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Juan D. Crisologo, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Pablo Villalobos, Respondents, G. R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title

Juan D. Crisologo, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Pablo Villalobos, Respondents, G. R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Language

English

Source

The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Criminal Law

Treason

Commonwealth Act No. 408

Court of First Instance -- Zamboanga

Criminal Procedure

Double Jeopardy

Juan D. Crisologo

Certiorari and Prohibition

Rights

Abstract

[The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo was accused of treason but prior to this, he has three other charges. First and third, were those of treason while the second was that of having certain civilians killed in time of war. He was found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the second wherein he was sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment. It appears that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil Court is the same. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed and granted wherein the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in the court ordered dismissed.]

Fulltext

part of the two brothe1·s and Abi to rob the house and to kill the inmates in order to better hide the crime, an agreement which they aetually carried out. This is supported not only by the vE:ry testimony of the two brothers Motin and Apolonio, admitting that after the killing they took part in rans&eking the house and taking awar money and articles, but by t.he test.l.mony of Roque Idala whl) l\ccording to him responded to Maria's shouts for help and witnes~d p:ll't C'l the killing by the two brothers from his place of hiding and observation, a distance of several metE:l'S from the house, He also s:iw the killers, including the two brothers leave the house ca.rrying in bundles what they had taken from Leyson's dwelling, According to ldala after the marauders had left be entered the house and saw the dead b~dies on the floor. Tb~ participation of Motin and Apolonio in the ki1ling a11d the l"Obbery is further supporb .. -d by their own affidaYits, Exhibits A-1 a.nd B-1, wherein they admit that once in the house of Leyson and afte1· Maria had told ti.em that there was no food in the house, the two brothe1·s took part in killing the inmates after they saw Abi initiate the murderous assault. This, to sa.y nothing ot' thoir spont9.neous plea of guilty to th(' eha1·ge applied equally to all. It cannot fail to create a resentment in the hearts of the herein accused beca.~se, whereas they are to suffer the extreme penalty of the law for the crime, Abi, who is as guilty, if not more, as they are, is free. Ca.ses as this is one of the causes of tlie people's losing respect for the law and faith in the government. But the non-prosecution of Abi canr.ot be an impediment to the conviction of the accused if they are really guilty." With the modification above euutrterated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice a.nd the Chief, Philippine Cons.. tabulary. Paras, Pablo, Beng:um, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, J'ugo, Bautista Angelo ll.nd Labrador, J. J., concur. XII Juan D. Crisologo, Petitioner, 11s. People of tlu Philippines and Hon. Pablo Villalobo8, Respondents, G. R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954. of robbery with homicide, not robbery with triple murder (l) was striken from the record. As to the voluntariness of the affidavits, Exhibits A-1 nnd B-1, Eufr<'.lnio A. Escalona, Justice of the Peace l. of Libaea?, before whom they were sworn ~ssured the Court that CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; CASE AT BAR. - C was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under A1ticle 114 of the Penal Code in an information filed in the people's court but before C could be bi-ought under the jurisdiction of the cou1t, he was on January 13, 1947 indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the articles of war before a military court. The indictment contained three charges two of which were those of treason, while the other was that of having certain civilians killed in time of war, He ws.s found guilty of the second and was sentenced to life impri-sonment. he read to the affiants the contents in t.he local dialeet and told them tha.t they could either affirm or deny the truth the1·eof, but. that they told him that they contained the truth. Even during the trial Motin and ApoJonio told the court that they were neither intimidated nor maltreated by the Ccnstnbulary or the police. The crime committed' by ap11ellants which is the complex crime of robbery with homicide, not r.:ibbery with triple mul'der Cl) was truly hideous and shocking, not only beeause of the massacre of th1·ee innocent persons but because the killing of two of the victims was clearly unnecessary. Even if the two had been spal'ed, they were too young Caged 3 and 1-1/2 years) to remember and to relate the occurence and identity of the culprits; and the gouging of the eyes of the little boy as confessed by Apolonlo is a manifestation of waD.. ton cruelty and hruta)ity. Ordinarily, this honifying crime deserves the death penalty imposed by the trial court because of the pusence of SPVeraI aggravating circumstances, such as dwelling, uninhabited place, abuse of superior strength, etc.• but some members of this Tribunal are inclined to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment not only because of ignorance and lack of instruction of the defendants ~i~~ ~::s: ::vi~::~ :::;u:~~;~hri~~~n~i:e~d ~:: ~:c~s:f i:s~:;:: 2· tion in the mountains, Apolonio told the court th&t he had never been to. the poblacion of Libacao within whose territorial jurisdiction he had· been living since birth. Lacking the necessary number of votes to impose the extreme penalty, the death penalty imposed by the trial court is hereby reduced to life imprisonment; and following the. sugg~_stion of the Solicitor General, the indemnity to the heh·s imposed by trial cou1·t fo1· the killing should be raised to P6,000.00, and the value of the articles taken away raised fl"Om P273-.60 to P303.60. We notice that Abi, the person who according to the two bi:others, was the leader, up to no\v has not yet been arrested despite the issuance of the conesponding warrant against him and although 3. according to the appellant he was still living in the sitio of Taroytoy not f&r from their home. The authoriiies should continue or renew their efforts to bring him to justice. We quote with approval a paragraph of the decision from on this point. With the approval of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the people's court, the criminal case in the court against C was, pursuant to . the p1-ovisions of said act, tra.nsferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the cou1t and pleading double jeopardy because of his sentence in the military court. The court denied the motion. IBID; TREASON A CONTINUOUS OFFENSE. - Treason being a continuous offense, one who commitS it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as the1·e are overt acts, because all overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those constitute but a single offense." (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 31. 1953l and it has been repeatedly held that a person cannot be fouttd guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the inform&tion for tr~son even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those ove1t acts are not separate offens"a distinct from that of treas~n but constitutes ingredients thereof. COURT; CONCURRENT JUR>ISDICTION. - Mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court prfority to take cognizance af the offense, it being neces.. s&ry in addition that the court wher~ the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the J;iel'Son of the defendant. "The court notes that Abi was a co-accused in the Justice of the Peace of origin. A warrant was issued for his arrest. The record does not show what happened with the case with respect to Abi after the warrant of arrest was issued. This, in spite of the fact that Abi, according to the herein accused. is not hiding. HE: is in Taroytoy. This shows reluctance on the part of the peace and prosecuting officers to bring Abi to the bar of justice. Such an attitude cannot fail to create in the mind$ of many a belief that, &t times, the law is not 4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CONVIC.. {l) U.S. v, Landeean, 36 Phil. 869. People v. M1111uel, 44 Phil. 533. Tl-ON OR ACQUITTAL IN A CIVIL COURT NOT A B~R TO A PROSECUTION IN THE MILITARY COURT; EXCEPTION. - There is, for sure, a rule that where an act trans.. gre.sses both civil and military law and subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military authority, a conviction or O.Il aCquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a p1-oseeution in the military court, and vice 11uaa. But the rule "is strictly limited to the case of a singie act which infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to constitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the co:gMay 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL 288 nizance of the milita1·y courts and the other is subject of civil jurisdietion" <15 Am. Jur, 72), and it doe11 not apply where both cou1·ts derive their powers from the same sovereigncy <22 C. J. S. p. 449.> . It, therefore, has no &pplication to th9 present case where the military court that convicted the pe~ titioner and the civil cou1·t which propoSes to try him aguin derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not 1isputed that the charges of treason tried in the court martial wer<' punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a zii.atter of fact impliedly admitted by tha Solicitor Gener&l. that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Antonio V. Raquiza, Floro Crisologo and Carlos Horrill4ino for petitioner. Pa.blo Villalobos for respondent. DECISION REYES, J.: The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain .in the USAFFTt:: during the last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the P~ilippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Art. 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an inform&tion filed in the People's Court. But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 18, 1947, indicted for violations ·Of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the Army Chiet of Staff, the indictment 'containing three charges, two of which, the fi:r_:st and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information a.nd aid to the eneny leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and cOoperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third chargt;s but guilty of the second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to lif~ imprisonment. With the approval on June 1'1, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People's Court, the ~riminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, eba}... lenging the juriadi.ction of the court and pleading double jeopardy be.cause of his previous sentenCe in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this Court to ha.ve the trial judge desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case. '!'.he petition is opP,Osed by the Solicitor General who, in UPholding the jurisdiction of the trial judge, denies that petitioner is being subjected to double jeopardy. As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts. The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the case of U. S. vs. Tubig, 3 Phil. 244, a soldiel' of the "United States Army in the Philippines was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assasinated one Antonio Alivia. Upon arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been previously convicted and sentenced by a court.martiR.I tor the same offense and had already served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea :>n the grounds tha.t as the provincl! where the offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the . military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this Court held that "one who has been tried and convicted by a court ma1'!ial under circumstances giving that tribunal juris.. diction of the defendant and of the offense, has been once in jeoll&l'dy and cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in another court of the same sovereignty." In a later case, Grafton ''s. U. S. 11 Phil. 776, a private in the United .states Army in the Philippines was tried by a general court martial for homicide under the Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court. he was prosecuted in the Court of First ln2tance of Iloilo for mu1'der under the general Jaws of the Philippines. Invoking his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it in bar of proceedings against him in the civil cou1·t, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trial found him guilty of homicide and sentenced him to prison. The sentence was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States-, the sentence was reversed and defendant acqbitted, that court holding that "defendant, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to have been committed by him by a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of the United States, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in . a civil court exercising authority in the PhmPpines:" There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military law and subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court ca.nnot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the milita_ry court, and vice versa. But the rule "is strictly Umited to t"he case of a single act which infrin!E!S both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to ~onstitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizanee of the military courts and the other a subject of civil jurisdiction" ns A. Jur. 72>, and it does not apply where both courts derive their powers fl'om the same sovereign.. ty. (22 C. J. S. p. 449.) It, therefore, ha.a no app1ication tc the pi-esent case where the military court that convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him again derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that the charges of treason tried in the court martial were punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly admitted by the Solicitor General tha.t the two courts have concun-ent jurisdiction over the offense charged. It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military cou1·t is different from that cha1·ged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People's Court ha.d previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the. amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt act11 distinct from those charged in the-. military court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not specifi~ in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of which is within the cognizance of the mi1itary courts and the other is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense." <Guinto vs. Veluz, 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 81, 1958.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains a.n enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before t11e military court is immate~ial since the new alleged overt acts do nnt in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense foom that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held' th&t a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts considered separately, are punishable by law, fC1r the simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from that of tr1::oson but constitutes ingredients thereof. Respond.. ents cite the eases of Melo vs. People, 47 Off. Gaz., 4681, and People vs, Manolong, 47 Off. Gat., 5104, where this Court held: "Where after the first pl"lsecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the ~ha­ racter of the offen11e and, together with the facts existing at the tiine, constitutes a. new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if' indicted for the new offense." But respondent overlook that in the present case no new facts have 2Sf LAWYERS ,TOURNAL May 31, 195' supervened that would change the nature of the offenae for which petitioner was tried in the military court, the alleged additional overt acts specified in the amended information in the civil court ha"Ving already taken pla.ce when petitioner was indicted in the former court. Of more pertinent application is the following from 15 American Jurisprudence, 56-5~: 4'SubJect to statutory provisions a11d the interpretation thereof for the purpose of arriving at the intent of the legislature in enacting them, it may "be said that as a rule only one prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and· that where an offense charged consists of a series of acts extending over a period of time, a conviction or acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will ba.r a prosecution covering the whole period. In such case the offense is single and indivisible; &nd whether the time alleged is longer or shorter, the com. mission of the acts which constitute it, within any portion to give the explanation and had submitted the required evidence, for him and in behalf of Atty. F, there waa no reason to require the further personal appearance of the petitioner for the same purpose in Bacolod on some other da.te. The swom explanation is according· to our rule~ prima facie evidence <Sec. 100, Rule 123). 3, IBID; IBID; IBID. - Atty. 14 who had sworn that the fact.a stated in the explanati~ are of his personal knowledge, and who was the one called upon to attend the Criminal Case of the 15th day of Sept., 1963, was a competent person to give a pertinent explanation of the absence of the petitioner on the date of trial on Sept. 15, and he actually offered to give such explana.. tion. It does not appear that there was any question asked of him a~ut the non.appearance of the petitioner· which he could not answer by his own knowledge and about which only Atty, F could give legally admissabJe answe1-. of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for other aCts committed within the same time. x x x." · 4• IBID; IBID; IBID. - The denial to hear Atty. M's explana.. tion only because it includes Atty. F's 'ex:planation,,is against the law. It is indisputable that he has the right to be heard in its own representations. then and there. There was no reaaon to compel him to come back. It was also indisputable that Atty. F had also the right. to be heard "by himself or counsel" <Rule 64, Sec. 3). There was at the moment no reason at all to requh·e his personal appearance, even laying aside his delicate state of health at the time which wa!!I an impediment for him to travel. As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction ovU the case. well lmown is the rule that when several courts ha.ve con.. current jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclu8ion of the athers. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. C22 C. J. S. pp. 186-18'1.) . Tbe record in the present case shllWs that the information for tre._ son in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner JUSTICE ANGELO BAUTISTA, concurring. had not yet been a.rreat4d or brought into the custody of the court - l, the warrant of attest .had not ~ been inued - when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that cou~ priorit)· lo take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of defendant. ' It a.ppearing that the offense charged in the mili'bt.ry court 2. and in the civil Court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try ~he case and 'that both Ct)Urts derive their powers froni- one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court tn the petitioner shouJd, in accordance with the precedents above. cited, be a bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. 3. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed. Without costs. Paf'0.8,. Pa.blo, Bengzon, Padilla, M~tema.yor, Jugo, Ba.uti8ta Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, J, J., concur. XIII CONTE.MPT OF COURT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. - The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts a.nd ia essential to their right of self.preservation, "The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such para.nty said institution would be resting on a veey shaky foundation." Th.is power is i-ecognized by our Rules of Court <Ru1e 64.). IBID; KINDS OF CONTEMPT. - Under this rule, contempt is' divided into two kinds: (1) direct contempt, that is, one committed in the presence o!, or so near, the Judge as to obstruct him in. the administration of justice; and t2) constructive contempt, or that which is committed out of the presence of the court, as in refusing to obey it& order or lawfuJ process. · IBID; HOW IT SHOULD BE INITIATED. - As a rnle, con.. tempt proceedin.c is initiated by filing a 'charge in writing with the court. <Section 3, :RuJc 64.) It has·been held however that the court ma.y motu fWOpio require a person to answer why he &hould not be punished fo1· contemptuous behaviom·. Such power is necessary for its own p1-otection against an imp1·oper inte1·fe1·ence with the due administration of justice. Vicente J. FNticisco atid F·ra.nciscn Marasigan, Petition.M"B, vs. Edutwdo Ent~, Judge of the CoW""t of Fi-rst Instance of Negros Occidental, Respondent, G. R. No. L.7058, March 20, 1964. 1. CONTEMF1.' OF COURT; FAILURE OF AN ATTORNEY TO APPEAR AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE; EXPLANATION FOR .SUCH FAILURE; CASE AT BAR. - Attorney F and 4.. IBID; CASE AT BAR. - The contempt under consideration is a constructive one it having arisen in view of the failure of Attys. F and M to obey an 01-d.er of the court, and for such failure i·espondent Judge ordered them to appear and show cause why they should not be punished. for contempt. The1-e wa.s therefore no formal charge filed against them but the action wa111 taken directly by the court u~n- its own initiative. his assistant M with law office in Manila were the lawyers of L &. in a. criminal ease instituted in Negros Occidental. On the day when the trial of the case was to be resumed in BaCPlod both lawyei·s dld not appear. Ju~ Eduardo Enriquez ordered their arrest. Attorney F requested that the order be suspended and sent Attorney M to Negros to explain that their failure to at.. tend at the trial was fully justified. Judge Eniiquez refused to listen to Attorney M's explanation because he wanted Attorney F to appP.ar peJ:sonally and to be the one to pplain why he did / . not appear on the said date. Held: The order is without reason &ll;d the judge acted in excess o! jurisdiction. 6. 2. IBID; IBID; IBID« - After the required explanation had been presented under oath, and after Atty. M J1a.d. appeared in per.son IBID; WAIVER OF APPEARANCE. - The rule on th-a matter is not cJcar <Section 3, Rule 64>. While on one hand it allows a person charged with contempt to appear by himself or by com1sel, on the other, the rule contains the foJ1owing provision: "But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court front iwuing process to bring the accused party into court or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.'' Ap. parently, this is the provision on which respondent Judge is now relying in insisting On the persona£ app£arance of Atty. F. IBID; POWER OF THE COURT TO ORDER .ARREST OF THE ACCUSED PARTY. - This powet <to order the 11.rrest of the accused party> can only be exercised when there ere good reasons justifying its exercise. The record discloses -none. The May 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL 235

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