Lazara R. Bien, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Pedro Beraquit, Respondent-Appellant, G. R. No, L-6855, April 23, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Lazara R. Bien, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Pedro Beraquit, Respondent-Appellant, G. R. No, L-6855, April 23, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal Volume XIX (Issue No.6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Quo warranto; Government officials -- Appointments, qualifications, tenure, etc.; Court of First Instance -- Albay
Rights
Abstract: [This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay declaring respondent Pedro Beraquit ineligible to the office of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, province of Albay, on the ground that he was not a resident of said municipality one year prior to the elections held on November 13, 1951. ]
Fulltext: irregularity would in effect disfran.::hise two hundred or more voters if the purpose is to annul the clecti<·n in the aforesaid precinct. This is now the order subject of the present petition for certiorari . It should be noted that the main ground of the opposition of protestant to the presentation of the ('vidence which protestee desires to adduce is the fact that the irregularity which is desired to be established has not been clearly a1~d specifically set out in th(; answer, which vaguen('ss or gcnE-ralization makes the avernment utterly inadequate or insufficient to serve as basis for the rresentntion of evidence, even if at the trial counsel made a verbal manifestation as to the 1iarticular acts constitutive of the violation of law on which he bases- his pica for the nullification of the election in p1·ecinct No. 6 of Pamplonn . But it appears thP..t such is not the ground entertained by the 1·espondent Judge in ruling out the evidence, it being a matter which may be subserved with the mere amendment of th<>. pleading, but rather his view, right or wrong, to the effect that such evid<>nce could not serve any useful purpose for, even if it be allowed, it may not have the effect of nullifying the f'lection as such would have the effect of disfranchising two hundred or more legitimatc voters whose right has never been assailed, Such being the question before us for determination, we are of the Gpinion that the action taken by petitioner to correct the ruling of the court is not the proper one, it being a mere error of judgment which should be corrected by appe!ll, and not an act of lack of juris.. diction or grave abuse of discretion which is the proper subject of a petitioi:i for certiorari. As a rule, the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. In the trial of a case, it becomes necessary to distinguish errors of jurisdiction from errors of judgment. The first ma.y be reviewed in a certiorari proceeding; the second, by appeal. Errors of jurisdiction render an order or judgment Yoid or voidable, but errors of judgment or procedure are not necessarily a ground for reversal <Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1952 ed., p. 158) . Again, a writ of certiorari will be denie~ where the appeal is a.n adequate remedy though less speedy than certiorari. "Mere possible delay in the perfection of an appeal and in securing a decision from the appellate court is no justification for departing from the prescribed procedure . . " unless "there was Jack or excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion and the delay would work injusl1ce to the comph1ining pa.rty . . " (f<leni, pp. 166, 167.) The order complained of by petitioner 1s merely interlricutory or peremptory in character which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. That order may be erroneous, but it is a mere error of judgment which may be corrected by appeal. This remedy is adequate enough, for whatever delay may be suffered in the }>l'O<".eeding would not work injustice to petitioner who sure enough is presentlr_ holding the office contested by respondent. \Vht'r€"fore, the petition is hereby denied with costs agtdnst pl:titioner. The writ of injunction issued hy this Cou1t is hereby di::;sc-lved. Paras, Po.bk>, Padilla, Montc11111yvr, Jugo, Be119zon, TuaR?n, Revt:., and I.-abrador, J.J., concur. XJCll Lazara R. Bien, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Pedro Beraqitit, Respondent-Appellant, G. R. No, L-6855, April 23, 1954, Bautista Ange. Io, J.: P LEADING AND PRACTICE; GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER AFTER THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD; DISCRETION OF THE COURT.-The granting of a motion to file an answer after the period originally fixed in the summons, or in the rules of court for that purpose had expired, is a matter that is addressed to the discretion of the court, and under the circumstances obtaining in the case, we find that this discretion has been properly exercised. Delf1'n de Vera for appellant. Ramon C. Fernandez for appcllee. DECISIO N BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay declaring respondent Pedro Bera.quit ineligible to the office of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, province of Albay, on the ground that he was not a resident of said municipality one year prior to the elections held on November 13, 1951. A petition for quo 1varranto was filed by Lazara R. Bien to test the eligibility of Pedro Beraquit to be a candidate for the office of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, province of Albay. It is alleged that the resPondcnt was ineligible for that position because he was a resident of Baras, Catanduancs, and has not resided for at least six months in Malilipot, Albay, prior to the elections held on November 13, 1951, and that, notwithstanding his ineligibility, he registered his candidacy for that office and was proclaimed duly elected by the municipal board of canvassers on November 17, 1951. It is prayed that his election be declared null and void and the office be declared vacant. The record shows that upon the filing of the petition for qiw 1varranto on November 19, 1951, the court issued an order directing that summons be ·made immediately upon respondent giving the latter three days within which to answer from service thereof. The hearing was set for December 4, 1951. In - compliance with said order, the clerk of court, on November 23, 1951, required the deputy sheriff of Catanduanes to serve the summons at respondent's residence in Baras, Catanduanes, and directed that another summons be served upon him at his residence in Malilipot, Albay. Neither of the summons was served either because of respondent's absence or because of the refusal of the persons found in his residence to accept the service. As a result, substituted service was resorted to as allowed by the rules by leaving a copy of the summons at the :residence of respondent. When the date set for hearing came, neither the respondent , nor his counsel appeared. He di'.l not also file an answer as required by the court. Petitioner asked to be allowed to adduce evidence in the absence of respondent, but the court decided to transfer the hearing to December 7, 1951 in order to give respondent ample opportunity to appear and defend himself. In the same order, the court directed th~t another summons be served upon respondent. Again, the summons failed for the same reasons. And when the case came up for hearing for the second time, and respondent again failed to appear, the court decided to allow petitioner to present her evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered granting the petition. Copy of this decision was received by respondent on December 15, 1951 and on December 18, he filed a motion praying that the decision be set aside and the case be heard on the merits. This motion was granted and the court set the hearing on February 22, 23, and 25, 1952. On February 22, 1952, petitioner presente,d four witnesses. On February 23, 1952, she presented one witness, and on February 23, 1952, she presented two more witnesses, plus eleven pieces of documentary evidence. Then she rested her case. When the turn of respondent came to present his evidence, June 30, 1954. THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 297 counsel for petitioner made a manifestation whereby he made of record his objection to any and all evidence that respondent intends to present on the ground that it would be immaterial and inele· vnnt for the reuson that he has failed to file an answer to the petition. At this juncture, counsel for respondent asked for an opportunity to file an answer, and instead of ruling on this request, the court allowed counsel to prc,sent evidence without prejudcie on its part to disregard it if should find latel' that tl1e question raised is well taken. But after the presentation of one witness, and while the second witness was in the course of his testimony, the court suspended the hearing and requil'ed the parties to present memoranda to determine whether or not respondent may be allowed to file his answer and continue presenting his evidence. This was done, and on March 14, 1952, the court issued an order denying the request to file an answer and declaring the ease submitted for decision. And on the same date, it rendered decision declaring respondent ineligible as prayed for in the petition. The case is now before us upon the plea that the question involved in this appeal is purely one of law. The question posed in this appeal is whether the 1ower court erred in denying the request of respondent to be given 4n oppor. tunity to file an answer to the petition and, in default thereof, in denying him the right to continue presenting his evidence notwithstanding the action of the court in setting aside its previous decision in order to give him an opportutiity to appear and defend himself. The reasons which the lower court has considered in denying the request of respondent to be given an opportunity to file an answer and to be allowed to present evidence in support of his defense are clearly stated in the decision. Said reasons are: "As abo\•e stated, respondent failed to file his answer and when his turn came, and he attempted to present his evidence, counsels for petitioner vehemently objected on the ground that he has n~t raised any issue. The court, after a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, was constrained to sustain the objection of petitioner, and barred respondent from presenting his evidence. For evidently, he is guilty of gross and inexcusable negligence. From the time he voluntarily appeared in court on December 18, 1951 when he filed the motion for reconsideration above adverted to, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His voluntary appearance is equivalent to l!er· vice. Consequently, he should ha,,e filed then his answer within the reglamentary period fixed by law, it being his legal duty to do so. At least, he should have filed his answer from the time he received the order setting aside the judgment-that is, on January 21, 1952, and befo1·e the 15 days period ex1iired. When he entered trial on February 22, 1952, without filing his answer, there was no issue raised, and a summary judgment for petitioner may be rendered. Indeed, Section 8, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides, among others, that material averments in the com1ilaint other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied; and Section 10 states that defenses and objectoins not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." We can hardly add to the foregoing reasons of the lower court which we find fully supported by the record. We can only state in passing that the granting of a motion to file an answer after the period originally fixed in the summons, or in the rules of court for that purpose had expired, is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and under the eircumstance.s obtaining in the case, we find that this discretion has been properly exercised. The court has been most liberal to respondent such that it even went to the extent of setting aside its previous decision. And we don't believe that the interest of Justice will be jeopardized if the decision of the lower court is maintained for, while on one hand the evidence adduced by the petitioner aJlpears to be strong, on the other, it does not appear that respondent has made any offer of the evidence he inWnded to introduce that might give an inkling that, if presented, it may have the effect of offsetting the evidence of petitioner. There is, therefore, no legal basis for concluding that the result of the decision would be changed has respondent been able to complete his evidence. And in the absence of this basis, i·espondent's plea for equity can deservt! but scant con. sidcration. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affmned, without pronouncement as to costs. Para!!, Re11l}zon, Reyes, Labr. 'ldor, Pablo, Mon!~mayor, / 1190; Concepciol1, and Dio/.:no, J.J., concur. XXIII Antoufo llfi,,.asol, Petitio11u, vs. Porfirio Gerochi y Gamboa, 1'/lirlano Gerochi y Gamboa, Jt1an Nn.rajas y Gamboa, Saturnina Na.va;a. Gam./Joa mul the Co11rt of A ppet1/s, Re:;pondents, G. R. No. -4929, pronnllgated b1ly 23, 1953, Bantista Angelo, J. LAND REGISTRATION; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE: WHEN PURCHASER IS NOT A "SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OP HEGISTERED LAND." - Where 1.me purchases a registered land from a· person who did not have apy certificate of t itle in his name, his only evidence being the deed of sale in his favor, and its annota.tion on the certificate of title which still appears in the name of the previous owners, most ol whom had already died, the purch,.ser is not a "subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good fa.itl1" and who is protected aga..inst any encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, as provided for in Section 39 of Act No. 496. Jose D. Evangeslista for peti\..'ioner. L11is G. llofileiia and Cet1C1r T. Martin for respondents. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is :l petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on June 14, 19!il wherein, amonr other things, the deed of sale executed by Saturnina Navajas in favor of Antonin MirnS<•l, petitioner herein, was declared valid in so far as the shine and participation of said Saturnina in Lot No. 3760 of the cadash'al survey of Iloilo City is concerned, which participation is one. half <1/ 2) of the undivided one-fout·th 0 / 4) be.longing to her mother Dionisia Gnmboa; Juan Navajas w3s declared owner of one-half <1/ 2) of the same undivided share; anrl with regard to the cross.claim of Antonio Mirasol, Natividad Escarrilla was ordered to pay him the sum of rl,575. In the same decision it was ordered that the judgment Le registered and annotated on the original Certificate of Title No. 1399 CO\•ering Lot No. 3760. On July 30, 1946, two deE>ds of .sale wel'e executed, one by Filomena Ledesma, who posed as only heh· of the deceased Teodo. rica Gamboa, over one.fourth undivided share belonging to the latter in Lot No. 3760 of the cadastral survey of the City of Iloilo, which lot was covered by originnl Certificate of Title No. 1399, in favor of Salvador Solano, and a.nr,ther executed by Saturnina Gerochi, who posed as only heir ::if the deceased Dionisia Gamboa, &\'er one-fourth undivided share belonging to the latter in the same Lot No. 3760, in favor of the same purchaser. These two deeds were annotated on the original Certificate of Title No. 1399, as well a.s on the owner's duplicate of the same title, On August 1, 1946, Salvador Sofa.no in tui:n sold with pGCto de retro for a term of two years the port.ion bought from Satumino Gerochi to Natividad Escarrilla for the sum of f3,500, and on 298 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June SO, 1954
pages: 297-298