Claro Rivera, Rizalina S. Rivera, Lope K. Sarreal y Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., Recurrentes, contra El Hon.Felicisiimo Ocampo, Cathay Ceramics, Inc. Y. Jesus L. Uy, Recurridos. G. R. No. L-5968, August, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Claro Rivera, Rizalina S. Rivera, Lope K. Sarreal y Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., Recurrentes, contra El Hon.Felicisiimo Ocampo, Cathay Ceramics, Inc. Y. Jesus L. Uy, Recurridos. G. R. No. L-5968, August, 1953 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English; Spanish
Source: The Lawyers Journal Volume XIX (Issue No.6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Civil procedure -- Philippines; Civil law -- Philippines; Court of First Instance -- Manila; Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc.; Cathay Ceramics, Inc.; Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
Rights
Abstract: [In Civil Case No. 17111, entitled Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc., plaintiff, against Cathay Ceramics, Inc., Jose Sarreal, Asao cited Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., Rizalina S. Rivera, Claro Rivera, and Jesus L. Uy, defendants, filed on July 29, 1952 in the Manila Court of First Instance, the applicant He asked the Court to decide who or who, among the defendants, have a right to the sum of P21,792.49 that said plaintiff deposited in the notary office of the Court. Is. The sum represents the value of the second steel rail table sold to the Demanding Atkins, Kroll & Co., lnc. by Cathay Ceramics, Inc. by virtue of a contract between the two on April 25 from 1952; and in accordance with said contract, the first consignment is sent the plaintiff by Ceramics, Inc. on June 20, 1952, with a total cost of P25,789.45, and the second shipment that rides at P21,792.49, shipped on July 17 of the same year.]
Fulltext: been paid and collected under an illegal ordinance, the real party in interest is not the municipal treasurer but the municipality concerned that is empowered to sue and be sued. (4) The judgi"nent appealed from is affirmed, with costs ai'ai11st the appellant. Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Ju.go, Bautista A11oelo, f,cbmdor, Cunr<;Jeion, and Diok110, J.J.; concur. ~t l:i Fuenlu d al .. G. R. No. L-3925, 15 December 1961. v Claro Rivera, Riznlina S. R;i·era, Lope K. ~MreC1l JI A.Hociatcd Insurance & Surety Co., !no., Recu"entes, con.tTfli El Hon.. Felid simo Ocnmvo, Cathay Ceramics, Inc. Y. Jes1U L. Uy, R ecu1'1"ido1. G. R. No. L-5968, A11,gust, 1953, Pablo. M. l. CIVIi. PROCEDURE; INTERPLEADER; MONEY WHICH IS THE SURJECT-MATTER OF INTERPLEADER DEPOSITED WITH CLERK OF COURT CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN BY SUBSTITUTING IT WITH A SURETY BOND.-Aikins. Kroll and Co. deposited the sum of !"21,792.49 with the Clerk of Court and asked the court to dec.ide who an-ong the Cathay Ccrnmics Co., Inc., Lope Sarreal, the Associated In1mra.ncc and Surety Co., Rizalina Rivera, Chuo Rivc!'a and Jesus . Ur. had a right to the said sum. Cathay Ceramics Co. Inc., presented n motion asking the cou1t to withdraw t.'he eum of 1"21.792.49 and to substitute it with a surety. This was op.. posed by Ri:r.alina Rivera a.nd the Associated lnauran!!P. and Sul'rA'y, Co. The Court, hnwever, authorized the Clerk of Court to deliver out of the sum of P21,782.49 deposited, the sum of Pl9,800 t<, J esus L. Uy and the balance of Pl,992.49 to the defendant Cathay Ceramics Inc. ttpnn the filing of the Cathay Ceramic~ Jnr.. of a surety in the amount of P25,000.00, "Oliff of the conditions of which shall be that the surety shall Pa.) to the claimants herein upon the adjudication of their several claims by th1!! Court immediat\>ly and without the necessity ot any further suit in court to enforce collection upon such bond" HELD: There is a great diffe:-cm.•e between lhe amounl' of P21,792.49 de:posited with the Clerk of Court, disposable al: any moment by said clerk upon orders of the court, a.nd a surety of P25,000 borrowed to insure a case. The value of the surety is not the amount which can be distributled by the Clerk of Court at any momcr.t that the court orders, because it is not in his possession. In order that the clerk of courl: may deliver or dia.. tribute it, the court has to order first the guaraotor to deposit t he snm of money wit'h the clerk nf court. 1f the surety CC'mpany on acc0unt of technicality or because theM is no fund dis.. posablc or on account of otht:r motives does not comply im. mediately with th~ orrler of the c<:u1·t, the claimants are left: to wait for the goodwill 'lf the guarantor. How many cases have been brought: to the court bccau~e the sureties did nnt comply with the t erms of the contract. 2. CI\'lL CODE; DEPOSIT; OBLIGATION OF DEPOSITARY.-· The depositary, according to the Civil Code m:iy not use the thing Jeposited without t'hc permission of the depositor C1766 Spani&h Civil Code and Art. 1977, Civil Code of the Philippines>. As a. corollary, the depositary may not dispose of the tbina dl'posited so that others may use it, MR. JUSTICE TUASON, diss~nting, CJ) The law does not provide that the subject-matter of intcrpleader be deposited with i'he clerk of court. By Section 2 of Rule 14 the bringing of the money or property into court is left to the sound judgment of the judge handling the case. In other jurisdicl'ions it is held that it ls not necessary to ot. fer to bring money into court, but only to bring in before other proceedings are taken. <33 C.J. 455>. It has also been held that the stake-holder may ho made the bailee of the fund pend. ing Che litigation. <33 C.J. 451; Wagoner v. Buckley, IS N.Y.S. 599L <2> The sole ground of obJcction to the questioned order by two of the defrndants, to wit ; "the surety bond can not be !\Jl adequate substituCe for money" ·- is, flimsy; and the fears expressed by this court ·regarding the delays and difficulties of enforcing a bond could ea!:.ily be overcome by the selection of a solv..:nt surety of good ~t;;\nding and adequate proviaion1 in U1e undertaking insuring prompC payment when the money was needed. If the court can allow the plaintiff to keep the fund In his posseHion during the pendency of the suit without obligat.,il)n to give any sccurit.'y, why can it not make a tespon1ible third party, with good and sufficient bond, the bailee ot t.he muney? <3> It is of interest to note that t'he remedy by interplcadcr is an equita ble one <38 C.J. 419), and tha.t even in making the final award the c~urt is not necessarily circum. scribed by the legal right's of tht: parties. Thus, "where t.he court has properly acquired jurisdiction of the cause as between defendants, it is not bound to award the fund or other thing in dispute wholly to him who has the legal t'itle, but may so ·shape its rlecree as to do t:omplete equii'y between the -parties." 133 C.J, 467>. JosP.fino 0. CorP'HS for petitioners. Benjamin Re/O'l)a, and S. Emilia.no catma for i·espondents. DECISION PABLO, M.: En la caus:l eivil No. 17111, titulada Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc., demnnda.nte, cont'ra Cathay Ceramics, Inc., Jose Sarreal, Asao. ciated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., Rizalina S. Rivera, Claro Rivera y Jesus L. Uy, demandados, presentada en 2!1 de Julio de . 1952. en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, la dema.ndante f1idi6 que <:!l Juzgado decidiese quien o quiCncs, '!litre los demandados, tienen dcrecho n la suma de P21,792.49 quc dicho dcmandante dcposit6 en la escribania dcl Juzgado. Esta. suma representa el valor de la segunda rcmesa de rieles de acero vendida a la demnndante Atkins, Kroll & Co., lnc. por la Cathay Ceramics, Inc. en virt'ud de un contrato habido entre ambas en 25 de abril de 1952; y de acuerdo con dicho contrato, la primera remesa se envi6 a la demandante por la. Ceramics, Inc. en 20 de Junie de 1952, con un costo total de 1'25,789.45, y la segunda remesa que monta a "21,792.49, se envi6 en 17 de J ulio del mismo aiio. Segii.n la demanda, Jesii.s L. Uy, por medio de su abogado J ose L . Uy, reclam6 derecho prefe1·ente sobre el importe de la segunda remesa con exclusi6n de Rizalina S. Rivera y la Asso. dated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.: que estos dos recurrentea, a su vez, _ reclamaron derecho preferente, adrnitiendo, &ln embarab, ,,. la Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc, quc de loa P21,792.4.9 cicbe pagarse antes la reclamaci6n de Ri:zalina S. Rivera. y que el saldo se la pague a ella. Estns reclnmaciones contrarias 11on las que dieron Juga.r a que Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. se viera obligada a presentar la demand& de 1 "nterpleuder y a depositar la sum a de P21, 792.49 en la. escrib11nia de! juzgado. En 30 de Julio de 1952, un dfa despuCs de presentada la demanda, la Cathay Ceramics, Inc. prcsent6 una moci6n urgente pf. dicndo que sc la pcnnitiera retira.r el dep6sito de P21,792.49 para sustifuirla con una fianza, selialando cl 31 de julio para la viab de la moci6n, a la que se opusieron Rizalina $ , Rivera y la As. socia.ted Insurance & Surety Co., Inc, La moci6n fue vista ant. el Hon. Juez Zulueta que entonces presidia tempora.lmento la Sala 7. a de! Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila; pero, en vez 276 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June 30, 1954 de resolvcrla, endos6 cl e:xpedicnte al Hon. Juez Ocampo que entonces presidia la Sala. 7.a. Oidas las partcs en 4 de agosto, al siguiente <lia, o sea, 5 de agosto, el Hon. Juez Ocampo dict6 una orden cuya parte dispositiva cs la. siguicntc: THEREFORE, the Court hereby authorizes the Clerk c.1f Com·t to deliver, out of the sum of P21,792.49 deposited in his office, the sum of Pl9,&00.00 to defendant: JESUS L. UY dnd the balance of Pl,992.49 to defendant Cathay Ceramics Inc., upon the filing by the said defendant Cathay Ce1'amics, Inc., of a surety bond in the sum of P25,000.00, one of the con.ditions of which shall be thai' the surety shall pay to the claimants herein upon the adjudication of their several cl:!.ims by this Coul"t immediately and without the ut!eessity of any further suit iu court: to enforce collection upon such bond. "The authority herein granted shall take effect upon tho approval of the above-mentioned bond." Al enterarse de dicha orden, Rizalina S. Rivera. y Ia Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. presentaron una moci6n ur~ gente de reconsideraci6n, con una petki6n adicional de que, en cl ca.so de que se dencgase su moci6n de reconsideraci6n, no se efectuara la retirada. de la cantidad consignada mit:ntras eJtuviera pendiente en el Tribunal Supremo una petici6n de certiorari; que el Juez recurrido signific6 que denegaria la moci6n de reconside:raci6n y que ordenaria la ejecuc:i6n de la orden de 5 de agosto a menos que el recibiera una orden <le interdicto. Los rec:urrentes a.cudieron a este Tribunal alegando en sU sohc:itud que el Juez recurrido obt·6 en exceso de Sll jm·isdicci6n o con grave abuso de su discreci6n al expcdir su orden del 5 de .agosi.b; que no tienen ot:·o remcdio fiicil, sencillo y expcdito en el curso ordinario de los procedimientos sino el presente recurso y pidieron que se rcvocace la orden impugnada y, mientras tanto. que se expidiese un interdicto proilibitorio preliminar. Se expidi6 la orden pedida. Cathay Ceramics, Inc. contiende que no hay ninguna proviSi6n le:gc.I qu<:! prohih<-1. al Juzgado permitir que una de las partes en una acci6n de inte?-pleader retire el dep6sito que es el object'o· de ia ac:ci6n siemprc que los derechos de los otros interesados esMn propiame:nte prctegidos por mcdio de una fianza; y los otros re .. curridos c:ontienden que dicha orden no es injusta a los recurrentes puesto que la orden discutida esta redaci..'ada en ta! forma. quc protcge ampliamentc por mcdio de una fianza de 1'25,000 los derec!ios e lntercses de los recurrentes, ye que l'>icndo Cathay Ceramics, Inc. la dueiia y summistradora de los rieles de acero, ella. tiene derecho de recibir el producto de dichos efectos swninistrados. Est:o /ltimo al'gumento no se ajusta a los hechos: de la cantidad depositada, Pl9,800 se entregarian, segU.n la orden, a JesUs L. Uy y solamente Pl,992.49, a la Cathay CE"ramics, Inc. Hay mucha diferencia entre P21,792.49 depositados en la escribania, disponibles en cualquier momento por el escribano a la primera indicaci6n del juzgado, y una fianza de P25,000 prestada por una. casa aseguradora. El import~ de la fianza no es cantidad que puede distributir el escribano en cualquier tiempo quc el juzgado rirdene, porque no esta en su poder. Para quc el escribano pueda entregarlo o distribuirlo, tiene que c.rdenar antes el juzgado al fiador que lo deposite en la escribania. Si la casa. aseguradora, por algun tecnicismo o ya porque no tenga fondos disponibles o por algun otro motivo, no cumple inmediatamente la orden dcl juzgado, los reclama.ntes quc tienen derecho a cobr2.l" quedan en la expectativa esperando la voluntad de la casa fiadora. Cu:l.ntas causas se incoan en los juzgados porque los fia.dores no ban cwnplido los terminos precisos de sus fianzas! Parte de la orden impugnada dice asi: "It is obvious that if by delivering the deposit in the hands of the Cink of Court to defendant: Cathay Ceramics, Inc., a.nd to its co-defendant Jesus L. Uy, said Cathay Ceramics would be aided in a large measure in fulfilling its obligations to the plaintiff, it should likewise be ob\;ous that its co-defendants would be benefited because, then. payments for subsequent shipmem's would be assured.'' Lr.. demandante, que no ~icnc interCs en la cantidad de P21,792.49, la deposito en la escribani& con la suplica de que el Juzgado, despuCs de oir a todas las partes intcresadas, determinase quien tienc derecho a dicha cantidad y que :irdenase su pa.go a la parte y vencedora; no se deposit6 esa cant'idad para que Cathay CC'ramics, Inc. necesitaba dlnero para poder cumplir debida.mente sus obligaciones, que lo obtenga de otra fuente, de algU.n banco, y no de la escribanfa. El depositario, dice el C6digo Civil, no pucde servirse de la cosa depositada sin el permiso del depositante. <Art. 1766, CO. digo Civil Espa.ii.ol y Art. 1977, Civil Code of the Philippines); como corolario, tampoco puede disponcr del mismo para que ot'ro Jo utilicc. El fin por cl cual sc dcposito la cantidad redamada por los dcmandados queda frustrado si uno o dos do cllcs la utiliz:::m para su propio provecho. No pucde, por tanto. el juzgado disponer la retirada del deposit6 de la escribania para quc la Cathay Ceramics, Inc. y JesUs L. Uy pueda11 usarlo en .sus negocios. Se concede el recurso pedido y los rccurridos, exccpto el Juez, pagar6.n · 1as costas. Pablo, Ju!Jo, Bautista A11 gelo. Labrador. Paras, Montema11or and Reyes, J .J. conformes. Justice Padilla took no part • FERIA, J.: Concurring and dissenting The present case is not a mere action of interpl~ader filed by Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc., a debtor, against several persons claiming preferred right Co a.n obligation or debt due from the plaintiff, in which the law does not require the subject matter of thi:>" interpleader to be deposited with the Clerk of Court, as contemplated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. Nor is it a case arising from a contract of depositum in which the bailee is obliged to keep l'hc thing deposited and cannot use it w.ithout the authority of the bailor under Article .1766 of the old Civil Code cited by the majority in their decision to show that the respondent Judge, as a. bailee, had no authority or abused ifu discretion in issuing its order of August 5 herein complained of, for the simple reason that there was not and could not exist such a contract of dcpositum between t'hc plaintiff and the respondent Judge. This is a case of a deposit made by a debtor of the sum of P21,792.49 with the Clerk of Cou:-t claimed by several persons as creditors entitled to receive it, in order to relieve himself of any liability under Article 1176 of the Civil Code. Under the provisions of Articles 1176 to 11$1 relating to tender of payment and deposit, which are the only provisions of law applicable to the case, the money deposited in court is in C11Stodia legls <Manajcro v. Buyson Lampa, 61 Phil. 66) and cannot be disposed of by the court except in accordance with the provision of Article 1180 and 1181 of said Code. Therefore, the respondent J udge ccted without authority or in excess c.f the court's jurisdiction in issuing its order complained of. Therefore, we concur in the result of the majority's decision, but we dissent from the reasons given in support thereof. T UASON, J., di.ssenting: The law does not provide that the subject-matter of fnterpleader be deposited wit.b the clerk of cot1rt. By Section 2 of Rule 14 the bringing of the money or property into court is left June 30, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 277 his adopted brother who, on account of having been a.dopted, bttomes his co-heir. t.o the sound judgment of the judge handling the case. In other jurisdictions it is held \.hat it is not necessary to offer to bring mont!y into court, but only to bring in before other proceedings are taken. (33 C.J. 445.) It has also been held th~t the stake- 2. holder may be mliode the bailee of the fund pending the litigation. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT CONSTITUTE IMPEDIMENT AS WOULD PREVENT SAID ADOPTION.-The possibility of adopting a step-child depends on the non-existence of legitimate heirs of the "dopting parent. When the Code Commission said in its report that the adoption of a step-child softens family relations it had in mind a case in which none of the legitima.te children will be prejudjced by Che said adoption. <33 C.J. 451; Wagoner v. Buckley, 13 N.Y.S. 599.> Finally Section ·6 of Rule 124 provides: "Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdictiO'll. into effed. - When :ri ~:il{~;~'!!,~ii~: ;!o~;::e:~~d o~~e: ;:~~~ ~:~!~;!~~\:f:~::~ 3 · JD.; JD.; ID.; ART. 335 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE HAS CHANGED SYSTEM OF ADOPTION UNDEH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.-Article 766 of the Codigo de Procedimiento Civil is of American origin. It does not: explicitly prohibit the adoption of a step-child by the step father who has a legitimate child; on the contrary it l!tates that the step-father may ask for the adoption of the ~tep-child. 'l'he Codigo de Procedimiento Civil has revoked the s)stem of adoption in the Civil Code <Jn re adoption of Emilia O. G'.lzman, 40 O.G., 2083J, which doctrine was confirmed in Joaquin v. Navarro and Castro in the Int.estate Estate of the spouses Angela Joaquin alld Joaquin_ Navarro, 46 O.G., <Supp. lJ, 155. Jn order to change this system of the Codigo de Procedimiento Civil which pem1its the adoption of a step-child by a step. father who lms a leiiitimate child, an adoption which may produce grave troubles wit'hin the family which believes in forced heirs, the Code Commission. adopted Article 174 of the Spanish Civil C:ide with some amendnlents, which is now Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suita.ble process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which i1.ppears most conformable to t.he spirit of said rules." The court's order of which petitioners comphiin has for its avowed purpose the promotion of the interest not only of Ceramics but of all the other defendanls, and it contains adequate safeguards against any substa.ntial injucy to any of the interested parties. The sole ground of objectic-n to the question ori:ler by two of the defendants-to wit: "the surety bond con not oe an adequate substitute for money" - is, flimsy; and the fears expressed by this Court regarding the delay!:! and difficulties of enforcing a bond could easily be overcome by the selection of a solvent surety of good standing and adequate provisions in the undert:aking insuring prompt payment when the money was needed. If the court can allow the plaintiff to keep the fund in his pC"seession during the pendency of the suit wil'hout obligation to give any security, why can it not make a responsible third party, with good and suf. ficicnt bond, the bailee of the money? It is of interest to not:e that the remedy by interpleader is an equitable one (33 C.J. 419>, and that even in making the final award t'he court is not necessarily circumscribed by the legal rights of the parties. T~us, "where the court has properly acquired jurisdiction of the cause u between defendants, it is not bound 1."o award the fund or othf'r thing in dispute wholly to him who has the legal title, but may so shape its decree as to do complete equity bet\veen the parties." C33 C.J. 467.) By the ordC'r under consideration the respondent Judge has not violated any positive legal provision, or abused its discretion, or jeopardized any substantial righC of any of the defendants, and In interfering with that order this Court has shown rigid paternalism not in accord with its powers of review and the spirit of a sound judicial system. VI I. CIVIL CODE; ADOPTION; STEP-FATHER MAY ADOPT STEP-CHILD IF' NO IMPEDIMENT EXIST; CASE AT BAR. -B. an American residing in the P.I., wants to adopt W. son of B's wife who is a divorcee. B and wife have a child. The Solicitor General maintains that B cannot adopt W under Art. icle 335 of the Civil Code, which states that those who have legitimate children cannot adopt!. The lower court held thai B could adopt under Article 33R, which states that a step-child may be adopted by the step-father or step-moiber. HELD: - -Article 338 should be understcod in the sense that a stepfather or step-mother may e.dopt a sCep-child if there is no impediment. If the step-father who adopts has a forced heir, the adoption is not conducive to peace and harmony in the f!l-mily, because the legi~mate child cannot look with favor at 4. ID.; ID.; ID. ; THE WOHD "MAY" USED JN ART. 838 IN. TERPRETED.-Arlicle 338 uses the word "may"; this word may be interpreted in i.11e impen:.tive sense, which imposes an obligation, or permissive, which confers a discretion; its interpretation de11ends on the inte11tion of the legisiator, an intention which may be deduced in relation with the whole law. <Case of Mario Guarifia, 24 J ur. Fil. 38.> lf it is obligatory, therefore, Article 335 is redundant. It is unfair to suppose that the legislature had included in the Code a. rule that is' useless or two rules which are contradictory. If one law is susceptible to various interpretation, the Code should adopt that which does not contradict the other rules, but that which supplements them. Therefore the word "may" in this case is interpreted to mean that which confers discretJon ; it permits, but does not oblige, the adoption of a step-child. R~conciling Article 335 wit.h 338, a stcp-mothllr or step-father who has no legitimat'e child may adopt " i;tep-child; but if they have, they cannot. Solicitor General J11a1~ R. Liwa9 and Solicitor Estrella Abad San. t.-,,s for appellant. J. de Guia for appellee. DECISION PABLO, M.: Normun H. Ball, ciudadanO americano y domiciliado en F ilipinas, habfa pedido la adopciOn de! menor George Willia.m York, Jr. que naciO en 29 de febrero de 1948. El Ministel'io Fiscal se opuso. Despues de la vista correspondicnte, el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila decretO la adopciOn de dicho menor de ilcuerdo con el artfculo 338 del CodigO Civil de Filipina.s. Contra esta decisiOn, tal come ha sido enmendada, en 21 de octubre de 1951 apelO el Ministerio Fiscal. Los hechos son los siguientes: George William York, Jr. es hijo de George William York, Sr. y Sophie S. Farr, los cuales se divorciaron en 1944. DespuCs del decretO de divorcio, est.e menor continuO bajo el cuidado de su m:idre. George William York, Sr. ya esti casa.do con otra mujer y vive en San Francisco, California. El solicitante Norman H. Ball se casO en 5 de agosto de 1947 con la divorciada Sophie S. Fan y con la Cua] tiene una hija do does afios de edad. La fa.milia vive en la calle Balagtas No. 278 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL J unc 30, 1954.
pages: 276-278