Godofredo Navera, petitioner vs. Hon. Perfecto Quicho, etc., et al., respondents G. R. No. L-18339, June 29, 1962

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Title: Godofredo Navera, petitioner vs. Hon. Perfecto Quicho, etc., et al., respondents G. R. No. L-18339, June 29, 1962
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: Land titles -- Registration and transfer -- Philippines; Land Registration Act
Rights
Abstract: [On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.]
Fulltext: she had brought for the purpose of asking the Court to fix the reasonable rental and the period of extension of the lease contract, the rental demanded by the plaintiff being speculative and excessive (civil case No. 21897); that the parcel of land the possession of which the plaintiff seeks to recover is pv.rt of the Hacienda of Santa Mesa and Diliman; and that pui·suant to Republic Act No. 1162 all detainer cases had to be suspended until expropriation proceedings a1·e terminated, provided the current rentals are paid by the tenant. Upon these premises she prayed for the dismiss:\! of the complaint or suspension of the proceedings in the detai1:er case and for nny other just and equitable relief. After trial, on 1 October 1955 the Court of First Instance of J\lanila rendered judgment which, aside from reiterating what the Municipal Court had adjudged, ordered the defendant Carmen Preyslcr vda. de Garrb: to remove from the parcel of land her improvement or construction thereon. Her motion for reconsiderntion and/ or new trial having been denied on 27 October 1955, she appealed to the Court o{ Appeals. The appeal was certified to this Court, Oecause the appellec Teresa Realty, Inc., in objecting to the appellant's motion to suspend the detainer proceedings under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1599, had raised the question of constitufrmality and applicability of the statute. On 7 November 1956 this Court returned the case to the Cou1·t of Appeals for the latter to ascertain the number of hou..,es built on the leased 11arcel of land which was necessary for the determination as to whether the case would come under Republic Act No. 1599. Pursuant to this directive, the Court of Appeals -designated its Deputy Clerk Esper idion M. Venturn as commissioner to recei\1C evidence on such number of h·ouses built thereon. On 5 August 1958 the commissioner rendered a 1·cport that more than 50 houses were on the tract of la1?d bc\ong:ng propriation of the parcel of land must ilave been instituted.( 1) Otherwise, the law could not be availed of. Jn the case at bar, the parcel of land subject of the litigation is not being cxpropriatt>d. The r ental of P225.40 a month, which is 12'k per unnum of the a ssessed value of the parcel of land involved herein, is reasonable.(Z) The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against lh appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista A11gelo, Labrador, Concepeio11, Barrera~ Pa redes, Dizon, Rega.la and Makalint<tl, JJ., concurred. J.B.L. R'!yes, J., took no part.' Vlll Godofredo 1\/avera., v etitio11e1· 1!S, Hon. Perf1.;cto Quicho, etc.,. et al., roop<nu1ents G. R. No. L-18339, June 29, 1062, Buutista .'~ ll !JClo, J. l. REGlSTRATION OF LANDS; PUBLIC lllGHWA Y IS EXCLUDED FROJ\I THE TITLE.- Under Section 39, Act No, 49G, Land Registration Law, any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded as a legal lien or encum~ brance in the l'egistered lan<l. •. ID.; INCLUSION BY MISTAKE OF A LAND WHICH CANNOT LEGALLY BE REGISTERED DOES NOT :\1AKE APto the plaintiff, or, as admitted by the assistant manager of the Teresa Realty, Inc., there were about 460 tenants, and that 53 ten- 3. ants, he had interviewed, had, in their own right or together with PLICANT OWNER; THEREOF.- A person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does i1ot by virtue of such inclusion bl'come the owner of the land erroneously included therein. But this thC!ory only holds true if there is no dispute that the poi'lion to be excluded is really part of a Jlubtic highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity r..s to the issue of fact involved. ID.; CORRECTION OF CERTIF'lCATE OF TITLE UNDER SECTION 112 OF ACT 496 (Lane\ R~gistration Act); WHEN PETITION CANNOT BE GRANTED.- The claim of the municipality that an error has been committed in the survey of the lot recorded in respondent's name by including a portion of tho Natera Street is not agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that that is a question of fact that needs to· be proven because it is controversial. There being dissension as to 1111 important question of faci;, the petition cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act No. 406. their predecessors-in-interest, occupied their respective parts of the tract of land for more than ten years bc·fore Re1iublic Act No. 1599 was approved. On November 1958 the Court of Appeals agt>.in certified the case to this Court. The appellant contends that the t1·ial court erred in not suspending the detainer proceedings against her and in ordering her to vacate the lot leased by her and predecessors-in-interest since 3 lfune 1910 and to pay a monthly rental equivalent to 12'/o of assessed value of the parcel of land. According to hC!r, the requisitC!s of section 1 of Republic At No. 1599, namely, that the parcel of land in litigation (1) be part of a landed estate or haciendnthe former Hacienda de Santa Mesa y Diliman in Manila; <2) had been leased for at least ten years; and (3) that the landed estate had more than fifty houses of tenants, are present; hence the law invoked by her applies and the detainer proceedini,.-s against her should have been suspended as provided for in section 5 of Republic Act No. 1599. Said section partly provides: From the approval of this Act, and even before the commencement of the expropriation herein provided, ejectment proceedings against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas or lamls herein authorized to be expropriated, shall be suspended for a period of two years, upon motion of the defendant, if he pays his current rentals, :x x x. The appellant"s eontention cannot be sustained. The authority granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 159!), approved on J7 June 1956, amending Republic Act No. 1162, which took effeet on 18 June 1954, to expropriate "landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly fo1med part thereof, in the City of Manila, which are and have been leased to tenants for at least ten years," "Provided, That such lands shall have at least fifty houses of tenants erected thereon," docs not mean that once these conditicns or requisites are present, Republic Act No. 1599 or Republic Act No. 1162 would !'eadily be applied. Before either Act together with the remedies therein provided, such as suspension of detainer proceedings, installment payment of rentals, or maximization of rentals, could be availed of, it is necessary that proceedings for the ex4' ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF LAND REGISTRATION COURT TO MAKE CORRECTION IN CERTIFICATE OF TITLE~ ORDlNARY COURT.-Whih.! Section 112 of Act No. 496, among other things, authorizes a person in interest t() ask for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that rcgiste!'ed interests 'lf any description, whether vested, contingent, .expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased', and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the pa11.ies, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. DEC I S IO N On January 24, 1D61, the municipality of Ligao f:Jed with the Court of First Instance of Albny a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godvfredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cn.dastral survey of Ligao. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. H~ contends that, under (1) Tel'esa RC!aity, Inc. vs. l\Iaxima Blouse de Po.tcnciano, G.R. No. L-17588, 30 J\lay 1962. (2)I<l. Page 276 LA WYERS JOUHNAL Septembc:- 30, 1002' said section, the court can only author ize an alteration which may not impair the rights rec.orded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such r ights, or one which is consented to by all pnrties concerned, or can authorize the correction of any error or mistakes which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. Herc the petition will have such effect, for it will involve the correction of the technical cfcscription of the land covered by the certificate of title in question, segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registrntion. This cannot be done at this stage after the kpse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title. After hearing both parties, the court a quo issued an order denying the mction to dismiss and requiring Navcra to answer the petition wit.bin the reglc•nentary period. After this motion for reconsideration was denied, Navel"a filed the present petition for certiorari disputing the jurisdiction of the court a. quo. It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it wa~ ascertained by a duly licc:-i~e<I surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the cad3stral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by depriving the street of an area a.no~mting to 123 sq. m. which w.is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covcrcci by Transfer Certificnte of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. Hence, the municipality prays for the corredion of such error in the techr1ical description of the lot. as well as in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding thf.'rcfrom the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein. The court a. qiw, over the objection of Navcra, granted the petition even if the same was fil,..d under Section 112 of Act No. 496. The court predicates its ruling upon the followin~ 7'aeionalc; "It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operntiun of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from 3\1 clairr.<i and encu'Y!brances not :Of·pearing on the title. However, the law excepts certain rights and liabilities from the rule, and tl:ere are certain burdens on the !ands registered which continue· to exist and remain in force, although not noted on the title, by express provisions of Section S9 of Act No. 496, as amended. Among the burdens on the land registered which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39. is 'any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation ca.nal or lateral thereof. where the certificate of title does not state that tl:e boundaries ot such hichway, way, or irri~tion canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.' The principle invohe<l here is that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which car.not be registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone bec?me the owner of the land illegally included therein. In the case of Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil., 679, the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that t'hc inclu1>ion of public highways in the certificate of title under the Torrens Systen: docs not thereby give to the holder of ~uch cerUf;catc sai<l public highways.' " Petitioner Navera docs not agree with this ruling, invoking in his favor what we stated in a recent case to the effect that, "lhe lnw authorizes only alterations which do not Impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterntio:-is which, if they <lo not prcjudie<: such rights, are consented to by all parties concerned, or alterations to correct obvious mistakes, without opening the origina~ decree of registration" (Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds, G. R. No. L-4463, promulgated March 31, 1953). Navera contends that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a clerical error but to reopen the original decrC<e of registration which was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition seeks to direct tbe registe: of deeds to make the necessary correction in the teehnical description in order that the portion erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. In effect, therefore, the petition docs not seek merCly the correction of a mistake but the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to respondent. This c.annot be done without opening the original decree of registration. The theory entertained by the court a q· uo that if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the t itle issued to petitioner because it is part of the Nadera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law! ;my public highway, even if not noted ·on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrarice, is in our opinion correct. This is upon th'.! principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included ~hcrein.2 But this theory only holds tl"ue if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is r eally part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity 3s to the issue of fact involved. Here said unanimity is Jacking. The claim of the mu:-iicipality that an error has been committed in the survey of the lot reeorded in respondent's name by including a portion of the Natera street is not agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that that is a question of fact that needs to be proven because it is controversial. There being dissension as to an important question of fact, the petition cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act No. 496. "'Ve are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves a controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. 496. While t his section, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title 'upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminn.ted and ceased, and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity a.mong the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on , the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary ca.se or in the case where the incident properly belongs. x x x" (Tangunan, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-5545, DCC')mber 29, 1953: See also Jimenez v. De Castro, 40 O.G. No. 3, 1st Supp. p. 80; GoTernmcnt of the Philippines v. Jalandoni, 44 0. G., 1837) Wherefore, petition is granted. The order of respondent ceurt dated March 8, 1961, as well as its order dated March 25, 1961, are hereby set aside. No costs. Bengzon, C.J., Pa<lilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Ban·.~i·a, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and iltakalintal, JJ., concurred. IX People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appcllee vs. Emitedo Villanueva, Pedro Percal and Felix Jasmilona, Dgfenda.nts-a.ppellants, C.R. No. L-12687, July 31, ~962, Bengzon, C.J. I. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; WHEN MAY EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ONE CONSPIRATOR BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST PARTIES CONCERNED.- The rule is that where the recitAls in the extrn-judicial confession of one of the conspirators a!·e corroborated in its important details by other proofs in the record, it. may considered as part of the evidence against the parties concerned. 2. IO.; CONFESSION; AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED MAKING THE CONFESSION; HEARSAY EVIDENCE AGAINST HIS CO-DEJ<~ENDANTS; EXCEPTIONS.While a confession is against him but not against his co-defend· t Section 39, Act 496. 2 Ledesma v. Municipality of l loilo, 49 Phil. 709. September 30, 1962 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 277
pages: 276-277