The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, Antonio Espada, Offended-Party-Appellee, vs Pelagio Mostasesa et al., Accussed-Appellants, G. R. No. L-5684, January 22, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Title

Language

English

Source

The Lawyers Journal XIX (5) May 31, 1954

Year

1954

Subject

Supreme Court Decisions

Coercion

Criminal Law

Court of Appeals

Court of First Instance

Article 1593 of the Civil Code

Mostasesa, Pelagio

Espada, Antonio

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

[This criminal case involves a crime of coercion wherein Mostasesa and others, the accused-appellants, were found guilty. The Court of Appeals imposed the appropriate penalty in which the defendants were sentenced either to return the articles in question (two bales of tobacco) to Antonio Espada, the complainant, or to pay him Php 632.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.]

Fulltext

Valencia was retired, even as his position was retained, and Ocampo 2. promoted to take his CValencia'sl position. As Valencia's posi. IBID; IBID; RESTITUTION OR REPARATION AS THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY. - The purpose of the law is to place the offended party as much as possible in the same condition as he was before the offense was committed against him. So if t!te crime consists in the taking away of bis property, the first remedy granted is that of restitution of the thing taken away. If restitution can not be made, the law allows the offended party the next best thing, .reparation , tion was not abolished or suppressed, Valencia should not have been separated by retirement; it should have been Ocampo who should have been retired because of the aboUtion of his own position. Petitioner's argument in effect is as follows: that there is economy if Valencia is separated and Ocampo retained, but none if Ocampo, whose position is abolished, is retained &.nd Valencia dismissed. The absurdity of the contention is evident; it is its own refutation. ~:i~~~s b~t e:~::.~:iym~~t h~;: !:;~!~~o!~e r;t~~~::ly:f ~:ie;;;::~ B. IBID; IBID; REPARATION MAY NOT BE MADE BY THE DELIVERY OF A SIMILAR THING. - Reparation may not be made by the delivery of a simiJar thing <same amount, kind or spP.cics and qua1ityJ, because the value of the thing taken may have decreased since the offended party was deprived there. of. Reparation, therefore, should consist of the price of the thing taken, as fixed by the court <Art. 106, Revised Penal Code). tion was merely the opportune occasion for a dismissal without cause. Wu the dismissal in the interest of efficiency? The CIR found that Valencia's efficiency is shown by the greater amount of production obtained· during his incumbency. Even the petitioner admits that there is no charge of inefficiency. CSee Brief for the Petitioner, p. 89.) But the separation was recominended "for the good of the aei'Vice/' implying that there were valid reasons therefor. NoM 4. appear in the record. On the other hand, the evidence submitte1l prove Valencia's efficiency. Even if there were rea.sons therefor, which were not disclosed, the separation would still be illegal because IBID; IBID; AMOUNT TO BE PAID TO THE OFFENDED PARTY AS. REPARATION; MONEY AS STANDARD OF VALUE. - In the case at ba:r, the court considered the payment of P600 as the next beet thing, if the property taken could not be returned. No valid objection can be raised against this decision; money is the standard of value, and, except in finan. cial crises, it does pot fluctuate in value as much as merchandise or things, especially those bought and sold in the ordinary course of commerce. no charges of any kind whatsoever appear to have been filed against him and neither does any opportunity appear to have been given him to answer them or to defend himself against them. The above considerations cover the most important points raised in this appeal; it would be unprofitable to answer all the other ar. guments, most of which are high.sounding claims without founda.. tion in fact and in law, Suffice it for us to state that we have carefully examined the recOrd and we find no reason or ground to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the judgment. The findings of faet are based on the testimonial and documentary evid~nce submitted. The claim that the facts appearing in the record are not sta.ted, or that the requirements of due process of law have been igno1·ed, find no support in the recQJ"d, it appearing that every opportunity was afforded petitioner to present its side. The judgment is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Para.s, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor; Reyes; Jugo and Bautista Angelo, J. J., concur. Mr. Justice Concepcion &.nd Mr. Justice Diokno did not take part. XIX The People of the Philippiius, Plaintiff, Antonio Espada, Of. fended-Party.Appellee, 'VS Pelagi., Jl..fo11ta8esa et al., AcCUBsed-AppellanU, G. R. No. L-5684, January 22, 1954. 1. CRIMINAL LAW·; CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. - The defendants were found guilty of the crime of coercion and were sentenced either to return the articles in question <two bales of tobacco) to the com:plainant or to indemnify him of the same of P632.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In compliance therewith, the accused delivered to the provincial sheriff two bales of tobacco but in ·spite -of this the provincial sheriff levied up1>n certain real properties of the accused. The accused claimed tha.t tobacco is a fungible thing and that in accordance with article 1598 of the Civil Code, the obligation of one who receives money or fungible things is to return to the creditor the sa.me amount or thing owned of the same kind or specie and quality, Held: The civil liability of the accused.appellants, in the case at bar, is not governed by the Civil Code, as contended, but by Articles 100-111 of the Revised Penal Code. In accordance therewith, the sentence is for the return of the very thing, taken, restitution. and if this can not be done, for the payment of P600 in lieu thereof, t"epa1"ation. Thie amount represents the value of the two bales of tobacco taken, at the time of the taking, and this va.lue was fi.ii:ed by the court presumably in accordance with the evidence adduced during the trial. Julio SiCl'IJOco for appellants. No appearance for a.ppeJlees in the Supreme Court. DECISION LABRADOR, J. : In the above entitled criminal ease, the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of coercion and were sentenced by the Court of Appeals, as follows: "x x x the penalty is increased to four (4) months and one (1) day of arreeto mayor, and that appellant should also be sentenced either to return the articles in question to the com. plainant or to indemify him in the sum of P632.00, with subsi. diary imprisonment in case of insolvtncy, xx x." When the case was returned to the Court of .First Instance for the execution of the above sentence, said court issued an order of execution for P600, the value of two bales of tobacco obtained by the acacueed from the offended party. The provincial sheriff levied upon certain real properties of the accused Paulino Dumagat to secure the payment thereof, notwithstanding the fact in oomplianee with the judgment, the accused had delivered to him (the sheriff) two bales of tobacco. So the accused presented a motion in court pi·aying tha.t the order of execution be set aside. The offended party opposed the petition, and the court sustained this opposition, deriying the petition to set aside the order. Against this order of denial, the accused have prosecuted thi.q appeal. In their brief, the accused claim that tobacco is a fungible thing and that, in accordance with Article 1593 of the Civil Code, the obligation of one who receives money or fungible things is to return to the creditor the same amount of the thing owed of the same kind or species and quality. The civil liability of the accused-appellants, in the case at bar, ir1 not governed by the Civil Code, as contended, but by Articles 100~111 of the Revised Penal Code. In accordance therewith, the sentence is for the return of the very thing taken, Testitution, and if this can not be done, for the payment of P600 in lieu thereof, t"eparation, This amount represents the value of the two bales of tobacco taken, at the time of the taking, arid this value was fixed by the court presumably in accordance with the evidence adduced during the trial. , The purpose of the law is to place the offended party as much as possible in the same condition as he was before the offense Wa! committed against him. So if the crime consists in the taking away May 31, 1954 LAWYERS JOURNAL 246 of his property, the first remed"y granted is that of restitution of 3. the thing taken away. If restitution can not be made, the law allc-ws the offended party the next best thing, repa.ration. The Spa. nish jurist Viada, commenting on this provision of the law says: ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COLLATERAL AT.TACK. - In cases of collateral attack, the principles that a.pply have been stated as follows: "The legitimate province of collateral impeachment is void judgments. There and there alone can it meet with any mea.. sure of success, Decision after decision bears this import: "En las causas por robo, jurto, ete., en que no hayan sido reeuperados durante el proceso Jos objetos de dichos delitos, be condenarse a los reos a su i·estitucion, o, en su defecto, a la indemnizacion correspondiente en la cantida.d en que hayan sido valorados o tasados por loi; peritos; xx." <3 Viada 6>. Rep&l'ation may not be made by the delivery of a similar thing (same amount, kind or species e.nd quality), because the value .of the thing taken may have decreased since the offended party was deprived thereof. Reparation, therefore, should consist of the price of the thing taken, as fixed by the court <Art, 106, Revised Penal Code>. In the case 11t bar, the court considered the payment of• P600 as the next best thing, if, the property taken could not be returned. No valid objection ca.n be raised against this decision; money is the standard of ".Blue, and, except in financial crises, it does not fluctuate in value as much as merchandise or things, especially those bought and sold in the ordina1·y course of comrrieree. In any case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 01·dering restitution, or the payment of the value of the property taken, is now final and exeoutory and can no longer be subject to modificatjon. The appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs against accused&ppellants. So ordered. Puma, Pa,blo, Bettgaon, ·Padilf.4, MonUmayOt, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista, Angelo, J. J., concur. xx Re: Transfer Certificate of Title No, 14123, Ti.rso T. Reyes, aa guaniian of the minnrs, Azticena, Flor-De-Lis and Tit'so, Jr., ell surnanicd Reyes y Barretto, Petitioners-Appellees versus Milagros Ban-etto .. Datu, Oppositor-Appellant, G. R. No, L-5549, Febr11airv 26, 1954. ,,,~ ~.; 1. F'INAL JUDGMENTSf lllBJ'ERENT WAYS OF ATTACKING THEIR VALIDITY. :_;_''Under oul' rules of procedul'e, the validity of a judgment or order of the court, which has become final a.nd executciry, may be attacked only by a direct aetion or proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in another case if, in the latter case, the &urt had no jul'isdiction .to ente1· the ord~r or pronounce the judgme..t CSec. 44, Rule 39 of thP. Rules of Courtl. The first proceeding is a direct attack against the order or judgment, because it is not incidental to, but is the main object of, the proceeding. The other one is the collateral atta.ck, in which the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relit"f, other than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and the att8ck is only an incident. Cl Freeman on Judgments, -Sec. 306, pp. 607-GQS. > A third manner is by a petition for relief from the judgment or order as authorized by the statutes or by the rules, such as those · expressly provide:l in Rule 38 of the Rules of Cou1·t, but in this case it is to be noted that the i·elief is gra.nted by express statutory authority in the same action or Proceeding in which the judgment or order was entered. . In the case at bar, we are not .concerned with a relief falling under this third class, because the project of partition was approved in the testate proceedings in the year 1949, whereas the petition in this case is in a. ~·egistrat.iQn proceeding and was filed in the year 1951. 2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. -- In the case at bar, the respondent Lucia Milagros Barretto is objecting to the petition by the second methr.id, the collatet'Bl attn.ck. Wh~n a judgment is sought to be assailed in this manner, the rule is that the &ttack must be based not on mere errors or defects in the order or judgments .. There and there alone can it meet with any meaand void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief, or no jurisdiction ovC:1· the subject matter or over the parties or both. llbid. Sec, 3261 p. 650). In every· case the field of collateral inquiry is narrowed down to the single issue concerniri.g the void character of the judgment and the nssaila.nt is caUed upon to satisfy the court that such is the fact, To compass his purpose of overthrowing the judgment, it is not enough that he show a mistaken or el'l'oneous decision or a record disclosing non-jurisdictional irregula1ities in the proceedings leading up to the judgment. He must go beyond this and show to the court, generally from the fact of the :record jt.;:elf, that the judgment complained of is utterly void. If he can do that his a.ttack will succeed for the eases leave no doubt respecting the right of a litigant to collaterally impeach a judgment that he can prove to be void." <I Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 322, p. 642.) 4. ID.; ID.; WHEN LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT MAY BE A GROUND.l'OR COLLATERAL ATTACK. - The doctrine that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the i·ecord alone, thereby excluding extraneous proof seems to be the natural unavoidable result of that sta.mp of authPnticity whic,h, from the earliest times, was placed upon the record, and which gave it such uncontrollable credit and verity tha.t .no plea, proof, or averment could be heard to the contrary. x x x. Any other rule, x x x, would be disastrous in 'its results, since to pe:cmit the court's records to be contradicted or va.ried by evidence dehors would render such records of no avail and definite sentence would afford but slight protection to the rights of parties once solemnly adjudicated. x x x. Cl Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 376, p. 789.> Deogracias T. Reves and ViruilW Am:. Cruz for appellant. Cala.nog and Alafrk for appellee. DECISION LABRADOR, J. : I\ n;-< This is an ap~eal .pl'Ol:l_ecuted in this' C~J\t} U,ainst two orders of the Court -.if First Instance '-of Bulacan, 1ssUtN::.,:1.n Case No. 116, G. L. R. 0, Rec. No. 12908, requiring t.h~-'~positor-appella.nt J,ueia 1rlilagrns Barretto to surt'fmdt?t' Transfer-;.'q~i:tificate of Title No. 14123, issued in the name of liihiano Bar1:etto;_J1!) that the same may be cancelled and a new one issut'd in lieu'. 'tlieie'Of in the Barn~ (If Azucena, Flor-de-Us and Til'so, J1·., all «slih1.f!..med Reyes, coc1wnr.rs of an undivided one..hal:i sha~·e, and !.U.Cia Mila&'l'08 Barretto as t.he ownt'r r.if the other half. The circumstances leading to tht" issuance of the said orders may be briefly stated a:s follows~ Bihia.110 Banetto died on February 18, 1936, and in the testat.e proceedings for the settlement of his estate, Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Banetto wer, declared as his children and heirs. Lucia Milagros Barretto was at that time a minor, 15 years of age, a.nd proceedings were instituted iri the same cou1·t CCsse No. 4988U for the appointment of her guardian, In the testate proceedings a pJ'Oject of partition was submitted, which was signed by Salud Barretto, Lucia Milagros Barretto (minol') and Maria Gerardo (surviving spouse>, the latte!.' signing "on her behalf a.nd as guardian for the Minor, Milagros Barretto," This project of partition was ap:r·roved by the court. It was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on May 22, 1940 but the transfer certificate of title over the prope1-ty in question was nevPr cancelled. His widow, Maria Gerardo, died on March 5, 1948, a.nd in the testate proceedings for the settlement of her estate, Lucia Milagros Barretto submitted a will purporting to be of !!'aid deceased for probate, in ac.. ccrdance with which Maria Gerardo had only one child with the deceased Bibia.no Barretto, namely. Lucia Milagros Barretto. Thi• will submitted by Lucia Milagi'Os Barretto was declared to be the last wit! and testament of the deceased Maria Gerardo. (Continued on page 253> 246 LAWYERS JOURNAL May 31, 19.54

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