Antonio Mirasol, Petitioner, vs. Porfirio Gerochi y Gamboa, Mariano Gerochi y Gamboa, Juan Navajas y Gamboa, Saturnina Navajas y Gamboa and the Court of Appeals, Respondents, G. R. No. L-4929, promulgated July 23, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Antonio Mirasol, Petitioner, vs. Porfirio Gerochi y Gamboa, Mariano Gerochi y Gamboa, Juan Navajas y Gamboa, Saturnina Navajas y Gamboa and the Court of Appeals, Respondents, G. R. No. L-4929, promulgated July 23, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XIX (6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Land titles -- Registration and transfer -- Philippines
Rights
Abstract: [This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on June 14, 1951 wherein, among other things, the deed of sale executed by Saturnina Navajas in favor of Antonino Mirasol, petitioner herein, was declared valid in so far as the share and participation of said Saturnina in Lot No. 3760 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo City is concerned, which participation is one half (1/2) of the undivided one-fourth (1/4) belonging to her mother Dionisia Gamboa; Juan Navajas was declared owner of one-half (1/2) of the same undivided share; and with regard to the cross-claim of Antonio Mirasol, Natividad Escarrilla was ordered to pay him the sum of Pl,575. In the same decision it was ordered that the judgment be registered and annotated on the original Certificate of Title No. 1399 covering Lot No. 3760.]
Fulltext: counsel for petitioner made a manifestation whereby he made of record his objection to any and all evidence that respondent intends to present on the ground that it would be immaterial and inele· vnnt for the reuson that he has failed to file an answer to the petition. At this juncture, counsel for respondent asked for an opportunity to file an answer, and instead of ruling on this request, the court allowed counsel to prc,sent evidence without prejudcie on its part to disregard it if should find latel' that tl1e question raised is well taken. But after the presentation of one witness, and while the second witness was in the course of his testimony, the court suspended the hearing and requil'ed the parties to present memoranda to determine whether or not respondent may be allowed to file his answer and continue presenting his evidence. This was done, and on March 14, 1952, the court issued an order denying the request to file an answer and declaring the ease submitted for decision. And on the same date, it rendered decision declaring respondent ineligible as prayed for in the petition. The case is now before us upon the plea that the question involved in this appeal is purely one of law. The question posed in this appeal is whether the 1ower court erred in denying the request of respondent to be given 4n oppor. tunity to file an answer to the petition and, in default thereof, in denying him the right to continue presenting his evidence notwithstanding the action of the court in setting aside its previous decision in order to give him an opportutiity to appear and defend himself. The reasons which the lower court has considered in denying the request of respondent to be given an opportunity to file an answer and to be allowed to present evidence in support of his defense are clearly stated in the decision. Said reasons are: "As abo\•e stated, respondent failed to file his answer and when his turn came, and he attempted to present his evidence, counsels for petitioner vehemently objected on the ground that he has n~t raised any issue. The court, after a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, was constrained to sustain the objection of petitioner, and barred respondent from presenting his evidence. For evidently, he is guilty of gross and inexcusable negligence. From the time he voluntarily appeared in court on December 18, 1951 when he filed the motion for reconsideration above adverted to, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His voluntary appearance is equivalent to l!er· vice. Consequently, he should ha,,e filed then his answer within the reglamentary period fixed by law, it being his legal duty to do so. At least, he should have filed his answer from the time he received the order setting aside the judgment-that is, on January 21, 1952, and befo1·e the 15 days period ex1iired. When he entered trial on February 22, 1952, without filing his answer, there was no issue raised, and a summary judgment for petitioner may be rendered. Indeed, Section 8, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides, among others, that material averments in the com1ilaint other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied; and Section 10 states that defenses and objectoins not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." We can hardly add to the foregoing reasons of the lower court which we find fully supported by the record. We can only state in passing that the granting of a motion to file an answer after the period originally fixed in the summons, or in the rules of court for that purpose had expired, is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and under the eircumstance.s obtaining in the case, we find that this discretion has been properly exercised. The court has been most liberal to respondent such that it even went to the extent of setting aside its previous decision. And we don't believe that the interest of Justice will be jeopardized if the decision of the lower court is maintained for, while on one hand the evidence adduced by the petitioner aJlpears to be strong, on the other, it does not appear that respondent has made any offer of the evidence he inWnded to introduce that might give an inkling that, if presented, it may have the effect of offsetting the evidence of petitioner. There is, therefore, no legal basis for concluding that the result of the decision would be changed has respondent been able to complete his evidence. And in the absence of this basis, i·espondent's plea for equity can deservt! but scant con. sidcration. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affmned, without pronouncement as to costs. Para!!, Re11l}zon, Reyes, Labr. 'ldor, Pablo, Mon!~mayor, / 1190; Concepciol1, and Dio/.:no, J.J., concur. XXIII Antoufo llfi,,.asol, Petitio11u, vs. Porfirio Gerochi y Gamboa, 1'/lirlano Gerochi y Gamboa, Jt1an Nn.rajas y Gamboa, Saturnina Na.va;a. Gam./Joa mul the Co11rt of A ppet1/s, Re:;pondents, G. R. No. -4929, pronnllgated b1ly 23, 1953, Bantista Angelo, J. LAND REGISTRATION; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE: WHEN PURCHASER IS NOT A "SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OP HEGISTERED LAND." - Where 1.me purchases a registered land from a· person who did not have apy certificate of t itle in his name, his only evidence being the deed of sale in his favor, and its annota.tion on the certificate of title which still appears in the name of the previous owners, most ol whom had already died, the purch,.ser is not a "subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good fa.itl1" and who is protected aga..inst any encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, as provided for in Section 39 of Act No. 496. Jose D. Evangeslista for peti\..'ioner. L11is G. llofileiia and Cet1C1r T. Martin for respondents. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is :l petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on June 14, 19!il wherein, amonr other things, the deed of sale executed by Saturnina Navajas in favor of Antonin MirnS<•l, petitioner herein, was declared valid in so far as the shine and participation of said Saturnina in Lot No. 3760 of the cadash'al survey of Iloilo City is concerned, which participation is one. half <1/ 2) of the undivided one-fout·th 0 / 4) be.longing to her mother Dionisia Gnmboa; Juan Navajas w3s declared owner of one-half <1/ 2) of the same undivided share; anrl with regard to the cross.claim of Antonio Mirasol, Natividad Escarrilla was ordered to pay him the sum of rl,575. In the same decision it was ordered that the judgment Le registered and annotated on the original Certificate of Title No. 1399 CO\•ering Lot No. 3760. On July 30, 1946, two deE>ds of .sale wel'e executed, one by Filomena Ledesma, who posed as only heh· of the deceased Teodo. rica Gamboa, over one.fourth undivided share belonging to the latter in Lot No. 3760 of the cadastral survey of the City of Iloilo, which lot was covered by originnl Certificate of Title No. 1399, in favor of Salvador Solano, and a.nr,ther executed by Saturnina Gerochi, who posed as only heir ::if the deceased Dionisia Gamboa, &\'er one-fourth undivided share belonging to the latter in the same Lot No. 3760, in favor of the same purchaser. These two deeds were annotated on the original Certificate of Title No. 1399, as well a.s on the owner's duplicate of the same title, On August 1, 1946, Salvador Sofa.no in tui:n sold with pGCto de retro for a term of two years the port.ion bought from Satumino Gerochi to Natividad Escarrilla for the sum of f3,500, and on 298 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June SO, 1954 August 17, 1946, he sold to the same person e.nd under the same terms the portion he bought from Filomena Ledesma for the sum of Pl,400, which was later increased to PS,150, These deeds were also annote.tcd on the original as well as on the duplicate certificate of title of the property on September 14, 1946. When Natividad Escarrilla became the absolute owner of the two portions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, she- trnnsferred her interest, right and participation over one-half of the undivided one-fourth share which was originally acquired from Saturnina. Gerochi to Antonio Mirnsol for the sum of P3,Hi0 on October 21, 1946, and the corresponding deed of sale was likewise nnnotated on thr original and duplicate of the certificate of title of the property. On October 8, 1947, Porfirio Gerochi, Mari:mo Gerochi, Juan Navajas and Saturnina Navaja..s bega.n an action in the Court of }''irst Instance of Jloilo a.gainst Natividad Escarrilla, Antonio Mirnsol, Salvador Solano and Saturnina. Gerochi for the annylment of the deeds above mentioned alleging, on one hand, that Porfirio and Mariano Gerochi were the only heirs of Teodorica Gamboa. and, therefore, the owners of the one.fourth undivided share which had been sold by Filomena Ledesma to Salvador Solano, and on the other, that Saturnina and Juan Navajas were the heirs of Dlonisia Gamboa and, therefore, the owners of the one.fourth undivided r:hare which had been sold by Saturnina Gerochi to Salvador Sola.no, and praying thnt said deeda be declnrcd null and void and that the plaintiffs be declared respectively owners of the shares and interests therein mentioned. The court, after receiving the evidence of both parties, dismissed the complaint, with coi;ts against the plaintiffs. The court !'l-aid that while "plaintiffs Mariano Gerochi and Saturnina Navajas themselves executed exhibits 5-Escarrilla and 8-Escarrilla a.nd therefore are stopped from seeking their annulment on the grounds alleged in the comP,laint, the same cnnnot be said with respect to the plaintiffs Porfirio Gerochi and Juan Navajas, Their remedy, however, would seem to Jie not in this action but under the provisions of Rule 74, et seq., of the Rules of Court. Upon appeal te.ken by the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals moditied the decision appealed from in the following dispositive part: "FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERA'flON, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and we hereby declare CU that. by virtue of the d.:~ds of sale and conveyance designat.. ed es Exhibits 4-Escarrilla and :>-Esca!'rilla, v.rhich we hereby declare va.lid and executed by Saturnina Navajas, and Annex F, defendant Antonio Mirasol is now the own~r of the share and participation of Saturnina Navajas in Lot No. 3760 of the cadastral survey of Ilvilo, which participation is one-half Cl/ 2) of the Ul\dividcd one-fourth <1/4) belonging to her mother Dionisia Gamboe.; t2> that the deeds, Exhibits 8Escarrilla, 7-Escarilla, and 6-Escarilla are null and void, and the :mnotalions thereof on the crrtificate of title, Exhibit A, ordered cancelled; (3) 1"11at Porfirio and Mariano Gerochi continue to be and are the owners of the undivided one-fourth Cl/4) share and participation of their deceased owner T~ dorica GambCla in said Lot No. 3'i60; and C4) that plaintiff Juan Na.vaj&s is the owner of one-half Cl/ 2) of the one-fourth Cl/ 4> undivided share and participation of th~ deceased Dionisia Gam'!na in said Lot No. 3760, and we hereby order that this judgment be registered and annotated on Original C~rtificate of Title No. 1399. The action of the plaintiffappellant Saturnina Navajas is hereby dismissed. Judgment is also hereby rendered in favor of defendant Antonio Mirnsol on his cross-claim against his co-defendant Natividad Escarrilla, who is i>rdered to pay him the 1mm of Pl,575.00. Judgment is also rendered on Natividad Escarrilla's cross..claim in her favor nnd against Filomena Ledesma and Salvador Solano, jointly and severally, ordering the latter to indemnify her in the amount of f'l,750. One-half of the costs shall be taxed against plaintiff-appellant Saturninn Navajas; the other hatr against defondants-a.ppellants Salvador Solano and Filemon Ledesma.'' The case is now before this Court by virtue of the peti. tion for review interposed by · Antonio Mirasol who now contends that the Court of Appeals, in deciding the issues involved and raised by the parties, has invoked the pertinent provisions of Act No. 496 and the several decisions of this Court which proclaim the iudefeasibility of a torrens title and 11rotect every subsequent pur£haser of registered land who tak~s a. certificate of title for value and in good !nith against all encumbrances except those noted on the ccrtifi,.tate of title. Petitioner claims that,. having been found to be purchaser ~n good faith and for value of a registered land, the cleeds of sale subject of the petition for review cannot be declared null and void to his prejudice. One of the cases cited by petitioner in support of his contention is De la C!'UZ v. Fahie 35 Phil. 144, wherein it was held that, "even admitting the !act that a registration obtained by means of fraud or forgery iE not valid, and may be cancelled forthwith, yet when a third person has acquired the prope1ty subject matter of .Such registratiOn from the person who appears as registered owner of the same, his acquisition is valid in all respects and the regis.. tration in his favor cannot be annulled or cancelled: neither can the property be recovered by the previous owner who is deprived thereof by virtue of such fraud or forgery.'1 (See Reyn.ts v. Barrera, 68 Phil. 658.) The doctrine laid down in the case of De la. Cruz v. Fable wa!l reaffirmed in the subsequent case of Reynes, et al, v. Barrera, rt al., 68 Phil. 656, wherein this Court made the following pronCluncement: "There is no question that the defendant-appellant is a purchaser of Lot No. 471-~ jn good faith and for a valuable considera.tion. There was nothing in the certificate of title Jf Manuel Heynes, from whom she acquired the property, to indicate any cloud or vice in his ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon. Where the subject of a judicial sale is a registe!'ed prnperty, the purchaser thereof is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicate in quest for any hidden defect or incho~te right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which th'!! Torrens system F.eeks to insure, would entirely be futile and nugatory. 'Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith, shall hold the Sain(: f(ee :>f alJ encumbranc'l exct'lpt tJ>ose noted on said certificate x x x.' !Sec, 89, Act No. 496. as amended hy Act No. 2011.) In De la Cruz vs. Fahie <SS Phil., 144), it was held that, ev(:n admitting the fuct that a registration obtained by means vf fraud or forgery is not valid, a.nd may be cancelled forthwith, yet, when g, third person has acquired the property subject matter of such regi11tration from the person who appears as registered owner ot same, his acquisition is valid in all respects and the registration in his favor cannot be annulled err cancelled; neither can the property be recovered by the 11revious o'.'l"ner who is deprived thereof by virtue of 3uch fraud or forgery." Pctiticmer herein cannot invoke in his favor the benefit of the salutary doctrine laid down in the c:tses above adverted to. His E>ituation is different from that of Ramon Fabfo in tho case of June 30, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 299 De la Cruz. In that case, it has been shown "that Ramon Fahie is an innocent holder of a certificate of title !or value.'' Vcdasto Velasquez, from whom he bought the propert.y, not only had a title registered in his name, but the !iame was given to Fahie, who, together with the deed of sale, took it to the Register of Deeds, and C1btained the issuance of a t'itle in his name on the strength of said deed of sale, and so it was there declared that "in conformity of the oft-cited section 55 of Act No. 496, he is the absolute owner of the land mentioned in the complaint, and the action for recovery of possession, improperly brought iigainst him, c:m in no w_ ise prosper." Antonio Mirasol is in n diff~rent predicament. He bought the property from Natividad Escarrilla, who in turn ac11uired it from Salvador Solano. The different deeds of conveyan(';e were merely annotated on the original and duplicate certificates of title which appear m the name of the p1·evious owners. Neither Sola.no, nor Escarrilla, nor Mirasol ever ·secured from the Register of Deeds the transfer of a new certificate of title in their names. In other words, the. only picture Mirasol presents before us is that of a purchaser of registered land (rom a person who did not have any certificate of tit1e in his name, his only evidence being the deed of sale in his favor, and its annotation on the certificate of title which still appears in the name of the previous owners, most of whom had already died. He is not therefore a "subsequent pui:. chaser 1Jf registered land who tak-es a certificate (}f title for value and in good faith" and who is protected against any encumbrance except those noted o.11 said certificate, as provided for in Section 39 of Act No. 496. The ca!la of petitioner falls squarely within the doctdne )aid down in the case of The Director of Lands v. Addison, 49 Phil. 19, wherein this Court ruled that the entry of a memorandum of a conveyance in fee simple upon the original certificate of tit1e with.. out the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser· is not a sufficient reg\stration of such a conveyance. The issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser is one of the essential features of a conveyance in fee by registration and in ('lrder to enjoy the full protection of the registration system, the purchaser must be a holder in good faith of such ::ertificate. And elaborating on this point, and incidentally in drawing a striking contrast between the case above referred to and that of De la Cruz, this Court said: "As will be seen, the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser is one of the essential features of a conveyance in fee by registration and in 01·der to enjoy the full protection of the reiistralion system, the purchaser must be a holder in good faith of i:uch certificate. This appears clearly from section a9 of the Land Registration Act which provides that 'every applicant recdving a Ctl'lificatt of title in pursuance of a decree of Tegistration, P.nd every subsaqut:nt purchaser of registered land who takes a. certificate of title for \•alue in good faith, l"'hall hold the same free of all en. cumbrance except those noted Cln said certificate, and any _ ot the followir.g incumbranees which may be subsisting, namely: (enumeratbn of subsisting ineumbrances).' In fact the re~ gister o! deeds has no autho1·ity to register a conveyance in fee without the presentaticn of the conveyor's d:.iplicatf' certificate unless he is ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction \s~e I.and Registration Act, section 5bl, As we have already shown, neither Pedro Manuntag nor Soledad P. Hernandez ever held a. certificate of title to the land here in question and the1·e had therefore been no sufficient legal conveyance in fee to them neither by deed nor by regis.. tration. The t>riginal certificate of title No. 414 in favor of the Angeles heirs has never been cancelled and is the only certificate in existence in regard to the property. ''In the case of De la Cruz vs. Fahie, aUpra, the situation was entirely different. There the registration of the property in question was decreed in the name of Gregoria Hernandez and a duplicate original certificate of title issued to her, She turned the duplicate ce1·t.ificate over to her nephew, the de'fenda.nt Vedasto Velasquez, who forged a deed to himself of the property and presenting the same with the duplicate certificate of title to the register of deeds obtained a transfer certificate with its corresponding duplicate in his own name. He thereafter sold the land to his co-defendant Ramon Fa.. bie to whom a transfer certificate of title was issued upon the cancellation of Velasquez' certificate. There was there. fore a complete chain of registered title. The purchaser was guilty of no negligence and was justified in relying on the certificate of title held by the vendor. In the present ease, on the other har.d, the vendor held no certificate of title and the1·e had thel'eforo been no complete conveyance of the fee to him. The purchusu was charged with presumptive knowledge of the law 1·elating to the conveyance of la.nd by registration and, in purchasing from a persun who did not exhibit the proper muniments of t itle, must be considered to have been guilty of negligence r.nd is not in position to com. plain of hie loss.'' Whcrnforc, the decision appP.aled from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner. Parn!f, Pablo, Beng=on, Padilla, Tua.!011, Montemayor, Reves, and Jugo, J.J., concur. Mr. Juatice LabTador took no part. XXIV Arsenio Algarin et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,, vs. Francisco Navarro et al., Defenda11ts-Appella11ts, G. R. No. L-5257, April 14, 1954, Labrador, J, CIVIL PROCEDURE; SECTION 10 OF RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF COURT CONSTRUED AND APPLIED; CASE AT BAR-Plaintiffs filed an action against the defendants to recover from the latter the amounts which the plaintiffs earned while working in the construction of defendants' house. The ease was t ried in the Municipal Court, nnd after the plaintiffs' had closed their evidence, one of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that there is no contractual relation between him and plaintiff, and that as the latter have not shown that he had violated the provisions of Act 3959, he is not liable. The l\lunicipal Court sustained this contention and dismissed the ease. The plaintiffs appealed from this decision to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which found the order of dismissal entered by the Municipal Court to be an err<n· and reversing it and remanding the case to said Court for further proceeding under the authority of Section 10 of Rule 40 of the Rules oi Court which states that "where the action has been disposed of by an inferior court upon a question of Jaw and not after a valid trial iipon the 111-erits, the Court of First Instance shall on appeal review the ruling of the inferior court nnd may affirm or reverse it ." Held: There is no question that there was a trial. The trial was held after issues of fact had been joined by the filing of an answer. And the case was not terminated solely on a question of law, because the court found that the facts proved do not entitle the plaintiffs to recover. Moreover, the mere fact that the municipal court found that there was absence of allegations necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to recover, or evidence to xtablish said allegations of essential facts, does not mean /~hat there was no valid trial upon the merits. IBID; IBID.-What section 10 of Rule 40 considers as ter· soo .THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June 30, 1954
pages: 298-300