Feliz Fabella and Ernesto Figueroa, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, Vicente D. Alobog, and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., Defendants--Appellants, G. R. No L-6090, November 27, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: Feliz Fabella and Ernesto Figueroa, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, Vicente D. Alobog, and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., Defendants--Appellants, G. R. No L-6090, November 27, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Pleading -- Philippines; Court of First Instance -- Rizal
Rights
Abstract: [This is an action for damages instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal arising from the attachment of a movie house together with all equipment, machineries and furniture found therein, the ownership of which in disputed.]
Fulltext: eurrentes el Bon. Jtiez recurrid.o estaba autorisado Por el ultimo parrafo del art. 3 de la Regla 64 que prov~e que el miamo no se in .. terpretari. de modo que impida al Juzga.do ordenar que el acusado sea traido al Juzgado o de tenerle detenido durante la pendencia del incidente. Se pueden tambien invoca.r al mismo efecto los arts. 5 y 6 de la misma regla. Sin emba.TgO, el arresto de Joa recurrentes e~ abandonado y el argumento es por tanto imn&terial. Entonces todo lo que quedaba del incidente era resolverlo. EN VlRTUD DE LO EXPUESTO, se concede el recurso. La. orden del 24 de septiembre de 1953,. en cuanto requiere a Joa recurren. tes que comparezcan ante el Hon. .Juez recurrido para un tramite Ya hecho, cual es, el de explicar la incamparecencia de loa miamoa en la vista del dla 15 de septiembre de 1963 de la cauaa criminal No. 3220 del Juzgado de Primero Inatancia de Negros Occidental queda anulada. Sin coataa. Asi se ordena. Para.ti, Bengzon, MontemagOT', /"1Jo, Labrador, Pablo, Padil~; Reves and BautistG Angelo, J. J., concU:r. · BAUTISTA ANGELO, I., concm•ring: On SepW-mber 15, 1953, date set for the continuation of the bearing of the case, Attys. Francisco and Marasigan, Who were .appearing for the accused, failed to show up, whereupon respondent J'udge issued an order for their aueat. Informed of this order, Atty. Francisco sent a wire askins for an opportunity to explajn. The order was S11Bpended btat Atty&. Francisco and Marasigan were required to appear personaUv on September 24. Atty. Francisco replied by telegram informing the court that he could not appear on the date .set due to failing health and doctor's advice, but was submitting his explanation through Atty. Marasigan. Atty. Mara.. sigan in effect appeared on the date set but respondent Judge re.. fUsed to hear his explanation if it would include that of Atty. Francisco. A portion of the transcript showing what has taken plaee during the hearing is as follows: "Court: I have told you already that I will not accept any explanation from somebody else but from Mr. Francisco himself. He must oppea.,. he.,.e pe-rsonall'/I. - 1 ' - - J I . - - x - "Atty. Marasigan: x x x If in a criminal action the accused can waive his presence, why cannot Atty. Francisco waive his presence and allow me, instead in the meantime to e."Cplain for him, Your Honor! "Court: I can tell you that a defendant in a criminal case can waive his presence in certain stage in the proceedings but he cannot waive his presence to be arraigned of this informs.tion or charge. He ·mu.st be pnaent he.,.e. He cannot be represented by somebody else. "Attr. Marasigan: But in this case there is no arraignment, Your Honor. As a rule, contempt p1'0Ceeding is initiated by filing a charge in writing with the court. <Section 3, Rule 64.) It baa been held however that the court may motu provrio require a person to answe:r whf he should not be pUnished for contemptuous behavior. Such power is necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice <In re Quirinor 76 Phil. 630>. The contempt under considel'Btion is a constructive one it having arisen in view of the failure oJ Attys. Francisco and Marasipn to obey an order of the court, and for such failure respondent Judge ordered them to appea.r and show cause why they sho11.ld not be punished for contempt. There was therefore no formal charge filed against them but th~ action was taken directly by the court upon its own initiative. The question that now araies is: Can ~ha. attorneys waive their pet"sonal appea.nime as ordered -by the court? The ru]e on the matter is not clear (Section 3, Rule 64>.. While on one hand it allows a person charged with contempt to appear by himself or by counsel, on the other, the rule contains the following proviso: ''But nothing in this section shaJl be so construed aa to prevent the court from issuing pt'OCf'ss to bring the accused party into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.'' Apparently. thia is the provision oii. which respondent Judge is now i-elying in insisting on the persona] appearance of Atty. Francisco. I believe, however, that this power can only be tixercised when there a.re good reasons justifying its exercise. The record discloses none. The reason for the appearance is already well known. The contemptuous charge was clP.ar. The only thing required was for Atty. Francisco to explain his conduct. Thia he did in his telegram to the cuurt intimating that his failure to appear was due to !ailing health and doctor's advice, while, on the other hand, he caused Atty. Marasigan to appclar for him and elaborate on his explanation. ThiS attitude, in my opinion, is a substantial compliance with the rule a.nd justifies the action taken by Atty. Francisco. XIV Feli% Fabella and E'THBsto Figuet"oa, Plainti/fa-AppeUeea, vs. Ths Provincial Sheri.fl of Riznl, Vicente D. Alobog, and Alto Surety a.n.d Insurm1ce Co. 111.c,, Defndonts .. AppeUa'fttB, G. R. No L.6090, No11emb&r 27, 1953. l. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ITS NATURE. - The nature of a judgment on the pleadings maybe found in Section 10, ~ule 36 of the Rules of Court, which provides "where an answer fails to tender an iuue, or otherwise admits the m&terial allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading, ezcept in actions for annulment of ma1:riage or divorce wherein the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." The rules contain no other provision on the matter. "Court: Precisely he ia required to be here, to be apprai~ of 2 the charge. IBID; WHO MAY ASK JUDGMENT. ON THE PLEADINGS.Apparently, in this jurisdiction the rul.:= regarding judgment on the pleadings only applies where an answer fails to tender an issue and plaintiff invokes the rule. The rule is silent as to whether a similar relief· may be asked by the defendant, although under American jurisprudence, the rule applies to either party. "Atty. Marasigan: In a criminal charge there is an arraignment but in a contempt proceedings, there is none. 11Court: Why not? That is the reason Why the cnurt wants him to .be present hel't! to ~ apprised of the charges. 1'Atty. Maiasigan: But he is apprised alnadu. As a matter of fact there is no arraignment." The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to their right of. ·self-preservation. "The reason for this is that i-espect fo1· the~ ciiurts guarantees, the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty sa.id institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation." (Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724..) This powel" is recognized by our Rules of Court <Rule 64). Under this rule, contempt is divi.ded into two kinds: (l)_ direct contempt, that is, one committed in the presence of, or so near, the Judge AS to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and <2> constructive contempt, or that which is committed out of the presence of the court. as in refusing to obey its order or lawful proceaa. <Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 366, 871; lso Yick Mon v. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548; Caluag v. Pecson, 46 0. C. <a>, 514.> 3. IBID; CASE ILLUSTRATING THE NATURE AND APPL!. CATION OF THE RULE. - We have in this jurisdiction q11ite a good number of cases illustrating the nature and application of the rule. As a.n illustration and guidance, we may cite the following restatement of the rulings found in different cases decided by this Court: When the defendant neither denies nor admits the material allegation of the complaint, judgment on the pleadings is proper <Alemany, et a1. v. Sweeney, 3 Phil. 114>. But where the defendant's anaWer tenders an issue, judgment on the plea.dings should not be rendered <Ongsin v. Riarte, 46 O. G. No. 1, p. 67). And when the defendant admits all allegations of the complaint, the adniiasion is a sufficient gl'Ound for judgment. One who prays for judgment on the ple~ngs without offering proof as to the truth of h:is own 238 LAWYERS JOURNAL May 31, 1964 allegations, and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the OPposing pal'ty, and to i-est his motion for judgement on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are ad.. mitted in the pleadings. (Bauermann v. Caaas, 10 Phil. 386; Evangelista v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil., 116: Tanehico v. Ramos, 48 0, G. [1] 654,l 4. IBID; WHEN JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ll!AY BE RENDERED. - Judgment on the pleadings can only be rendered when the pleading of the party against whom the mo.. tion is directed, be he plaintiff or defendant, does not tender a.ny issue or admits all the material allegations of the pleading of the movant. Otherwise, j'udgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered. I. C. Monsod for appellant Vicente D. Alobog. Ped'J'"O C. Glof'ia fOr a}>pellees. . DE c·I s I 0 N BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: of plaintiffs state: 'THAT PLAINTIFFS DENY GENERALLY. AND SPECIFICALLY EACH AND EVERY ALLEGATION CONTAINED IN EACH AND EVERY PARAGRAPH oF THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM.; That the herein moving party is thus entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. That the defendant Vicente D. Alobog is ready to present evidence as to the amount of Damage suffered by him therein alleged. WHEREFORE, p1·emises considered, the undersigned pny for an order giving judgment 'in favor of the defendant Vi .. cente D. Alobog and against the plaintiffs based on the plead. ings on file; that the defendant Vicente D. Alobog be allowed to present evidence as to the amount of damage suffered by him as therein aJlegt!d; and further pray for· such other and further relief as the court may deem just with costs, against the plaintiffs." ' What is the nature of a judgment on the pleadings? This point is well defined in our Rules of C.ourt. Thus, in Section 10, Rule 35, it is provided that "where a.n answer fails to tender an issue, 01· otherwise admits the material allegaticms of the adve1·se party's pleading, the cou1t may, on motinn of that party, direct judgment This is an actfon for damages instituted in the Court of First :~easd~:~. P!:::~~~'inex::~!n~n f~~ti:~~:i:e:;-1~~lm::r~gem:;ri;~r:: :~ii::: :i:iz:111·a:~~ii;~e~r::' ::h~!=~:e:~dof!:rn7t:%e ::::: wherein the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be therein, the owne1·ship ·of which is disputed. . :~::i;, ·i~h~~=l~:r~::::::nn~h:th;:1:r;;~;;in'; :=:;:!~r~n ~i; the ~::n!:~t d:~:;t;0:~:~g 0~il:i:r~t, ~:ti:~edto a!isi::e;n!h:!: pleadings only applies where an an"ewer fails to tender a.n issue and he denied specifically aµ the material allegations of the complaint =~~~ti!!u~~v::; ~e •1:~l~ b~h:ieru~:,!::!~~tal~~o:ghw:::: :n:~ and ~~i:~::::n:~::tit~: a:!:~e;;~~i!ef:::.~:;n!e~~;u~:i:1:~~~ . rican jurisprudence, the rudle applies to either party. CRoxoline deny "generally and specifically each and every allegation eon- Petroleum Co. v. Craig, et al., 300 P. 620; 71 C. J. S. p. 883.) tained in each and every paragraph" of said counterclaim. There- Iese ~~i:h:::: ~:;' i!~~k:u~ew:e:~; :~~ ;!°;:; 0 :d ::':.~ :!:' ~e~~:~~:!~~~ :.:~=gio ct:~::n,-: i:::, ::-:~f'i:0;:;. in this jurisdiction quite a good number of cases illustrating the praying that judgment be rendered in his favor and against plain- nature and application of the rul". Aa an illustration and guidtiffa, asking at the same time that he be allowed to present evi- :;:e•tl:e f:;~:w~:; :~-:!~e!s 0~8 i::!u=::an f::~~~d:~~r::t in:• dene;.h~: :oti:: ~~;us:! ~!r ~::;, ~:ti:scl;!~::.~~ 0~i~i:n:u: SES decided by this Court: When the defendant neither denies nor Eel failed to appE.ar, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court that admits the material allegations of the complaint, judgment on the he was agreeable that a judgment on the pleadings be rendered pleadings is proper <Alemany, et al. v. Sweeney, 3 Phil. 114). But as prayed for in the motion of defenda.nt. Accordinily, the court where the defendant's answer tenders an issue, judgment on the rendered judgment granting practically the relief prayed for in pleadings should not be rendered <Ongsin v. Riarte, 46 O. G. No. 1, the complaint. From this decision defendant has appealed. p. 67). And when the defE'ndant admits all allegations of thE' comThe cHe was originally taken w the Court of Appeals, b>it when plaint, the admission is a sufficient ground· for judgment. One the case was called for hearing appellant's counsel admil..ted tru.t who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof he was "merely raising questions of law, to which appelleea' counsel as to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the op. agreed, &8 in fact the latter alleged in his brief that said cou1t ~~~:g J~:ii~ni::P:~:::i: ~I i~~~~~~~e==~ !:~':.!': :::::: ~as th:o ~ ~=;~:~i~ouo~~r ~:er::0:~h!~!~t. =~u~:r:i::i;ar!~: tions of the opposing party, and to rest his motion for judg111ent on Court. · those allegations taken together with such of his own as are adThe motion which ·the lower court considered as one for judg- mitted in the pleadings. <Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil., 386; Evanment on the pleadings a.nd which served as basis of its decision i-eads gelista v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil., 115; Tanchico v. Ramos, 48 0. G. as follows: (1) 654. > It is apparent from these rulings that judgment on the pleadings can only be rendered when the pleading of the party ''Comes now defendant Vicente A\obog, by and through his against whom the motion is· directed, be he plaintiff or defendant, undersigned. counsel and to this Honorable Court moat res- does not tender any issue, or admits all the material allega.tions of peetfully shows: the pleading of the movant. Otherwise, judgment on the pleadings 1. That the defendant Vicente D. Alobog in answer to cannot be rendered. the plaintiffs' complaint on file denying the allegations con- If we consider the motion filed by the defenda.n.t wkerein he tained therein, except paragraph 1 and in a wa.y paragraphs 8, l>rsyed th!l.t judgment be rendered on the pleading in the light of 5, 6, and 13, for the truth of the matter are as stated in the the foregoing rules, one cannot but reach the conclusion that what Affirmative and Special defenses, and by way of Counterclaim was intended was merely to ask fCtr judgment in so far as the reproduces all the allegations of his 'Answer', 'Affirma.tive De- couterclaim contained in his answer is concerned iJ\ view of the fense' and 'Special· Defense' and incorporated therein aa part failure of the plaintiffs to traverse it as required by the roles. of said Counterclaim in the amount of Twelve Thousand This is i·efiected in the second paragraph of the motion wherein CP12,000.00> Pesos for damages suffered by said defendant. defendant makes patent the fact that plaintiffs' answer to his 1aid counterclaim of said defendant Vicente. D. Alobog, said counterclaim failed to tender an issue because it merely pleaded a answer dated September 6, 1960, failed to tender an issue, and general denial Thia is also refieeted in the prayer wherein he instead in law admit the material allegations of the ea.id 1.An- aeked that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the plain.. ; swer', 'Affirmative Defense', 'Special Defense', and 'Counter- tiffs and that he be allowed to present evidence as to the amount claim' of defendant Vicente D. Alobog, for the said answer of damages claimed by him in his coanterclaim. The motion could ll!ay 81, 1964 LAWYERS JOURNAL 289 not have l'efe"rred to the material allegations of the complaint for the simple reason that they were specifically denied in the answer and therefore the latter has tendered an issue which could not be tht= subject of a judgment on the pleadings. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from a careful analysis of the contents of the motion of defendant. A contrary interpretation would be incongruous and contrary to its very purpose. It is for these reasons that we believe that the lower court committed an error in considering the aforemiid motion as an implied admission of all th~ me.terial aUegations of the complaint and in rendering judpent accordingly. Wherefore, the decision 8.ppealed from is hereby ·revoked, without pronOuneementa as to costs. The case is remanded to the lower court. for further proceedings. PanJ.8, Pablo, Bengzrm, Padilla, Tua.son., Montemayor, Rqn, Jugo and Lalwador, J. J., concur. xv Ma.1nuto Mission, et al., Pef.itiOMrs, -vs. Vicente S. del Rosi.Mio, as Acting Mayor of Cebu City, et al., .Respondents, G. R. No. L-6754, Febnta1"1/ 26, 1954. . 1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; "DETECTIVE" DEFINED.-"The word 'detective', as commonly understood in the United States_. is defined. as one of a body of police officers, usually dressed. in plain clothes, to whom is intrusted the detection of crimes and the apprehension of' the offenders, or a policeman whose business is to detect wrongs by adroitly investigating their haunts and habits." [Grand ·Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. King, 83 N.E. 778, 780, 41 Ind. App. 707, citing Am. Diet, and Webst. Diet. (Vol. 12, Words and Phrases, p. SIS.)] 2. IBID; "POLICEMAN" DEFINED. - The term "policemen" may include detectives <62 C.J.S. p. 1091). "3. IBID; "POLICE" DEFINED.-"The term 'police' has been defined as an organized civil fo1·Ce for maintaining order, prevertting and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws, the body of men by which the municipal law, and regulations of a city, town, or district are enforced." 4. IBID; COMMON FUNCTION OF POLICEMEN AND DE· TECTIVES.-With few exceptions, both policemen and detectives perform common functions and duties and both belong to · ·the ·police department. In contemplation of law therefore both shall be considered. as members of the police force. · 6. IBID; REMOVAL OF CITY POLICE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 557 .-Section 1 of Republic Act No. 557 provides, in so far as may be pertinent to their ease, that the members of the ritJJ police shall not be removed "except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine government, serious irregularities in tlle performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty," and in auch eases, chargea shall be preferred by the cit:r mayor and investigated. by the city Council in a public hearing, and the accused shall be given opportunity to make their defense. A copy of the charges shall be furnished the accused and the investigating body shall try the case within ten days from notice. The trial shall be finiahed within a reasonable time, and the investigating body shall decide the ease within fifteen days from the time the case is submitted for decision. The decision of the city council shall be appealable to the Commisaion of Civil Service. · 6. REMOVAL OF CITY POLICE UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264.-Exeeutive Order No. 264, on the other hand, prescribea a more summa:ey procedure. It applies to secret service agents or detectives and provides in a general way that the appointing officer JQ&Y terminate the aerricea of the persons appointed if he deems. it necessary becawse of lack of trust or confidence· and if the person to be separated is a civil• service eligible, the advice ·of his separation shall &tate the reasons therefor. Under this procedure no investiP,tion is necessary, it being sufficient that the appointee be notified. of hia separation based on lack of confidence on the part of the appointing officer. 7~1~.~~;!~!~v~M?nV!~ ~:U~~=~s~ ~:: ;~ were removed by the Mayor because he had lost his confidence in them. The detectives maintain that ~heir removal is illegal because it was made in violation· of the law and the Constitu· tion which protect thoae who are in the civil service. On the pther hand, the mayor contends that their positions being primarily eonfidentia1, their removal ean be effected under Execn.. tive Order No. 264 of the President, on the ground of lack of trust or confidence. HELD: (1) Sec. l of Republic Act No. 557 provides, in so far aa may ~ pertinent to their ease, that the members of the city police shall not be removed "except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine government, serious irregularities in the perf()11nance of th"r duties, and vioh;.tion of law or duty," and in such ease19, charges shall be preferred bY. the city mayor and investigated by the city council in a public hearing, and the accused shall be given opportunity to make their defense, etc. Executive Order No. 264, on the 'other hand, prescribes a mon summary procedure. It applies to secret service agents or detectives and provides in a general way that the appointing officer ma)' terminate the services of the persons appointed if he deems it necessary because of lack of trust or confidence and if the persond to be separated is a civil service eligible, the advice of his separation shall st.ate the reasons therefor. Under this procedure no investigation is necessary, it being sufficient that the appointee be notified of his separation based on lack of confidence on the part of the appointing officer. An analysia of the pertinent provisions of the Charter of t~e City of Cebu (Com. Act No. 58) will reveal that the position of a detective comes under the police department of the city. Thia is clearly deducible from the provisions of sections ,32, 34, and 35. There- , fore, the detectives were illgeally removed from their positions. Fermindo S. Ruiz for petitioners. Jose L. Abad for respondents. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Petitioners were detectives in the Poli~e Department of the City of Cebu duly appointed. by the Mayor of the city. Some of the appointees were civil service eJigibles. ' Their rank, length of Bel'vice, and efficiency rating appear in the certification attached to the petition. On ,May 11, 12, and 19, 1953, petitioners were notified by the Mayor that they had been removed because he has loat his confidence in them. Following their removal, the City Treasurer and City Auditor stopped the payment of their salaries, and after thei1· positions had been declared vacant because of their removal, the City Mayor immed.aitely filled them with new appointees who are presently discharging the function& and duties appertaining thereto. Considering that their removal was made in . violation of the law and of the Constitution which protect those who are in the civil service, petitioners filed the present petition for mandamus in this Court praying that their removal be declared. illegal and without effect and that their reinatatement be ordered and their salaries paid from the date of their removal up to the time of their reinstatement. Respondents in their answer tried to justify the removal -of petitioners contending that, their positions being primarily confidential, their removal can be effected under Executive Order No. 264 of the President of the Philippines, on the ground of lack of trust or confidence. They claim that the Ma:ror of Cebu Ctiy has lost confidence in tliem, and io he separated' them from the service upon due notice. ~e only isaue invo~ved in this petition hinges on the determina· 240 LAWYERS JOURNAL Ma1 31, 195'
pages: 238 - 240