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Manuel Lara, et aL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., Defendant-Appellee, G. R. No. L-6339, April 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title

Manuel Lara, et aL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., Defendant-Appellee, G. R. No. L-6339, April 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Language

English

Source

The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Employer and Employee

Commonwealth Act 444

Rights

Abstract

[This article refers to the complaint of taxi drivers against Petronilo del Rosario, Jr. owner of twenty-five taxi cab which later sold to La Mallorca, a transportation company. This caused for the drivers to lost their job and then request to Mr. del Rosario to compensate their rendered overtime work.]

Fulltext

no necessity for the taking of the deposition. It will simply delay the proceedings. The court will deny 01· set aside the taking of the deposition and the counsel for the plaintiffs can test the validity of the_ ruling of the court in the ap.. pellate court. x x x x As the court $ted from the beginning, the court will issue a formal order directing that no deposition will be taken because that will not be necessary. The court finds that such taking of the deposition will lead the parties or the court to ~o practical result. I will have the order made in due form." Cojuangco moved for the rec'Onsideration of said order, but hia motion was denied. Section 16, of Rule. 18, provides that "after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the actien is operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, 01· even for 24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and state of health 8-nd physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and makes considerable . gross returns and receives much as his 20% commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to :rest between tl"ips and works for a less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his conuniSsion. In other words, his compensation :(or the day depends upon the result ·of his work, wllich in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. pending micy- make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, S. IBID; IBIDi IBID.-ln an opinion dated July 1, 1939 (Opinion etc." It is clear from this section that the taking of a deposi- No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated Jantion is discretionary with the trial court. We do not find that uary 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the court abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose· way not taken, the reasons given by it being plausible and cOgent. ln certain working hours. daily.'' and "the time they report for certain cases, there may be sufficient grounds for taking the de- work as well as the time they leave work was left to. their di&positibn Qf a party or witness, such as his impending departure cretion," :receiving no fixed saJary but only 20% of their gross frem .the country, or that certain pertinent facts could not .be earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not elicited except by means of a deposition. No such grounds exist _yve:red by the provisions of the Eight Hour Labor Law. ;ee~~ ~::n!ii:a:.uni~er;r i:ru:to h?~:i~: ;:::es~~:n r:~p::~en;a~ ~ IBID; IBID i IBID.-"The provisions of this bulletin on crverwhich may not be Obtained_.from-him at the trial itself, with the ~ compenaation s~all l\pply to all ~ersons employed .in any same coerceive remedies at the disposal of the petitioner. mdu~ or occupation, whether pu~lic or priva~ with tAe As there has been no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of dis- ez:oeptum of farm laborers.' non-agricultural labor~rs, or emcfetion on the part of the respondent court, the remedy of cer- plo~s ~ho ai: paid on .piece work, contract, pak~ao, task or tlorari does not lie; nor may the writ of mandamus be issued, for citmmiasi~ basia, domestic servantf and ~erson~ m the perthe reason that this remedy is available only to compel the per- sonal service of another and members of tile family otf the emfom:iance of a mandatory and ministePial act_ on the part of fin ployer working for him." officer. Manansala and Manansala for appellants. Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee. DECISION In the case of F'rank & Co. vs. Clemente, (44 Phil., ·ao), it was held that the taking of a deposition rests largely· in -the sound discretion of the court, Although that decision was rendered Under the provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), ft is also applicable in- the present case, in view of the provisions MONTEMAYOR. J,: of section 16 of Rule 18. In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. PMas, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, MontemayOf', Reyes, and Lf.ibrador, J. J., concur. Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo takes -no part. IX Manuel La!ra, et aL, Plaintiffs.Appellants, vs. Petfonilo del Rosario, Jr., Defendcmt-Appellee, G. R. No. L-6339, April 20, .1954, 1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; SECTION 3 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 444 COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE EIGHT HOUR LABOR LAW CONSTRUED.-The last part of Section S of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra compensation for overtime work "at the· same rate as their regula., wages Of' sala#-g, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional," and that section 2 of the same act excludes from the application thereof labo1·ers who preferred to be oJJ,· "pie~e WOf'k basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with 'hi> fixed :..alary, we.ges or remuneration but :receiving as compensation from his employer an uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the :result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. 2. IBID; IBID; DRIVER IN TAXI BUSINESS NOT ENTITLED TO OVERTIME COMPENSATION.-A driver in the tu.xi busitte!!IS of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, .in one day could In 1950 defendant PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, Jr., owner of twenty-fin taxi cabs or cara, operated a taxi business under the name of "WAVAL TAXI." He employed ainong others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods railging from 2 to 3'1 months. on- September 4, 1950, with bv.t givlng said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 da}'B advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to LA MALLORCA, a ~ans­ portation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs abovementioned they lost their jobs because the La ldalloua failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work reildered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salli.ry (mesada) provided for in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce because of the faliu1·e of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So, only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs, The defendant filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding that only questions of law are involved, certified the case to us. The ·parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the hours or the period or time that they worked. Rather, they were pd.id on the commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20% of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs claim tliat as a rule, eaeh driver operated a t.azi 12 hours a day Mat 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL with gross earnings ranging from P20.00 to P25.00, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20% ahare ranging from P4.00 to P5.00, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays and Holi· days when a driver worked 24 hours a day, he grossed from P40.00 to P50.00, thereby receiving a share of from P8.00 to Pl0.00 for the period of twenty-four hours. The reasons given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the Eight Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20% of their gross earnings, "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece WOl"kers and hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce.'' For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight ~our Labor Law, namely, sections 1 io 4. "SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person em· ployed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. "SEC. 2. This Act ahall apply to all persona employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the per-sonal service of another and members of the family of the empfoyer working for him~ "SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accidents, fire, fioodT typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, ~.r other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, Or insi,Uations in o~der to avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all such cases the laborers and employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performe4 at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, [llus at least twenty-five per centum. additional. "In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and regulations for the operation as compensation from his employer an uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could operate his taxi cab eight ·hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even for 24 hourS on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feeJs strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and makes eonsideJ'able gross returns and receives much as his 20% commission. .AJlother day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wanta to rest between trips and works for a less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his conunission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends upon tJte !'esl,J.lt of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the. period of time employed. In short, he hu no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge Felicisimo OcamDO which ~akes the following findings and observations on this point. " x x x. As already stated, their eaminga were in the form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. Their participation in moat cases depended upon their own in· dustcy. So much so that the more hours they stay on the road, the greater the gross returns and the higher their com. missions. They have no fixed. hours of labor. They ean retire at pleasure, they not being paid a fixed saJary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly· basis. "It results that the Working hours of the plaintiffs a1 taxi drivers were entirely characterized by its irrerularity, as distinguished from the specific and regular remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factors and commercial employees. ''In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each given day. x x x x." of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to In an opinion dated July 1, 1939 (Opinio;n No. 115) modfiied be paid the laborers. by Ophlion No. 22, series 1940, dateci January 11, 1940, the Secre"SEC. 4. No person, firm. or corporation, business es- tary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow Taxicab tablishment or place or center of labor shall compel an em- Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and ployee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, "the time they repcn·t for work as well aa the time they leave work unless he is paid an additional sum of at 'east twenty-five · was left to their dilM:retion," receiving no fixed sala.ry but only per eentum of his ·regular remuneration: Provided however, 20% of their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities perform- and therefore not covered ht the provisions of the Eight Hour ing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, po-- Labor Law. wer, water, or providing means of transportation or communi- The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor cation." in its INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN No. 2 dated May 28, 1952, Under section 4, as a t1ublic utility, the defendant could have his chauffeui-s work on Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25% of their .regular rf!nmneration; but that, with reference only to work performed en Sund~.ys and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hnurs a day, then the Eight Hour J~abor Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came unde.r section 2 of the said law. ::l'.o that the question to be decided here is whether or not pJaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included, It will be noticed that the last part of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra compensation for overtime work "at the same rate as their regular wages or aalotry, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional," and that section 2 of the same act excludes from the application thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving under "0•1ertime Compensation," ht Section S thereol entitled COVERAGE, says: "The proviEoions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the e:rception of farm laborers, non-agricultural laborers, or employees who are paid on piece work, eontraet, pakiao, task or commission ba.sis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of ali.other and members of the family of the employer working for him." From all this, to us it ia clear that the claim of plaintiffs. appellants for overtime compensation under the Eight Hour Labor Law has no valid support. As to the month pay <mesada) under Ari. 302 of the Code of Commerce, Article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Aet 386> appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions Or the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal 280 LAWYERS JOURNAL .May 81, 1954 took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of se1'Vices of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force, speaks of "salary corresponding to said month," commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary whether by the day, week or the month, then computatton of the month's sal~ry payable would be impos sible. Article 802 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book entitled "Commentarie& and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. I. 4th. edition, p. 160, says that Article 302 is not applicable to emplofec:>s without fixed salary. We quote - "E1nployees not entitled to indemnity.-This article refers only to those who are engaged under salary basis, and not to tholff! who only receive compensation equivalent to whatev~1· service they may r~der. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals On Commercial Matters.)" Jn view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labradof', Concepcion and Diokno, J. J, concur. Jn the result.-Paras x Pedro Galano, Petitioner-Appellant 11s. Pedro Cruz, RespondentAppellee, G. R. No. L-6404, January 12, 1954, 1. ELECTION; PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO; DISMISSAL THEREOF FOR FAILURE TO STATE SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION; APPEAL.-Jn the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. Jn the case of Marqu.ez v. Prodigalidad, 4_6 0. G. Supp. No. 11, p. 264, we held that Section 178 of t;he Revised Election Code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that pr.otests involving other offices such as municipal councilor may be appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the 'appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case involving as it does purely questions of law is proper. 2. ID.; ID.; CONTESTANT CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED ELECTED; OFFICE SHOULD BE DECLARED VACANT.Jn the case of Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 0. G. No. 2p, p. 727, wherein petitione"r .Llamoso who claimed to have received the next highest number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office for which he was : proclaimed elected, on the ground of ineligibility, we held that ; section 173 of the Revised Election Code while providing that any registered candidate may contest the l'ight of one elected to any provincial or municipal office on the ground of ineligi:. bility, it does not provide that if the coiltestee is later declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed elected. J. 'R. Nuguid for petitioner-appellant. Emilio A. Gangcayco for l'eSpondent..appellee. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J., For purposes of the present appeal the following facts, not disputed, may be briefly stated, As a result of the 1951 elections respondent PEDRO CRUZ was proclaimed a councilor-elP\'t in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Petitioner Pedro Catano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto under Section 173 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act lio. 180) contesting the right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the office of municipal councilor. Jn his prayer petitioner besides asking for other remedies which in law and equity he is entitled to, asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the Municipal &ard of Canvasser in November, 1961, to the effect that Cruz was counci1or-elect, he (Calano) be declared the councilor elected in respondent's place. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the petition, the Court of First Instance of Bataan issued an ·order of December 27, 1951, dismissing the petition for quo warranto on the ground that it was filed out of time, and also because petitioner had no legal capacity to sue as contended by respondent. On appeal to this Court by petitioner from the order of dismissal, in "' decision promulgated on May 7, 1952, we held that the petition was filed within the period prescribed by law; and that although the petition might be reg2ol·ded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, said question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the g1-ound relied upon, namely, that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of a~tion but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical penonality, or any other disqua1ification of a party. As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was· remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. UpOn the return of the case to the trial cou1·t, respondent again fuoved for dismissal on the ground that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action, presumably relying upon the observation made by us in our decision. Ful'ther elaborating on our observation that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, we said that paragraph S and 8 of the petition which read thus - "8. Que el recurrente tenia y tiene dereeho a acupar el cargo de concejal de Orion, Bataan, si no habia sido · proclamado e1ecto concejal de Orion, Bataan, al aqui recurrido. "8. Que el recurrente era candidato a concejal del municipio de Orion, Bataan con el Certificado de candidature. debidamente presentado, y registrado asi como tambien fue votado y elegido para dicho cargo, en la eleecion del 13 de Noviemb1·e de 1951." <Underscoring ours) were conclusions of 1aw and not statement.of facts. The trial court sustained the second motion to dismiss in its order of September 80, 1952, on the g1-ound that the petition failed to state a sufficient cause of action.- Again pi?titioner has appealed from that order to this Court. Appe11ant urges that the trial court erred not only in not holding that the motion to dismiss was filed out of time but also in declaring that the complaint failed to state a st1ffieient cause of action. In answer i-esponclent-appellee contends that the appeal should not have been given due course by the td!J,I court because under the law there is no appeal from a decision of a Cou1·t of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or election of a municipal councilor, the appeal being limited to election contests involving the offices of Provincial Governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors 8.nd City Mayors, this under Section 178 of the Revised Election Code. In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. Jn the case of Marquez v. Prodigalidad, 46 0. G. Supp. No. 11, p. 264, we held that Section 178 of the Revised Election Code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance hi e1ecl:oin contests over the offices of P1-ovincial Gove1·nor, Members of the Pro"·inciat Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that protests involving other offices such as municipal councilor may be appealed provided that only legal questions Sl·e involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case. involving as it does purely questions of Jaw is proper, , Going to the question of sufficiency of cause of action, it should be stated that our observation when the case came up for the first time on ,appeal was neither meant nor intended as a rule or docMay 31, 1964 LAWYERS JOURNAL 281

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229-231