United States Supreme Court advance opinion: Reck v. Pate

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Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: United States Supreme Court advance opinion: Reck v. Pate
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XXVII (9) September 30, 1962
Year: 1962
Subject: United States -- Constitutional law -- Cases
Rights
Abstract: [Under circumstances detailed in headnote 4, infra, an accused confessed to and was convicted of murder in a state court, and was sentenced to a 199-year prison term. Several years later, the accused filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District. Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting that he was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the admission into evidence at the trial of his allegedly coerced confession. The writ issued, but after reviewing the circumstances surrounding the confession, the District Court ordered the writ quashed. (172 F Supp 734.) The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. (274 F2nd 250.) On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgements of the District Court and the Court or Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court. In an opinion by STEWART, J., expressing the view of six members or the Court, it was held that under the circumstances the confession was coerced und that its admission into evidence at e state trial violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. DOUGLAS, J. joined by WHITTAKER, J., dissented on the ground that the confession was not coerced.]
Fulltext: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Advance Opinion EMI L HECK, Petitioner, FRANK J. PAT E, Warden - US -, 6 L ed 2d 948, 81 S Ct - [No. 181) Argued April 19, 1961. Decided May 12, 19Ul. SUi\li\IA R Y Under circumstances detailed in headnote 4, infra, an accuscc! confessed to and was convicted of murder in a state court, and w11s sentenced to a UJ9-ycar prison term. Severn! years later, lhe accused filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District. Court for the Northern District. of Illinois, asserting that he was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the admission into evidence at the tr ial of his allcgN!ly coerced confession. The writ issued, but after reviewing the circumstances su!'l'ounding the confession, the District Colirt ordered the writ quashed. (172 F Supp 734.) The Cou1·t of Appeals fer the Seventh Circuit affirmed. (274 F2nd 250.) On certiornri, the Supremc Court vacated the ju<lgment~ "'r the District Coul't and the Court or A1>1>eals and remanded the case to the District Cou1-t. In an 01>inion by S'r EWART, J ., ex• pressing the view of six members or the Court, it was hel<I that under the circumstances the confession was coe1·ced und that its admission into evidence at the state trial violated the due JH'OC<.'SS clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. DOUGLAS, J .. joined by WHITTAKER, J ., dissented on the ground that the confession was not coerced. Constitutio11al Low Sec. 840..1 - <fuc J>roccs,q - i11vofo11tary confes:;ion. 1. The quest.ion whether there has been :; violation of the due process clause <if th<' Fourteenth Amendment by the intl'oduction of an involuntary confession into evidence is one which it i!l the ultimate responsibility of the United States Suprrme Court to determine. Evidence Sec. 682 - confc:s~ion - cocYcion. 2. The question whether a confession wns coerced depends upon whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed, for if such was the case, his confession cannot be del'med the Jlroduct of a rational intellect and a free will. Evidc,1ce Sec. 682 - confession - coercion. 3. In resolving the question whether a confession was coe1·ced, physical mistreatment is but one circumstance, albeit a circumstance which by itself weighs heavily; other circumstances may WHEN AN ALIEN . .'. (Co11tin11ed frm1i 1,age 259) desirable alien, it may be difficult or impossible to execute the order. For instance, if the said alien is "stateless," meaning he is "a man without a country," he cannot be depo1·ted. In such a case, he should be released from imprisonment, provided, however, that he posts the necessary bond and submits himself to reas011abl<' surveilance of the immigration authorities. Such a pei·son is entitled to release from imprisonment because of the theory that "after a reasonable length of time and in default of specific charges placed against him other than that. he is undesirable alien, a vagrant, or the like, the deportation order becomes fimct11s officio (cannot be executed or made effective) fo1· lack of ability to execute it and there is no authority for ful'ther ir,ca1·ee?·ation." In almost all cases, the cost of deportation is shouldered by the government. However, when deportation pi ocecdings are instituted within five years after the alien's entry, except when the reason for depoi·tation arises subsequent to his c.>ntr~·. Section 39 combine to 1 n·oduce an effect just as impellingly coercive as the delibernte use of the third degree. Evidence Sec. 685 - confessio11 - coercion - inlcrroyatiun. 4. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. is violated by the admission into evidence in a state murder J>rosccution of confessions obtained from the accused, a J9-ye::n-old youth of subnormal Intelligence and without previous experienre with the police, who was, for all practical purposes, held incommunicado for the four days preceding his first confession, during which time he was subjected daily to G- or 7-hom· stretches of relentless and incessant inter rogation, and was intennittently placed 011 1mblic exhibition in police "show-ups," where during the entire period he was physically weakened and in intense pain, and without adequate food, without counsel, and without t he assistance of family or friends . Co11J1titntio11al L.aw Sec. 840.S; Courts Sec. 766 - d11.~ vroce-ss - confes.<Jion - vrece<lents. 5. The determination of whether !lie confession of an accusetl was coerced, so as to render ils admission into evidence in a state criminal trial a violation of the due process clause of the F ourteenth Amendment, requires more than a mere color-matching of Appeul mu/ £y1·or Sec. 16b'9 - 1·cmt111d - for 1·e-trial - lwbells coi·pus - coerced confc;;sion. G. When vacating judgments of a Court of AJJpeals and a District Comt denying a state prisoner's application for habeas co1pus in a coel'ced confession case, the United States Supreme Court will remand the case lo the District Court with ~irections to the Distl"ict Court to enter such orders as a rc appropriate and consistent with the Su1 >reme Court's opinion, al!owing the state a reasonable time in which to re-try the prisoner. A P PEARANCES OF COUNSEL Do1111/d Pn9e Mot>r-~ argued the cause for pctiti011c1". IVillfom C. Wi11es argued the cause for respondent. (Co11ti1111ecl next page) of the PhilipJline lmmgrntion Act of 1940 as amended provides that the cost of deportation from the port of dcpotiation shall be at the expense of the owner or owners of the vessel by which the alien came. In case that is •not practicable, the J."'OVel"llment foots the bill. A procedure similar to deportation is exclusion. Should an alien brought to the P hilippines be excluded, be would be sent back immediately to the country from where he came, on the same vessel that fias brought him, and in accommodations of the same class by which he arrived. The owner or owners of such vessel is 1·equired to shoulder the expense of his l'eturn. In the event that the said vessel has left and if it should not be possible to return the alien within a reasonable t ime by means of another vessel owned by t he same interests, the government may pay the cost of 1·cturn and later charge it against 11'e owner, agent, or consignee of the vessel. Contrnry to popular belief, Jeportation proceedings are not criminal in nature and t herefore deportation 'is not a J>unishment. Page 260 LAWYERS JOURNAL September 30. 1962 OPINION OF T H E COU RT l\l r. (Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of t he Coud. On the night of Janu:.iry 2, 1936, D:·. Silbei· C. Pcncock. n Chicago physician, left his Edgewater Beach a partment in res1 >0nse to an emergency telephone call to attend a sirk child. He never returned. The next day his ~ifeless body was found in h i<; automobile on a Chicago street. Jt was appa rent that he had been brutally murdered. On Wednesday, !\larch 25, 1936, the pet itioner, Emit Reck, aml thi·ee others were arrested by the Chicago police on suspicion of stealing bicycles. Late the following Saturday a fternoon Reck co1 1fesscd to participa tion in the murder of Dr . Peacock. The next day he signed another written confession. At Reck's subsequent trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County, JI. \inois, t he two confessions were, over timely objectio11, received in evidence aga inst him. The jul'y found Reck guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to prison fo1· a term of 199 years. " The conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Rock, 392 Ill. 311, 64 NE2d 526. Several years later Reck filed a petition under tlle Illinois Post-Convict io1 1 Hearing A ct, alleging that his confessions had been procui·ed by coercion and that t heir use as evidence at his trial had, therefore, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A fter :i. hearing, the Criminal Court of Cook County denied i·elief. The Supreme Coul't of 11\linois affirmed the Criminal Court's finding that due process had not been violated a t Reck's tl'ial. Reck \·. People, 7 11! 2d 261, 130, NE2d ZOO. Th:s Court denied certiorari "without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas corpuq in an ap1n-opriate United States District Court." Heck v. llli· nois, 351 US !:142, J(}O L ed 146!:1, 76 S Ct 838. • Reck then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District for the Northern District of Illinois. The writ issued, and at the hearing the District Cou1t received in evidence the transcript of all relevant proceedings in the Illinois courts. ln an opinion reviewing in detail the circ~1mstances surrounding Heck's confession, the District Court held "the Duo P rncess Clause not violated in the instant case." 172 F Supp 734. T he Court of Appeals for the Sevenfo Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting, 274 F2d 250, and we granted certiorari, 363, US 838, 4 L ed 2d 1725, 80 S Ct 1629. The only question presented is whether the State of Illinois violated the Due P rocess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by using an evidence at Reck's trial confessions which lie had been coerced into making. The question whether there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the introduction of an involuntary confession is one which it is the ultimate responsibility of this Court to determine. See Malinski v. New York, 324 US 40 1, 404, 89 L ed 1029, 1032, 65 S Ct 781; Thomas v. Ar· zona, 356 US 390, 393, 2 Led 2d 863, 866, 78 S Ct 885; Watts v. Indiana, 338 US 49, 51 52, 93 L cd 1801, 1804, 1805, 60 S Ct 1347, 1357. After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case, we are satisfied that t he district judge's summary of the undisputed facts is accurate and complete. Neither in bi·ief nor oral argument did the respondent take issue with these findings. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to paraphrnsc the district judge's words: .. Emil Reck was at the time of this horrible crime but nineteen years old. Throughout his life he had been i-epeatedly classified as mentally retarded and deficient by psychologists :_:.11(\ psychiatrists of the Institute for Juvenile Research in Chicago. At one time he had been committed to an institution for the feebleminded, where he had spent a year. He dl"Opped out of school at t he age of 16, never having completed the 7th grade, a nd was found to have the intelligence of a child between 10 and 11 years of age at the time of his trial. Aside from his rdardation, he was never a behavior problem and bore no crimin3\ record. "Reck was arrested in Chica~o without a warrant nt 11:00 a.m. Wednesday, l\fa!'Ch 25, 1936, on suspicion of stealing bicycles. He was then shuttled between the North Avenue Police Station and the Shakespeare Avenue Police Station until l :15 p.m., at which time he was 1·etumcd to the Noi·th Avenue Police Station and there intenogated mainly about bicycle thefts until 6:30 or ,7:00 p.m. He was then taken to the \Vanen Aven ue Police Station where the niAht. The records shows that Reek was fed an egg sandwich a11d coffee at the Noi-th Avenue Station and a bologna sausage sandwich at the Wanen Avenue Station. "On Thui·sday, at 10:00 a .m., Reck wall brought back to the No1th Aveuue Stat ion where he was intenogaied some six or seven hours about various cl"imes in the Dist1·ic1. Aftenvards, he was sent to the Shakespea re Station and later that evi;.ning he was taken downtown to the Detect ive Bureau where hr was exhibited r,t a socatled 'show~up'. The record does not indkate where Reck spent the night. T he records shows tha: Reck was fed an cgt, sandwich a 1 HI a glass of milk on Thu1·sday but apparently nothing <'lsc. "The record is silent as to where Reck spent F rida y morning but it is clear I.hat interrogation was 1·esumed sometime in the earl~' afternoon. F riday evening over one hundJ"Cd people congre· gated in the Not·th Avenue Police Station where Reck was exhibited on the second floor. Shortly a fter 7:00 1>.m. Reck fainted and was bl"Ought to the Cook Count~, Hospital where he was examin<>d Uy an intern who found no ma1 ks or bruises upon his body and rejected him for treat ment. Reck was then taken directly back to the North A venue Station where he was immediately again placed on exhibition. He again· became sick and was taken to a n unfurnished handball room, where a Sergent Aitken, a ssigned to the Peacock murder investigation, c1uestioned him ubout the Peacock murder for a short period of time. Reck again became sick :rnd a Dr. Abraham was ca lled who later tP~ti ficd tkit Reck was extrem·~ly nervous, that he was exposed and that his shirt was unbuttoned and hanging outside of his pants. H e was rubbing his abdo~en and complaining of pain in that region. After an examination of GO to 90 seconds, Dr. Abraham left and Reck was <1uestioned intermittently and exhibited to civilians trntil approximately 9:30 p.m. when he became ill and vomited a considerable amount of blood on the floor. " Reck was again brought tot.he Cook County H ospital at 10:15 p.m. on Friday where he was placed in a ward and given injections, of morphine, atropine, and ipecac twice during the evening. At about 2:00 a.m. two physicians, Doctor Scatliff which has been assistinA" the poliC<i in the Peacock murdct came at the request of Prosecutor Kearney to see if there were any ma rks of brutality on Reck. They found the doo1· of Heck's room bnncd by a police officer. After securing permission from one, P olice Captain O'Connell, the~· went in and fount! Reck asleep and therefore made c.nly a cursoi·y examination in the da1·k which revealed nothing conclusive. At 9 :00 a.m. on Saturday, Reck told Dr. Zachary Felsher of the Cook County Hospital that the police had been beating him in the stomach. He also told Dr. Weissman of the same hospital that he had been beaten in the abdomen a nd chest over a three-ciay period. This was the fi rst time since his a l'l'est som(' 70 hours before that Reck had conversed with any civilian outside the presence of police officers. His father had attempted to see Reck on Thursday and Friday at the North Aver:ue Police Station and on Saturday a t the Cook County Hospital. Each time he was refused. "At 9 :30 a.m. on Satui·day. n eck was removed from the i1ospital in a wheelchair and was questioned about the Peacock murder as soon as he was transferred into Captain O'Connell's car to b<? transported to the North A\'cnue Police Station, where the questioning continued until the after noon, when he was taken to the State's Attorney's office at approximately 2 :00 p.m. "Previously to this, on F riday evening, two of the boys, Nash and Goeth, who had been arrested witll Reck, had confessed to t.hc murder of Dr. Peacock, implicating Reck and one other boy, Livingston. At about 3 :00 a .m. on Saturday, Livingston also agreed to sign a confession. (U1 wn arraignment, Livingston Jllcaded not guilty and alleged that he was subjected to physical a buse by the 1>olice.) "On Saturday afternoon, Reck was questioned about t he where· abouts of the gu0n which Goeth had told police that Reck possessSeptember 30, 1962 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 261 ed. Afler intensive interrogation, Reck admitted that Coeth had told him of the Peacock murder. About 4:30 p.m. in front of a group of officers and 1irosecutors, Reck was confro11ted with Nash ~md Coeth. Nash told the story which became his signed confes· sion. Reck denied participation in the crime. Goeth then made the statement that Nash was f:etling the truth and implicated Reck. At this point Reck stnted tha t he was present at the crime but that Livingston and not he struck Dr. Peacock. "At 5 :55 1>.m. of the sume Saturday, l\Iarch 28, 1936, a joint confession was taken, at which time Reck was ve1·y weak and sic!: looking. Al this point. Reck liad been in custody almost 8-0 hours without counsel, without contact with his family, without a court appearance and without charge or bail. The text. of this joint confession reveals mostly yes and no answers in 1hc case of Reck. The interrogation did not deal with the gun or the automobile usrd in the crime and was signed by all that. Snt.urday nig·ht. "On Sunday, Heck was again inlenogated in the State's Attorney's office and at 4 :30 p.m. hi'S individual statement was taken which was more or less a reiteration of the> joint confession. The boys then washed up and were g iven clean clothes. Thereaft!'I', in a formal ceremony in front of numerous officers and p1·osecutors as well twelve invited civilians, the statements wei·e read to the boys, they were duly caution·~-:! and tho.: confassions W"re then signed. The boys did 11ot know there were civilians p resent and were not permitted counsel. At this time Reck had been with_out solid food since F l'iday when he had an egg sandwich. He was .Placed on a milk diet by the doctor Friday night at the hospital. ;,Reck was held in custody Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, l\farch 30 th rough April !. Why, is not revealed i11 the recol'cl. On Thursday, A pril 2, 1936, Reck was 1·ea1·raigned in open court. and pleaded not g1dlly. He had not seen his fathel' or other relatives or a ny lawyer during this entire period." As the district judge further noted, the ncord "carries ~n unexpressed im1iort of police b1 ·utality, . " Reck testified at length to beatings inflicted upon him on each of the four days he was in police custody before he confessed. His testimony was corroborated. The police, however, denied beating Reck, and, in view of this conflict in the evidence, we proceed upon the premise, as did the Dist rict Court, that the officers did not inflict deliberate 1 ihysical abuse or injui·y upon Reck dul'in~ the period they held hi•r. in their custody. Sec Thomas v. Arizona, 356 US 390, 402, 403, 2 L ed 2d 863, 871, 872, 78 S Ct 885; Stein v New York, 346 US 156, 183, 184, 97 L ed 1522, 1541, 1542, 73 S Ct 1077; Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US 143, 152, 88 L ed 1192, 1198, 1199, 64 S Ct 921; Ward v Texas, 316 US 547, 552. 86 L ed 1663, 1665, 1666, 62 S Ct 1139. But it is hardly necessary to state that the question whethe1 a confession was extracted by coercion does 11ol depend simply upon whether the. police !'esorted to the crude tactic of deliberate physical abuse. " The blood of the accused is 1 :ot the only hallma1·k of an unconstitutional inquisition" Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199, 206, 4 L ed 2d 242, 247, 80 S Ct 274. The question in each case is whether a defendant'!' will was overbol'Jle ~1t the time he confessed. Chambei·s v F lorid:l, 309 US 227, 84 L ed 716, GO 8 Ct 472 ; Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49, 52, 53, 03 L eel 1801, 1805, 1800, 69 S Ct 1347, 1357; Leyra v Denno, 347 US r;;:.G, 558, 98 L ed 948, 950, 74 S Ct 716. If so, the confession cannot be deem· ed "the product of a rational intellect and a free will,' Blackburn, supra (361 US al 208) . In resolving t.he issue all the cil'cumstances attendant upon the confC'ssion must" be taken into account. Sec F ikes v. Alabama, 352 US 191, 198, 1 L cd 2d 246, 251, 77 S Ct 281; Payne v Arkansad, 356 US 560, 567, 2 L ed 2d 975, 9W, 78 S Ct 844. Physical maltreatment. is but one such circumstance, r:!beit a circumstance which by itself weighs heavily. But other circumstances may combine to produce an effect just as impeltingJy coercive as the deliberate use of the tl1il'{I degrc~. Such, we think, were the undisputed circumstances of this case, as set out in detail by the District Court. At the time of his arl'est Reck was a nineteen·y<>ar old youth of subnormal intelligence, He had no prior criminal record or experience with the police. He was held nearly eight days without n judicial hearing. Four of those days pn:ceded his first confessio11. During that period Reck was subjected each day to six or seven hour stl'etches of relentless and incessant i1•terrogation. T he 11uestioning was conducted by groups of officers. For the first three days the interrogation ranged over a wide \•ariely of crimes. On the night of third day of his tletention the interrog3tion turned to the crime fo1· which petitioner stands convicted. During this same fou1·-day period he was shuttled back am\ forth between police stations and interrogation rooms. In addition, Reck was inmitt.ently placed on public exhibition in "show-ups." On the night bcfot c his confession, petitioner became ill while on display in such a "show.up." He was taken to the hospital, 1·eturned to the police stution and put back on public display. When he again became ill he was t'emoved from the "show-up," but interrogation in the windowless "handball court" continued relentlessly until he grew faint nnd vomited blood on the floor. Once more he was taken lo the hospital, where he spent the night under the influence of drugs. The next morning he was removed from the l1ospita\ in a wheel chai1", and intensive inteJ"rogation was immediately resumed. Some eight houJ's later Reck signed his first confession. The 11cxt afternoon he signed a second. During the cntii·e period p1·eceding his confcssit>ns Reck was n.:ithout adequate food, without. counsel, and without i:he assistance of family or friends. He was, for all prnctical purposes, held incommunicado. He was physica lly weakened aud in 1ntcnse pain. We conclude that this total combination of cil·cumstances " is i;o inhel'ently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear.'' Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US 143. 154, 88 L ed 1192, 1199, 64 S Ct 921. It is true that this case lacks tl1e physical brutality present in B1-0w11 v l\Iississip1li, 297 US 278, 80 L ed 682, 56 S Ct. 461 , the t hreat of mob violence apparent in Payne v Arkansas, 356 US 560, 2 L ed 2d 975, 98 S Ct 844, the thirty-six hours of consecu· tive questioning found in Ashcraft v Tennessee, 32"2 US 143, 88 L eel 1192, 64 S Ct 021, the threats against defendant's family used in Harris v South Carolina, 338 lJS 68, 93 -c eel 1815, 69 S Ct 1354, 1357, or the deception emplo~1ed in Spano\' New Y·J1·k, 360 tJS 315, 3 L ed 2d 1265, 79 S Ct 1202, and Leyrn v Denno, 347 US 556, 98 L ed 048, 74 S Ct 716. Nor wc.s Reck's mentality apparently so irrational as that of the petitioner in Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US HW, 4 L ed 2d 242, 80 S Ct 274. However, it is equally true that Reck's youth, his subnorma l intelligence, and his lack of previous experience with the police make it i1'npossible to equate his powers of resistance of overbearing police tactics with those of the defendants in Stein v New York, 346 US 156, 97 cd 1522, 73 S Ct 1077, 01· Lisenha v California, 314 US 219, 86 L eel 1U6, 62 S Ct 280. Although the pi·ocess of decision in this area, i1s in most, requires more than a mere color-matching of cases, it is not inat>· 1n·opriate to com1 iare this case with Turner v Pennsylvania, 338 US 62, 03 L ed 1810, 69 S Ct. 1352, 1357, where we held a confession inadmissible on a record disclosing circumstances less compelling. Decision in Turner rested basically on three factors : the length of detention, the amount and manner of interrogation, and the fact that Turner had been held incommunicado by the police. 'furued had been in custody for four nights and five days before he confessed. He had been quest ioned intel'lnittently, as much as six hours in a day, sometimes by one, sometimes by several officCl's. He had been interrogated a total of some t wenty·three hours. !?eek was held the same length of time, under basically the same circumstances, before his second confession. He was held some twenty. four hour less than Turner before his first con· Page 262 LAWYERS J O URNAL Se1 itembe/' 30, 1962 fession, but during that period he was subjected to more eoncenlrntedly intensive interrogation, m longel' stretches. He also spent considerable period!' of time on public display in "show-ups," a factor not present in Turner. In addition, Reck wns weakene1! by illness, pain, and lack of food. Finally, unlike Tui·ncr, Rc.'rk must be regarded as a case of a least bonle!'linc mental retardation. The record hei·e thus presents a totality of cocl'cive circumstances far more aggravated than those which dictated our Cecision in Turner. See also J ohnson v Pennsylvania, 340 US 881, 95 L ed 640, 71 S Ct 191; Fikes v Alabama, 352 US Hll, 1 L ed 2d 246, 77 S Ct 281. It cannot fairlv be said on this record that "the inward consciousness of havi~g committed a murder and a robbery and of being confronted with evidence of guilt which petitioner could neither deny nor explain seems enough to account for th~ con~essions here." Stein v New York, 346 US 156, 185, 97 L ed 1522, 1542, 73 S Ct 1077. It is true that, as in Stein, Reck did not confess until confronted with the incriminating statements of his companions. But beyond this the circumstances in Stein bear little resemblance to those involved in this case. The defendants in Stein were questioned a total of twelve hours during a thirtytwo hour detention. Part of that time was spent working out a "bargain" with police officers. Neithel' defendant was "young, soft, ignorant or timid." Stein, supra (346 US at 185). Nor were they "inexperienced in lhc ways of crime oi· its detection" or "dumb as to their rights." Id. 346 US at 186. Br contrast, Reck was in fact young and ignorant. He . was in fact inexperienced in the ways c;f crime and its detCf'tion. Moreover, he was subjected to pressures much greater than were the defendants in Stein. He was held incommunic.'\do and questioned over a much longe1· period. He was physically ill during much of that time, in pain, and weakened by lack of food. Confrontation with the confessions of his COlllJ)anions in these circumstances could well have been the event which made further resistance seem useless to Reck, whether he was guilty or not. On this record, therefore, the fact that his confession came hatd upon the confessions of others who implicated him has little· independent significance. The State has made no effort to distinguish between the Saturday and Sunday confessions. Nor could it properly do so. The coercive circumstances preceding the first confcssi0n existed through Sunday. Reck remained in police custody, without a judicial hearing. He was subjected to furthei· intci·rog~1tion. He did not see counsel, family or friends between Saturday afternoon and Sunday afternoon. There arc no other facts in the record suggesting that the Sunday confession was an act independent of the confession extracted on Saturday. Both confessions are subject to the same infirmities. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment neither was admissible at Reck's trial. The petitioner's detention is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and he is therefore entitled to be freed therefrom. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District Court are vacated and the case remanded to the latter. On remand, the District Court should enter such orders as are appropriate and consistent with the opinion allowing the State a reasonable t ime in which to retry the petitioner, Cf Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534, 549, 5 L eel 2d 760, 771, 81 S Ct 735; Irvin v Dowd, - US -, 6 L ed 2d 751, 759, 81 S Ct - . Vacated and remanded. SEPARATE OPINIONS Mr. I.Justice Douglas, concurring. Emil Reck at the age of twelve was classified as a "high grade mental defective" and placed in an institution for mental defectives. He dropped out of school when he was sixteen. Though he was retarded he had no criminal record, 110 r<>Cord of delinquency. At the time of his arrest, confession, and conviction he was nineteen years old. He was ancstcd Wednesday morning, ~larch 25, 1!136. The next day, l\farch 26, his father went to the police asking where his son was nnd asking to see him. The J>olice would give him no information. On March 27 his fathei· came to the police station aj!ain but was not allowed to see his son. Later the father went to sec his son at the hospiial but was denied admission. The father was denied the right to see his ~on over and again. The son was held for at least eight full days incommunicado. He was arraigned before a magistrate on Apt'il 12, 1936, only after he had confessed. The late professor Alexander Kennedy of the University of Edinburgh has put into illuminating WO!'ds the mannel' in which long continued intenogation undc!' conditions of stress can give the intcnogatoi· effective command over the p risoner. The techniques - now explained in a vast literature - include (1) disorientation and dissolution; (2) synthetic conflict and tension; (3) crisis and conversion; (4) rationalization and indoctrination; (5) apolegetics and exploitation. " P roduction by conditioning methods of a state of psychological tension with its concomitant physical changes in heart, rcspirntion, skin and other organs, the feeling being unattached to any pal'ticular set of ideas. This is later caused to transfer itself to synthetic mental <:onflicts created out of circumstances chosen from ihe subject's life-history, but entirdy irrelevant to the reasons for his detention. The object is to build up anxiety to the limits of tolerance so a:; to invvke patholog·ical mental mechanisms of escape comparnble to those of Convc1·sion Hysteria." Whether the police used this technique on F,mil Reck no one knows. We do know from this record that Emil Reck was quile ill during his detention. He was so ill that he was taken to a hospital incommunicado. He was so ill he passed blood. What actually transpired no one will know. The records coming befol'c us that involve the relations between the police and a prisoner during periods of confinem<>nt arc extremely unl'eliablc. The word of the police is on the 1'idc of orderly pl'Oce<lure, ncn-opprcs-, sive conduct, meticulous regard for the sensibilities of thi; prisor.~r. There is the word of the accused against tlw police. Bvt his voic~ has little persuasion. We do know that long detention, while the prisoner is shut off from lhe outside world, is a recunin~ practice in this country - for those of lowly birth, for those without friends or status. We also know that detention incommunicado was the secret of the inquisition and is the secret of successful interrogation in Communist countries. Pl'Ofcssor Kennedy summarized the matter: "From the history of the Inquisition we learn that certain empirical discoveries were made and recognized as important by a thoughtful and objective minority of those concerned. The first was that if a 1 1risoncr were once induced to give a detailed history of his past and to discuss it with his interrogators in the absence of threat or persuasion or even of ev:dcnce of interest, he might after an <'motional crisis recant and confess his heresies. The second discovery was that true and lasting conversion could never be produced by the threat of physical torture. Torture not infrequently had the opposite effect and induced a negative mental state in which the prisoner could no longer feel pain but could achieve an attitude of mental detachment from his circumstances and with it an immt:nity to inqaisition. The most surprising feature was the genuine enthusiasm of those who did recant. While these results were neccssariiy ascribed at the time to the powers of persuasion of the lnquistadorcs, it is evident in retrospect that something was happening which was often beyond their control. 'fhe same facts come to li.ght in the Jong histor3 uf Ru.>sian political interrogation. In the Leninist period, the success of the immensely tedious method of didactic interrogation then in use was simi!al'ly ascribed to the appeal of l\larxist doctrine to The fact is that in conditions of confinement, detailed September 30, 1962 LAWYERS JOURNAL Page 263 history-taking without reference to incriminating topics and the forming of :l personal relationship with an intc1Togato1· who s11bscribes to a system of political or religious explanation, there may occur an endogenous and not always predictable process or conversion to the ideas and beliefs of the interrogator." Television teaches that confessions are the toucl1slonc of law enforcement. E xperience however teaches tlmt confessions born of long detention under conditions of stress, -.:onfusion, and anxiety arc extremely unreliable. People arrested by the police may produce confessions that come rushing foith and carry all the earmarks of reliability. But detention incommunicado for days on end is so fraught with evil thnt we should hold ii to bf' :nconsistcnt with the 1·cquirements of that free society which is reflectcll i11 the Bill of Rights. It is the means whereby the commands of the F ifth Amendment (which I deem to be applicable to the St:.1tcs) are circumvented. It is true that the police have to interrogate to anest; it is true that they may ancst to interrogate. I would hold that :wy confession obtai11ed by the police while the defendant is under <lctention is inadmissible, unless there is prompt. ~11Talg11ment and unless the accused is informed of his right to silence and accorded an opp-0rtunity to consult coun;:.el. This judgment. of conviction ;:.hould thcrcfo1·e be reversed. l\lr. J ustice Clrul:, whom l\lr. Justice W ltittak<>r joins, dissen ting. Twenty.five years ago a jury found Reck guilty of the sav3ge murder of Dr. Silber C. Peacock. His first attempt. t(! upset that 'co1wict.ion came nine years later when he sought. a writ. of e1TOI' to the Supreme Court of 111inois. It was de1!ied by opinion, People v. Reck, 392 Ill 311, G4 NE 2d 52G (1945) . This Court denied certiorari. Reck v Jllinois, 331 US 855, !)! L eel 1862, G7 S Ct 1742 (19<17) . I n the same year the Illinois Supreme Coul't again denied Rcck's application for discharge. The next year the United States District Court for the Northern District of lllinois did likewise. Then, in 1952, an i:.pplication undct· the lllinois Post Conviction Hearing 'Act was filed to test the validity of Rock's 199·year sentence imposed by a ju1·y 16 years previously. His application was denied after a full hearing by the tri:d cou1·t. nnd the Illinois Supreme Court affo·med by a \lnanimous opinion. Heck v People, 7 Ill 2d 261, 13-0 NE 2d 200 ( 1955) . Petition fol' certiorari was again denied, without p!'ejudice to the filing of a1 > - 11ropriate proceedings in Federal District Cout'l. 351 US 942, 100 L ed 1469, 76 S Ct 838 (!95G). T his case was then filed in the United States Distl'ict Coui·t where no witnesses wcr<> heard, the court being satisfied with reviewing the record. Once again relief was denied, 172 F Supp 734. and the Court of Appeals a ffirmed. 274 F2d 250. Today - 25 ycai·s b.fter his conviction - t his Court overturns the decision of the original trial judge, the judgment a nd findings of a state trial judge on post-conviction hent'il\g, the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois on that a1)peal, decisions or both the Supi·eme Court of Illinois and a federal distt"ict judge on :;eparate applications for habeas corpus and, finally, those of a federal district judge and Comt of Appeals in this case. All of these courts am overruled on the ground that "a totality of coercive circumstances" sul'l'ounded Reck's confession. The Court :;econd-guesses the findings of the trial judge and those of the only other trial court that heard and saw any of the witnesses, both of which courts impartially declared the confession to be entirely voluntary. The Court has quoted at length and with approval the summary of the evidence by t he United States district. judge. I <1uote in the margin the findings of the two state judges who saw· the witnesses and heard t-he evidence, one 11 few weeks nftel' t he events, and the other sixteen yca!'S thei·cnfter. A casual compal'ison of the three findings shows that the foderal judge - to say the least - has imported conclusions and added embellishments not present in the cold 1·ecord of the t rial. T need onlv cite one example, where he finds that his "cold summary . ries an unexp1·essccl import of police brutality . " While the Court of Appeals at least sub sile11tio, overturned some of these findings, the State docs 1 1ot take issue with the basic facts in the summary but docs strenuously object to its concluso1y findings. Pcl'iiaps the explanation for these differences is best explained by the federal judge himself, when he finds that he has r ead "[t}he 1·ecol'(I in the light most favornble" to Reck; and further that "Rcck's confession was tested before a judge and jury who had the op1>01-tunity to observe witnesses and weigh other fresh evidence at fi rst hand while I must make my decision on the basis of a cold and ancient record, whic/i can tt[Jpear mi11leadi11g." (Em1>hasis added.) Although the Court says that it proceeds "upon t he premise, as did the District Court, that the officers did not inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck," it nonetheless finds the confession to have been coerced. I assume, therefore, that the Comt bases its reversal on psychological or mental coercion. Jn so doing it goes far beyond the holding of any of the prior cases of this Court. I shall not repeat the facts exce1Jt tu note that Heck was arrested on 'Vedncsday; he was 1 10\. interrog·atcd conc!!rning Dr. Peacock's mul'(ler until F riday, when he immediately became ill, and was hospitalized; later that night all three of his confederates confessed ; confronted with them on Saturday - each accusing him of participation in the murder - he confessed. There was no evidence or physical brutality, 110 1·equest for counsel, 1101·, unlike Turner v Pennsylvania, 338 US 62, fl3 L <:!d 1810, S Ct J3;)2, 1357 (1!149), for relatives and friends. Nor did he ask for food or make any indication of any desire or need therefor, showing. in the light. of the 1·ecoi·d, nothing more than t he lack of interest in food or one who had suffered from stomach ulcers for years. How the Court can now - 25 years later - f:.nd on this "co!d" record that these circumstances amounted to mental or psychological coercion is beyond my comprehension. I agree with the sco1·e of judges who have decided to the contrary. Since mental coercion is the keystone of its rationale, t he Coul't properly sets lo one side the cases invoh·ing physical bru· tality, e. g., Brown v l\lississi1 ipi. 29i US 278, 80 L ed 682, 56 S Ct 4Gl (rn:::G) . While they rlcnlt with factoi·s bearing upon the mental state of the defendants, the Court p roperly distinguishes cases involving threats of mob violence, the wearing down of the accused by protracted questioning, threats against members of the defendant's family, and t hose in which cleception was practiced. Nor can Reck be classified as mental defective, as was the case in Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199, 4 L cd 2d 242, 80 S Ct 2i4 (1960) . The Court relics heavily on Turner v Pennsylvania (US) suprn, 1 do not agree that it. presented this Court with ":i. totality of coercive cireumstnnces" <Significantly !css "aggl'avnted" than the sit.ualion presented here. In Turner the Court reviewed the Pennsylva nia Supreme Court's affirn1ance of p('titioner's conviction by a jury. In the present case 110 claim is made that the codcfendants' confessions, with which Reck was confronted, were in fact not made and did not in fact implicate Reck in the murder of which he was convicted. In Turner, however, the peti~ tioner" was falsely told that othe1 Suspects had •opcn<"!d up' on him." 338 US, at G4. Such a falsification, in my judgment, presents a much stronger case for relief because at the outset P enn· sylvania's officers J"esorted to triekery. Moreover, such a psyC'ho!ogical artifice tends to prey upon the mind, leading its vie~ tim to cit.her resort to counter charges or make " further resistance useless," and a bandonment of claimed innocence the only course to follow. Page 264 LAWYERS J OURNA L September 30, 1962 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS Paulino Garcia, petitimr,<>.ft' vs. the H onomble E xecutive Secretary, a11d J?1an, Salcedo, Jr., fo his cap<J.city as A cting Chairman of the National Science Dcvelopme11t Board, 1·cspondents, G. R. No. L-19748, Septe;1nb-sr 13, 1962, Bltrrera, J. I. CIVIL SERVlCE; ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTlGATION; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; AS PROVIDED JN THE NEW CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND REVISED ADl\IINISTRATIVE CODE; LIFTING OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING ADI\IINISTRATIVE I NVESTIGATION NOT FOUND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. - Section 35, Hcpublic Act 2260 (Civil Act of 195(1) is a new provision in our Civil Service lnw. In the RcvisC?d Administrative Code, in its A rticl<! VI on " Discipline of Person~ in Civil Service", is found the same power of JirCventive suspension exercisable by the P residf:;lt and the chi,>f of a bureau or oHicc. with the approval of the proper head of department, as is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no counterpart in thr:. Administrative Code, of Section 35 pending administrative investigation. 2. ID.; ID.; EVILS OF INDEFINITE SUSPENSION DUR.ING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. - The insertion for the first time in our Civil Service law of an express provision limiting the duration of preventive suspension is i:ignificant and timely. It indicates realization by Congress of the evils of indefinite suspension during investigation, where the re:;pondent employee is deprived in the meantime of his menns of livelihood, without an opportunity to find work elsewhP.re, lest he be considered to have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that it has been truly said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is equally true whether i!'!e UNITED STATES . . (Continued from page 264) Further, the issue of voluntariness of the confession in Turner was submitted to the jury, but the trial judge refused to charge "that in considering the voluntariness of the c<>nfession the prolonged interrogation should be considered." At p. 65. And the appellate court considered it an indifferent circumstance that "convicted murderer" was held five days in jail. 358 Pa 350, 357, 58 A2d Gl. Finally, in Turner the Supre:ne Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction in an opinion stressing the probable ·guilt of the petitioner and assuming that the alternatives before it were either to approve thC! conduct of the police or to turn the petitioner " 'lOOSC! upon [society] after he has confessed his guilt.' " 338 US,° at 65. This Court might well have disagreed in that case with findings so made, and, with less hesitation than is appropriate here, where the determinations of voluntariness have been so constant and so numerous, have reached an opposite conclusion. In this case we are not consider· ing the validity of a conviction by ce1·tiorari kl the court afCirm· ing that judgment. Voluntariness has not been here inadequately tested by a standard which refuses to take account of relevant factors. Cf. Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 634, 5 L ed 2d 760, 81 S Ct 735 ( 1961). To the eonhary, a proper standard has been successively applied by at least two trial courts and several appellate courts, no one of which felt itself forc.ed to choose between what it considered equally undesirable results, and with whose conclusions this Comt may not so lightly disagree. Similarly, in Fikes v Alabama, 352 US 191, 196, 197. l L ed 2d 246, 250, 251, 77 S Ct 281 (1957), also relied on by the Court, the confession was wrung from an "uneducated Negro, c.ertainly of low mentality, if not mentally ill." Fikes "was a weaker and more susceptible subject than the record in that case reveals Turner to have been." Unlike Reck, Fikes was removed from the local jail to a state prison far from his home and the Court recognized ·suspended officer or employee is in the classified or unclassi· tied service, or whether he is a presidential appointee or not. 3. ID.; 10.; NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF OFFICER APPOI NTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SUSPENSION OF SUBORDiNATE OFFICERS OR El\IPLOYEES.- There is nothing in Section 35, Civil Service Act, which distinguishes between the preventive suspension of an officer appointed by the President and the susp.:nsion of subordinate officers or employee undergoing administrative investigation. •I. ID.; ID.; LIFTING OI<~ PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SUSPEN· OED BY THE PRESIDENT.- The phrase "officer or employee" used in Section 35, Civil Service Act, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in Section 34 when speaking of the preYentive suspension ordered by the chief of a bmean or office. In fact, the last scnte11ce <•f Section 35 which ptovides that, "if the respondent officer or employee is t:xonerated, he shall be restol'ed to his position with full pay from tht:' pedocl of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and employees whether suspended by the President or by the Chief of office or bureau, or investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service, or by a presidential investigating committee. 5. ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATIVE CASES SHOULD PASS THROUGH SCRUTINY OF COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE; APPEAL OF DECISION TO CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS.-The first sentt>nce of Section 35, Civil Service Act, stating that "when the adminis· trative case against the officer or employee under preventive (C~ntinued next page) that petitioner's location was a fact "to be weighed." So, too, in Fikes the petitioner's lawyer was barred from seeing him, unlike the situation here, where no request for counsel was made. Of cours", I agree with the Court that confession eases are not to be resolved by color·matehing. Comparisons are perhaps upon occasion unavoidable, and, may even be proper, as in a case "on all foms" whose facts approach identity with those of one claimed opposite. I do not find that to be the situation here, however. Jn my view, the Court today moves onto new ground, and does not merely retread the steps it took in Turner. In my judgment, neither the elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion heretofore developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, nor the disposition made in Turner requires us to disagree with more than a score of impartial judges who have previously considered these same facts. Perhaps, as these cases indicate, reasonable minds may differ in the gauging of the cumulative psychological factors upon which the Court bases its reversal, but in what case, r ask, llBs a court dealing with the same extrinsic facts, a quarter of a century after conviction, overturned so many decisions by so many judges, both state and federal, entire. ly upon psychological grounds? When have the conclusions of so many legal minds been found to be so unreasonable by so few? Certainly, I walk across this shadowy field no more surefootedly than do my brothers, but after reading the whole record and the opinions of all of the courts that have heard the case I am unpersuaded that the combined psychological effect of the cir· cumstances somehow, in some way made Reck speak. The fact is, as the Court of Appeals said, when oonfronted with and accused by all three of his confederates, Reek kne\~ the "dance was over and the time had come to pay the fiddler,'' quoting from Mr. Justice Jackso11's opinion for the Court in Stein v N;ew York, 346 US 156, 186, 97 Led 1522, 1543, 73 S Ct 1077 (1953). September 30, 1962 LA WYERS JOURNAL Page 265
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