Pedro Calano, Petitioner-Appellant vs. Pedro Cruz, Respondent-Appellee, G. R. No. L-6404, January 12, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Pedro Calano, Petitioner-Appellant vs. Pedro Cruz, Respondent-Appellee, G. R. No. L-6404, January 12, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Identifier: Supreme Court Decisions
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Elections; Quo warranto; Court of First Instance – Bataan; Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180)
Rights
Abstract: As a result of the 1951 elections, respondent Pedro Cruz was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the municipality of Orion, Bataan. Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto under Section 173 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) contesting the right of Cruz for the office of municipal councilor due to his ineligibility. Calano plea for other remedies which in law and equity he is entitled to, and asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvasser in November, 1961, to the effect that Cruz was councilor-elect, he (Calano) be declared the councilor elected in respondent's place. However, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Fulltext: took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of se1'Vices of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force, speaks of "salary corresponding to said month," commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary whether by the day, week or the month, then computatton of the month's sal~ry payable would be impos sible. Article 802 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book entitled "Commentarie& and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. I. 4th. edition, p. 160, says that Article 302 is not applicable to emplofec:>s without fixed salary. We quote - "E1nployees not entitled to indemnity.-This article refers only to those who are engaged under salary basis, and not to tholff! who only receive compensation equivalent to whatev~1· service they may r~der. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals On Commercial Matters.)" Jn view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labradof', Concepcion and Diokno, J. J, concur. Jn the result.-Paras x Pedro Galano, Petitioner-Appellant 11s. Pedro Cruz, RespondentAppellee, G. R. No. L-6404, January 12, 1954, 1. ELECTION; PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO; DISMISSAL THEREOF FOR FAILURE TO STATE SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION; APPEAL.-Jn the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. Jn the case of Marqu.ez v. Prodigalidad, 4_6 0. G. Supp. No. 11, p. 264, we held that Section 178 of t;he Revised Election Code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that pr.otests involving other offices such as municipal councilor may be appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the 'appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case involving as it does purely questions of law is proper. 2. ID.; ID.; CONTESTANT CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED ELECTED; OFFICE SHOULD BE DECLARED VACANT.Jn the case of Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 0. G. No. 2p, p. 727, wherein petitione"r .Llamoso who claimed to have received the next highest number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office for which he was : proclaimed elected, on the ground of ineligibility, we held that ; section 173 of the Revised Election Code while providing that any registered candidate may contest the l'ight of one elected to any provincial or municipal office on the ground of ineligi:. bility, it does not provide that if the coiltestee is later declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed elected. J. 'R. Nuguid for petitioner-appellant. Emilio A. Gangcayco for l'eSpondent..appellee. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J., For purposes of the present appeal the following facts, not disputed, may be briefly stated, As a result of the 1951 elections respondent PEDRO CRUZ was proclaimed a councilor-elP\'t in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Petitioner Pedro Catano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto under Section 173 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act lio. 180) contesting the right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the office of municipal councilor. Jn his prayer petitioner besides asking for other remedies which in law and equity he is entitled to, asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the Municipal &ard of Canvasser in November, 1961, to the effect that Cruz was counci1or-elect, he (Calano) be declared the councilor elected in respondent's place. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the petition, the Court of First Instance of Bataan issued an ·order of December 27, 1951, dismissing the petition for quo warranto on the ground that it was filed out of time, and also because petitioner had no legal capacity to sue as contended by respondent. On appeal to this Court by petitioner from the order of dismissal, in "' decision promulgated on May 7, 1952, we held that the petition was filed within the period prescribed by law; and that although the petition might be reg2ol·ded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, said question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the g1-ound relied upon, namely, that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of a~tion but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical penonality, or any other disqua1ification of a party. As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was· remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. UpOn the return of the case to the trial cou1·t, respondent again fuoved for dismissal on the ground that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action, presumably relying upon the observation made by us in our decision. Ful'ther elaborating on our observation that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, we said that paragraph S and 8 of the petition which read thus - "8. Que el recurrente tenia y tiene dereeho a acupar el cargo de concejal de Orion, Bataan, si no habia sido · proclamado e1ecto concejal de Orion, Bataan, al aqui recurrido. "8. Que el recurrente era candidato a concejal del municipio de Orion, Bataan con el Certificado de candidature. debidamente presentado, y registrado asi como tambien fue votado y elegido para dicho cargo, en la eleecion del 13 de Noviemb1·e de 1951." <Underscoring ours) were conclusions of 1aw and not statement.of facts. The trial court sustained the second motion to dismiss in its order of September 80, 1952, on the g1-ound that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action.- Again pi?titioner has appealed from that order to this Court. Appe11ant urges that the trial court erred not only in not holding that the motion to dismiss was filed out of time but also in declaring that the complaint failed to state a st1ffieient cause of action. In answer i-esponclent-appellee contends that the appeal should not have been given due course by the td!J,I court because under the law there is no appeal from a decision of a Cou1·t of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or election of a municipal councilor, the appeal being limited to election contests involving the offices of Provincial Governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors 8.nd City Mayors, this under Section 178 of the Revised Election Code. In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. Jn the case of Marquez v. Prodigalidad, 46 0. G. Supp. No. 11, p. 264, we held that Section 178 of the Revised Election Code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance hi e1ecl:oin contests over the offices of P1-ovincial Gove1·nor, Members of the Pro"·inciat Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that protests involving other offices such as municipal councilor may be appealed provided that only legal questions Sl·e involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case. involving as it does purely questions of Jaw is proper, , Going to the question of sufficiency of cause of action, it should be stated that our observation when the case came up for the first time on ,appeal was neither meant nor intended as a rule or docMay 31, 1964 LAWYERS JOURNAL 281 trine. We were merely considering the main prayer contained in appellant's petition, namely, that he be declared councilor-elect in the place of the respondent-appellee. In other words, we only olr served that petitioner could not properly ask for his proclamation aa councilor elect without alleging a.nd stating not mere conclusions of law but facts showing that he had the right and was entitled to the granting of his main prayer. Considering the subject of cause of action in its entirety, it will be noticed that Section 173 of the Revised Election Code provides that when a person who is not eligible is elected, any registered candidate for the same office like the petitioner-appellant in this ~ase, may contest his right to the office by filing a petition for quo warranto. To lega1ize the contest this section just mentioned does not i-equire that the contestant prove that he is entitled to the office. In the case of Llamson v. Fel'?er, 47 0. G. No. 2, p. 727, wherein petitioner Llamoso who claimed to have received the next highest number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office fo.r which he was proclaimed elected, on the ground of ineligibility, we held that Section 173 of the Revised Election Code ·while providing that any registered candidate may contest the right of one elected to any provincial or municipal office on the gr.ound of ineligibility, it does not provide that if the contestee is later declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed elected. In other words, in that case, we practically declared that under Section 173, any registered candidtae may file a petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility, and that would constitute a sufficient cause of. action. It is not necessary for the contestant to claim that if the contestee is declared ineligible, he (contestant> be declared entitled to the office, As a matter of fact, in the case of Llamoso v. Ferrer, we declared the office vacant. In view of the foregoing, the failure of Catano to allege that he is entitled to the office of councilor now occupied by the respondent Cruz does not affect the sufficiency of his cause of action. Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is hereby remnaded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs. PMaS, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla., Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Lab-radOt", J. J., concur. XI Peopk of tM Philippines, Pla..i:ntiff-Appellee, -vs. Motin Coc<>'Jh et al., Defetulants, Matin Cocoy and Apolonio CocOj/, Defetula:nta .. Appellatn.s, G. R. No. L..6019, Dec. 15, 1953. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. - A, B and C went to the house of D, and there boloed to death D's wife, daughter and son. Afterwards, thP.y ransacked the house and left it dean of its contents. Heltl: The crime cor.mitted is the complex crime of robbery with ho~icide, not robbery with triple murder, . Henninio P. Villam.~yor for appellants. Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista. for appellee. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J.:. MOTIN COCOY, his younger brother APOLONIO COCOY, their father BARBIN COCOY, one named MAGDALENO VILLORENTE and another calli!d ABI, were originally o!harged with robbery with triple murder in the Justice of the Peace Court of Libae&D, Capiz. With tJ:!.e exception of Abi, all were arrested and aubmitt.ed to the preliminary investigation conducted by the Justice of the Peace who later sent the case up to the Court of Fil'St Instance. Upon representations Of tlte Provincial l<'iscal that the evidence for the prosecution was not enough "to convict Barbin CocoY and Magdaleno Villorente, the infonna.tion was dismissed as against the two. Upon arraignment the remaining two accused Motin and Apolonio pleaded guilW. Because of the seriousness of the offense charged and because the two l.rothers were illiterate non..Christians, instead of thenceforth sentencing them, the trial court presided over by Judge Luis N. de Leon had Motin Cocoy take the witness stand. With his testimony the trial judge had the impression tha.t the two accused might not have understood the meaning and effect of their plea ·of guilty and so ordered a plea of not guilty. Arter trial the lower court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with triple murder and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the sum of PS,000.00 plus P273.60 for the value of the things taken away, and to pay one..half of the costs. Tl)e case is now hei:e for review under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court providing for the transmission to this Court of all C'l'iminal cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court. There is no dispute as to the following facts. In the month of 'Ma1·ch, 1952, Jose Leyson, his wife Maria Felix, their daughter Gardenia. aged three and their son Golt>ihan 1-1/2 yei.rs old were living in the barrio of Manica, municipality of Libacao, province of Capiz, in a sort of temporary building commonly known as an evacuation hut, consisting of one sing1e room, including the kitchen, situated near the forest snd standing only about two feet f1'0m the ground. Their nearest neighbor was about two kilometers away, The hut was a good many miles from the poblaeion, requiring many hours hiking over trails and fording streams to negotiate the dis.. tance. In the morning of March 12, 1952 <Wednesday) Leyson left his family in the house to go to the poblacion to make pur .. chases the following day <Thursdayl which was & market day. That same afternoon Wednesday, several marauders entered his house and after killing Maria and the two children by means of bolo blows, ransacked the house and left it clea.n of its contents such as plates, kitchen utensils,·money amounting to P210.oo. jeweley valued at P50.00, clothes costing P40.00 and one cavan of rice worth Pl0.00, According to investigation by the police, the body of Maria bore seven wounds. Gardenia - 6 wounds and the little boy - 8 wounds. The two eyes of the boy were found to have been gouged and extracted from their sockets. Due U. the distance of the poblacion from his house and because upon his return home he could not cross swollen streams, Leyson did not reach his home until &aturday afternoon March 15. We can only imagine the shock that must have stunned him and his reactions to the scene of death and desolation that greeted his eyes, - his dear ones whom only three days before he had left alive end hale, now but corpses scattered on the floor, and the house itself <fespoiled of all its contents. He notified his relatives and then hurried back to his home where they arrived two or three days later. We agreed with the trial court and the Solicitor General that the evidence adduced during the trial is conclusive that Martin Cocoy and his brother Apolonio Cocoy and according to them one named Abi were responsible for the robbery a.nd the killing of the three victims. According to the testimony of Kotin and Apolonio, together with Abi and upon suggestion of the latter they all went to the house of Leyson late in the afternoon of Wednesday. Upon arrival there Abi asked for food telling Maria that they were hungry and the housewife said she would prepare for them. After a long wait Abi impatient a.sked her about the food promised them and she answered that there was no food in the house, whereupon Abi began boloing and otherwise attacking Maria and the two children Golpihan and Gardenia until they were all dead. Motin said that he did not see the killing because at the time he was at the window looking toward the forest. His brother Apolonio equall)' disclaimed having witnessed the actual killing, because aecordinl' to him he was a.t the door looking cut and when the two brothers turned around, Maria and her children were already lying dead on the floor. We do not blame the trial court for calling and consider .. ing this story of the two brothers "too fantastic, a downright lie." The infliction of the seven wounds on Maria, six wounds on Gar .. denia and three wounds on the little Soy could not ha.ve been accom. plished in an instant like the exploaion of bomb but must haveo taken some time, and undoubtedJy accompanied by resistance even if ineffective, shouts or even noiB"! &nd commotion produced by the assault, and 7et Motin and Apolonio would have the court believo that all these happened without their Jmowledge because they were engrossed in contempl&ting the scenery. There is every reason to believe a:nd to find that tHere was a previous agreement on the ~82 LAWYERS JOURNAL
pages: 231-232