Salvador E. Bimeda, Petitioner, vs. Arcadio Perez and Hon. Jose T. Surtida, Judge of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10 Judicial District, Respondents, G. R, No. L-5588, Aug. 26, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

Title: Salvador E. Bimeda, Petitioner, vs. Arcadio Perez and Hon. Jose T. Surtida, Judge of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10 Judicial District, Respondents, G. R, No. L-5588, Aug. 26, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal Volume XIX (Issue No.6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Certiorari -- Philippines; Mandamus -- Philippines
Rights
Abstract: [This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to compel respondent Judge to allow petitioner to adduce evidence relative to an alleged irregularity committed by the board of inspectors of precinct No. 6, of Pamplona, Camarines Sur, during the election for municipal mayor held on November 13, 1951. The purpose of the injunction is to restrain respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of the protest pending determination of the issue raised in this proceeding. This injunction was issued as prayed for. The petition is denied with costs against the petitioner. ]
Fulltext: pearing that the acluations which are sought to be nullified took place more than ten years ago. As regards the ground that there is a prior judgment which bars the present nction, the court ruled that the same cannot be entertained because it involves a question of fact which does not appear admitted in the complaint. The court expressed the opinion that no affidavit or evidence can be considered on a motion to dismiss because the sufficiency of a complaint should be tested on the basis of the facts alleged therein, The court, however, allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within five days from receipt of the order in accordance with the discretion given to it by the rules of court. Paras, Pablo, Be11g::cm, Montemayor, Reyes, Ju.90, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diok110, J.J., concur. / XX! v. . . DECISION Salvador E. B1medll, Pt.ht1011 er, vs. Arcadio PerM ttnd Hon,. Jose T. Swrtida, J11dge of First l111~ta11cc o/ Camarines Swr, 10 Judicial District, Respondents, G. R, No. L-5588, Ang. 26, 1953, Bautista Angelo, J.: Taking advantage of this grace, plaintiffs submitted an amend. 1. ed complaint wherein they reiterated tl1e same facts with some clarifying modifications. Defendants reiterated their motion to dismiss on the same grounds. And finding no substantial difference between the original and the amended complaints, the court ordered the dismissal of the case without pronouncement as to costs. After the case had been taken to the Court of Appeals, it CERTIOHARI; ERROR OF J URISDICTION nISTJN. GUISHED FROM ERROR OF JUDGMENT. - As a rule, lhe erro1·s which the court ma.y commit in the t!Xercise of its jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. In the t·rial of a case, it be<'omes necessary to distinguish errou of jurisdiction from errors of Judgmrnt. The first may be reviewed in a certiorari proceeding: the second, by appeal. E1·rors of jurisdiction 1·ender an order or judgment void or viodable but errors of judgment or procedure are not necessarily :i. ground for reversal CMonn, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1952 ed .. p. 158>. was later certified to this Court on the ground that the appeal involves purely questions of law. A cursory reading of the amended complaint will reveal that the actuations of the clerk of court, as well as of the sheriff, which are sought to be nullified are: the writ of execution issued by the 2. clerk of court on December 12, 1934, as well as the sales and other actuations executed by the sheriff by reason of said writ of execution; the decree of the clerk of court issued on May 21. 1986, as mm; WHERE APPEAL IS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY. - A writ of certiorari will be denied where the appeal is an adequate remedy though Jess speedy than certiorari. Mere possible delay in the perfection of an appeal and in securing a decision from the appellant court is no justification for departing from the prescribed procedure . •. "unless" there was lack or excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion and the delay would work injustice to the complaining party. well as the sale1t and other actuations of the sheriff made in pursmmce thereof: the decree of the clerk of court issued on July 7, 1988, as well as the actuations of the sheriff made in compliance with said decree: and the assi,IZ'llment made by Rafael Valcarcel of his right and interest in the land sold on February 17. 1941 to defendants Bonifacio Ri(!'(lnan and Segundo Nacnac. And as a necessary consequence, plaintiffs also asked for the nullification of the order of the court dated Julv 18. 1941 placing Bonifacio Rigo. nan in possession of the land sold to him. It appears from the above recital that the acts and decrees which are soug-ht to be nullified took place more than ten years prior to the filing of the present action, and since under Article 44 of Act No. 190 an action of this nature prescribes in ten years, it follows that the action of the plaintiffs is already barred bv the statute of limitations. If the aforesaid acts can no lonirer be nullified, it also follows as a 1el!al consequence that no action can be taken on the order of the court issued on July 18, 1941 directing the sheriff to place Bonifacio Rii:ronan in possession of the parcel of land sold to llim because of the principle that possession must follow ownership unless ordered otherwise. As regards the second ground invoked in the motion to dismiss no affidavit or extraneous evidence can be considered to test the sufficiency of a complaint except the fact11 alleged in the same complaint. We hold that under Section 3, Rule 8, a motion to dismiss may be proved or disproved in accordance with Rule 123, Section 100, which provides: "When a motion is baRed on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties but the court may direet that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." And in our opinion the copy of the decision attached to the motion, which is not disputed, may be considered as sufficient evidence under the rule to prove the existence of a prior judgment between the same parties. In this sense, the second ground of the motion to dismiss may also be entertained to test the sufficiency of the cause of action of the plaintiffs. Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without prono11ricement as to costs. Dominndc>r P. Padilla for petiti<'ne>r. Ramon Imperial for respondents. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to compel respondent Judge to allow petitioner to adduce evidence relative to an alleged irregularity committed by the board of inspectors of precinct No. 6, of Pamplona, Camarines Sur, during the election for municipal mayor held on November 13, 1951. The purpose of the injunction i!I to restrain respondent Judge from procc:eding with the trial of the protest })ending determination of the issue raised in this proceeding. This injunction was issued ai; prayed for. Petitioner w".l.S declared elected municipal mayor of Pamplona, Camarincs Sur, with the plurality of one vote, in the elections h<:ld on NovemlM:r 13, 1951. Respondent Arcadio Perez contest.eel the election in due time. In hia answer, respondent set up a t'ounter-protest averring, among other things, "That he impugns the electoral returns in Precinct No. 6 of Pamplona e..s well as the votes therein on the ground of wholesale irregularity, gross violation of the election law by the Board rof Inspectors, and wanton disregard by said boa1·d of the right of some 20 or more voters in Eaid precinct to vote fol' protestee; it follows that were it not for such irregularity a.nd ''iolation of law, protestee would have obtained 20 or more votes in his favor." When tria.I came, and after protestant had concluded presenting his evidence, protestee proceeded to present his evidence to establish not only his specil\I defenses but also his coun.ter-protest relative to the irregularity which he claims to have been allegedly committed :n Precinct No. 6 of Pamplona as stnted in the .preceding paragraph, but respon:lent Judge, sustaining the opposition of protestant, ruled out such ~vidence upon the theory that to permit proof of said 296 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June 30, 1954 irregularity would in effect disfran.::hise two hundred or more voters if the purpose is to annul the clecti<·n in the aforesaid precinct. This is now the order subject of the present petition for certiorari . It should be noted that the main ground of the opposition of protestant to the presentation of the ('vidence which protestee desires to adduce is the fact that the irregularity which is desired to be established has not been clearly a1~d specifically set out in th(; answer, which vaguen('ss or gcnE-ralization makes the avernment utterly inadequate or insufficient to serve as basis for the rresentntion of evidence, even if at the trial counsel made a verbal manifestation as to the 1iarticular acts constitutive of the violation of law on which he bases- his pica for the nullification of the election in p1·ecinct No. 6 of Pamplonn . But it appears thP..t such is not the ground entertained by the 1·espondent Judge in ruling out the evidence, it being a matter which may be subserved with the mere amendment of th<>. pleading, but rather his view, right or wrong, to the effect that such evid<>nce could not serve any useful purpose for, even if it be allowed, it may not have the effect of nullifying the f'lection as such would have the effect of disfranchising two hundred or more legitimatc voters whose right has never been assailed, Such being the question before us for determination, we are of the Gpinion that the action taken by petitioner to correct the ruling of the court is not the proper one, it being a mere error of judgment which should be corrected by appe!ll, and not an act of lack of juris.. diction or grave abuse of discretion which is the proper subject of a petitioi:i for certiorari. As a rule, the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. In the trial of a case, it becomes necessary to distinguish errors of jurisdiction from errors of judgment. The first ma.y be reviewed in a certiorari proceeding; the second, by appeal. Errors of jurisdiction render an order or judgment Yoid or voidable, but errors of judgment or procedure are not necessarily a ground for reversal <Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1952 ed., p. 158) . Again, a writ of certiorari will be denie~ where the appeal is a.n adequate remedy though less speedy than certiorari. "Mere possible delay in the perfection of an appeal and in securing a decision from the appellate court is no justification for departing from the prescribed procedure . . " unless "there was Jack or excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion and the delay would work injusl1ce to the comph1ining pa.rty . . " (f<leni, pp. 166, 167.) The order complained of by petitioner 1s merely interlricutory or peremptory in character which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. That order may be erroneous, but it is a mere error of judgment which may be corrected by appeal. This remedy is adequate enough, for whatever delay may be suffered in the }>l'O<".eeding would not work injustice to petitioner who sure enough is presentlr_ holding the office contested by respondent. \Vht'r€"fore, the petition is hereby denied with costs agtdnst pl:titioner. The writ of injunction issued hy this Cou1t is hereby di::;sc-lved. Paras, Po.bk>, Padilla, Montc11111yvr, Jugo, Be119zon, TuaR?n, Revt:., and I.-abrador, J.J., concur. XJCll Lazara R. Bien, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Pedro Beraqitit, Respondent-Appellant, G. R. No, L-6855, April 23, 1954, Bautista Ange. Io, J.: P LEADING AND PRACTICE; GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER AFTER THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD; DISCRETION OF THE COURT.-The granting of a motion to file an answer after the period originally fixed in the summons, or in the rules of court for that purpose had expired, is a matter that is addressed to the discretion of the court, and under the circumstances obtaining in the case, we find that this discretion has been properly exercised. Delf1'n de Vera for appellant. Ramon C. Fernandez for appcllee. DECISIO N BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay declaring respondent Pedro Bera.quit ineligible to the office of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, province of Albay, on the ground that he was not a resident of said municipality one year prior to the elections held on November 13, 1951. A petition for quo 1varranto was filed by Lazara R. Bien to test the eligibility of Pedro Beraquit to be a candidate for the office of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, province of Albay. It is alleged that the resPondcnt was ineligible for that position because he was a resident of Baras, Catanduancs, and has not resided for at least six months in Malilipot, Albay, prior to the elections held on November 13, 1951, and that, notwithstanding his ineligibility, he registered his candidacy for that office and was proclaimed duly elected by the municipal board of canvassers on November 17, 1951. It is prayed that his election be declared null and void and the office be declared vacant. The record shows that upon the filing of the petition for qiw 1varranto on November 19, 1951, the court issued an order directing that summons be ·made immediately upon respondent giving the latter three days within which to answer from service thereof. The hearing was set for December 4, 1951. In - compliance with said order, the clerk of court, on November 23, 1951, required the deputy sheriff of Catanduanes to serve the summons at respondent's residence in Baras, Catanduanes, and directed that another summons be served upon him at his residence in Malilipot, Albay. Neither of the summons was served either because of respondent's absence or because of the refusal of the persons found in his residence to accept the service. As a result, substituted service was resorted to as allowed by the rules by leaving a copy of the summons at the :residence of respondent. When the date set for hearing came, neither the respondent , nor his counsel appeared. He di'.l not also file an answer as required by the court. Petitioner asked to be allowed to adduce evidence in the absence of respondent, but the court decided to transfer the hearing to December 7, 1951 in order to give respondent ample opportunity to appear and defend himself. In the same order, the court directed th~t another summons be served upon respondent. Again, the summons failed for the same reasons. And when the case came up for hearing for the second time, and respondent again failed to appear, the court decided to allow petitioner to present her evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered granting the petition. Copy of this decision was received by respondent on December 15, 1951 and on December 18, he filed a motion praying that the decision be set aside and the case be heard on the merits. This motion was granted and the court set the hearing on February 22, 23, and 25, 1952. On February 22, 1952, petitioner presente,d four witnesses. On February 23, 1952, she presented one witness, and on February 23, 1952, she presented two more witnesses, plus eleven pieces of documentary evidence. Then she rested her case. When the turn of respondent came to present his evidence, June 30, 1954. THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 297
pages: 296 - 297