azo11, J., toqk no part. III In re ; Dfabci1·ntent p,.oceeding11 A gai11st Atty. Dio11tlado Q. G11tiCl'l'ez, l?e.~pomlcttl, A dm. Casi· No. 363, J nly ::11, J96Z, .lfokaliut<d, J. l. ATTORN EYS-AT-LAW ; R EMOVA L AND SUSPENSION BY HEASON OF CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVI:-lG MORAL T U RPIT U DE SUCH AS MURDER.- Under Section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be removed or susJJended from his office as attorney hy the Supreme Cou1·t by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpiturie. · MuJ"der is, without doubt, such a crime. 2. ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE ; WHAT J\I AY IT INCLUDES.The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honest, modesty or good morals. (In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275.) 3. ID.; ID·; I N DISBA RMENT STATUTES; MEAN ING OF.As used in disbarment statutes it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrnry to the acce1 Jtcd rule of right and duty between man and man. (State ex 1 ·el. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 4~ ; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.) 4. 10.; ID.; PARDON; WHEN IT : MAY BE A BAR TO 'DISBARMENT PROCEEDING.-When proceedings to st rike on attorney"s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a par•lon operates to wipe out the conviction and is ~l bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. 5 . JD. ; IO.; ID.; EFFECTS OF ABSOLU TE PARDON·-A person reaches both the punishment prescribed for t he offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offendel' is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before ccnviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as. it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. Page 270 LAWYERS JOURNAL September 30, 1962
pages: 269-270