Teresa Realty, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellee vs. Carmen Preysler Vda. de Garriz, Defendant-Appellant, G.R. No. L- 14717, July 31, 1962

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Title: Teresa Realty, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellee vs. Carmen Preysler Vda. de Garriz, Defendant-Appellant, G.R. No. L- 14717, July 31, 1962
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: Real property -- Philippines; Republic Act No. 1162; Republic Act No. 1599
Rights
Abstract: [On 19 May 1948 Carmen Preysler vda. Garriz acquired by purchase from the successors-in-interest of D. M. Fleming a residential house and a leasehold right on a parcel of land (Lot ll-K) where the house stands (Exhibit A-2). Situated on 23 Manga Avenue, Santa Mesa, Manila, the parcel of land contains an area of 1,492.59 square meters described in transfer certificate of title No. 30061 issued in the name of Teresa Realty, Inc. by the Register of Deeds in and for the City of Manila, and assessed at P22,540. On 21 March 1918 D. M. Fleming acquired by purchase the leasehold right from John W. Haussermann (Exhibit A-l) who on 3 June 1910 bad entered into a contract of lease with Demetrio Tuason y de la Paz, the manager (administrator) of the Estate of Santa Mesa y Diliman (Exhibit A). Under the original lease agreement (Exhibit A), the term thereof was to expire on 31, December 1953.]
Fulltext: the decedent, arising from contrnct, express or implied, whc· ther the same be due, not due, or cortingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money agai11st th!! decedent, must hr! filed within the t ime limited in the notice; otherwise they are baned foi·ever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action lhat the executor or udministrntor may br ing against the claimants. W here an executor or ad. ministrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action aJ. ready commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the de· cedem, instead of pl'esenting them indPpendently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off aga inst each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so tletermined shall be considci·ed tl1e true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the ad· ministration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingcmt, may be approved at their present v·alue." T he word ''cla ims" as used in stat utes requi ring the present.a· tion of elaims against a decedent's estate is generally construed lo mea n debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money j udgments; a11d arilong these are those founded upon contract. 21 Am. Jur. 579. The claim in this case is based on contract - specifically, on a breach there· of. It falls squarely under section 5 of Ruic 87. "Upon all .con· tracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they were pei·sonat to the dcceclent in liability, the personal 1·e· 1 >resentative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." 3 Schouler on Wills, Executors a nd Administrators, 6t-h Ed., 2395. A cl:tim for breach of a covena nt in a deed of the dl'cedent must be Jlresented under a statute requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on contract. Id. 2461; Clayton v. Dinwoody, 93 P. 7::::3; IJames v. Corvin, 51 P. 2nd 689.(') The only actions t hat may be instill1ted against the executor or adminisfrator are those to recover rea l or personal prnpei·ty from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and aetions to re· cover damages for 'an injury to person or property, real or per· sonal. Rule 88, section 1. The instant suit is not one of them. Appellant invokes Gavin v. l\lelliza, 84 Phil. 794, in support of his contention that this action is proper against the executrix. T he citation is not in point. T he claim thcrei!l, which was filed in the testate proceeding, was based upon a breach of contract committed by the executrix herself, in dismissing the claimant as administrator of the hacienda of the deceased. While the contract was with the decedent, its violation was by the executrix and hence personal to her. Besidf::s, the claim was for indemnity in the form of a certain quantity of palay every yea1 · for the unexpired po1 ·tion of the term of the contract. The denial of the claim was affirmed by this Court on the grounds that it was not a money (!) Plaintiff's claim arose from a breach of a covenant in the deed. It is very clearly expressed by the statute that all claims arising on contracts whether due, not due, or contingent, must be presented. The only exception made by the statute is t hat a mortgage 01· lien "against the property of t he estate subject thereto" may be enforced without first presenting a claim to the executor or administrator "wtiere all recourse against any other property of the estate is expressly waived in the complaint." But this was not an action to enforce a lien. It was not one seeking to have the claim satisfied out of specific property of t he cst~tc, or to subject any particular property of the estate to the satisfaction thereof. Clayton v. Dinwoody, 93 p. 723. The claim for damages for the unexpired portion of t he lea se is not an obligation incurred by the administratrix in the course of her admnistration of the estate. It arises out of a contractual obligation incurred by Louis llohnson and is governed by the statute of nonclaim. By the terms of the lease, he obligat· ed himsc!lf, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns to pay $,4,860. for the premises for a term of five years, covering t he time involved in this action. A claim for damages for a breach of cont1:act arises out of that obligation requiring as prerequisite to a smt thereon, that the claim be served on the adtni11ist ratrix and filed with the clerk of court. James v. Corvin, 51 P (2d) 689. claim and that it arose after · the decedent's demise, placing it outside the scope of Rule 87, Sedion 5. The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against appellant. Bcngzon, C.J., Labrador, Conce1Jcion, Bart'':l'IJ, Paree/cs, Dizon mul Reyola, JJ., concuncd. Padilla, J., took no part. Vil Ter.esa Realty, Inc., Plai11tiffs-Appellee vs. Ca .. onen. Preysler l'ti<t. de Garl'iz, Defendant·A ppellant, G.H. No. f_.-14717, July 31, 1962, Padilla, J. LANDED ESTATES; CITY OF MANILA; SUSPENSION OF DETAINER. PROCEEDINGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 1162 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1599 ; REQUISITE.The authority grnnted by section 1 o( Republic Act No. 1599, ap· proved on 17 J une 1956, amending Republic Act No. 1162, which took effect on 18 J une 1954, to expropriate " landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly formed part thereof, in the City of Manila, which arc and have been leased to tenants for at least ten years," "Provided, T hat such lahds shall have at lea st fifty houses of tenants erected thereon," does not mean that once these conditions or requisites are present, Republic Act No. 1599 or Re· public Act No. 1162 wou!d readily be applied. Before either Act together with the remedies therein provided, such as suspension of detainer proceedings, installment payment of rentals, or maximization of rentals, could be availed of, it is necessary that proceedings for the expropriation of the parcel of land must have been instituted. Othen.vise, the law could not be availed of. Jn the case at bar, the parcel of land subject of the lit:gation is not being expropriated. DEC I S IO N On 19 May 1948 Carmen P reysler vda. Ganiz ac<i:iired 1 iy purchaso from the successors·in·interest of D. M. Fleming a resi· dential house and a leasehold right on a parcel of land (Lot ll·K) where the house stands (Exhibit A·2) . Situalc:d on 2:-: Manga Avenue, Santa :Mesa, Manila, the parcel of land contains an area of 1,492.59 square meters described in transfer certificate of title No. 30061 issued in the name of Tere~a Realty, Inc. by t he Regis· ter of Deeds in and for the City of J\fanila, and assessed at P22,. 540. On 21 March 1918 D. M. Fleming acquired by purchase the leasehold right from J ohn W. H aussermann (Exhibit A·l) who 011 3 June 1910 bad entered into a contract of lease with Demetrio Tuason y de la P az, the manager (administrador) of the E state of Santa Mesa y Diliman (Exhibit A). Under the 01 ·iginal lease agreement (Exhibit A) , the term thereof was to expire on 31, December 1953. Effective 1954 the parcel of land above referred to was H!ii· scssed at P22,540 by the City Assessor of Manila in the name of Teresa Realty, hie. (Exhibit B) . On 22 December 1953, or before the expiration of the lease on 31 Decembel' 1959, the Teresa Really, Inc. notified in writing Car· men Presyler vda. de Carriz that it would agree to a new lease for five years at an increased rental from Pl35 a year 1 ilus tax on the land to P225.40 a month, which is 12'/o of the assessed value of the parcel of land. Despite such offer to enter into a new lease contract the lessee refUsed to have it renewed for five yc::irs al ;.in increased rental as offererl by the lessor. For thm reason, : he Teresa Realty, I nc. brought a detainer action against Carme11 Preysler vela. de Garriz in the Municipal Court of Manila. A fte1· trial, the court 1·endered judgment 01·dering Carmen Preysler vrla. de Garriz or any person claiming under her to vacate the parcel of land subject of the lease and to pay PZ"25.40 as reasonable monthly rental for the use of the parcel of land from 1 January 1954 until possession of the same shall have been restored to the plaintiff, and costs. She appt'aled to the Court of F irst Instance of Manila. Whereupon, t he complaint filed i11 the Municipal Court was reproduced. On 17 Januai·y 1955 the defendant lessee a11swered anew the reproduced complaint and a lleged fnr· thcr by way of special defenses that she 'yas holding possession of the parcel of land waiting for the Court to decide the action September 30, 1962 LA WYERS JOURNAL Page 275 she had brought for the purpose of asking the Court to fix the reasonable rental and the period of extension of the lease contract, the rental demanded by the plaintiff being speculative and excessive (civil case No. 21897); that the parcel of land the possession of which the plaintiff seeks to recover is pv.rt of the Hacienda of Santa Mesa and Diliman; and that pui·suant to Republic Act No. 1162 all detainer cases had to be suspended until expropriation proceedings a1·e terminated, provided the current rentals are paid by the tenant. Upon these premises she prayed for the dismiss:\! of the complaint or suspension of the proceedings in the detai1:er case and for nny other just and equitable relief. After trial, on 1 October 1955 the Court of First Instance of J\lanila rendered judgment which, aside from reiterating what the Municipal Court had adjudged, ordered the defendant Carmen Preyslcr vda. de Garrb: to remove from the parcel of land her improvement or construction thereon. Her motion for reconsiderntion and/ or new trial having been denied on 27 October 1955, she appealed to the Court o{ Appeals. The appeal was certified to this Court, Oecause the appellec Teresa Realty, Inc., in objecting to the appellant's motion to suspend the detainer proceedings under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1599, had raised the question of constitufrmality and applicability of the statute. On 7 November 1956 this Court returned the case to the Cou1·t of Appeals for the latter to ascertain the number of hou..,es built on the leased 11arcel of land which was necessary for the determination as to whether the case would come under Republic Act No. 1599. Pursuant to this directive, the Court of Appeals -designated its Deputy Clerk Esper idion M. Venturn as commissioner to recei\1C evidence on such number of h·ouses built thereon. On 5 August 1958 the commissioner rendered a 1·cport that more than 50 houses were on the tract of la1?d bc\ong:ng propriation of the parcel of land must ilave been instituted.( 1) Otherwise, the law could not be availed of. Jn the case at bar, the parcel of land subject of the litigation is not being cxpropriatt>d. The r ental of P225.40 a month, which is 12'k per unnum of the a ssessed value of the parcel of land involved herein, is reasonable.(Z) The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against lh appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista A11gelo, Labrador, Concepeio11, Barrera~ Pa redes, Dizon, Rega.la and Makalint<tl, JJ., concurred. J.B.L. R'!yes, J., took no part.' Vlll Godofredo 1\/avera., v etitio11e1· 1!S, Hon. Perf1.;cto Quicho, etc.,. et al., roop<nu1ents G. R. No. L-18339, June 29, 1062, Buutista .'~ ll !JClo, J. l. REGlSTRATION OF LANDS; PUBLIC lllGHWA Y IS EXCLUDED FROJ\I THE TITLE.- Under Section 39, Act No, 49G, Land Registration Law, any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded as a legal lien or encum~ brance in the l'egistered lan<l. •. ID.; INCLUSION BY MISTAKE OF A LAND WHICH CANNOT LEGALLY BE REGISTERED DOES NOT :\1AKE APto the plaintiff, or, as admitted by the assistant manager of the Teresa Realty, Inc., there were about 460 tenants, and that 53 ten- 3. ants, he had interviewed, had, in their own right or together with PLICANT OWNER; THEREOF.- A person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does i1ot by virtue of such inclusion bl'come the owner of the land erroneously included therein. But this thC!ory only holds true if there is no dispute that the poi'lion to be excluded is really part of a Jlubtic highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity r..s to the issue of fact involved. ID.; CORRECTION OF CERTIF'lCATE OF TITLE UNDER SECTION 112 OF ACT 496 (Lane\ R~gistration Act); WHEN PETITION CANNOT BE GRANTED.- The claim of the municipality that an error has been committed in the survey of the lot recorded in respondent's name by including a portion of tho Natera Street is not agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that that is a question of fact that needs to· be proven because it is controversial. There being dissension as to 1111 important question of faci;, the petition cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act No. 406. their predecessors-in-interest, occupied their respective parts of the tract of land for more than ten years bc·fore Re1iublic Act No. 1599 was approved. On November 1958 the Court of Appeals agt>.in certified the case to this Court. The appellant contends that the t1·ial court erred in not suspending the detainer proceedings against her and in ordering her to vacate the lot leased by her and predecessors-in-interest since 3 lfune 1910 and to pay a monthly rental equivalent to 12'/o of assessed value of the parcel of land. According to hC!r, the requisitC!s of section 1 of Republic At No. 1599, namely, that the parcel of land in litigation (1) be part of a landed estate or haciendnthe former Hacienda de Santa Mesa y Diliman in Manila; <2) had been leased for at least ten years; and (3) that the landed estate had more than fifty houses of tenants, are present; hence the law invoked by her applies and the detainer proceedini,.-s against her should have been suspended as provided for in section 5 of Republic Act No. 1599. Said section partly provides: From the approval of this Act, and even before the commencement of the expropriation herein provided, ejectment proceedings against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas or lamls herein authorized to be expropriated, shall be suspended for a period of two years, upon motion of the defendant, if he pays his current rentals, :x x x. The appellant"s eontention cannot be sustained. The authority granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 159!), approved on J7 June 1956, amending Republic Act No. 1162, which took effeet on 18 June 1954, to expropriate "landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly fo1med part thereof, in the City of Manila, which are and have been leased to tenants for at least ten years," "Provided, That such lands shall have at least fifty houses of tenants erected thereon," docs not mean that once these conditicns or requisites are present, Republic Act No. 1599 or Republic Act No. 1162 would !'eadily be applied. Before either Act together with the remedies therein provided, such as suspension of detainer proceedings, installment payment of rentals, or maximization of rentals, could be availed of, it is necessary that proceedings for the ex4' ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF LAND REGISTRATION COURT TO MAKE CORRECTION IN CERTIFICATE OF TITLE~ ORDlNARY COURT.-Whih.! Section 112 of Act No. 496, among other things, authorizes a person in interest t() ask for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that rcgiste!'ed interests 'lf any description, whether vested, contingent, .expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased', and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the pa11.ies, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. DEC I S IO N On January 24, 1D61, the municipality of Ligao f:Jed with the Court of First Instance of Albny a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godvfredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cn.dastral survey of Ligao. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. H~ contends that, under (1) Tel'esa RC!aity, Inc. vs. l\Iaxima Blouse de Po.tcnciano, G.R. No. L-17588, 30 J\lay 1962. (2)I<l. Page 276 LA WYERS JOUHNAL Septembc:- 30, 1002'
pages: 275-276