The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Felipe A. Livara, Defendant-Appellant, G. R. No. L-6200, April 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Felipe A. Livara, Defendant-Appellant, G. R. No. L-6200, April 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal XIX (6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Criminal law -- Philippines; Courts-martial and courts of inquiry -- Philippines; Revised Penal Code; Court of First Instance -- Romblon
Rights
Abstract: [After the corresponding trial in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, Felipe A. Livara, was found guilty of malversation of public funds and sentenced to imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional to ten (10) years of prision mayor, with perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, to indemnify the government in the sum of P5,597.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.]
Fulltext: 168-D, Manila. La madre de George William dib su consentimiento a la adopciOn de su hijo por el so1icitante, el cual, segtin las pi-uebas, est8 en condiciones econcimicas para educa.r y mantener al El Procurador General contiende que el solicitante no puede adoptar al menor porque el articulo 335 del Codigo Civil de Fili. pinas dispone qu~ no pueden adoptar aquellos que tiElnen hijos legitimos. Dicho articulo dice asi: "ART. 335. The following cannot adopt: "{l) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknow. ledged natur:i.l children, or natural children by legal fiction; "l2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, beCcre the final approval of his accounts; "CS> A married person without the consent of the other spouse; "C4> Non-resident aliens; "(51 Resident a.liens with whose government the Repub.. lie of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations; "(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when the penalty imposed was. six months' imprisonment or more." Codi~ !~:t d~s::::e:funda su decisiOn en el articulo 338 deJ mismo "ART. 338. The following may be adopted: "(l) The natural child, by the natural father or mothel'; "(2) Other illegitimat.'e children, by the father or mother; "C3> A step._child, by the step-father or step.rnother.n. En .apoyo de su in~rpretaciOn, cita el informe de la ComisiOn de Codigos clel tenor siguiente: "Adoption of a step.-child by a step. f~th~; o: step-mother is advisable. f~r it eases up a strange pituatto11. . E_ ste argumento es bueno s1 el o ell a no tiene hijo legitimo; pero St ti~~e, la adapcion de un hijastro no suaviza las fricciones en la fam1ha; la ,empeora por cl cvntrario, porquc el hercdero for. ~os~ no s~ ~ntirill felit con la ad~pciOn de su hermanastro; queaana perJudicado porque no gotaria de todo el culdado y amor de :~eJ::fae ~e~i~:· : ;e~:C~~!i.cip:i.ciOn en la herencia, si Ja tuviere, La a.d~.pciOn de George no puede, puea, mejorar las rel1tcioncs entre el h1Jo adoptivo y la hija legitima, La disposiciOn del artL cuJo ~-38 debe entcnderse en el sentido de que se puede adoptar a un .hiJastro por un padrasto o por una madraSUi. si no existe imped1mento algun~~ Si · el padra.sto que adopta ticne un heredero forzoso, la adopc1qn no puede producir paz y armonia en su familia, porque el hijo legitimo no puede ver con buenos ojos al hermanastrC" que~ .P~r haber sido :i.doptado, se convierte en su coheredero. La ~s1b1hdad de la a.do,Pcion de un hijastro depende de la no existenc1a de. herederos legitimos del adoptante. Cuando la ComisiOn dijo en su mforme que la :i.dopcion de un hijast'ro suavita las relaciones !~~~:rr~~ ;:~~~d~c:d~a ::n:c~! :~S:pc~:in.que ningun hijo Jeg{ti~o El ~r.ti'~ulO 174 del CodigO Civil espaiioJ dispone: "Se prohi"" la adopcion: 1.o x x x. 2.o A _los )lUC tengan desccndienbs le.qi. timos o lt!gitimados. etc." Razon de esta disposiciOn: "Tambien prohibe el CodigO la adopciOn a lo.:; que tengan descendientes Jeg{~::? P:~:gi!!~eardo:~li:~~~:n~~ :rt.lo:9,h~:: :e:i~~:le~u:e~e~n:;~:~ bido se tiene pornacido para todos los efectos que le sean favorables'. El fundamento de esta prohibiciOn es sencillo y evidentc tratandose de los que consideran que la adopciOn tiene por fin proporcionar consuclo al que no tiene hijos, pero no para nosot:ros que no vemos en a.quella obra de miscricordia, aunque muy piadosa y loable, la base suficiente de una instituciOn juridica. Nosotros en contrnmos legitimada dicha prohibiciOn, teniendo en cuenta Jos conflictos y diferencias que produciri.l ln cntrada dcl extrafio adop. tado en una socicda.d familiar quc cuenta ya con ot'ros individuos a quicnes prodigar los cuidados y atenciones a que cl adoptado ten. drili derccho.1' (2 Manresa 6.a Ed., 108.> El articulo 766 del Codigo de Pfflcidimiento Civil dispone asi: ''.De la adopciOn por un padrasto.-El h:i.bitante de las Islas Filipin:i.s, marido de una mujer que tuviere un menor habido de m:i.trimonio anterior, podra solicitar del Juzgado de Primera Inst!ancia de la provincia donde residiera., la autorizaciOn para adoptarlo y para cambiar su apellido, pero set& n(' cesario el consentimiento escrito de dicho menor, caso de que tuviere catorce aiios, y el de su madre si 110 padeciere de dcmcncia o embriague_r incurables, sustituyendole en el UJ. timo caso el tut:or legitimo, y si no lo hubiera, una persona discreta e idonea. nombrada por el juzgado actual'a como amigo de! menor." Esta ley es de origen amerlcano; .no prohibe expresamente )a ad op. ciOn de un hijastro por un padrasto que tiene hijo legitimo; al contrario, dispone que el padrasto puede solicitar la adopcion de un hijastro. El Codigo de Procedimienth Civil ha deroga.do el sistema de adopcion del Codigo Civil (In re adoption ot ,Emiliano Guzman. 40 O. G., 2083), doctrina co~firmada en Joaquin contra ~avarro y Castro en Intestate Estate of the Spouses Angela Joaquin y Joaqu[n Navarro, 46 0. G. <Supp. 1), 155. Para cambiar,esta dispG. siciOn del Codigo de Procedimiento que tiene hijo legitimo, adopcio'n que pucde producir grave!! trastornos dentro de la familia que crce en la herencia forzosa, la Comisio'n de CodigOs adoptO el articulo 174 de! Ccldigo Civil espaflol con ciertas cnmiendas, que es hoy el articulo 335 de! c0digo Civil de Filipinas. El articulo ~38 emplea. la palabra may; clicha palabra puede intcrpret~rse c~mo i.'!1perativ.a, que 1m~?ne un dcber, o p~rmisi:V~· que conf1erc <.hscrecion: su mterpreUlcion depende de la mtenc1on · del legisl:i.dor, int<-nciOn que pucde deducirsc de! ~onjunto de toda la ley ' Asunto de Mario Guarifia, 21 Jur. Fil., 38.) Si es obli. 1Iatoria, cntonccs es redundante cl articulo 335. Es injusto suponer quc el legislador hayn. incluido en el C0digo una db1posiciOn inUtil o dos disposicioncs contrarias. Si una ley es susceptible de varias interpretaciones, el tribunal debe adoptar aquella en que nc se contradigan sus varias disponsiciones sino que se complementtn entre si. Declaramos que la. palabra may esta usada en el sentido de quc confiere discreciOn: permite, pero no obliga I:?. adopciOn de un hijastro. Armonizando los articulos 835 y 338, el padrasto o la madrasta que no tienen hijo lcgitimo puedcn adoptar a un hijastro; pero r.i tienen, no pueden hacerlo. Como Herman Ball ticne una hija legitima, no puede adpotar a George William York, Jr. Se revoca la decisiOn aPelada. Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayt>r, Re11es, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, J.J., conformes VII Thi! People of the Philippines, Plairitif/.Appel!ce vs. Felipe A . Livara, Defn1dant.Appellant, G. R. No. L-6200, April 20, 1954; Beng. zon, J. CIVIL COURTS AND COUH.TS-MARTIAL; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. - The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed by a. member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public law, The first court to take Cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other <Grafton v. U. S., 11 Phil. 776; Valdes v. Lucero, 42 O. G. No. 112845>. June 30, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 279 CRIMINAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 217 01" THE UEVISED PENAL CODE. - Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which reads: "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be primn fUC1.0 e evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses," is not unconstitutional and the 'ialidity of that article was discussed and upheld in People v. Mingoa, L-5371, promulgated March 26, 1953, wherein this <"OUrt through Mr. Justice Reyes declared: 1'there is no constitutional objection to the passa.ge of a law providing thnt the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.'' Marulino Lontok for appellant. Solicitor General Pompcyo Diaz and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee. DECISION BENGZON, J: After the corresponding trial in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, Felipe A. Livara, was found guilty of malversation of public funds and sentenced to imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1 l day of prison correcional to ten <IO> years of pr£sion mayor, with perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, to indemnify the govecnment in the sum of P5,597.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this judgment he app('aled on time. Because he assailed the constitutionality -::if Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the expcdiente was fonya.rded to this Court. Appellant was from January, 1947 to July 22, 1948, provincial disbursing officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Ilomblon. As finance and accountable officer, he took charge o.f paying the salaries and subsistence of the PC officers and enlisted men of that region. On July 22, 1948, he ca.me to Manila carrying some money, and, having se~ured a Treasury Warrant from the finance officer at Camp Crame for more than PB,000.00, he cashed the same in the Finance Building at 'f4ft Avenue. In November, 1948, an examin9.tion of his account.a was conducted by Major Emilio Raldia, Chief of the Cash Examin<ition and Inspection Branch of the Finance Service, who found him with a net shortage of P9,597 .00 unaccounted for. Major Baldia submitted a report of his findings to the Adjutant General of the PC. Da.ys afterwards, a board of officers was created formally to investigate the appellant. That board found him accountable for P9,59,7.00, and recommended his prosecution before the civil courts for malversation of public funds. An information for the crime of malversation of public funds was consequently filed in the Court of First Instance of Romblon on September 10, 1949. Ma.jor Emilio Baldia, testified in the Romblon court that sometime in November 6, 1948, he examined the accountability of Lieutenant 1"elipe A. Livara and found he had incurred a net sl-.ortage of P9,597.00; and that in answer to his question, appellant admitted his financial liability but asserted he ha.d lost ihe money in Manila on his way to North Harbor to board a vessel for Romblon. Capt. Teofifo V. Dayao, Zone Finance Officer, testified that in the month of August, 1948, he was dispakhed to Romblon to pay the sala.ries and subsistence of the officers and enlisted men of the PC stationed in said province; that he inquired into the whereabout.a of Lt. Livara but was informed that' he had left for Manila on July 23, 1948, to submit for approval the disburs~ent he had made and get the re tum of the same from the PC headquarters; that finding the safe of the accused locked, he sealed it in the presence of Capt. Diaz and Lt. Tafiedo and brought it to Manila where it was opened in the presence of eleYen officers including the appellant; and. that no cash was found in the safe. Provincial Auditor Aproniano S. Celajes, last tirosecution wi~ ness, declared that on July 16, 1948, he examined and verified the books of account and money accountability of the appella.nt amJ ,found a balance of P14,984.00, represented by cash of P6,330.10, actually found on hand and vouchers in the amount of PS,654.00. The appellant Felipe A. Livara :.vas the lone witness for the defense. He d(:clared that on J uly 22; 1948, he c::i.tne to Ma.nil& and submitted his abstract to the Auditor of the PC; that a treasury warrant was issued to him in the amount of more than PB,000.00; that he proceeded to the Finance Building at Taft Avenue and cashed the same; tha.t while riding a public utility jeepney bound for the North H3rbor to embark on the S . S. Elena for ROmblon, he lost his portfolio containing the said money plus about PlOOO more, and other public documents. He swore to having made efforts to r('cover t he portfolio but the jeepney was nowhere to be found. There is no doubt about the !'lhortage. It constitutes prima facie evidence that the accused made personal use of the money, unless he gives a. satisfactory explanation <Art. 217 Rev. Penal Code>. His account of the loss of the portfolio was not believed by the board officers that 0 investigated him, and by the court below. It is really an incredible story. With about ten thousand pesos in it, the portfolio /could not have b1..-en forgotten for one moment by any passenger, especially a finance officer like the accused. The alleged loss was obviously a ruse to conceal his defalcations. As a., matter of fact, even before the Manila trip he was already In the red" as shown by the testimonies of Lt. Bernabe Cadiz, commanding officer of the 83rd PC company and Lt. Damaso C. Quioo, a,d. jutant, supply and finance officer, of Romblon. If the portfolio had actually been lost as recounted.by appellant, he would not be responsible for the money. Yet he admitted hie liability, n1ade efforts to paY it, even used for that purpose a false check payable to Colonel Selga of the Constabulary. ,, Counsel for the appellant c1;>ntends that the Court of First Instance of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the caSJ', arguing that the alleged crime of malvcrsa.tion of public funds occurred during the incl.irnbency of the ac<"used as an officer of the Philippine Constabulary. Such contention is without merit. The civil courts and courts.martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public law. The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the exclusio~·of the other <Grafton v, U.S., 11 Phil. 776; Valdez v . Lucero, 42 0. G. No. 112845). 'l'he accused-appellant having been first tried and convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance of Romblon he cannot now claim that the criminal action should have been brought before a courl:-me.rtial. The constitutionality of the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise assailed. It reads: "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming a.ny public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prinm facie evidence tha.t he has put .such missing funds or property to personal uses.'' Defense counsel maintains the view that this provision is contrary to the constitutional directive that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. This contention deserves no merit, inasmuch as the validity c! the said article has already been discussed and upheld in People v. Mingoa., 1-5371, promulgated March 26, 1953, wherein this court through Mr. Justice Reyes declared: "There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrarY presumption fqunded upon the experience of human conduct. and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption uf innocence.'' 280 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL June 30, 1954 WHEREFORE, as this appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds and as the penalty imposed on him r.ccords with the ~~~~l·~~ here~y affirm the judgment with cost.s against him, Sc> Paras, PaMo, Montemayor, Reye:i, Jugo, Bauti~ta Angelo, La. brador, Cuncepcfon and Diokno, J.J., concur, VIII Smiti'ago Ng, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. Republic of the Philip· JJi1les, Opposit<>r-Appellee, G.R. No. L-5258, February 22, 1954, /itgo; J. 1. NATURALIZATION; FULL COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISION BY APPLICANT NECESSARY.- It is not within the courts to make bargains with applicanh for na.. turalization. The courts have no choice but to require that there be full compliance with the statutory provisions. (2 Am. Jur., 577). 2. IBID; IBID.-An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only -upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect a matter ao vital to the public welfare. <U.S. vs. Ginsberg, 243 U.S., 4.72; 61 L. ed. 853; 856). Pat1filo M. Ma11g11era for a.ppellant. Solicitor General /fian R. Liwag and SoliciWr Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee, DECISION JUGO, J.: On October 25, 1949, Santiago Ng filed with the Court of First Instance of Marinduque a petition praying for his naturalization as a Filipino citizen. The petition was accompanied by the affidavit of Jose Madrigal, Municipal Mayor of Boac, Marinduque, and the affidavit of Filemon Ignacio, Chief of Police of the same municipality, together with two pictures of the pet.itioner. However, the petition was not accompanied by the declaration of intention to apply for Philippine citizenship presented one year prior to the filing of the petition. The notice of hearing o( the petition had been posted in 3 conspicuous place in the Capitol Building of 'Marinduque and published in Llie newspaper "Nueva Era," a newspaper o( general circulation in said province, on October 31, November 7, and 14, 1949, and in the Official Gazette in October, November and December, 1949. The petition was called for hearing on September 8, 1950, at 9:10 a.m. No oppo$ition was filed, except that o( the Provincial Fiscal, which was presented on September 13, 1950. At the hearing it was established that the petitioner was born on May 28, 1927, at Boac, Marinduque, Philippines, his father being Ng Kin and his mother Ching Kiat, who ai:e still living, both citizens of the Republic of China, the petitioner, therefore, being also a citizen of said country; that the petitioner was 22 years old, single, native and resident of the municipality of Boac, Marinduque, where he had been residing continuously from the time of his birth up to the date of the hearing; that he is of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that dul'ing his residence he had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner both in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the people in the community with whom he mingled; that he has a lucrative and lawful occupation as a trained mechanic; and that he is able to read and write English and Tagalog. He has no children. He has completed the primary and elementary courses and the first and second year high school. After he finished the second year high school he stopped and entered the vocational school known as the National Radio School and Institute o( Technology in Manila, Philippines, which is duly recognized by. the Philippine Government, He graduated from said school on May 23, 1948, obtaining a diploma. The cou1t o( first instance of Marinduque denied his petition on the ground that he had not made a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one yea1· be(ore he filed his petition. The petitioner appealed from said decision, alleging that the trial court erred in not exempting him from the requirement of making his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year before the filing of his petition by virtue of Section 6 of the Naturalization Law, as amended, which, among other things, provides as follows: "Pe.rso11s ezempt from requirenunt to nuike a. declaration of intention.-Person.s born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any r11ce or na.tionality, and those who have residt:d continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to mRke a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. x x x''. It is clear that he has not resided for thirty years in the Philippines. He has finished only the second year of high school. The question is whether the course that he took in the National Iladio School and Institute of Technology is equivalent to the third and fourth year high school. The court below on this point ' said: "1-The subjects given in the High School course are entirely different from those given in the vocational school; cultural training is emphasized in the first while scientific and practical training in ~he second; "2-The number o( unit hours required to (inish the first and second year High School 'is much more than those required in finishing the vocational course, "The 1ietitioner does not have sufficient knowledge of Philippine history, government and civics. "In view thereof, the Court has eome to the conclusion that the vocational course eannot be the equivalent of the third, and fourth year High School course. In other words, the pet itioner did not complete his secondary education as required by section 6 o( the Re~ised Naturalizaiton Law for exemption from filing a declaration of intention to acquire Philippine citizenship one year before an alien may file a petition for the acquisition o( Philippine citizenship by naturalization." This Court, in the case of Jesus Uy Yap v. Republic o( the Philippines, G. R. No, L-4270, held as follows: "Because of petitioner's failure to file his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, we are constrained to deny his application for naturalization. It would seem rather unfair to do this because outside of his failure to file a declaration of intention, the applicant is clearly entitled to naturalization. According to the findings of the trial eourt, not impugned by th~ Government, the applicant was born ~nd raised in the Philippinea, resided continuously here up to the time he npplied June 30, 1964 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 281
pages: 279-281