Cebu Portland Cement Company, Petitioner vs. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) and Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Respondents, G. R. No. L- 6158, March 11, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: Cebu Portland Cement Company, Petitioner vs. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) and Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Respondents, G. R. No. L- 6158, March 11, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: The Court of Industrial Relations; Employer and Employee; Labor Unions
Rights
Abstract: This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations ordering the petitioner Cebu Portland Cement Company to reinstate Felix V. Valencia to his former position as general superintendent, with full back pay at Php l,000 a month from November 15, 1950, up to his reinstatement and the differential salary collectible from May 1, 1949 up to November 16, 1950, with all the privileges and emoluments attached to said position.
Fulltext: D8 a guaranty to the fulfillment of the original obligation of P3,000.00. In other word, plaintiff corporation had no right to dispose (of) the warehouse r1..-ceipt until after the maturity of the promissor1' note Exhibit A. Moreove1·, the 2,000 cavanes of palay were not on the first place in the actual possession of plaintiff corpors.tion, although symbolice.lly speaking the delivery of the warehouse receipt was actually done to the bank." We hold this finding to be correct not only because it is in line wit.h the n11.ture of a contract of pledge as defined by law lArticles 1857, 1858 and 1863, Old Civil Code), but is supported by the stipulations embodied in the contr1t.ct signed by arpellant. when he secured the loan fl'om appellee. There is nn question that the 2,000 cavanes of palay covered by the w&1.·eho11sc receipt .were given to appellee only as guarantee to secure the fulfillment by appellant of his obligation. This clearly appears in the contract Exhibit A wherein it i11 expressly stated that said 2,000 cava.nes nf palay were given as a collateral security. The delivery quired by Commonwealth Act No. 103 is not a prerequisite to the right of a labor organization to appear and litigate a case beJorc the O:>urt of Industria] ~lations. CKapisanan Timbu1an ng mga Ma.nggagawa, 44 0. G. CU, pp. 182, 184-185.) In the second place, (lnce the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto. 2. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; THE POSITION 01'' SUPERINTENDENT IS THAT OF AN EMPLOYEE. - In a reneral sens£: an· " 'employee' is one who rendto:t·s service for another for wages or salarY, and that in this sense a person entployed to superintend, with powe1· ~ employ and dischal'ge men and generally to represent the principal is &n 'employee,' " <Shields v. W. R. Grace and Co., 179 P. 265, 271, quoted in 14 Words and Phrases 360.) of said palay being merely by way of security, it foJlows that by 3. the very nature of the trans9.ction its .ownership i·e1nains with IBID; IBID. - It has been said tha.t while a superintendent who has the power to appoint and discharge may be considered as part of the management, in the dispute that arises between it and the laborers, said surerinrettdent is an employee in his own relatiou to the capitalist or owner of the business, in this case, the Cebu Pol"tla:ud Cement Company. the pledgo1· subject only to foreclosure in case of non-fulfiJlment of the obligation. By this we mean that if the obligation is not paid upon maturity the most that the pledgee can do is to sell the property and apply the proceeds W the payment of the obligation and to return the balance, if any, to the pledgor <Article 1872, Old Cicil Code). This is the essence of this contract, for, according to 4. law, a pledgee cnnnot become the owner of, nor appropriate to-him- , self, the thing given in pledge <Article 1859, Old Civil Code>. If IBID; IBID. - Valencia. was, in the case of bis dismissal by the Cebu Portland Cement Company an employee, not a part of the management, and his case properly falls under the catego:i-y of an industrial dispute falling under the jurisdiction of the Court '>f Industria] Relations. And the fact thai his position was among the highest in a government enterprise did not change the nature of his 1-elation to his employer. by the contract of pledge the pledgor continues to be the owner of the thing pledge dut~ing the pendency of the obligation, it stands to reason that in case of loss of the p1·operty, the loss should be borne by the pledgot'. The fact that the we.rehouse receipt eovering the palay was delivered, endorsed in blank, to the bank 5. does not alter the situation, the purpose of such endorsement being merely to transfer the juridical possession of the property to the pledgee and to forestall any possible disposition thereof on the part of the pledgor. -This is true notwithstanding the pt'OviaionS to IBID; DISMISSAL WITHOUT CAUSE. - There is no question that the position of general superintendent was not aboli~ed; its sala1·y of P6,000 and which was held by one Ocampo, was supi)ressed. Instead of retiring Ocampo, whose petition was abolished, Valencia wes retired, even as his position was re... tained, and Ocampo promoted to take his <Valencia's) position. As ValE'ncia's position was not abolished or suppressed, Valencia should not have been separated by retfrement: it should have been Ocampo wh:> should have been retired because of the abolition of his own position. Petitioner's argument in effect is a.s foilows: that there is economy if Valencia is separatfo.d and Ocampo retained, and Valencia dismissed. Thf! absurdity of the contention is .evident; it· is its own refutation. Reasons of economy may have justified the reduction, of Valencia's salary, but certainly not his separation. Evidently the ·reduction wa.s merely the opportune occasion for a dismissal without cause. the contrary of t!Je Warehouse Receipt Law. In a. case recently decided by this Court <Martinez v. Philip. pine National Bank, G. R. No. L.4080, September 21, 1953) which, involves a similar transaction, this Court held: "In conclusion, we hold that whe1·e a warehouse i-eceipt or quedan is transferred or endorsed to a creditor only to secu1-e the payment of a loan or debt, the transfenee or endorsee does nnt automatically become the owner of the good covered by the wa.rehouse receipt or quedan but he merely retains the 1.ight to. keep and with the conser;it of the owner to sell them so as to satisfy the obligation frnm the proceeds of the sale, this for the simple reason that the transaction involved is not a sale but only a mortgage or pledge, and that if the property covered by the qpedans or wa1·ehouse receipts is lost without the fault or negligence of the mortgagee or pledgee , or the transferree or endorsee of the warehouse receipt or quedan, t-hen said goods are to be 1-egarded as lost on account of the real owner, mc:.rtgagor or pledgor." Wherefore, the decision appea.led from i$ affirmed, with costs against appellant. . B-engzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Reyes and Labrador, J. J.; concur. Chief Justice Paras dissents for the same reasons ·stated in Martinez vs. P.N.B., L.4080. XVlll Cebu Portland Cement Company, Petitioner vs. The Court of liaduatrial Relations (CIR) and Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union CPLASLU>, ~espondents, G. R. No. L- 6158, Ma.reh 11, 1904. 1. COURT O~' INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM FILED BY A LABOR UNION WHOSE PERMIT HAD ALREADY EXPIRED AND NOT RENEWED BY THE SECRETARY OF I.ABOR. - Tlie registratfon re. Legal Counsel of Cebu Po1tland Cement Company, FM'tunato V. Borromeo and Asst. Gov't Corporate Counsel, Leovigildo Monasterial for petitioners. Emilio Lumontad for respondents, PLASLU. DECISION LABRADOR, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations ordel'ing the petitioner Cebu Portland Cement Company to reinstate Felix V. Valencia to his former position as general superintendent, with full back pay at Pl,000 a month from November 15, 1950, up to his reinsta.tement and the differential salary collectible f1·om May 1, 1949 up to November 16, 1950, with all the privileges and emoluments attached to said position. The reco1•d discloses that on December 31, 1948 i-espondent Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union CPLASLO> filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations, docketed as CIR Case No. 241-V and entitled Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor U:nion vs. Cebu Portland Cement Company, submitting a set of grievances and demands againet the therein respondent, herein petitioner, for decision and settlement hi said cou1t. While the said case was pending and on May 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL 248 November 20, 1950, said PLASLU filed an incidental motion in the S&id case, alleging that respondent herein Felix V, Valencia was dismissed without just cause on Nevember 16, 1950 and praying that he be reinstated with back salaries. The Cebu Portland Cement Company filed an answer denying that Valencia was dismissed without cause and alleging that he was retired from the service together with 100 other employees and/or labo1-ers to promote economy and efficiency in the service in accordance with the order of the Secretary of Economic Coordination. In that same answer the cement company questioned the PLASLU's juridical personality as· a labor union, as well as the jurisdiction of the CIR to take cogniz&nce of the inCidental case. After hearing the merits of the incidental case the Court of Industrial Relations rende1·ed the decision appealed from. After a motion for reconsideration filed by the cement company .was denied in bane, it filed the present action for certiorari a.lleging that (a) the CIR has no power to take cognizance of the incidental case of Valencia, firstly, because the PLASLU's license as a registered labor unipn waS revoked by the See1:etary of Labor on August 251' 1950, and 13econdly, because the subject. matter involved in the said incidental case is not an industrial or agricultural dispute i-elated to the main case, Valencia belonging to the management group of the petitioner company; Cb). that the court had no power and acted with grave abuse of discreti:m, firstly, because it did not state correctly the facts appearing on record secondly, because it disrega.rded the essential requirements of ·due process; thirdly, because it did not weigh the evidence aubmitted by the petitioner herein before promulgating its decision; fourthly, because it ha.d, no jurisdiction to consider the claim of a Filipino citizen in the service of a government contro11ed corporation, etc. The facts giving rise to the incidental case filed by Valencia against the Cebu Portland Cement Company may be briefly stated as follows: On or before November 10, 1950, Felix V. Valencia was a genel'al superintendent of the compa.ny with a. salary of P12,000 per annum. He first served with the Cebu Portland Cement Company a.s assistant general superintendent from July, 1989 with a st:ilary of P7,200 pe:t annum. In November, 1947, on recommendation of the general manager, he was promoted to the position of general superintendent with compensation at the rate of P9,600 per annum. On May 1, 1949, he got a promotional appointment with a compensation of P12,QOO per annum. On October 7, October 21, and October 28, the Secretary of J!!conomic Coordination ordered the general manager of the Cebu Portland Cement to take steps to secure a reduction in the expenses of the company, in order to enn.bie it to produce cement at a lower cost and thus reduce its pl'ice for the benefit of the public. Pursuant to this order the manager proposed that the annual salary of the general superintendent of the r1Iant to be reduced to Pl0,800 anc:i recommended that Valencia be retired for the good cf the sel'Vice and the assistant general superintenden~ take his place as genera.I superintendent. The Secretary of EconQmic Coordinatitm approved the propos:al and recommerulation and ordered the retirement of Mr. Valencia effective November 16, 1950. Valencia refused tci retire .p.s ordered and so filed the incidental case. One of the most important questions raised in this appeal is the supposed lack of jurisdiction nn the part of the Court of Indus.. tria.I Relations to consider the incidental case of respondent Va.. lencia, for the reason tliat when his claim was p1·esented befo1-e the court on November 16, 1950 the Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, to which he belonged, had no longer any persona.Jity befllre the said court, because its permit to continue as a labor 01·ganization had already expired and the same was not renewed by the Secretary cf Labor. In the first place, it must be remembered that the registration required by Commonwealth Act No. 108 is not a prerequisite to the right of a labor organization to appeai• and litigate a case before the Court of Industrial Relations. CKa.pisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 44 0. G. CU, pp. 182, 184-185.) In the second place, onee the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the Jaw of its ci-eation, it retains th&.t jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto. <Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Coinpany and the Court of Industrial Relations, 73 Phil. 874; Mortera, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 45 Q. G. (4), p. 1'114; and Luzon Brokerage Company vs. Luzon Labo1· Union, 48 0. G. (9), p. 3883.) It is also claimed that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the case of the dismissa.I 01· separation of Valencia, because th!! dispute involved between him and the Cebu Portland Cemenf Company is not an industrial dispute which is causing or likely to cause a strike or a lockout, and the number of employffS or labore1·s invoh·ed does not ·exceed ~O. In answe1· to this contention it must be noted that the original case was instituted by 'fue Philippine Land.Air-Sea La.bor Union CPLASLU> and the circumstances requh-ed by law for the case to be submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, as i·equh-ed by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, we1·e then p1-esent. While this original action was pending, the incidental caae of Valencia, a member of the PLASLU, arose and the powe1· of the court to take cognize.nce thereof is recognized in Section 1 of said Commonwealth Act No. 108 as a dismissal of an employee during the pendency of the proceedings in the ol'iginal case. It is also contended that the position o:C general supel'intendent held by Valencia, which is next ih importance to that of general manage1· with respect to the operation of the company's plant, is not that of an employee, as Valencia represented the management of the company and his dismissal was a case involving a member of the management and not 4ll employee, and, therefore, not a.n industrial dispute. In a general sense an •• 'employee' is one who r~nders service fer another for wages or salary and that in this sense a person employed to superintend, with power to employ and discharge men and generaUy to represent the principal is an 'employee,'" (Shields v. W. R. Grace and Co., 1'19 P . .265, 2'1lj quoted in 14 Wo1·ds and .Phrases 860.> It is true that in the case between the PLASLU and the Cebu Portland Cement Company, Valen.ci'l actually i-epresented the management in the dispute arising between the Cebu Portt8nd Cement Compa.ny, employer, and the union of the laborers, employees. But in the incidental case at bar, we a1-e not concerned with said 1-elation between the PLASLU and the Cebu Portland Cement Company, but we are with that of Valencia, employee, on one side, as against the Cebu· Portland Cement Compl!dl.y, em1>loyer, on the other. It has been said that while a superintendent who has the power to appoint and discharge may be considered as part of the management, in the dispute that arises between it and the laborers, said superintendent is an employee in his own relation to the capitalist or owner of the business, in this case, the Cebu Pootla.nd Cement Company. "A foreman in his relation to his employer, is an employee, while in his relation to the laborers under him he is the representative of the empfoye1· and within the definition of Section 2C2) of the Act. Nothing in the Act excepts foremen from its benefits nor from protection against discrimination no1• unfair labo1· practices of the master. <NLRB vs, Skinner and Kennedy Stationary Co., 113 Fed. 2d., 667,) .. ''His inte1·est properly may be adverse to that of the employe1· when it comes to fixing his own wages, hours, SPniority rights or working conditions. He does not lose his right to serve himself in those reSpects because he serves his maste1· in others. x x x." (33U U. S. 485.) Valencia was, in the case of his dismissal by the Cebu Poitland Cement Company an employee, not a. part of the management, and his case properly fa1Js under the category of an industrial dispute falling under the jurisdiction of the Cou1t of Industrial Relations. And the fact that his position was among the highest in a government enterprise did not change the nature of his case or his relation to his employer. Let us now consider the merits of the arguments submitted by :petitione1· in justifica.tion of Valencia's separation. It is claime.d that this was made in the interest of economy and efficiency. There is no question that the position of general superintendent was not abolished; its salary was reduced only, from P12,000 to Pl0,800 pc-r annum, That of assistant general superintendent, which carried a salary of P6,000 a.nd which was held by one Ocampo, was SUPp1-essed .- Instead of retiring Ocampo, whoS<, position was abolished, 244 LAWYERS JOURNAL May s1, 1954 Valencia was retired, even as his position was retained, and Ocampo 2. promoted to take his CValencia'sl position. As Valencia's posi. IBID; IBID; RESTITUTION OR REPARATION AS THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY. - The purpose of the law is to place the offended party as much as possible in the same condition as he was before the offense was committed against him. So if t!te crime consists in the taking away of bis property, the first remedy granted is that of restitution of the thing taken away. If restitution can not be made, the law allows the offended party the next best thing, .reparation , tion was not abolished or suppressed, Valencia should not have been separated by retirement; it should have been Ocampo who should have been retired because of the aboUtion of his own position. Petitioner's argument in effect is as follows: that there is economy if Valencia is separated and Ocampo retained, but none if Ocampo, whose position is abolished, is retained &.nd Valencia dismissed. The absurdity of the contention is evident; it is its own refutation. ~:i~~~s b~t e:~::.~:iym~~t h~;: !:;~!~~o!~e r;t~~~::ly:f ~:ie;;;::~ B. IBID; IBID; REPARATION MAY NOT BE MADE BY THE DELIVERY OF A SIMILAR THING. - Reparation may not be made by the delivery of a simiJar thing <same amount, kind or spP.cics and qua1ityJ, because the value of the thing taken may have decreased since the offended party was deprived there. of. Reparation, therefore, should consist of the price of the thing taken, as fixed by the court <Art. 106, Revised Penal Code). tion was merely the opportune occasion for a dismissal without cause. Wu the dismissal in the interest of efficiency? The CIR found that Valencia's efficiency is shown by the greater amount of production obtained· during his incumbency. Even the petitioner admits that there is no charge of inefficiency. CSee Brief for the Petitioner, p. 89.) But the separation was recominended "for the good of the aei'Vice/' implying that there were valid reasons therefor. NoM 4. appear in the record. On the other hand, the evidence submitte1l prove Valencia's efficiency. Even if there were rea.sons therefor, which were not disclosed, the separation would still be illegal because IBID; IBID; AMOUNT TO BE PAID TO THE OFFENDED PARTY AS. REPARATION; MONEY AS STANDARD OF VALUE. - In the case at ba:r, the court considered the payment of P600 as the next beet thing, if the property taken could not be returned. No valid objection can be raised against this decision; money is the standard of value, and, except in finan. cial crises, it does pot fluctuate in value as much as merchandise or things, especially those bought and sold in the ordinary course of commerce. no charges of any kind whatsoever appear to have been filed against him and neither does any opportunity appear to have been given him to answer them or to defend himself against them. The above considerations cover the most important points raised in this appeal; it would be unprofitable to answer all the other ar. guments, most of which are high.sounding claims without founda.. tion in fact and in law, Suffice it for us to state that we have carefully examined the recOrd and we find no reason or ground to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the judgment. The findings of faet are based on the testimonial and documentary evid~nce submitted. The claim that the facts appearing in the record are not sta.ted, or that the requirements of due process of law have been igno1·ed, find no support in the recQJ"d, it appearing that every opportunity was afforded petitioner to present its side. The judgment is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Para.s, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor; Reyes; Jugo and Bautista Angelo, J. J., concur. Mr. Justice Concepcion &.nd Mr. Justice Diokno did not take part. XIX The People of the Philippiius, Plaintiff, Antonio Espada, Of. fended-Party.Appellee, 'VS Pelagi., Jl..fo11ta8esa et al., AcCUBsed-AppellanU, G. R. No. L-5684, January 22, 1954. 1. CRIMINAL LAW·; CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. - The defendants were found guilty of the crime of coercion and were sentenced either to return the articles in question <two bales of tobacco) to the com:plainant or to indemnify him of the same of P632.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In compliance therewith, the accused delivered to the provincial sheriff two bales of tobacco but in ·spite -of this the provincial sheriff levied up1>n certain real properties of the accused. The accused claimed tha.t tobacco is a fungible thing and that in accordance with article 1598 of the Civil Code, the obligation of one who receives money or fungible things is to return to the creditor the sa.me amount or thing owned of the same kind or specie and quality, Held: The civil liability of the accused.appellants, in the case at bar, is not governed by the Civil Code, as contended, but by Articles 100-111 of the Revised Penal Code. In accordance therewith, the sentence is for the return of the very thing, taken, restitution. and if this can not be done, for the payment of P600 in lieu thereof, t"epa1"ation. Thie amount represents the value of the two bales of tobacco taken, at the time of the taking, and this va.lue was fi.ii:ed by the court presumably in accordance with the evidence adduced during the trial. Julio SiCl'IJOco for appellants. No appearance for a.ppeJlees in the Supreme Court. DECISION LABRADOR, J. : In the above entitled criminal ease, the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of coercion and were sentenced by the Court of Appeals, as follows: "x x x the penalty is increased to four (4) months and one (1) day of arreeto mayor, and that appellant should also be sentenced either to return the articles in question to the com. plainant or to indemify him in the sum of P632.00, with subsi. diary imprisonment in case of insolvtncy, xx x." When the case was returned to the Court of .First Instance for the execution of the above sentence, said court issued an order of execution for P600, the value of two bales of tobacco obtained by the acacueed from the offended party. The provincial sheriff levied upon certain real properties of the accused Paulino Dumagat to secure the payment thereof, notwithstanding the fact in oomplianee with the judgment, the accused had delivered to him (the sheriff) two bales of tobacco. So the accused presented a motion in court pi·aying tha.t the order of execution be set aside. The offended party opposed the petition, and the court sustained this opposition, deriying the petition to set aside the order. Against this order of denial, the accused have prosecuted thi.q appeal. In their brief, the accused claim that tobacco is a fungible thing and that, in accordance with Article 1593 of the Civil Code, the obligation of one who receives money or fungible things is to return to the creditor the same amount of the thing owed of the same kind or species and quality. The civil liability of the accused-appellants, in the case at bar, ir1 not governed by the Civil Code, as contended, but by Articles 100~111 of the Revised Penal Code. In accordance therewith, the sentence is for the return of the very thing taken, Testitution, and if this can not be done, for the payment of P600 in lieu thereof, t"eparation, This amount represents the value of the two bales of tobacco taken, at the time of the taking, arid this value was fixed by the court presumably in accordance with the evidence adduced during the trial. , The purpose of the law is to place the offended party as much as possible in the same condition as he was before the offense Wa! committed against him. So if the crime consists in the taking away May 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL 246
pages: 243-245